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Abstract 
The topic “Intellectual Property Rights Infringement on the Internet: An 
Analysis of the Private International Law Implications” has become increasingly 
important as the Internet has revolutionized the traditional understanding of the rules 
of private international law which govern the determination of jurisdiction in the case 
of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet.  
The private international law of intellectual property has until recently been 
both straightforward and based on traditions, geographical boundaries and physical 
space1. 
However, the ubiquitous nature of the Internet has brought new challenges in 
the area of the private international law of intellectual property, which lawmakers, 
judges and lawyers have to deal with. In particular, the private international law of 
intellectual property needs somehow address the fact that many of the actions and 
effects of intellectual property rights infringement within the territory of a particular 
Member State will not actually have physically taken place there2. For example, 
material protected by intellectual property law can be uploaded in one state, 
downloaded in another, and viewed in a large number of other states3. This means that 
the intellectual property rights infringers and the owners of intellectual property rights 
are often miles apart, while the infringers might never have set foot in the country or 
region where the harm occurs4. Moreover, damage is typically suffered in multiple 
states simultaneously.  
Therefore, the question of which national authorities have jurisdiction over 
matters theoretically located in cyberspace is the first point of interest for every 
intellectual property rights owner whose rights are infringed over the Internet. Thus, 
the main aim of this work is to identify the problems and provide jurisdictional 
solutions with regard to the application of the existing jurisdictional rules according 
to the Council Regulation 1215/2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. For without clear and 
effective jurisdictional rules of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet, the internal market cannot function properly. 
 
  
                                                 
1 Arthus Harry. W. & Kreklewich, Robert, law, Legal Institutions, and the Legal Profession in the New 
Economy (Osgoode Hall law School 1996) 16. 
2 Bernhard Maier, ‘How has the law attempted to tackle the borderless nature of the Internet’ [2010] 
International Journal of law and information Technology, 142. 
3 Niloufer Selvadurai, ‘The Proper Basis for exercising jurisdiction in Internet disputes: Strengthening 
state boundaries or moving towards unification?’ [2013] Journal of Technology law and policy 1.  
4 Shinder Littlejohn, Debra, Scene of Cybercrime – Computer forensics Handbook (Syngress 
PublishingInc. 2002) 629. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 The interface between private international law 
and intellectual property rights 
 Private international legal oversight of intellectual property has not always 
been easy. To many intellectual property lawyers, private international law seems like 
an esoteric and complicated field of law with many potential pitfalls5. But no-one 
doubts its importance both practically and in terms of policy: with huge global 
intellectual property rights infringement and the growth of the Internet, private 
international law issues, such as where an action can be brought, are of first 
importance. 
In order to conduct an adequate legal analysis of the impact of the Internet on 
intellectual property rights infringements over the Internet, an understanding of the 
interface between private international law and intellectual property rights is 
necessary. 
1.1.1 Private international law 
Private international law issues such as jurisdiction are not regulated globally. 
In spite of what the label suggests, private international law does not constitute a set 
                                                 
5 Stefan Leible, Angsar Ohly (ed), Intellectual Property and Private International Law (Mohr Siebeck 
2009). 
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of rights and obligations between States, but aims to regulate transnational conduct 
between private parties. Thus, each country has its own set of private international 
law rules.  
At the European Union level, the jurisidction of the courts in civil and 
commercial disputes is governed by the Council Regulation (EC) 1215/2012 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters6 (hereafter the Brussels I Recast)7 (which replaces Regulation 
(EC) 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial matters8 and the Brussels Convention of 1968 on Jurisdiction 
and the Enforcement of Judgment in Civil and Commercial Matters9). The Brussels I 
Recast is applicable to any proceedings instituted before the court of EU Member 
States on or after January 10 2015. The Brussels I Recast is implemented in Member 
States of the EU and therefore applicable if the parties to the conflict are domiciled in 
the Member States of EU. Article numbering has changed, but from the perspective 
of this thesis, the changes in content are not relevant.  
The fundamental jurisdictional principles of all three instruments are the same 
and there is a practical consensus that the case law of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) regarding the interpretation and application of the Brussels Convention or 
Brussels Regulation 44/2001 should automatically be followed in respect of all three, 
unless the existing (usually minor) differences in wording warrant making an 
exception10. 
The main principle of private international law is the principle of territoriality. 
This denotes the territorial boundaries of state jurisdiction11: namely, territoriality 
means that the laws adopted in a particular country have effect within the limits or 
boundaries of that jurisdiction. The application of this principle to offline activities is 
                                                 
6 Council Regulation (EC) on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters 1215/2012 [2012] OJ L 351. 
7 For the purposes of this work all references will be made to the relevant Articles of the existing 
Regulation (EC) 1215/2012 (Brussels I Recast) (even if the case law or academic discussion refer to the relevant 
Articles of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001 or Brussels Convention of 1968).  
8 Council Regulation (EC) on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters 44/2001 [2001] OJ L 012. 
9 Convention (EC) on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
Official journal of the European Communities [1968] OJ L C 27.  
10 Michael Bogdan, ‘The Brussels/Lugano Lis Pendens Rule and the Italian Torpedo’ [2007] Scandinavian 
Studies in Law, 90. 
11 Brown, Karen B., Snyder, David V. (Eds.), General Reports of the XVIIIth Congress of the 
International Academy of Comparative Law (Springer 2012) 394. 
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usually approached on a territorial basis taking into account the geographical location 
of the parties of a dispute (e.g. the domicile of the defendant12).  
There is also a presumption that by maintaining a system of courts that are 
empowered to decide civil cases, Member States must be prepared to apply the rules 
of private international law to cases with a foreign element13. Indeed, when a case 
contains a foreign element or the parties do not reside in the same country14, the court 
must determine whether it has jurisdiction to adjudicate on the case. If the court has 
no jurisdiction, the case shall be dismissed and the plaintiff should sue before another 
competent court.  
1.1.2  Intellectual Property Rights and their infringement 
“Intellectual property rights”15 is the umbrella phrase used to cover a wide range 
of assets. While they are all intangible, and therefore share certain factual and legal 
particularities, they also differ considerably.  
At a general level it is possible to divide intellectual property rights into two 
categories16: 
- Industrial property, consisting of, inter alia, inventions (patents), 
trademarks, and industrial designs; and  
- Copyright, which, for example, can be embodied in literary and artistic 
works such as novels, poems, plays, paintings, sculptures and architectural 
designs.  
Intellectual property law, like private international law, is also based on the 
principle of territoriality, albeit with a slightly different understanding. The first 
examples of exclusive intellectual property rights could be traced back to the Middle 
Ages when sovereigns and princes granted exclusive monopoly rights on an 
individual basis17.  
                                                 
12 Chris Reed, Internet Law. Text and Materials (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press 2004) 217. 
13 Brown, Karen B., Snyder, David V. (Eds.), General Reports of the XVIIIth Congress of the 
International Academy of Comparative Law (Springer 2012) 394.  
14 Bogdan Michael, Svensk Internationell Privat-och Processratt (5th ed., Stockholm 1999). 
15 Intellectual Property (IP) is the term given to the productions of original intellectual or creative activity.  
16 WIPO, Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization 1967, art. 2 (viii) 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/convention/trtdocs_wo029.html#P50_1504> accessed 8 June 2011. 
17 J. Basedow, ‘Foundations of Private International Law in Intellectual Property’ in J. Basedow, T. Kono 
and A. Metzger (eds), Intellectual Property in the Global Arena, (Mohr Siebeck 2010) 7.  
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However, as the time passed most countries have adopted domestic statutes 
dealing with intellectual property rights18. And in order to protect creators in third 
countries, bilateral agreements have been adopted19.  
With the development of international trade and speedy exchange of 
information, more and more countries have recognised that an effective international 
cooperation system is vital to enhance the protection of intellectual property rights 
around the world20. A number of agreements and conventions have been reached.  
A first international regulation of intellectual property was provided by two 
treaties concluded at the end of the 18th century, i.e. the Paris and Berne 
Conventions21. These treaties regulate a few substantive minimum rights and provide 
the principle of national treatment according to which each country shall accord the 
rights provided for in the conventions to the nationals of other contracting states22. 
One of the ideas of the Paris and Berne Conventions is the principle of territoriality 
according to which protection in a particular state could be granted if certain national 
law requirements are met23. 
Practically all countries of the world grant intellectual property rights which are 
valid and effective in their respective territory. Thus, arts and literature works, 
technical inventions, signs, etc. are subject to as many territorial rights as the 
countries which protect them at a national24 and regional25 level. 
These national rights are independent from each other, so that granting 
protection in one country does not create an obligation for another state to grant 
                                                 
18 Brown (n 13) 394. 
19 J. Ginsburg, ‘The Private International Law of Copyright in an Era of Technological Change’ [1998] 
Recueil des Cours, 273. 
20 Dermot W.J. Zhang, ‘Cross-Border Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in an E-Commerce 
Environment’ (2002) <http://www.hllawyers.com/publications/en/publications-20.html> accessed 25 June 2011.  
21 WIPO, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html> accessed 15 August 2011; WIPO, Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of September 9, 1886 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html> accessed 15 August 2011.  
22 Sam Ricketson, Jane C Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights. The Berne 
Convention and Beyond, Volume I (2d ed., Oxford University Press 2006) 6.93. 
23 Brown (n 13) 394-395. 
24 On the need to harmonize distinct national IP rights with varying scope see: Directive (EC) 2004/48 on 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L157, recitals 8, 13; Directive (EC) 96/9 on the legal 
protection of databases, [1996] OJ L 077, recital 4; Regulation (EC) 469/2009 concerning the supplementary 
protection certificate for medicinal products [2009] OJ L 152/1, Art. 2. 
25 E.g. European Union intellectual property rights: See Treaty (EC) 2008/C Consolidated versions of the 
Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ L115/01, Art. 118; Council Regulation (EC) 6/2002 on Community designs 
[2002] OJ LEC L 3, Art. 1(3), recital 2; Council Regulation (EC) 207/2009 on the Community trade mark [2009] 
OJ L 78/1, Art. 1(2); Council Regulation (EC) 2100/94 on Community plant variety rights [1994] OJ L 227, Art. 
2; Council Regulation (EC) 510/2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs [2006] OJ L 93/12, recital 6.  
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protection in relation to the same asset. In particular, Article 5(2) of the Berne 
Convention establishes the principle of the independence of literary and artistic 
works: “the enjoyment and the exercise of authors’ rights shall be independent of the 
existence of protection in the country of origin of the work” 26. Article 4 bis (1) of the 
Paris Convention enshrines the principle of the independence of patents: “Patents 
applied for in the various countries of the Union by nationals of countries of the 
Union shall be independent of patents obtained for the same invention in other 
countries, whether members of the Union or not”27. Finally, Article 6(3) of the Paris 
Convention establishes the principle of the independence of trademarks: “A mark 
duly registered in a country of the Union shall be regarded as independent of marks 
registered in the other countries of the Union, including the country of origin”28. As a 
result, an asset such as a book theoretically may be protected by intellectual property 
law in one country, but unprotected in another29.  
Intellectual property rights are a “creation” of national legal orders30. As 
Ginsburg and Lucas note: “Each country determines, for its own territory and 
independently from any other country, what it is to be protected as intellectual 
property, who should benefit from such protection, for how long and how protection 
should be enforced”.31 The conditions vary considerably between intellectual property 
rights.  
In the case of registered rights (patents, trademarks and registered industrial 
designs), exclusive rights are granted on application to an official body such as the 
UK Intellectual Property Office, while in the case of unregistered intellectual property 
rights (copyright, unregistered design rights, rights in unregistered trademarks and 
confidential information) protection exists from the moment the work or sign is 
created or used. 
                                                 
26 WIPO, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of September 9, 1886 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html> accessed 15 August 2011.  
27 WIPO, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html> accessed 15 August 2011. 
28 ibid. 
29 Hotel Maritime [2005] 163/02 5 GRUR Int 433 (German Supreme Court); Barcelona.com v. 
Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona [2003] 330 F.3d 617 (U.S. Court of Appeals 4th Cir).  
30 Markus Perkams, James M. Hosking, ‘The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Through 
International Investment Agreements: Only a Romance or True Love?’ [2009] 2 Transnational Dispute 
Management <http://www.chaffetzlindsey.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/000074743.PDF> accessed 7 June 
2011. 
31 J. Ginbsurg, A. Lucas, ‘The Role of Private International Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution’ in 
WIPO, Intellectual Property on the Internet: A Survey of Issues (Geneva 2003) 283.  
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Intellectual property rights holders have the right to exclude others from using, 
reproducing, selling or distributing the protected asset.  
However, regional and international economic integration in the second half of 
the 20th century contributed to the decline of the importance of the territoriality 
principle and shifted the regulation from national to supranational level32.  
Indeed, the principle of national treatment and the substantive provisions of the 
Paris and Berne Conventions do not guarantee an appropriate level of protection; 
other subsequent international treaties have focused on establishing and imposing on 
national legislation minimum standards of protection33. In particular, the TRIPS 
Agreement contemplates “effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of 
trade-related intellectual property rights, taking into account differences in national 
legal systems”34. Yet the above mentioned international conventions do not address 
private international law issues. For example, when a copyright infringement dispute 
arises in one State that is a signatory to the Berne Convention (State X) concerning an 
author who hails from another signatory state (State Y), on hearing the case the court 
in State X would still apply and interpret national law35. TRIPS do not change this 
scenario. This means that Intellectual property rights remain territorial. The effect of 
such intellectual property rights is limited to the territory of the state granting them. 
 This occurs in almost all countries including EU Member States36, common-
law countries around the globe37 and the US38.  
                                                 
32 Brown (n 13) 395.  
33 Pedro A. De Miguel Asensio, ‘The Networked information society: Territoriality and beyond’ (paper 
presented at Annual Kyushu University Law Conference 2010, Fukuoka) <http://www.law.kyushu-
.ac.jp/programsinenglish/conference2010/draft12.pdf> accessed 20 May 2011. 
34 WTO, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights <https://www.wto.org/ 
ENGLISH/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/trips_03_e.htm> accessed 11 June 2014.  
35 Hector MacQueen, Charlotte Waelde, Graeme Laurie, Contemporary Intellectual Property. Law and 
Policy (Oxford University Press 2008) 991.  
36 Case C-192/04 Lagardère v. SPRE [2005] ECR I-7199, para. 46 (‘…the principle of the territoriality of 
those rights, which is recognised in international law and also in the EC Treaty. Those rights are therefore of a 
territorial nature and, moreover, domestic law can only penalise conduct engaged in within national territory.’). 
37 Graeme Austin, ‘Private International Law and Intellectual Property Rights: A Common Law 
Overview‟ (paper presented at the WIPO forum on Private International Law and Intellectual Property on January 
30 and 31, 2001) <www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/.../wipo_pil_01_5.doc> accessed 25 May 2011.  
38 Subafilms v. MGM-Pathe Communications [1994] 24 F.3d 1088 1091 (U.S. Court of Appeals 9th Cir.); 
Barcelona.com v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona [2003] 330 F.3d 617 (U.S. Court of Appeals 4th 
Cir.); NTP v. Research in Motion [2005] 418 F.3d 1282, 1313 (U.S. Court of Appeals Fed. Cir.,); Microsoft v. 
AT&T (2007) 550 U.S. 437 ( U.S. Supreme Court). 
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In the UK these concerns were reflected in rules which made it particularly 
difficult for an English and Scottish court to hear a case concerning an infringement 
of a “foreign” intellectual property right39.  
The first was the public policy rule concerning jurisdiction, enunciated in the 
old case of British South Africa Co v Companhia de Mocambique40 (the Mocambique 
rule). According to this rule torts occurring in foreign lands were classified as local in 
the sense that they had a particular connection with the territory on which they 
occurred. It was held that any action in respect of this tort was to be heard in the place 
where the wrong occurred. Accordingly, English and Scottish courts refused to 
entertain actions concerning “foreign” intellectual property rights.  
The second rule concerned a choice of law rule, i.e. the “double actionability 
rule”41. Under this rule an act committed in a foreign country is a tort and actionable 
as such in a domestic court only if it is actionable as a tort under both the national and 
foreign law. This meant that the laws of two different territories had to be applied to 
determine whether the act in question was unlawful.  
Still now, there is a strict adherence to such old rules when it comes to deciding 
intellectual property rights cases. Indeed both the European and US courts hold that 
local courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate the infringement of “foreign intellectual 
property rights”42.  
1.2. Intellectual property rights and the Internet  
To most people, the world of the “Internet” is as mysterious as the electronic 
impulses which constitute it.43 Therefore it is necessary to give a brief description of 
what the Internet actually is in order to understand the areas where intellectual 
property rights disputes may arise. 
 
                                                 
39 Hector MacQueen (n 35) 991.  
40 British South Africa Co v Companhia de Mocambique [1893] AC 602. 
41 Philips v Eyre [1870] LR 6 QB1. 
42 Tyburn Productions Ltd v Conan Doyle [1991] Ch 75; Jan K. Voda M.D. v. Cordis Corp. [2007] 476 F. 
3d 887 (Fed. Cir.). 
43 Philip Ruttley, ‘E.C. competition law in cyberspace: an overview of recent developments‘ (1998) 19 
E.C.L.R. 186-203. 
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1.2.1 The background and nature of the Internet 
The idea to connect single computers within a network to enable users to 
exchange ideas and data came into existence at the beginning of the 1960s when 
American military researchers decided to enhance their ability to share academic 
research44. Shortly after that, in 1965, the first wide-area network had been built45. In 
spite of that, from the network of two computers in the 1960s and the subsequent 
creation of the ARPANET, a military communication network with three hundred 
computers linked in 198146, a long time passed before the Internet became as it is 
known today.  
The Internet became a world-wide network of interconnected computes in 1989 
when Tim Berners Lee created the non-proprietary and free World Wide Web, which 
revolutionised access to information and interaction between people situated in 
different locations in the world47. This means that each user connected to the Internet 
can communicate with any other user, collect information or distribute it around the 
world using single common language (the Internet protocol language)48.  
Today we cannot imagine life without the Internet as computer networks 
support critical infrastructure such as health and education, energy, transportation, 
banking and finance49. Indeed, as of June 30 2014 the global Internet network 
includes 3,035,749,340 users which means that 40% of the world population has an 
Internet connection.50 That figure continues to grow each year51.  
However, in spite of the growing impact of the Internet on our society, it is very 
difficult to give a definition of the Internet. In providing a legal response to the 
impact of the Internet on our society, the United States Supreme Court described the 
                                                 
44 Barry M. Leiner, ‘A Brief History of the Internet’ (1999) <http:/www.isoc.org/Internet-history/#fricc> 
accessed 5 May 2011. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Kevin M. Fitzmaurice, Renu N. Mody, ‘International Shoe Meets the World Wide Web: Whither 
Personal Jurisdiction in Florida in the Age of the Internet?’ [1997] 71- FLA. B.J. 22 
47 Berners Lee, Tim, Weaving the Web: The Original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the World Wide Web 
(1st, HarperCollins Publishers, USA 2000). 
48 Christopher Vajda, Anders Gahnstrom, ‘E.C. competition law and the Internet’ [2000] E.C.L.R. 21(2), 
94-106. 
49 Kamal Ahmad, The Law of Cyber-Space – An invitation to the Table of Negotiations (United Nations 
Institute of Training and Research 2005) 17. 
50 Internet World Stats, ‘Internet Usage and World Population Statistics’ (June 30, 2014) 
<http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm> accessed 2 March 2015. 
51 Since 1993 the number users with access to the Internet increased from 14.161.570 (equals to 0.3% of 
population with Internet) to 3.035.749.340 in 2014 (equals to 40% of population with Internet)according to the 
Internet Live Stats, ‘Elaboration of data by International Telecommunication Union and United Nations 
Population Division’ ( 2015) <http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users> accessed 3 March 2015.  
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Internet as “a unique medium – known to its users as “cyberspace” – located in no 
particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world”52. 
Indeed, the Internet can be described as the electronic nervous system of our 
society which gives the world its dynamic structure53. In this regard the question of 
whether the Internet can be regulated is one of the most debatable. 
In particular, one of the approaches is based on the idea of an unregulated 
Internet54. Lessig also argues that the Internet is largely regulated by architecture or 
code, hardware, and software, which shape cyberspace55.This means that the Internet 
as a place is free from regulation by public authorities56. However, the freedom of the 
Internet does not mean that everything on the Internet would be free except in the 
sense of being unrestricted57. In particular, the freedom of the Internet should be 
understood as “free speech”, not as “free beer”58.  
In this regard it is important to note that the Lessig’s concept of an Internet 
unregulated by government is not a new idea but originates from the 
famous Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace which states that “the global 
space should be naturally independent of the government tyrannies”59 . As noted, one 
of the founders of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Barlow, rejects any form of 
regulation imposed by governments as this would undermine “freedom and self-
determination” and therefore be detrimental to cyberspace60.  
However, as we know today, the global social space we are building is not 
independent of tyrannies of governments61. In particular, taking into account the 
increasing rate of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, the 
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regulation of the Internet is required. Indeed, in contrast with previous methods of 
communications like television and phone, the Internet allows users to be not only 
passive consumers of information but also active producers of content for a global 
audience62. In this respect, some authors also argues that the self-regulatory approach 
cannot adequately address the transnational, intangible and ever-changing Internet 
space63.  
Indeed, these days the necessity of regulation of the Internet is practically 
undisputed64. However, the question of how to regulate the Internet still remains 
open65. Indeed, the nature of the Internet makes it practically impossible to regulate 
Internet by a single regulatory body that would control all activities on the Internet: 
the networks within different countries are funded and managed according to national 
politics66. In my opinion even in the future it will be very difficult to achieve 
consensus with the regard to regulation of different aspects of the Internet by a single 
regulatory body on international level due to cultural, political and juridical 
differences. 
Therefore the most logical approach for regulating the Internet should be based 
on the layered architecture. On the one side, this recognises the unique and complex 
characters of the Internet as a technological and social construction. On the other side, 
it recognises the openness of the Internet and its decentralised structure. Indeed, the 
Internet will only be maintained if the open and decentralised organisational model of 
the Internet is both recognised and respected67.  
Therefore, we can agree with Weiser’s point that the Internet’s growth, 
innovation and success depend on a complex regulatory framework68. Indeed, the 
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regulation has an impact on technology but is also affected by it69. This means that 
technology determines regulatory policy, which then influences the technology 
itself70. In my opinion, the layered approach to regulation of the Internet architecture 
is the result of its historical development. Indeed, since the Internet has transformed 
from an exclusive and limited network into a global, user-centred platform71, these 
changes have influenced not only the model of distribution of content but also the 
architecture of the Internet, which has become very complex due to its huge number 
of services and applications. Therefore, we need to identify the main layers of the 
Internet architecture, how these layers are “managed” and what is main characteristic 
of each layer. 
The layered approach draws its origins from computer science theory72. The 
main idea of the layered approach to regulating the Internet is to split the services and 
applications into sub-functions that each layer performs and allocate them to different 
protocol layers of the network73. Thus, in order to provide a conceptual rather than a 
technical framework for regulating the Internet, we need to redefine the layers. The 
number of layers in particular models varies74. 
For example, the basic Open System Interconnection model separates the 
Internet’s infrastructure into the following seven layers: physical, data link, network, 
transport, session, presentation, application75. The same approach was taken by Solum 
and Chung76. However, this technocratic approach is obviously difficult to realise as 
there is no unambiguous correspondence between technical functions and social 
action77. Therefore, it would be reasonable to restrict the number of layers to three78. 
For example, Zittrain distinguishes a physical layer, a protocol layer and an 
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application layer, which includes but could also be separated from the content layer79. 
 Similarly, Benkler distinguishes three interconnected layers: a physical layer, 
a logical layer and a content layer80. The lower layers are more technical and the 
upper layers more social81. 
The “physical” layer of the Internet includes millions of networked computers 
joined together by phones routers, fibre-optic pipes and other transmission media into 
a worldwide network of networks82. The physical infrastructure of the Internet is 
“managed” at a high level by the international bodies responsible for the technical 
and engineering aspects of the Internet such as the Internet Architecture Board, the 
Internet Engineering Task Force, the Internet Research Task Force and the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. Other new–comers to the 
management of the Internet include the World Wide Web Consortium based in 
Geneva, which is an international industry consortium founded to develop common 
protocols for the evolution of the World Wide Web83. Thus, the main characteristic of 
the physical layer is the absence of any central regulatory authority that would 
regulate the physical infrastructure of the Internet.  
The physical layer of the Internet is interconnected with the logical layer of the 
Internet in order to allow users to communicate or to access services84. The logical 
layer of the Internet consists of a set of protocols, such as Internet Protocol (IP) and 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) which handle things like IP addresses and port 
operations by exchanging information with the physical protocol and the 
application.85  
In particular, as far as the computers are concerned, the location of a Web site is 
identified by an IP address, which comprises a unique 32 bit number86 separated by 
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dots, for example, 255.255.100.1. Using these numbers, one computer can contact 
and communicate with any other computer on the Internet and share data. But in spite 
of the fact that Internet has “addresses”, these IP addresses do not disclose the 
geographical location of a user, but only locate the machine on the network. However 
it should be pointed out that since IP addresses have been allocated in blocks, it is 
technologically possible to map most IP addresses. As some authors have noted, that 
could mean that borders are returning to the Internet87. But it is debatable. Indeed, 
geolocation tools can predict the location of a computer connected to the Internet but 
these tools are not used for all Internet interactions and transactions88. 
Moreover, the logical layer of the Internet ensures the management and 
functioning of the Domain Name System89. To reach a given Web site, a user relies 
on a domain name, which represents an alphanumeric label corresponding to an IP 
address (and vice versa)90. Domain names are hierarchical. They include a “top level 
domain name” which can be either generic (such as .com, .org, .net, .int, or .edu) or 
country-specific (so-called country-code domain names, such as .fr or .lt) and a 
second level domain name (e.g. whatis, coca-cola). At each level of the tree the so-
called server is operated to maintain a table of all names registered under that level 
and to point all enquiries to the name server registered for that name91. 
It is important to note that while generic top level group of domains (gTLDs) 
are “open” group (in which any business or individual can make an application to a 
Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), which could register domain names in these gTLD a 
country code top-level domain (ccTLD) is generally used or reserved for a country, a 
sovereign state, or a dependent territory. In spite of that, even a country code top-
level domain name does not necessarily indicate that the assignees of that name are 
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located in that country. Indeed, many registrants (for example, Tokelau Islands92) 
offer country-code top-level domain name for non-resident users93.  
It is important to note that the Board of the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN) has recently approved one of the biggest changes ever 
to the generic top-level domains name system by allowing anyone around the world 
to register top level domains in any language or script94. For example, it is possible to 
register gTLDs that could include such addresses as .google, .coke, or even .BBC, or 
to register brands at the second level of new gTLDs registered by others (i.e., 
.Diet.Coke, Videos.MTV).  
In addition, in spite of the fact that the country code top-level domain 
management company is responsible for maintaining the accuracy of the details that 
are contained in the database, such a company does not take legal responsibility for 
any possible infringement of third parties’ intellectual property rights95. The BT v. 
One in A Million case is a striking example: “any person who deliberately registers a 
Domain Name on account of its similarity to the name, brand name or trademark of 
an unconnected commercial organisation must expect to find himself on the receiving 
end of an injunction to restrain the threat of passing off, and the injunction will be in 
terms which will make the name commercially useless to the dealer”96. 
Thus, the main characteristic of the logical layer of the Internet is identification 
by an unambiguous address and by the domain name system. 
The third layer of the Internet is the content layer. Most users of the Internet see 
only the top layer – the content layer – that presents material streamed across the 
network, Web pages, mp3s, e-mail, streaming video as well as application 
programmes that run on, or feed, the network97 (for example, programmes providing 
functionality for an operating system or for a Web server). 
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The content layer of the Internet is the actual information made accessible by 
applications that depend on the logical layer as it uses the physical network to shift 
the content from providers to users98.  
As one author noted, there are no obvious significant barriers to entry and there 
are innumerable suppliers of Internet content99. This means that any user owning a 
computer and connected to the Internet is able to post on a Web site any content 
including content which infringes an intellectual property right.  
Indeed, the Web is the most important carrier for information dissemination and 
information exchange100. According to the Web Server Survey, currently more than 
883 million Web sites are available on the Internet101. The Web can be defined as a 
system of linking together hundreds of millions of electronic documents (Web pages) 
on millions of computers (Web sites) across the Internet, each of which is reachable 
via a unique but changeable name or Universal Resource Locator (URL)102. Thus a 
Web site is simply a collection of a Web pages containing text, graphics, images or 
sounds and is created through the use of a computer language called hypertext mark-
up language (HTML). “When the web server receives an inquiry from the Internet, it 
returns the web page data in the file to the computer making the inquiry”103. 
Some Web sites are “passive” and merely provide information to visitors to the 
site, while the other sites are interactive and provide opportunities for visitors both to 
send and receive information to and from the site. The other way in which users can 
exchange information with each other is through the so-called “chat rooms” or 
“bulletin boards”, which are hosted by a particular Web site operator and allow 
Internet users to communicate messages, computer files and graphic images. A 
bulletin board service (BBS) often refers to a non-Web-based form of a chat room, in 
which subscribers to the BBS can upload and download data as well as post 
messages. 
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Now, it is undisputed that some forms of control of information dissemination 
is required to prevent intellectual property rights infringement over the over the 
Internet104. At the EU level the following documents regulate the dissemination of 
content over the Internet: Directive 2002/21 on a common regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services105; Directive 2002/19 on access to, 
and interconnection of, electronic communication networks and associated 
facilities106; Directive 2002/20 on the authorisation of electronic communications 
networks and services107; Directive 2002/22 on universal service and users' rights 
relating to electronic communications networks and services108; and Directive 
2002/58 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in 
the electronic communications sector109. 
Thus, in contrast with physical and logical layers of the Internet, which aim at 
shaping the general opportunities and constrains of utilising the Internet, the 
regulation of content touches the rules and regulations110.  
The content infrastructure of the Internet is “managed” by the Internet Service 
Providers responsible for access to the Internet, providing e-mail addresses and also 
hosting the information that users choose to publish on the Internet with so-called 
Web site hosting services111.  
The main characteristic of the content layer is active participation of Internet 
users in the content creation.  
On the basis of this analysis we can define the Internet as an electronic 
communications network based on the system of interconnected layers functioning as 
a single cohesive system characterised by the following unique qualities: 
decentralisation; identification by an unambiguous address and the domain name 
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system; and active participation of an Internet users in the content creation. These 
qualities of the Internet are direct result of its architecture. 
1.2.2 The impact of the Internet in Intellectual Property 
field  
The emergence of the Internet has resulted in an unprecedented growth in the 
number of issues about how to protect intellectual property rights on the Web. 
However, in order to protect intellectual property rights over the Internet it is 
important to identify what is the impact of the Internet in Intellectual Property 
field. This is also necessary in order to provide an adequate legal analysis of 
jurisdictional issues in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet. 
Our finding indicates the following major features of the Internet and its impact 
on the intellectual property field: 
1.2.2.1 It is a borderless world 
The Internet is a means of communication which ignores boundaries or, perhaps 
more exactly, it operates by definition on a cross-border basis112. Users do not realize 
that they are crossing State boundaries, and no one can stop a person from abroad 
from accessing a site.  
In the 19th century intellectual property rights infringement claims were usually 
dealt with by domestic courts. The courts easily localized the place where copyright 
works were put on stage or published, where trademarked goods were sold, and 
where patented inventions were used or made. Such acts took place, for example, 
where hard copies or products were distributed, live performances took place or 
factories were found113.  
Since the 1990s, international intellectual property law started to face new 
challenges: for instance, national boundaries have started losing their significance as 
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a consequence of the emergence of new forms of technology114. As one author has 
recently noted, the traditional concepts of jurisdiction and governance are 
multifaceted, but really boil down to two factors: “first when you are online, you are 
both everywhere and nowhere at once. Ubiquity is perhaps the defining characteristic 
of this remarkable new “borderless” medium. There are no passports on the Internet; 
you travel freely from one destination to another at the click of a button. And 
geography is a remarkably meaningless concept for Internet denizens. Second, no 
single entity or country owns or controls the Internet.115” As a result, in an Internet 
environment, some valuable IP information such as digital music, films, books and 
software can be transferred in a short time on the Internet without crossing borders.  
1.2.2.2 The digital nature of intellectual property 
With particular reference to copyright, the Internet and digital technologies 
have created a new reality with advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the 
Internet opens new market opportunities by allowing authors to distribute the results 
of their work freely to consumers, reducing the time between creation and 
distribution. But on the other hand, authors are exposed to a greater risk of 
uncontrolled copying, adaptation and piracy than traditional media116.  
Indeed, the digital age has changed the way in which users interact with the 
results of intellectual property rights creation (movies, games, music and e-books). 
Until recently, consumers would have needed to make a physical purchase at a shop 
or via an online retailer. Now, the same content can be downloaded at the click of a 
button directly onto their computers, smartphones and tablets 117.  
Current technology allows all information –whether text, images, graphics, 
video, audio, music or software – to be recorded and transmitted into digital form118. 
The digitisation of works is a process that reduces text, visual images and sound to 
computer-readable binary code of “0”s and “1”s, grouped in bits and bytes that can 
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travel over the networks, which has enabled works of any sort to be transferred so 
efficiently to the Internet119. Once a work is digitized, it can be stored, modified and 
reproduced easily and quickly, with virtually no loss of quality120. This rising trend 
led Barlow, Internet commentator and cofounder of the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, to speak of the “digitization of everything not obstinately physical”121.  
Indeed, we need to agree that technological developments are playing a key role 
in the increasing availability of digital content to Internet users122. In particular, until 
recently, providing a movie for download on a peer-to-peer site, or allowing others to 
have access to download a music collection was the most common IP rights 
infringements on the Internet123. Now, the situation is dramatically changing as 
unauthorized copies of e-books are being sold over the Internet in the same way as 
unauthorized music and movie downloads were sold over the Internet in the past124. 
Indeed, the Publishers Association is worried about the growth of copying and 
distributing electronic content in the course of a business or making content available 
on a commercial scale, as during 2012 -2013 more than 378,000 infringement notices 
were served with regard to e-books125. Until recently publishers and authors believed 
that books were relatively safe from piracy because it is so labour-intensive to scan 
each page to convert a book to a digital file. What is more, reading books on the 
computer is relatively unappealing compared with a printed version. Now, with 
publishers producing more digital editions, it is potentially easier for hackers to copy 
files. And the growing popularity of electronic reading devices like the Kindle from 
Amazon or the Reader from Sony makes it easier to read in digital form. Many of the 
unauthorized editions are uploaded as PDFs, which can be easily e-mailed to a Kindle 
or the Sony device126.  
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Thus, the digital nature of intellectual property rights content makes it 
vulnerable to massive infringements on the Internet. Reflecting on the problem of IP 
infringement over the Internet, the computational neuroscientist Sandberg noted that 
“The nature of intellectual property makes it hard to maintain the social and empathic 
constraints that keep us from taking each other’s things.127” In other words, we keep 
to our rules about intellectual property when it is expressed in a physical object (a 
book, a CD, a videotape) but we forget about it when intellectual property consists in 
a digital form. 
1.2.2.3 Scale of the infringement 
In many respects, intellectual property rights infringement on the Internet is no 
different from traditional offline infringement, but the speed and perfection with 
which online infringement is achieved are different. For example, with the advent of 
4th generation mobile phone communication (4G), digital content can be delivered to 
mobile networks in a matter of seconds and without a marked difference in quality128. 
There is practically no difference between the original and the copy129. Indeed, 
Populus130 research shows that 38 % of respondents committed some form of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet131. 
The real scale of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet is 
difficult to appraise. As noted by the Professor Ian Hargreaves in an Independent 
Review of IP and Growth, “there was no doubt that a great deal of piracy is taking 
place, but reliable data is surprisingly thin on the ground...as with online piracy, the 
scale of infringement is problematic and sources and methodology for much research 
are not open to scrutiny”132. However, there are various reports, case studies and 
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initiatives which provide an impression of the scale of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet.  
For example, the BSA’s Global Software Survey indicates that 43 % of 
software installed on personal computers around the world in 2013 was not properly 
licensed133. Moreover, the UK law enforcement agencies’ reports highlight the 
increasing volume of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet in the 
last few years. For example, during the investigation period from 2012-2013, the 
British Recorder Music Industry removed over 10,000,000 search results from 
Google directing Internet users to illegal copies of music; the Publishes Association 
has removed 223 listening from UK websites containing over 5,000,000 e-books134.  
Thus, the intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet has an 
impact not only on direct investment in creative industries135 but also has an economic 
impact on society as a whole. In particular, the UK audio-visual sector has suffered 
an annual revenue loss of £531 million due to digital copyright theft136. Business 
software piracy costs £1 billion, while video games software piracy costs £350 
million per year137. The music business is projected to lose £1.2 billion between 2007 
and 2012 from online copyright infringement138. 
Therefore, it is important to take measures not only with regard to detecting the 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet but also to prevent further 
intellectual property rights infringement through the information and education of 
Internet users. In particular, Ofcom research shows that 47% of all UK Internet users 
have no idea whether the content they are accessing online is legal or not139. Among 
the most common reasons for accessing IP content illegally were because it is free 
                                                 
133 BSA. Global Software Alliance, ‘The Compliance Gap. BSA Global Software Survey’ (June 2014) 
<http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2013/downloads/studies/2013GlobalSurvey_Study_en.pdf> accessed 12 April 2015. 
134 Intellectual Property Office, ‘Annual IP crime report: 2012 to 2013’ (12 May 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/annual-ip-crime-report-2012-to-2013> accessed 30 May 2014. 
135 Figures from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport shows that the GVA of the Creative 
Industries was £71.4 billion in 2012 and accounted for 5.2 % of the UK Economy according to the Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport, ‘Creative Industries Economic Estimates. Statistical Release’ (January 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/271008/Creative_Industries_Econ
omic_Estimates_-_January_2014.pdf> accessed 12 April 2015.  
136 Oxford Economics, ‘Final Report. Economic impact of legislative reform to reduce audio-visual 
piracy’ (March 2009) <http://www.allianceforip.co.uk/downloads/reports/Great%20Expectations-
%20Economic%20impact%20.pdf> accessed 12 April 2015. 
137 Alliance against IP Theft, ‘Value and Protect: A Manifesto for IP – 2010’ (2010) 
<http://www.allianceforip.co.uk/downloads/pdf/Manifesto2010.pdf> accessed 25 April 2015.  
138 Ibid. 
139 Ofcom, Kantar Media, ‘Online Copyright Infringement Tracker Wave 4 (Covering period Mar 13 – 
May 13) Overview and key findings’ (2013) <http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/telecoms-
research/online-copyright/w4/OCI_MAIN_REPORT_W4_FINAL.pdf> accessed 12 April 2015. 
28 
 
(49%), convenient (44%) and quick (36%)140. Indeed, in delivering the judgment in 
John Walmsley v Education Ltd, the judge remarked that the employee of the 
defendant, Ms Roberts, “found out how easy it is to copy images by the single click 
of a mouse and these do get republished all over the Internet, often without 
attribution”141. 
Thus, the unique qualities of the Internet, such as its speed, cost and ease of 
access make it the perfect mechanism for intellectual property rights infringers.  
1.2.2.4 Difficulty in detecting the infringement 
The first step in enforcing intellectual property rights is detecting infringement. 
But on the Internet this is a difficult matter. As some experts have argued, “The 
technologies of the digital system allow users to duplicate, manipulate and morph 
content – perfectly, instantly and infinitely – in ways that may be largely 
undetectable, thereby greatly expanding opportunities for confusion, fraud and 
infringement of intellectual property rights”142. 
For example, in the case of copyright infringement, it is very easy for everyone 
to infringe copyright on the Internet but it is very difficult for a copyright owner to 
detect the infringement and identify the infringer. First, it can be difficult to pinpoint 
the precise point where something has happened as between the original uploading of 
information and its eventual display on a screen in another country, the following 
events may be involved: “uploading of information; digitization of the work; storage 
of the digitized form of the work; conversion of the digitized form of the work into 
the carrying signal; transmission of the carrying signal; reception of the carrying 
signal in the receiving machine; downloading; screen display and, possibly, print out 
of display material”143. As a result, the transmission may go via a number of 
intermediate computers and the carrying signal may be received in virtually every 
country in the world.  
Second, the infringing material may be on the Internet for only a very short 
period of time, as “hosts” and Web page creators can delete files within hours or days 
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of their posting144. Under these circumstances, the intellectual property rights holders 
may not realize that their rights are being infringed in cyberspace, and even one 
publication of protected content on the Internet can lead to its proliferation through 
rapid copying by third parties. The detection problem is so significant that it has 
stimulated the growth of a new line of business: the professional Internet watch 
services, whose mission is to monitor the Internet for infringing activity on behalf of 
rights holders145.  
1.2.2.5 Problems of identity and location of infringers 
Once an infringement has been detected, it is necessary to identify the alleged 
infringer and where he is a resident, which is a difficult task for intellectual property 
rights holders. This is so because the Internet, by its very nature, makes anonymity 
possible, and tools are available, such as anonymous retailer programmes and strong 
encryption technology, that can make it virtually impossible to detect who is at the 
source of a particular communication146.  
Attributes of a person such as his or her name and geographical address are 
more difficult to assess and verify in an Internet communication that in face–to-face 
communication. For example, a person may have an electronic address with a service 
provider whose domain name comprises a national identifier, such as “UK”, without 
his being resident there147. 
At the same time, many companies that provide posting and distributing 
services on the Internet (such as domain name registrars, bulletin board operators and 
commercial Web page hosts) require identification and contact details of their 
customers, but these requests are often ignored since no sanctions are enforced if 
unreliable contact details are detected. Even having details of a customer’s credit card 
does not always determine where a person is located148. After Dow Jones & Company 
v Gutnick149, a US company may issue a credit card to an Australian.  
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However, identification information such as an IP address may be obtained 
from the respective Internet Service Provider (ISP). In particular, the Promusicae v. 
Telefonica150 case has made it clear that civil courts may order ISPs to disclose traffic 
data relating to copyright infringers in civil cases but ISPs are not obliged to do so. 
This appears consistent with the provisions of Article 8 (1) of Directive 2004/48/EC 
on the enforcement of intellectual property rights151, which provides for a right of 
information compelling the infringer as well as others to provide extensive 
information on the origin and distribution networks of the goods or services that 
infringe an intellectual property right. 
Nevertheless, the data protection aspects underlying the communication of 
infringers’ names in civil proceedings cannot be underestimated. Following 
Promusicae v. Telefonica152, Member States do not have an obligation to compel ISPs 
to communicate personal data in order to ensure effective protection of copyright in 
civil proceedings. In other words, the ECJ acknowledged that Member States have an 
obligation to protect rights holders in the information society, but not at the expense 
of data protection rights. So, fair balances between these fundamental rights are 
needed.  
In LSG v. Tele 2153 the court confirmed the Promusicae v. Telefonica154 ruling: 
EU law prevents Member States from establishing in national law an obligation to 
disclose personal data relating to Internet traffic to private third parties for the 
purpose of civil proceedings for alleged infringements of exclusive rights protected 
by copyright. However, again the principle of proportionality and the balancing of 
fundamental rights155 have been referred to as a “limiting” clause.  
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It could be deduced that while in Promusicae v. Telefonica156 the ECJ provided 
some neutral interpretations in relation to communication of personal data, in LSG v. 
Tele 2157 the court has stressed the need to balance both copyright and the rights of 
consumers through the application of national laws by Member States, allowing 
Member States to establish an obligation to disclose personal data in the context of 
civil proceedings.  
However, ISPs remain reluctant to disclose information for fear of violating 
data protection rules. For example, in Bonnier Audio AB and Others v Perfect 
Communication Sweden AB158, the Solna District Court ordered Perfect 
Communication Sweden AB to provide Audio Book Publishers with the name and 
address of the user of an IP address. However, the decision was appealed and the 
court ruled in favour of ABP. The analogous court practice exists in the USA. In 
particular, according to Liskula Cohen v Google, Inc159, Google was ordered to reveal 
the name of an anonymous blogger who had bad-mouthed the fashion model Liskula 
Cohen, but Google had refused to provide the person’s identity on the basis that to do 
so would constitute an infringement of its privacy policy. 
In addition, in many cases an IP address is not sufficient to establish a person’s 
identity as some access providers allocate IP addresses dynamically so that several 
connections share it.160 while some ISPs assign a new address every time a user logs 
on to the Web161. 
Another point of view on the location of the alleged infringer is based on such 
factors as the location of computers. However claimants do not know either the 
location of a computer from which the information is originated or the location of the 
information systems through which the communication is operated162. Computers are 
not necessary located in the same State as where infringers are resident or where their 
business is located163. The computer may be physically moved without any change in 
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its domain name. So, a domain name is not a reliable indicator of where a computer is 
located164.  
In addition, parties in communication via the World Wide Web are unlikely to 
know where any intermediate servers are located. Information may be routed via a 
server located in a jurisdiction other than that in which the addressee itself is 
located165.  
These factors and in particular the level of anonymity which the Internet affords 
to its users166 mean that for many claimants in Internet disputes it may be difficult to 
establish the defendant’s identity and to trace his or her whereabouts and assets, 
which are clearly prerequisites to starting proceedings. That is why intellectual 
property rights owners often ask courts to grant injunctions against intermediaries 
such as Internet service providers, i.e. because infringers are often unknown.167 
The EU Directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights168 does not 
address this constantly growing and serious problem of IP infringement on the 
Internet. 
1.3 Jurisdictional issues and the Internet 
 In a famous English case Carrick v Hancock, Lord Russell of Killowen CJ 
declared that “the jurisdiction of a court was based upon the principle of territorial 
dominion, and that all the persons within territorial dominion owe their allegiance to 
its sovereign power and obedience to all its laws and to the lawful jurisdiction of its 
courts”169. Indeed, until recently, the interaction between law and society has to a 
large extent been based on customs, traditions, geographical boundaries and physical 
space170. 
                                                 
164 Berliri, ‘Jurisdiction and the Internet, and European Regulation 44 of 2001’ in D Campbell and S 
Woodley E-Commerce: Law and Jurisdiction (Special Issue, The Comparative Law Yearbook of International 
Business 2002) 1, 2. 
165 Hossein Bidgoli, Handbook of Information Security, Information Warfare, Social, Legal, and 
International Issues and Security Foundations (Wiley 2006) 284. 
166 Heike Wollgast, ‘IP Infringements on the Internet – Some Legal Considerations’ [2007] WIPO 
Magazine. 1/2007 <http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2007/01/article_0005.html> accessed 9 May 2011. 
167 Report (EC) Application of Directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights COM 
779 final [2010]. 
168 Directive (EC) 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ LOJ L 157/ 45. 
169 Carrick v Hancock [1895] 12 TLR 59.  
170 Arthurs Harry. W & Kreklewich, Robert, ‘Law, Legal Institutions, and the Legal Profession in the New 
Economy’ [1996] Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 16.  
33 
 
However, the rise of the Internet has changed this. Indeed, the Internet has not 
only dramatically changed the way of communication between people, it has 
influenced international commerce and banking, education and healthcare171, and has 
presented a number of challenges to the traditional principles of the private 
international law of intellectual property. As noted by Reidenberg, “Internet creates 
ambiguity for sovereign territory because network boundaries intersect and transcend 
national borders”172.  
The problem of applying the traditional jurisdictional rules with regard to 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet is not new: it has been 
identified by the Hague Convention, which makes clear that the Internet makes 
boundaries less and less relevant for jurisdictional purposes173. However, how this 
problem should be resolved is not easy to determine considering that even within the 
European Union various jurisdictional and legal cultures are involved. Indeed, the 
Brussels I Recast does not contain specific jurisdictional rules that cover intellectual 
property rights infringements over the Internet. 
In particular, the rules on special jurisdiction in the Brussels I Recast are based 
on a close connection between the dispute and the Member State whose courts are 
designated as competent. However, it is very difficult to localise and connect the 
events of IP rights infringements to a particular court as the infringements of 
intellectual property rights may appear simultaneously in several Member States. For 
example, in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, 
material published on the Internet can be uploaded in one Member State, downloaded 
in another member State and viewed anywhere on the globe. Does this mean that the 
IP rights owner is able to appeal to every state where the materials are accessible? 
And what about the individual Internet users who posted material protected by IP law 
on an interactive Web site? Are they potentially subject to the jurisdiction of every 
state in the world? Indeed, the present lack of jurisdictional rules of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet creates a legal uncertainty where a 
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plaintiff can bring its case in multiple jurisdictions but is likely to commence 
proceedings in the most favourable forum174.  
Therefore, the issue of jurisdiction in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet remain unexplored until now; and it requires a legal 
response. Therefore the following question arises: on what basis should jurisdiction 
be determined in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet?  
However, before we start to analyse the jurisdictional issues in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, we should identify what 
the term jurisdiction means and how the issue of jurisdiction is linked with the 
Internet. Indeed, the question of jurisdiction is “the most difficult issue in the legal 
lexicon”175 as this term carries more than one meaning176. In particular, in Anglo-
American doctrine, the term “jurisdiction” is the power of a public organ to prescribe 
norms or conduct (prescriptive jurisdiction) and/or apply these norms in resolving a 
dispute (adjudicatory jurisdiction) and/or enforce these norms (enforcement 
jurisdiction)177. 
It is important to emphasise an interesting conclusion made by Professor Geist 
which argues that jurisdiction over the Internet can be compared with Internet 
infrastructure178. This means that three types of jurisdiction can be logically linked to 
the three layers of the Internet179. Indeed, the jurisdiction over the Internet can be 
divided into three layers: the application layer (which determines whether courts are 
competent to adjudicate the dispute); the substantive layer (which determines whether 
courts are competent to apply their laws to the dispute); and the enforcement layer 
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(which determines whether courts’ orders must be enforced in an online 
environment)180.  
Although the three notions of jurisdiction are intrinsically connected, in this 
work we will focus on the Internet jurisdiction’s application layer. This means that 
the term jurisdiction in Internet disputes will be used in the strict sense that refers to 
“the court’s authority to hear and resolve a specific dispute”181.  
In order to deal with the above private international law issues it is important to 
confirm whether the Internet is simply a new tool for achieving old objectives. In 
other words, is the Internet an existing method of communication such as the 
telephone, television, facsimile, or a new form of communication? The answer 
directly impacts on the manner in which jurisdiction over the the Internet should be 
regulated.  
As noted by Kurbalija J., there are two prevailing views about the way in which 
laws should be adapted on the Internet:  
a) “New wine in old bottles” – there is nothing conceptually new about the 
Internet. Existing legal systems in the fields of telecommunications, intellectual 
property and jurisdiction could be applied to most issues related to the Internet; 
b) “New wine in new bottles” – the Internet entails new social realities that 
cannot be regulated by existing legal rules. There is a need to introduce new laws – 
i.e. cyber laws182. 
Indeed, there is an approach that states that the Internet is just “new wine in old 
bottles” and the existing private international law principles could be applied to most 
issues related to the Internet183. In particular, Reed acknowledges that the challenges 
in determining jurisdiction over the Internet are not new184 and are comparable to the 
challenges posed by any other technological development that appeared 
historically185. This means that exising paradigms of the location of the parties or the 
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place where their infringing activities take place under the Brussels I Recast have the 
potential to deal efficiently with determining jurisdiction in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet186. Indeed, from the point of view of 
most Internet users, broadband Internet access, which is available through dedicated 
Internet lines as well as through existing telephone (digital subscriber line), and cable 
modems are roughly equivalent187. Thus, regardless of the fact that the Internet is a 
faster and more far-reaching method of communication, it still involves 
communication over distances between individuals188. Therefore, existing private 
international law rules must continue to determine which jurisdiction will hear a 
cross-border dispute of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet189.  
However, I do not agree with such point of view because the dematerialised 
nature of infringement activity over the Internet renders the location of the parties and 
the place where infringement occurred or may occur difficult to determine. In this 
connection Zekos suggest a new approach to determining jurisdiction in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet190. Indeed, the supporters of 
special jurisdictional rules argue that the Internet is a fundamentally different method 
of communication and that it requires new regulation191. 
There are widely held views of how the jurisdiction in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet should be established. In particular, 
Johnson and Post suggest that the Internet should be viewed as a separate space that 
extends beyond the jurisdiction of any individual nation192. According to their  point 
of view, such a separate and distinct cyberspace jurisdiction would be capable of 
regulating itself without recourse to national courts and laws.193. The same approach is 
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taken by MacGregor, who suggests that the Internet should properly be recognized as 
sovereign within itself, rather than a mere medium subject to the differing rules of 
multiple sovereign states194. 
However, in my opinion, such a jurisdictional approach is an expression of 
early utopian theory of “no man’s land”. Indeed, while the self-regulation rules are 
applicable to many regulatory subjects, including e-commerce, technical protocol and 
domain-names management (through the Internet Corporation for Assigned numbers 
and Names)195 this approach is not an effective way of solving jurisdictional problems 
in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. In particular, 
a State cannot exercise its adjudicatory authority over a party or a dispute unless is 
has the statutory authority to do so196. Indeed, as noted by Rice, the most fundamental 
principle raised by the Internet is the principle of the foreseeability of jurisdiction197. 
Thus, regulation of the jurisdictional issues on the Internet is required.  
In this regard, some authors propose to consider jurisdiction on the Internet as 
an “every man’s land”, where the laws of all states apply at the same time198. In 
particular, Menthe argues that unlike traditional jurisdictional problems that might 
involve two, three or more conflicting jurisdictions, the set of laws which could apply 
to a simple homespun Web page is, simply, all laws199. Therefore, as the Internet’s 
economic and commercial significance become clearer, the theory of separate space 
was replaced by the theory of international space200. The supporters of this theory 
believe that Internet is a separate space which should be governed by the laws of 
public international law201. Indeed, there are currently three distinct international 
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spaces under public international law – Antarctica, international space, and the high 
seas. The Internet should be treated as a fourth international space202.  
However, in order to apply the international space theory to intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet, a tailored analysis is necessary. The 
proposals provided so far by the academic community comprise two elements: 
Menthe and Kish propose a direct analogy between international spaces and 
cyberspace, and accept only the nationality principle as the basis of jurisdiction203; 
while Timofeeva’s model of cyberspace jurisdiction is based on the jurisdictional 
principles of territoriality and nationality204.  
In particular, Menthe’s theory of international space is based on the principle of 
nationality205. The main argument in support of this approach is based on the idea that 
in cyberspace there is no sovereignty, and therefore no basis for territorial 
jurisdiction206. As over international spaces, the jurisdiction over cyberspace should 
be determined by nationality of the actor or victor207. This means that the geographical 
location, or where the act was committed, is irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes208. 
In practical terms this means that a person uploading content protected by IP law on 
the Internet is required to mark it with his or her nationality before it could be sent ( 
this might be done automatically by the ISP)209. Indeed, we may not know where a 
Web page is, but we would know who is responsible for it210. According to Menthe’s 
proposal, the use of nationality as the basis for jurisdiction on the Internet “will 
provide predictability and international uniformity. It strikes a balance between 
anarchy and universal liability, and it works. Recognition of cyberspace as an 
international space is more than overdue. It is becoming imperative”211.  
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In my opinion, even though it might at first glance appear to respond to the 
jurisdictional problems of the Internet, it seems unrealistic to impose on an 
intellectual property rights infringer a legal responsibility for content posted on the 
Internet. Moreover, the ISP is also unable to identify the nationality of the intellectual 
property rights infringer. Indeed, it is very difficult if not impossible to determine 
who is an intellectual property rights infringer in complex intellectual property 
disputes because of the special technical possibilities of the Internet (such as proxy 
servers, mirroring sites and sites made for hire).212 Therefore, the nationality of an 
intellectual property rights infringer is not a relevant factor for jurisdictional purposes 
in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. 
However, even if jurisdiction over the Internet is based on the theory of 
international space, its non-physical nature would justify the application of the 
territorial principle213. In this regard Timofeeva suggests a little modification of 
jurisdiction in Internet disputes, which should be established on the principles of 
territoriality and nationality214. Indeed, in spite of the fact that Internet disputes occur 
transnationally without an obvious direct connection to a particular territory, the 
territoriality principle is useful in controlling Internet content issues as it enables a 
State to assert jurisdiction over a variety of parties such as online businesses, ISPs 
and intermediaries, who are residents of the State and involved in providing access to 
the Internet or hosting Internet content215. Thus, the notion of territorial connection 
should be retained with regard to the issue of jurisdiction in Internet disputes216.  
However, in spite of the value of public international law in regulating 
international spaces such as Antarctica, international space and high sears, such a 
jurisdictional basis is not an appropriate choice in the case of intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet due to the number of practicality-based reasons 
supporting this point of view. 
Firstly, the public international law regulates the relationship between states, 
while private international law regulates that between private parties. Therefore, it is 
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not possible to establish jurisdiction over intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet through public international law. 
Secondly, the legal regulation of Antarctica, outer space and the high seas217 is 
based on international convention, whereas the idea of separate international 
conventions focused on jurisdiction in Internet disputes is problematic due to 
difficulties with international harmonisation. In particular, the Hague Draft proposal 
on International Jurisdiction and Enforcement in Civil and Commercial Matters did 
not succeed due to legal, cultural and economic differences. Moreover, intellectual 
property rights infringements over the Internet involve a variety of disparate issues 
such as free speech, violations of privacy, and tort liability218. Traditionally, these 
issues have been adjudicated by different areas of law. But in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet, these issues should be tried together. 
This generates barriers to international harmonisation. 
Thirdly, the non-physical nature of the Internet precludes a comparison between 
physical international spaces and cyberspace219. Indeed, “no one lives or works in 
cyberspace” and “no nation can reasonably be expected to agree to give up significant 
portions of their sovereignty to some newly conceived realm of existence”220. 
Therefore, as a method of communication the Internet differs from other media in a 
variety of respects, but “not so radically that a declaration of sui generis jurisdictional 
status is required.”221 
In this connection I would like to agree with Dutson’s point of view that “the 
Internet is an old wine in new bottles from a conflict perspective”222. In other words, 
private international law principles should apply to this new form of communication 
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but should take into account the unique factual circumstances in which infringements 
of IP rights may be committed.  
In my opinion, the most reasonable solution would be to develop the rules of 
jurisdiction over intellectual property rights infringement over the internet on a 
regional level. In particular, this can be done through the reform of the Brussels I 
Recast by establishing common principles of private international law applicable in 
the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. 
Thus, jurisdiction in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over 
the Internet should be determined on the basis of the Brussels I Recast.  
  
1.4 The need for this project  
The necessity to reform the Brussels I Recast in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet is dictated by the following facts:  
First, the Brussels I Recast is currently inefficient in appropriately addressing 
the jurisdictional issues in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over 
the Internet. Indeed, the Brussels I Recast does not contain rules in relation to 
jurisdiction in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. 
The main purpose of this regulation is the resolution of offline disputes on the borders 
of the EU, which are very different from trans-border intellectual property disputes 
over the Internet.  
Indeed, the Internet has not only changed the way people live and interact but 
has also affected the legal regulation of private international law, which governs the 
determination of jurisdiction in the case of intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet. Until recently, private international law of intellectual property was 
based on the principle of territoriality. It was not difficult for courts to identify where 
the intellectual property rights infringement had taken place. Indeed, the courts could 
easily localize the place where copyright works were published, where trademarked 
goods were sold, and where patented inventions were used. Such acts took place, for 
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example, where hard copies or products were distributed, live performances took 
place or factories were found.223 
However, due to the specific features of the Internet the question of 
jurisdiction in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet 
may be problematic. The Internet is an international network that connects people 
across different jurisdictions and it is subject to different legislation. It crosses 
national borders where national governments have no sovereign authority. When 
intellectual property rights infringement occurs on the Internet, it is important not 
only to find appropriate jurisdiction but also to identify the intellectual property rights 
infringer.  
Indeed, on the Internet, due to the issues of privacy and data protection 
regarding Internet users it is very difficult to identify the intellectual property rights 
infringer. Moreover, the specific features of the Internet such as its worldwide 
accessibility and the digital nature of intellectual property rights make it difficult to 
identify the location of the event that gave rise to the damage. Indeed, the intellectual 
property right may be infringed in several Member States. For example, in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, material published on the 
Internet can be uploaded in one Member State, downloaded in another member State 
and viewed anywhere on the globe. Does this mean that the IP rights owner is able to 
appeal to every state in which the materials are accessible? And what about the 
individual Internet users who posted material protected by IP law on an interactive 
Web site? Are they potentially subject to the jurisdiction of every state in the world?  
Thus, the question of which national authorities have jurisdiction is the first 
point of interest for every intellectual property rights owner whose rights are 
infringed over the Internet.  
However, in spite of the fact that questions about jurisdiction 
arise in almost every Internet case, the legal rules remain unpredictable not only in 
the EU but also internationally. Indeed, intellectual property rights infringements over 
the Internet raise problems for the right holders interested in enforcing their parallel 
rights and stopping these illegal activities in all of the countries in which they 
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occur.224 Thus, the consolidation of transnational intellectual property disputes before 
one court uniformly applying the law of a particular country is essential for right 
holders. 
Therefore, developing jurisdictional rules in the case of intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet is a necessary step in order to satisfy the 
requirements of a new virtual world. In particular, the law that used to regulate 
jurisdictional rules in the offline environment does not provide certainty – either for 
Internet users regarding online activities or for service providers and courts. Thus, the 
legal development needs to consider global political, economic and technological 
developments in order to respond to the interests of all of the parties involved. This is 
also true in relation to jurisdictional regulation of the Internet in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement.  
Therefore, the main legal reasons for reform of the Brussels I Recast are the 
inefficiency of the Brussels I Recast and the necessity to address the issues of 
jurisdiction in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. 
In this work we need to respond to the challenges introduced by the Internet and find 
acceptable and feasible connecting factors to establish jurisdiction in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. In particular, we need to 
understand and explain the “big picture” – the picture of how the Brussels I Recast 
can be adapted with regard to torts committed over the Internet.  
Indeed, the determination of jurisdiction in the case of intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet is a critical legal issue, as parties to legal 
disputes prefer a “predictable legal environment to unpredictable environments”.225 
Therefore, adapting the Brussels I Recast is a necessary step forward from the current 
legal situation presented by the development of the Internet.  The main aspect of this 
research is the issue of jurisdiction in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet rather than the substantive IP law issues. The project 
does not intend to analyse the issues of when and under what circumstances 
intellectual property rights are infringed on the Internet.  The substantive law issues 
are discussed briefly and only in the situation where the issue of jurisdiction is 
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concerned with the substantive law issue.  Indeed, it is not possible within the 
framework of the present work to analyse all possible forms of intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet. In particular, as noted by Ross, the ways in 
which intellectual property rights infringement occurs on the Internet are limited only 
by the infringer’s imagination.226 Thus, only the issue of jurisdiction in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet will be analysed. 
Therefore, the necessity of this project is spelled out by the following facts: 
1) The inefficiency of the Brussels I Recast to appropriately address the 
issue of jurisdiction in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet;  
2) The specific features of intellectual property rights infringement over 
the Internet requiring special attention  with regard to the issue of jurisdiction; 
3) The inconsistency  of  various national practices (United Kingdom, 
Germany, Sweden and France) and scholarly debates in relation to the interpretation 
of the existing law in the context of the Internet; 
4) The necessity of a unified EU concept of jurisdiction in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet in order to satisfy the 
requirements of a new virtual world. 
1.5 Literature review  
 Despite the ubiquity of the problem, a dearth of literature exists on the 
subject227. Indeed, no country has yet expressly developed jurisdictional rules in the 
area of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. Thus, a systematic 
and comprehensive analysis of the topic is required. In this regard it is important to 
identify the most important academic literature in the subject. 
In particular, the book Internet jurisdiction and Choice of law: Legal Practices 
in the EU, US and China228 by Faye Fangffi Wang examines the existing jurisdiction 
and choice of law rules and proposes the interpretation of those rules to the digital 
age. However, the main focus of this book is electronic commercial transactions 
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which are conducted by private individuals and commercial entities without country 
boundaries. Thus, it does not discuss jurisdictional issues in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet.  
However, the most important book in this sphere is Intellectual property and 
Private International law229 by James J. Fawcett and Paul Torremans, which includes 
all major changes and initiatives in relation to private international law and 
intellectual property law issues. In particular, this book takes into account the 
replacement of the Brussels Convention by the Brussels I Regulation, the introduction 
of the Rome II Regulation (dealing with the applicable law in relation to non-
contractual obligations) and discussion of the decisions of the ECJ in the Roche and 
GAT cases. In addition, they covered infringement and piracy. However, the 
questions of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet was discussed 
only briefly. Therefore, a detailed analysis of the topic is required. 
The book Intellectual Property and Private International Law. Comparative 
Perspectives230 by Toshiyuki Kono offers a comparative perspective of more than 20 
countries across North America, Europe (include both EU and non-EU states) and 
Asia in relation to regulating the private international law aspects of intellectual 
property. This book contains the General and 20 National Reports arising from the 
18th International Congress of Comparative Law held in Washington (July 2010). 
These reports explain the legal regimes in force in those jurisdictions and the relevant 
case law concerning international jurisdiction, choice of law and the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments in multi-state IP disputes. However, this book does 
not discuss jurisdictional issues in the case of intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet.  
The same situation occurs in Brussels I Regulation. European Commentaries on 
Private International Law231 by Ulrich Magnus and Peter Mankowski, which covers 
jurisprudence of the ECJ and of the Member States but does not cover the 
jurisdictional issues of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet.  
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It is important to mention also the book Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and the 
Recognition of Judgments in Europe, Japan and the US232 
 by Jürgen Basedow, Toshiyuki Kono and Axel Metzger. This book is relevant as it 
contains an analysis of the CLIP and ALI Proposals. However, the CLIP and ALI 
Proposals in relation to ubiquitous infringement are discussed very briefly.  
The book Google and the Law233 by Lopez-Tarruella Aurelio is also relevant for 
the purpose of this thesis as it discusses online disputes in which Google has been 
involved. This book helps to understand how the current legal systems are adapted to 
business models such as that of Google.  
However, in spite of the value of these books, the recent ECJ case law points in 
the direction of a more online-specific interpretation and therefore requires a detail 
analysis. Indeed, the most relevant books in the sphere of this research were 
published during 2007-2012 while the majority of cases dealing with interpretation of 
Article 7 (2) of the Brussels Recast were decided in the last few years234. (This is also 
an argument in support of the conclusion that cross-border intellectual property rights 
infringements over the Internet are increasing.) 
1.6 The aim of the project  
 The protection of intellectual property rights on the Internet poses 
extraordinary challenges to the existing models of adjudicating international disputes. 
This is so because territoriality is deeply rooted as a basic feature of IP rights that 
influences jurisdictional rules235. One of the aims of this work is to analyse the 
application of the existing jurisdictional rules according to the Brussels I Recast in the 
case of intellectual property rights infringement on the Internet.  
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Indeed, because there are no special jurisdictional rules in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, jurisdictional rules 
according to the Brussels I Recast will be analysed. In particular, I will examine how 
Articles 4, 8 (1), 7 (2), 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast are applicable in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet.  
The next important issue in our discussion is to identify and analyse the 
problems associated with the application of the existing jurisdictional rules in the case 
of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. In particular, 
jurisdictional issues on the Internet arise because the existing jurisdictional rules are 
based on territorial connections, i.e. the location of an infringer or the location of an 
activity. However, the principle of territoriality collides head-on with the 
characteristics of the Internet, among which are its lack of territoriality or its 
international and decentralised nature236.  
On the basis of the analysis of the existing law and theory, case law and 
scholarly discourse, I will provide a solution for reforming the Brussels I Recast. 
Indeed, the development of technology and the Internet has led to changes in society 
and social behaviour237. Therefore, the reform of the Brussels I Recast is the logical 
step for developing more online-specific jurisdictional rules in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet. Indeed, it is important to establish 
clear and consistent jurisdictional grounds on which intellectual property rights 
disputes over the Internet can be accessed.  
Thus, the aims of this project, among other things, are to identify: 
- Whether jurisdictional rules under the Brussels I Recast are effective 
enough to deal with intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet.  
- Why it is difficult to apply existing jurisdictional rules in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. 
- What are the suggestions and recommendations for reform of the 
Brussels I Recast in order to satisfy the requirements of a new virtual 
world. 
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1.7 Research Methodology  
This chapter explores the nature of research and the general premises and principles 
on which the research is predicated and seeks to address the research questions.  
According to Berg, the purpose of the research is “not to amass data, but to 
discover answers through application of systematic procedures”238. Ghauri and 
Gronhaug define research as a process of planning, executing and investigating in 
order to find reliable answers to specific questions, and emphasise the need for a 
systematic approach so that “it is easier for others to understand and believe in our 
report”239. However, we need to agree that “the purposes of research are multiple, 
such as to describe, explain, understand, foresee, criticise or analyse already existing 
knowledge or phenomena in social sciences”240.  
In this connection, I would like to note that the main research method that I 
decided to use in this thesis is the analytical method of research. This research 
method analyses information already available and makes a critical evaluation of the 
material241. The analytical method of research employed here aims to describe and 
explain the legal framework regarding the conflict of jurisdiction concerning 
intellectual property rights infringements over the Internet on the borders of the EU. 
The analysis will be conducted within the following legal framework: 1) EU and 
national legislation (UK, Germany, Sweden, and France); 2) ECJ and national case 
law (UK, Germany, Sweden, and France); and 3) academic literature. 
Indeed, jurisdictional questions in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet are a global issue and thus require a global response 
involving the participation of all stakeholders in the international community. 
However, as it is not possible within the scope of this work to investigate every 
country’s approach to jurisdictional issues over the Internet, I decided to tackle these 
issues in the light of legal developments within the EU and its Member States.  
In the EU the questions of jurisdiction are regulated by the Brussels I Recast. 
However, this legal instrument does not extend its application to online issues. 
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Therefore, the Brussels I Recast will be analysed in the light of its applicability to 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. This allows for the 
identification and analysis of the legal barriers to engagement over the Internet. Some 
commentators have noted that the literature in relation to jurisdictional issues in the 
case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet is fragmented and 
inherent and that there is a need for framework development and research at the 
conceptual level to provide more focused research242.  
This thesis accepts that challenge. It takes as a basis of research an analytical 
approach to allow for the identification and explanation of factors affecting the 
application of the existing jurisdictional rules in the case of intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet. Thus, the territorial nature of intellectual 
property rights and the global nature of the Internet are at the centre of my discussion. 
Indeed, digital technology is challenging the traditional intellectual property sphere. 
In particular, it is very difficult to protect intellectual property rights on the Internet 
due to digitization of Intellectual property rights and the problems associated with 
intellectual property rights infringers’ identification and location.  
However, this thesis attempts to analyse not only legislation but also case law 
related to intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. In particular, four 
target jurisdictions will be analysed: the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden and 
France. However, the case law of these countries will be analysed not in a 
comparative perspective but as four examples of interpreting the jurisdictional rules 
under the Brussels I Recast in a particular Member State of the EU. These countries 
were chosen not only because they are EU Member States with similar legislation but 
also because they have the most developed case law in relation to the jurisdictional 
issues posed by intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. In addition, 
they are considered as democratic countries which provide similar responsibilities for 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. This provided a common 
ground for analysis. However, this common ground for comparison is open to debate. 
Indeed, in spite of the fact that they have similar legislation, the legal approaches 
taken in relation to interpretation are very different. Moreover, these countries have 
different legal systems: while Germany, Sweden and France are civil law countries, 
the UK has a common law system. Therefore, this provides a great opportunity to 
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explore different approaches to legal regulation in order to choose the best possible 
solution in relation to the issue of the jurisdiction of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet. 
Indeed, such analysis is very important for achieving harmonization of 
jurisdictional issues of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet at an 
EU level.  
Moreover, American doctrine and case law also will be taken into account 
during this research (where possible). This is because the USA has a more developed 
case practices in relation to jurisdictional issues of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet than EU Member States. Therefore, it is very important 
to be familiar with US practice.  
In addition to the legislation and cases, the academic literature in relation to 
jurisdictional issues will also be analysed. Special attention will be given to the 
application of the traditional jurisdictional rules in the online environment and the 
differences in legal regulation and regulatory approaches to resolve these issues. Two 
academic projects – the American law Institute’s (ALI) and Max Planck Group’s on 
Conflict of Law and Intellectual Property (CLIP) Proposals on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law, and Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Intellectual 
Property243 - will be analysed. These projects have been established in order to 
develop international standards better suited to adjudicating international disputes on 
intellectual property claims. Despite the fact that none of them has a binding legal 
status, they both intend to provide guidelines for courts, legislative bodies or 
international organizations on international private law issues in cross-border 
intellectual property disputes244. The analytical research of these projects will provide 
not only a comparative overview of legal approaches in the EU and the USA but also 
an understanding of the direction of global development in relation to jurisdictional 
issues of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet.  
It is important to emphasise that this thesis not only critically evaluates the 
existing literature but also makes suggestions for improvements of the existing law. 
Indeed, the investigation shows that law and regulations are not only mere extensions 
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of statutes, cases, and governmental documents but are social products influenced by 
the development of the Internet245. As a result, the law which was fully justifiable 
when it was introduced or adapted is no longer so justifiable because the reasons or 
circumstances that justified the original provisions are no longer valid or exist246. As 
will be shown, the Brussels I Recast does not fit with the construction of an efficient 
solution to intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. Therefore, the 
modification of the Brussels I Recast is required. Such modification is possible in the 
form of new articles dealing with the jurisdictional issues of intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet. This step is especially significant as the ECJ has 
emphasised repeatedly that the interpretation of the Brussels regime should be 
harmonised on a European basis rather than allowed to develop in different national 
directions247. This thesis will describe and explain which criteria should be used by 
developing more flexible jurisdictional rules of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet. In particular, the main emphasis will be on analysing 
why the chosen principles are the best possible ones to adopt, what conditions will 
allow them to be applied; and in what direction further possible reform and 
development may lie. Therefore, the analytical method of research can provide a 
theoretical framework for understanding the current legal regulation of jurisdiction in 
the EU with a view to developing better-suited rules to intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet.  
1.8 Structure of the thesis  
 The thesis comprises 5 chapters that include an introduction, the jurisdictional 
issues, and a conclusion.  
In order to analyse the impact of the Internet on private international law of 
intellectual property and jurisdictional issues Chapter 1 is divided into four major 
sections. Section one analyses the interface between private international law and 
intellectual property rights (paragraph 1.1.). Section two of this chapter analyses the 
                                                 
245 Maryann P. Feldman, Grazia D. Santangelo, New Perspectives in International Business Research (1st, 
EIBA 2008) 139-145.  
246 Khushal Vibhute, Filipos Aynalem, ‘Legal research Method’ (2009) <chilot.wordpress.com> accessed 
11 June 2014. 
247 See for example, Case 189/87 Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schroder Munchmeyer Hengst & Co [1988] ECR 
05565. 
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nature of the Internet and identifies the impact of the Internet on intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet (paragraph 1.2.). Section three analyses the 
impact of the Internet on jurisdictional issues. In particular, this section considers the 
existing jurisdictional approaches with regard to disputes arising over the Internet and 
which ones provide a most appropriate solution for determining jurisdiction in 
disputes of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet (paragraph 1.3.). 
Section four of this chapter analyses the methodological aspects of the project: the 
aim of the project; the need for this project; a literature review; the research 
methodology; the structure of the thesis; and a statement of originality and 
contribution to knowledge (paragraphs 1.4. - 1.9.). 
Following this, Chapter 2 of this thesis is dedicated to analysing the general 
jurisdiction according to Article 4 (1) of the Brussels I Recast and identifying the 
difficulties concerned with its applicability to intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet. The second part of Chapter 2 is concerned with the consolidation of 
claims in multi-defendant cases according to Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast. 
This chapter also includes the conclusion of this investigation.  
Chapter 3 of this thesis is concerned with tort jurisdiction according to Article 7 
(2) of the Brussels I Recast. It analyses its applicability in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet, identifies problems and makes 
suggestions for the modification of the Brussels I Recast (in the form of additional 
special jurisdictional rules for intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet).  
Chapter 4 of this thesis examines exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 24 
(4) of the Brussels I Recast and its applicability to intellectual property rights 
infringement on the Internet. This chapter identifies difficulties and makes suggestion 
with regard to Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast. 
Chapter 5 concludes this investigation. It considers the main findings of this 
research, addresses its importance and its contribution to knowledge, and finally 
suggests an agenda for further research in the field. 
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1.9 Originality and contribution to knowledge 
 This investigation not only identifies jurisdictional problems with regard to 
the application of the existing jurisdictional rules of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet, but also provides recommendations for the reform of 
the jurisdictional rules under the Brussels I Recast. 
Thus, this work provides a response to the jurisdictional problems in the case of 
IP infringement caused by the development of the Internet. In this regard this work 
fills the present gaps in relation to jurisdiction of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet.  
The work is important for at least three key reasons: (1) legal scholarship; (2) 
case study evidence of how regulation works in practice; (3) and policy making;  
First, it has implications for scholarship as this work identifies the problems of 
applying the existing jurisdictional rules under the Brussels I Recast in the following 
EU Member States: United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden and France.  
Second, this research explores the evolution of jurisdictional rules over the 
Internet. Indeed, the work provides an explanation of the evolution of jurisdictional 
rules caused by the development of the Internet in the case of IP infringement not 
only on an EU level (ECJ cases) but also on the national level (United Kingdom, 
Germany, Sweden and France). 
Third, the analysis developed here is expected to help reform current policy 
making in relation to regulating jurisdictional issues over the Internet, due to the 
growing importance of intellectual property rights protection across the world. In 
particular, this research can assist policy makers in modifying the Brussels I Recast in 
the form of new jurisdictional proposals applicable to intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet.  
In addition, this work as a form of legal dialogue with legal and scientific 
communities will provide further ideas for researching an acceptable jurisdictional 
solution to intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet.   
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Chapter 2 
Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast 
and its applicability in the case of 
intellectual property rights 
infringement on the Internet 
 
2.1 Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast: Introduction 
 Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast is classed as “general jurisdiction” and states 
that persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in 
the courts of that Member State248. This is a mandatory requirement249, and any cases 
of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet are not an exception to 
the rule, which means that the courts of the defendant’s domicile have to try the case. 
Therefore, a person who infringes intellectual property rights over the Internet can 
always be sued in his or her domicile250. However, as will be shown later, this general 
principle is subject to a number of specific exceptions provided in Articles 7 (2) and 
24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast, according to which a person domiciled in a Member 
State can be sued in the courts of another Member State.  
                                                 
248 Council Regulation (EC) 1215/2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2012] OJ L 351. 
249 Case C-281/02 Owusu v Jackson [2005] ECR I-1383, para 37. 
250 Metzger, ‘Jurisdiction in Cases Concerning Intellectual Property Infringement on the Internet, Brussels 
I Regulation, ALI-Principle and Max Planck Proposal,’ in Ohly and Leible (ed.), Intellectual Property and Private 
International Law (Mohr Siebeck 2009) 253.  
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Domicile as a jurisdictional connecting factor was developed in Roman law and 
maintained by civilian courts. English and other common-law courts, adopting a 
procedural approach, preferred to focus on physical presence at the time of service of 
process251. In common law a court had no jurisdiction outside its territorial limits252. 
Cornish and Llewelyn note that “domicile” is a matter for the law of the relevant 
State253, and only courts of the Member State where the defendant is domiciled has 
jurisdiction to deal with the dispute. For a definition of domicile, the Regulation 
distinguishes between natural (Article 62) and legal persons (Article 63).  
Article 62 of the Brussels I Recast does not give an autonomous definition of 
domicile and provides a conflict rule in order to determine whether a natural person is 
domiciled in the Member State254. Within the UK, domicile is defined in section 41 of 
the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Regulations 2009255, which incorporates the 
Brussels I Recast into UK law as meaning the place where a person resides and has 
some substantial connection256 – if a person has been resident somewhere for three 
months, there is a rebuttable presumption that said person has a substantial 
connection with that place257. Interestingly, multiple domiciles are possible, so 
someone who travels regularly for work and maintains two homes, one in England 
and one in France, could be domiciled in both England and France258. 
In the case of legal persons, Article 63 of the Brussels I Recast provides three 
connecting factors regarding domicile: the statutory seat, the central administration 
(that is, the place where the main management decisions are taken) or the principal 
place of business. Section 42 (3) of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Regulations 
2009 provides that a corporation or association has its seat in the United Kingdom, if 
and only if: (a) it was incorporated or formed under the law of a part of the United 
Kingdom and has its registered office or some other official address in the United 
                                                 
251 Oren Bigos, ‘Jurisdiction over cross-border wrongs on the Internet’ (2005) 54(3) I.C.L.Q. 585-620. 
252 Lenders v Anderson [1883] 12 QBD 50, 56; Ingate v La Commissione de Lloyd Austriaco, Prima 
Sezione [1858] 4 CB NS 704, 708 (CP); Pennoyer v Neff [1877].95 US 714, 722.  
253 W. R Cornish and David Llewelyn, Intellectual property: Patents, copyrights, trademarks and allied 
rights (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd 2007) 99 
254 Article 62 of the Brussels I Recast: ‘1. In order to determine whether a party is domiciled in the 
Member State whose courts are seized of a matter, the court shall apply its internal law. 2. If a party is not 
domiciled in the Member State whose courts are seized of the matter, then, in order to determine whether the party 
is domiciled in another Member State, the court shall apply the law of that Member State..’. 
255 The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Regulations 2009, SI 2009/3131. 
256 This is a statutory concept of domicile which is similar to but not the same as the common-law concept 
of domicile.  
257 The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Regulations 2009, SI 2009/3131, section 41 (6). 
258 Kay Lauchland, ‘Jurisdictions over defendants’ [2004] The National Legal Eagle 10(2), 11. 
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Kingdom or (b) its central management and control are exercised in the United 
Kingdom259.  
In this connection it is important to note the differences in how the concept of 
domicile is understood by the United Kingdom and other common-law countries. 
Thus, under the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Regulations 2009, it is possible for 
a person to have more than one domicile, whereas in other common-law jurisdictions 
only one domicile is possible260.  
Hence, general jurisdiction over natural persons is available in Europe in the 
defendant’s domicile and, for legal persons, at the defendant’s statutory seat, at the 
defendant’s central administration and at the defendant’s principle place of business.  
In this respect, it is interesting to note that the Brussels I Recast makes 
irrelevant the nationality or domicile of the plaintiff. In particular, in Josi 
Reinsurance v Universal General Insurance Company, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) clarified that the domicile of the plaintiff is generally irrelevant and hence the 
jurisdictional rules of the Brussels I Recast are applicable in a dispute between a 
defendant domiciled in a Member State and a claimant domiciled in a third State261. 
Therefore, a plaintiff from the United States or Japan is in exactly the same position 
as one from France or Germany262. 
Moreover, the Brussels I Recast does not contain the general discretionary 
power to decline jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens. This was 
confirmed by the decision in Owusu v Jackson263, in which the ECJ held that the 
Brussels regime precludes a court of a Contracting State from declining the 
jurisdiction conferred on it by the rule of general jurisdiction on the ground that such 
a court of a non-Contracting State would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of 
the action264. As a result, if the proceedings have been brought in England against an 
English defendant for the infringement of a foreign intellectual property right, forum 
non conveniens cannot be invoked by the English court; indeed, the jurisdiction of the 
                                                 
259 The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Regulations 2009, SI 2009/3131. 
260 Lawrence Antony Collins, Albert Venn Dicey and John Humphrey Carlile Morris, Dicey And Morris 
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English court is based on Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast. The forum non 
conveniens approach is confirmed also by Article 34 (2) of the Brussels I Recast. 
The most important questions in our discussion are as follows: Why is difficult 
to apply Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast in the case of intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet? What are the recommendations for the 
development of the existing law?  
2.1.1 Difficulty of applying Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast 
to IPRs infringement over the Internet  
Suing in the courts of the defendant’s domicile allows intellectual property 
rights owners to bring any claim arising out of the infringement of parallel intellectual 
property rights, regardless of whether or not they arise in the Forum State or in any 
other country265. Therefore, jurisdiction under Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast is 
very useful, as it allows for suing in one court only with regard to any damage 
caused. Indeed, the application of Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast meets the 
essential requirement of legal certainty and the objective, pursued by the Brussels I 
Recast, of strengthening the legal protection of persons established in the EU, by 
enabling the applicant to identify easily the court in which he can sue and the 
defendant to reasonably foresee in which court he could be sued266. 
However, intellectual property infringements in the offline reality and over the 
Internet have fundamental differences due to the Internet’s characteristics, which 
were examined previously in the introductory chapter. Nonetheless, the Brussels I 
Recast does not contain any special provision dealing solely with intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet, and so the court has to apply the existing 
jurisdiction rule to this matter.  
In this regard it is important to identify the main difficulties that can arise in 
applying this offline rule to intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. 
Therefore, the main issue here is: Why is it difficult to apply this traditional offline 
jurisdictional principle, in particular Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast, in the 
case of intellectual property rights infringement on the Internet? 
                                                 
265 Metzger, ‘Jurisdiction in Cases Concerning Intellectual Property Infringement on the Internet, Brussels 
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In this chapter we will examine problems such as the identity and location of 
the defendants, privacy and data protection issues arising in the case of disclosing 
personal data or information for the purpose of investigating online intellectual 
property rights infringement on the basis of the EU law and national laws of some EU 
Member States.  
2.1.1.1 Defendant’s location 
As discussed earlier, ascertaining the domicile of a defendant in the offline 
reality is not difficult: an action can be brought where the natural person is domiciled 
in the Member State (Article 62 of the Brussels I Recast) or where the legal person 
has a statutory seat267, central administration or principal place of business (Art. 63 of 
the Brussels I Recast). This jurisdictional principle is applicable even in when the 
current domicile of the defendant is unknown, according to the ECJ decision in 
Hypotecni Banka as v Lindner 268. Indeed, as stated by the ECJ, courts in the place 
where the defendant had his last known domicile may have jurisdiction to deal with 
proceedings against him. Therefore, the fact that it is not possible to identify the 
current domicile of the defendant must not deprive the applicant of his right to bring 
proceedings to the last known domicile of said defendant. 
However, in cases concerning Internet communication, a claimant may not 
know whether the defendant is domiciled in the territory of the European Union or 
outside the Union. Therefore, it may be difficult to apply Article 4 of the Brussels I 
Recast in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet.  
Domain names, e-mail addresses and Internet protocol addresses do not 
necessarily reveal the location of online IP infringers269, and without a doubt domain 
names do not reveal much about the user’s location – even a country code top-level 
domain name does not necessarily indicate that the registrant of that name is located 
in that country; for example, Turkmenistan’s registration authority assigns country 
code top-level domain names to non-resident users270, and this situation also applies 
to e-mail addresses. As a result, a person may have an electronic address with a 
                                                 
267 For the purpose of the United Kingdom and Ireland “statutory seat” means the registered office or, 
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service provider whose domain name comprises a national identifier, such as “UK,” 
without being resident in that particular State271. Even having details of a customer’s 
credit card does not always determine where a person is located272, because, as seen 
in Dow Jones & Company v Gutnick273, a US company may issue a credit card to an 
Australian. 
Moreover, Internet protocol addresses are not structured according to 
geographic locations and do not by themselves disclose the geographical location of 
the IP infringer. However, as a reaction to the difficulty of determining the location of 
Internet users, technologies are being developed on the basis of the Internet protocol 
address of a given user’s computer274. In particular, since Internet protocol addresses 
are allocated in blocks, it is possible for technologies such as www.quova.com and 
www.digitalenvoy.net to map most of them accordingly. As noted by Tedeschi, this 
development means that borders are returning to the Internet275; nevertheless, it is a 
debatable issue as to how accurately geolocation tools can predict the location of a 
computer connected to the Internet276, and in addition they are not used for all online 
interactions and transactions277.  
However, many companies providing posting and distributing services on the 
Internet (such as domain name registrars, bulletin board operators and commercial 
Web page hosts) require the identification and contact details of their customers, but 
these requests are often ignored, as no sanctions have been foreseen or enforced if 
unreliable contact details are detected.  
2.1.1.2 Anonymity 
The question of location is central to clarifying an IP infringer’s identity. Many 
communications via the Internet are anonymous278 and there is no way to verify with 
absolute certainty an IP infringer’s identity. A common variant of anonymity is 
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60 
 
pseudonymity, where the IP infringer participates in communications under a 
fictitious name or several fictitious names. Anonymity and pseudonymity were not 
invented with the advent of the Internet; they have occurred throughout history279. At 
the same time, the use of pseudonyms in real life may be fairly usual for a relatively 
small range of public persons, such as writers, actors and others, while in cyberspace 
it commonplace for most users. Indeed, anonymity is one of the characteristics of the 
Internet280, which provides an unmanageable infrastructure via websites, e-mail, chat 
rooms, FTP sites, Usenet newsgroups, encryption tools, re-mailers and anonymous 
server facilities that support anonymity281. 
There are many situations in cyberspace where anonymity or pseudonymity can 
be socially useful. In particular, people in dictatorships and undemocratic countries 
may use anonymity to avoid persecution for their opinions. In addition, due to 
anonymity, people may openly discuss personal issues, since features which enable 
identification can be removed282. Moreover, a manufacturer may receive objective 
feedback by seeking anonymous reviews of its products283. However, anonymity can 
also provide the perfect shield for different crimes, such as the distribution of 
computer viruses, fraud or online copyright infringement through peer-to-peer file 
sharing sites; for example, online file-sharers may avoid prosecution and lawsuits by 
concealing their identities. Indeed, as one EU study indicates, the growth of illegal 
file-sharing could cost European countries 240 billion euros (£215bn) in retail 
revenue losses and 1.2 million in jobs lost by 2015284. 
The worldwide growth of anonymous Internet communication therefore raises 
various legal questions. On the one hand, people are more and more concerned about 
their privacy and a desire to access the network anonymously285. On the other hand, 
                                                 
279 Jacob Palme and Mikael Berglund, ‘Anonymity On The Internet’ (2002) 
<http://people.dsv.su.se/~jpalme/society/anonymity.html> accessed 15 October 2011. 
280 Jelke Nijboer, ‘Big Brother Versus Anonymity On The Internet: Implications For Internet Service 
Providers, Libraries And Individuals Since 9/11’ (2004) 105 New Library World 256.  
281 H.L. Armstrong and P.J. Forde, ‘Internet Anonymity Practices In Computer Crime’ (2003) 11/5 
Information Management & Computer Security 214. 
282 Diane Rowland, ‘Anonymity, Privacy and Cyberspace’, paper presented at the 15th BILETA 
Conference: Electronic datasets and access to legal information (University of Warwick 2000). 
283 Saul Levmore and Martha Craven Nussbaum (e.g.), The Offensive Internet: Speech, Privacy, And 
Reputation (Harvard University Press 2010) 60. 
284 TERA Consultants, International Chamber of commerce/BASCAP, ‘Building a digital economy: the 
importance of saving jobs in the EU’s creative Industries’ (March 2010) 
https://oami.europa.eu/ohimportal/documents/11370/71142/Building+a+Digital+Economy,+the+importance+of+s
aving+jobs+in+the+EUs+creative+industries> accessed 5 March 2015. 
285 Philip Leith, “The socio-legal context of privacy” [2006] Int. J.L.C. 2(2), 105-136. 
61 
 
governments and IPRs holders are concerned that this anonymous access might mask 
illegal behaviour286. Therefore, the most important question associated with 
anonymous communication is how can we ensure the right balance between users’ 
right to privacy, the freedom of expression and the legitimate concerns of public 
authorities and third parties? 
At the EU level the use of online anonymity focuses on privacy issues. 
According to recommendations made by the Data Protection Working Party 
regarding anonymity on the Internet, the ability to choose to remain anonymous – and 
consequently to have anonymous access – is essential if individuals are to preserve 
the same protection of their privacy online as they currently enjoy offline.287 In 
addition, as noted by the Council of Europe, “Anonymous access to and use of 
services... are the best protection of privacy.”288 
However, anonymity is not appropriate in all circumstances289, since 
determining the circumstances in which the “anonymity option” is appropriate and 
those in which it is not requires the careful balancing of fundamental rights290. 
Indeed, the anonymity on the Internet is not an absolute right, and restrictions on its 
use may be imposed with a view to protecting other fundamental rights in a 
democratic society291 (this point will be discussed later). 
Furthermore, as noted by Ferguson, there is no reason to believe that we should 
have a right to remain anonymous if we are doing something that is harmful or risky 
to others292. This is especially important in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement on the Internet. For example, section 124A of the Digital Economy Act 
2010 requires the copyright owner to gather subscribers’ IP addresses as evidence of 
copyright infringement293, and among the major categories of resources facilitating 
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online piracy, only torrents make the IP addresses of other downloaders/uploaders 
visible294; therefore, in essence, the anonymised IP addresses of infringers cannot be 
protected by privacy.  
From a technical point of view, special software such as DtecNet allows 
claimants in Internet disputes to identify the IP addresses of those downloading 
illegal material. At the same time, it is only Internet service providers (ISPs) which 
are able to match the relevant IP address of a computer used on a network with an 
account holder and his/her physical address. The computer records held by the ISP 
can provide identification data, while DtecNet can only provide the eight-digit IP 
address. Moreover, personal information is provided by users to the ISP via the 
registration process, which means that the ISPs collect users’ personal data or 
sensitive information at this point. 
Conclusion 
On the basis of the analysis carried out herein, we can conclude that anonymity 
on the Internet is not an absolute right, and restrictions on the use of anonymity may 
be imposed with a view to protecting other fundamental rights in a democratic 
society295. In particular, this is evident in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet, where the anonymised IP addresses of infringers 
cannot be protected by privacy. Therefore, the ISP is able to match the relevant 
address of a computer used on a network with a unique Internet subscriber. 
 Indeed, as noted in the Irish case EMI v UPC, “It is definitively established by 
the evidence that, without the assistance of an ISP, the recording companies cannot 
discover the identity of those who are infringing their copyright.”296 By knowing the 
Internet protocol address297 and the date and time of connection, ISPs are able to 
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identify the connected computer, following which it is then possible to connect it to 
an Internet user’s account and his/her physical address298.  
2.1.1.3 Privacy issues 
2.1.1.3.1 Privacy and data protection 
Thus, in order to institute IP infringement proceedings, claimants or authorities 
need the details of potential infringers’ personal data in relation to relevant IP 
addresses from the respective ISP. This raises concerns around the duties and 
liabilities of ISPs, as there may be the need to disclose personal data or information 
for the purpose of investigating online intellectual property rights infringement299. 
Data protection law is related closely to the right to privacy, which is a 
fundamental human right recognised by Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, according to which “Everyone has the right to respect for his private 
and family life, his home and his correspondence”300. The right to privacy is also 
recognised by Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights301 and Article 
17 of the United Nations International Convention on Civil and Political Rights302, 
both of which state that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, or to attacks upon his honour and 
reputation, and that everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.  
“Without our privacy, we lose out integrity as persons,” Charles Fried declared 
over 47 years ago303, but the concept of privacy has far older historical origins in 
sociological and anthropological discussions about how extensively it is valued and 
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preserved in various cultures304; for instance, most important philosophical 
discussions are based on Aristotle’s distinction between the public sphere of political 
activity and the private sphere associated with family and domestic life. 
The two American lawyers S. Warren and L. Brandeis defined privacy as “the 
right to be let alone”305. They believed that the privacy principle was already part of 
common law and the protection of one’s home as one’s castle, albeit political, social 
and economic changes made it important to recognise explicitly and separately this 
protection under the name of privacy306. 
However, privacy is not a unified concept; as noted by Solove, for example, it 
is “an umbrella term relating to a wide and disparate group of related things”307. In 
particular, in Norris v Attorney General308, the court recognised that privacy was a 
“complex of rights, varying in nature, purpose and range, each necessarily a facet of 
the citizen’s core of individuality within the constitutional order.” Indeed, its meaning 
is dependent on a nation’s culture. For example, the classic contrast to the British 
attitude to privacy is Sweden, where their long tradition of open government means 
that a great deal of information considered private in Britain, such as the amount of 
tax a person pays, is readily accessible to a Swedish citizen309.  
Interest in the right to privacy increased in the 1960s and 1970s with the advent 
of information technology, which made personal data easily accessible and 
communicable310. This second generation of legislative efforts considered the 
protection of personal data as a separate fundamental right, distinct from the right to 
privacy311, and special rules governing the collection and handling of personal 
information were considered necessary in order to protect citizens’ privacy. In other 
words, data protection laws have been characterised as regulatory reactions to 
                                                 
304 Judith DeCew, ‘Privacy’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2012), <http://plato.stanford. 
edu/archives/fall2012/entries/privacy> accessed 11 June 2014. 
305 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review. 
306 Ibid. 
307 Daniel J. Solove, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’ (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 485.  
308 Norris v. A.G. [1983] IESC 3, para 71. 
309 Chris Reed and John Angel, Computer Law: The Law and Regulation Of Information Technology (6th 
edn, Oxford University Press 2007) 461. 
310 Global Internet Liberty campaign, ‘Privacy and Human Rights. An International Survey of Privacy 
Laws And Practice’ (2012) <http://gilc.org/privacy/survey/intro.html> accessed 29 February 2012. 
311 European Commission’s Information Society and Media Directorate-General, ‘EU study on the Legal 
analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society. New rules for a new age?’ (2009).  
65 
 
technological developments312 in an attempt to provide an answer on how data 
relating to a person are processed by others313.  
The first data protection law in the world was enacted in Germany in 1970314. A 
little later, in 1981, the first international agreement with regard to the automatic 
processing of personal data was introduced by the Council of Europe in its 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data, which holds that “it is desirable to extend the safeguards for 
everyone’s rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular the right to the respect 
for privacy, taking into account the increasing flow across frontiers of personal data 
undergoing automatic processing”315. Indeed, in Rotaru v Romania, the European 
Court of Human Rights identified the purpose of the Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data as “securing for 
every individual... his right to privacy with regard to automatic processing of personal 
data relating to him”316. Moreover, as underlined in the OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Trans-border flows of Personal Data, this document was 
introduced in order to prevent violations of fundamental human rights, such as the 
unlawful storage of personal data, the storage of inaccurate personal data or the abuse 
or unauthorised disclosure of such data317. 
However, when the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data was drafted in 1981, the Internet did not 
really exist, nor did the majority of the problems people face in terms of the proper 
use of their data. Therefore, the Council of Europe decided to update the Convention 
for the modern world. The data protection committee, in its meeting in Strasburg on 
December 3, 2014, adopted the modernisation proposals of the Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, and 
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the convention is open to ratification318. It is expected that the revised convention on 
data protection will become a binding international legal instrument for data privacy 
protection, with a potential worldwide application. Indeed, the Convention recognises 
that it is necessary to promote at the global level the fundamental values of respect for 
privacy and the protection of personal data319.  
Data protection and privacy are overlapping concepts, as both aim at protecting 
similar rights and values320. In particular, while data protection covers issues relating 
to the protection of individual citizens against the unjustified collection, storage, use 
and dissemination of their personal details321, privacy covers issues such as protection 
of family life, private communication, physical integrity and unwarranted 
investigations322. This means that data protection regulation is echoing a privacy right 
with regard to personal data. Therefore, many scholars view data protection and 
privacy as being interchangeable323. Nonetheless, privacy and data protection could 
be described as “twins, but not identical”324; in fact, as stated in the OECD 
Guidelines, “the development of automatic data processing, which enables vast 
quantities of data to be transmitted within seconds across national frontiers, and 
indeed across continents, has made it necessary to consider privacy protection in 
relation to personal data”325. Therefore, privacy is the starting point for identifying 
and determining the principles of data protection.  
Data protection is broadly analogous to the “information privacy” concept, the 
classic definition of which is given by Westin: “The claim of individuals, groups or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information 
about them is communicated to others”326. 
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Two legal developments in the UK have driven data protection and privacy ever 
closer together327. Firstly, the Data Protection Directive 95/46328, upon which the 
Data Protection Act 1998329 was based, expressly recognises its origins in the right to 
privacy as expressed in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In 
particular, Article 1(1) of the Data Protection Directive 95/46 provides that Member 
States shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in 
particular their right to privacy with respect of the processing of personal data. 
Secondly, the European Convention on Human Rights was incorporated into UK law 
by the Human Rights Act 1988, which imposed an obligation upon the courts, as 
public authorities, not “to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention 
right”330.  
Conclusion  
On the basis of the analysis undertaken herein, we can conclude that privacy 
and data protection are “twins, but not identical”331. This means that privacy is the 
starting point for identifying and determining the principles of data protection. 
Certainly, legal frameworks impose an obligation on competent authorities to protect 
people’s fundamental rights and freedoms and in particular their right to privacy with 
respect to the processing of personal data.  
2.1.1.3.2 EU legislation: processing and retention of personal 
data  
As discussed previously, intellectual property rights infringers are not easily 
identifiable. Therefore, in order to identify them effectively, the collection and 
processing of personal data are required, without which prosecution and trials would 
be practically impossible. However, the collection and processing of a user’s personal 
data are subject to data protection legislation, the aim of which is to protect personal 
data, i.e. data that can be attributed to a person332.  
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There are several major instruments on the European Union level that govern 
issues of data protection. Firstly, Article 8 of the EU Charter provides a separate 
fundamental right to data protection, in that everyone has the right to the protection of 
personal data concerning him or her. Such data must be processed fairly for specified 
purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other 
legitimate basis laid down by law. Furthermore, everyone has the right to access any 
data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent 
authority333.  
Secondly, there are several directives, such as the Data Protection Directive 
95/46334, the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications 2002/58335 and the 
Data Retention Directive 2006/24336, that regulate the fair and lawful processing of 
personal data. The concept of data processing is defined very broadly as any 
operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not 
by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organisation, storage, adaptation 
or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or 
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or 
destruction337. Therefore, almost everything that can be done with personal data falls 
within this definition338. As a general principle, it requires the express consent of the 
data subject, except in specific circumstances when the data are legally required to be 
processed and to protect the public interests of a private party holding certain 
fundamental rights339.  
This means that ISPs should keep their subscribers’ true identities confidential. 
In particular, according to Article 5(1) of the Directive 2002/58 on Privacy and 
Electronic Communications, Member States shall ensure the confidentiality of 
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communications and related traffic data by means of a public communications 
network and publicly available electronic communications services, all provided 
through national legislation340.  
National legislations have often been inspired by OECD privacy guidelines341. 
Among these guidelines is the purpose specification principle, whereby data may 
only be collected for a specific purpose, and they may only be used for other purposes 
if authorised by the law or the subject (the person to whom the data pertain). In the 
European Union this principle has been adopted by Directive 95/46 on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, according to which collection and processing is allowed only 
for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes342. Directive 2002/58 on privacy and 
electronic communications further specifies that access to any stored information is 
allowed only according to the subscriber or user’s consent with clear and 
comprehensive information about the purposes of the processing of personal data343. 
However, as referred to in Article 13 (1) of the Data Protection Directive 
95/46344, Member States may provide for exceptions to the principle of personal data 
confidentiality when such a restriction constitutes a necessary measure to safeguard: 
(a) national security; (b) defence; (c) public security; (d) the prevention, investigation, 
detection and prosecution of criminal offences, or of breaches of ethics for regulated 
professions; (e) an important economic or financial interest of a Member State or of 
the European Union, including monetary, budgetary and taxation matters; (f) a 
monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected, even occasionally, with the 
exercise of official authority in cases referred to in (c), (d) and (e), and (g) the 
protection of the data subject or of the rights and freedoms of others. Moreover, 
Article 15 (1) of the Directive 2002/58 on privacy and electronic communications345 
also provides a list of exceptions to the principle of confidentiality.  
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Therefore, it is unclear as to whether the exceptions stated in Article 15 (1) of 
Directive 2002/58 on privacy and electronic communications include those laid down 
in Article 13 (1) of the Data Protection Directive 95/46. The European Court of 
Justice, in Promusicae v. Telefonica346, clarified the situation, by stating that Article 
15 (1) of the Directive 2002/58 on privacy and electronic communications must be 
read in conjunction with Article 13 (1) of the Data Protection Directive 95/46, and it 
must therefore be interpreted as allowing Member States to restrict the scope of 
obligations provided in certain articles of the Directive 2002/58 on privacy and 
electronic communications when this is necessary to safeguard the rights and 
freedoms of others, including the right to intellectual property in civil proceedings. 
The ECJ also found that under the law of European Union Member States, ISPs 
are not obliged to disclose personal data in the context of civil proceedings for the 
purpose of copyright protection347. Therefore, Member States have been given 
autonomy to decide on whether or not they want to legislate this matter.  
Consequently, only in the situation when national law allows the disclosure of 
personal information, EU Member State authorities may require the disclosure of 
personal data according to Directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights348. In particular, Article 8 (1) of that Directive states that judicial 
authorities may order that information on the origin and distribution networks of the 
goods or services which infringe an intellectual property right shall be provided by 
the infringer and/or any other person who possessed, used or was involved in the 
production of the goods or services, in response to a justified and proportionate 
request of the claimant349. Acts on a commercial scale refers to those acts carried out 
for direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage350. Therefore, we can 
conclude that acts on a commercial scale may refer to an activity of users who, 
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through peer-to-peer file sharing systems351, for instance, upload and download files, 
i.e. these users do not make a profit but they certainly cause financial damage to 
copyright owners, and they also enjoy a financial benefit, since they get for free a 
“product” which bears a price352.  
However, while the situation with the disclosure of personal data of infringers 
by ISPs for the purpose of civil litigation is more or less clear, the retention of 
personal data for such a purpose was an issue in the Swedish case Bonnier Audio v. 
Perfect Communication353, which demonstrates an important gap in EU legislation.  
In the case, a Swedish publishing company, Bonnier Audio, which holds 
exclusive rights to the reproduction, publishing and distribution to the public of 27 
works in the form of audio books, sued a Swedish Internet service provider, Perfect 
Communication, because their copyright had been infringed by the public distribution 
of these works, without their consent, via a file-sharing service. Bonnier applied for 
an order to disclose the identity of any users who were known to them only by their 
IP addresses from which the alleged infringing files had been sent. The ISP disputed 
the claim and stated that the data retained under the Data Retention Directive 
2006/24354 could only be used for the purposes of the investigation, detection and 
prosecution of serious crime and not for unrelated purposes such as civil litigation.  
The Solna district court decided in favour of the publishers, but the Court of 
Appeal upheld the ISP’s appeal on the basis that the publishers were unable to prove 
any infringement of their IP rights. The publishers appealed to the Swedish Supreme 
Court, which decided to stay the proceedings and ask the ECJ whether Data Retention 
Directive 2006/24355 precludes the application of a national provision which is based 
on Article 8 of Directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights 
and which permits an order against a third party in a civil proceeding to give a 
copyright holder or its representative information on the identity of a particular 
subscriber whose IP address, it is claimed, is used in an infringement.  
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The ECJ, in Bonnier Audio v. Perfect Communication, held that Data Retention 
Directive 2006/24 must be interpreted as not precluding the application of national 
laws that allow an ISP to be ordered to provide information identifying a subscriber 
whose IP address is suspected of being used for infringing purposes356. This was 
because such national legislation does not fall within the material scope of Data 
Retention Directive 2006/24357. Indeed, the main proceedings in this case involved a 
civil procedure and the data were requested not by a competent national authority but 
by private persons. Therefore, the Data Retention Directive was not applicable in this 
case (and, accordingly, it was irrelevant as to whether or not the Member State 
concerned had implemented the Data Retention Directive358).  
The question referred to the ECJ was asked in a way that the fundamental 
aspect of the case regarding the legality of data retention per se was avoided. 
Therefore, the ECJ did not rule on the legality of the non-business-related storage of 
data under the Data Retention Directive.  
Moreover, Article 6 of the Data Retention Directive 2006/24 prescribes a 
retention period for which certain types of personal data have to be kept by publicly 
available electronic communication services or public communications networks, 
usually between six months and two years. Such retention of personal data is 
established as derogation to the general rule in Article 15 (1) of the Directive 2002/58 
on privacy and electronic communication. 
It is important to note that data retained by an ISP may be used only for the 
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime359. However, the 
Data Retention Directive did not identify what constitutes serious crime, and 
furthermore it did not specify the conditions for access to the data, thereby leaving 
this issue up to the national courts of each EU Member State to define and interpret. 
In this regard the legality of the Data Retention Directive and its compatibility with 
fundamental rights has been an issue of active discussion through the Member States 
of the EU360. For example, the German Constitutional Court declared the domestic 
implementing enactment of the directive as unconstitutional, as domestic enactment 
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created “a feeling of surveillance” and failed to put sufficient limits on the use that 
could be made of stored data361. 
Undeniably, as noted in the European Data Protection Supervisor on the 
conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement362, there is no legal basis 
under the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications 2002/58 and the Data 
Retention Directive 2006/24 that would allow ISPs to lawfully retain links between 
individual IP addresses and Internet usage for the purpose of longer-term monitoring 
or analysis aimed at identifying “possible” IPR infringers363. 
However, according to the ECJ point of view in Ireland v. European 
Parliament and Council, although the retention of an individual’s personal data may 
in principle constitute interference within the meaning of Article 8 of the ECHR, this 
interference may be justified, in terms of that article, by reference to public safety and 
crime prevention364. This means that the retention of traffic and location data by ISPs 
is allowed, and so the national authorities of EU Member States should adapt the 
necessary measures on national law. Indeed, in the case of failing to adapt national 
law, financial sanctions may be ordered for not complying with the Data Retention 
Directive 2006/24365. 
Therefore, taking into account the controversies surrounding the application of 
the Data Retention Directive 2006/24 on the national level, the ECJ, in Digital Rights 
Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, was 
called upon to examine the validity of the Data Retention Directive 2006/24 in the 
light of two fundamental rights under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, 
namely the fundamental right to respect in one’s private life and the fundamental 
right to the protection of personal data366. 
After careful examination of the case, the ECJ, in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v 
Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, declared the Data 
Retention Directive invalid, the main argument for which was based on the fact that 
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by adopting the Data Retention Directive, EU legislature exceeded the limits imposed 
by compliance with the principle of proportionality. Furthermore, in spite of the fact 
that retaining data for the purposes of fighting terrorism, in order to maintain 
international peace and security, “genuinely satisfies an objective of general interest,” 
the retaining of such data was viewed as being a form of interference with the 
fundamental right to the protection of personal data367. This means that the scope of 
the Data retention Directive was too broad368.  
According to the ECJ, in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for 
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, the Data Retention Directive was 
lacking a precise scope:  
- covers all individuals, all means of electronic communication and all 
traffic data, without any limitation to the objective of fighting against 
serious crime; 
- there is no connection between persons whose traffic data are retained 
and a real threat to public security; 
- the retention period of at least six months does not distinguish between 
the categories of specific data;  
- does not provide for sufficient safeguards against any unlawful access 
and the use of the data; 
- does not require that the data be retained within the EU.  
Therefore, the Data Retention Directive does not fully ensure the control of 
compliance with the requirements of protection and security – as required explicitly 
by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Such a control, carried out on the 
basis of EU law, is an essential component of the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data369. 
Conclusion 
On the basis of the analysis provided herein, we can conclude that while the 
disclosure of personal data is allowed in civil proceedings, its retention is prohibited. 
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On the one hand, as stated in Promusicae v Telef´onica de Espa˜na SAU370, 
ISPs are not obliged to disclose personal data in the context of civil proceedings for 
the purpose of copyright protection371. Therefore, Member States have been given 
autonomy to decide whether or not they want to legislate this matter. Consequently, 
only in the situation when national law allows the disclosure of personal information, 
EU Member State authorities may require the disclosure of personal data according to 
Article 8 (1) of the Directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights372.  
On the other hand, as the recent ECJ decision in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v 
Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources indicates, national 
authorities are prohibited from retaining the personal data of subscribers, as such an 
approach interferes with the fundamental right to the protection of personal data373. 
In my opinion, the ECJ decision in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for 
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources is a clear expression of the ECJ’s 
intention to support the privacy and data protection of Internet users, rather than the 
interests of intellectual property rights owners. Moreover, by balancing the rights of 
privacy and data protection, on the one hand, and the retention of data (what is in the 
interest of intellectual property rights owners), on the other, the ECJ prioritises the 
privacy and data protection of Internet users.  
Indeed, as noted by the European Data Protection Supervisor, such a decision of 
the ECJ that limits the blanket government surveillance of communications data 
highlights the value placed on the protection of fundamental rights as the core of EU 
policy in this critical area374. However, if national laws are invalidated based on the 
ECJ in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and 
Natural Resources, existing convictions may also start being challenged if they relied 
previously on communications data and the collection and processing of which were 
based on an invalid law375. 
                                                 
370 Case C-275/06 Productores de M´usica de Espa˜na (Promusicae) v Telef´onica de Espa˜na SAU 
[2008] ECR I-271 
371 Ibid.  
372 Council Directive (EC) 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] O.J. L 157.  
373 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. and Kärntner Landesregierung 
[2014] OJ C 175. 
374 European Data Protection Supervisor, “Press Statement: The CJEU rules that Data Retention Directive 
is invalid” (2014) <https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEwebdav/site/mySite/shared/ 
Documents/EDPS/PressNews/Press/2014/14-04-08_Press_statement_DRD_EN.pdf> accessed 11 July 2014.  
375 Monica Salgado, ‘Case Comment Data retention – what now?’ (2014) & D.P. 14(7), 13-14. 
76 
 
2.1.1.3.3 National scenario: UK Digital Economy Act 2010 
Compared with EU data protection legislation, the recent UK Digital Economy 
Act 2010 (the DEA), having received Royal Assent on 8 June 2010376 (with the 
exception of certain sections that will be brought into force by statutory 
instrument)377, holds a different point of view on privacy and data protection. The 
DEA was introduced by the government378 as a response to the increasing problem of 
online copyright infringement through peer-to-peer file-sharing by subscribers to 
Internet services. 
The DEA contains measures aimed at reducing the level of online copyright 
infringement by identifying online perpetrators, in particular those involved in the 
illegal uploading and accessing of material online. More specifically, the DEA 
requires Internet service providers to supply copyright owners, if requested by the 
latter, with anonymised records of subscribers’ IP addresses that they allege are 
repeatedly infringing their rights, or upon a court’s order to provide copyright holders 
with the personal details of persistent alleged infringers in order to pursue civil 
actions379. These measures are known as “initial obligations.”  
The practical aspects of implementing the measures established by the DEA are 
provided by Ofcom. On June 26, 2012, Ofcom published a draft code for consultation 
that would require large Internet service providers to inform customers of allegations 
that their Internet connection had been used to infringe copyright380. The new rules 
were the first major revision made by Ofcom since first laying out its copyright 
infringement procedure in 2010381, as part of the Digital Economy Act, and in many 
ways they were similar to those that preceded it. The new proposals applied only to 
large ISPs with more than 400,000 broadband-enabled fixed lines – at the time BT, 
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Everything Everywhere, O2, Sky, TalkTalk Group and Virgin Media, which together 
accounted more than 93% of the retail broadband market in the UK.  
According to the draft code, ISPs would need to send letters to customers, at 
least a month apart, informing them that their account had been connected to reports 
of suspected online copyright infringement. After three separate infringement notices 
in a 12-month period, anonymous information may be provided on request to 
copyright owners, who would then be able to seek a court order requiring the ISPs to 
reveal the identity of the customer. It is currently expected that the first customer 
notification letters will be sent no earlier than the end of 2015382.  
The notification system established by the DEA survived the challenge of a 
judicial review initiated by Internet service providers BT and TalkTalk. The 
claimants contended that the provisions of the DEA, which required service providers 
to process users’ personal data and sensitive personal data, are unlawful as a matter of 
EU law. In particular, the claimants submitted that the provisions of the DEA are 
incompatible with privacy requirements under Directive 95/46 and Directive 2002/58, 
as they require the “processing” by ISPs and copyright owners of subscribers’ 
personal data without their consent.  
Indeed, these statutory provisions of the DEA attracted a lot of criticism383. On 
the one hand, as noted by Richard Taylor, the DEA was not properly scrutinised by 
parliament and would also cause undue harm to the privacy rights and freedoms of 
Internet users384. In particular, in order to identify heavy infringers, the DEA adopts a 
fundamentally flawed method of matching peer-to-peer traffic with IP addresses, 
which means that users might become the frequent victims of wrong accusations385, 
particularly as one IP address can be shared by several individual users at public 
access points such as schools and libraries or on community WIFI.  
On the other hand, as noted in a report by the London School of Economics and 
Political Science, peer-to-peer technology has many legitimate benefits and therefore 
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should be encouraged to promote new and innovative applications. The School’s 
research shows that providing user-friendly, hassle-free solutions to enable users to 
download music legally at a reasonable price is a much more effective strategy for 
enforcing copyright that a heavy-handed legislative and regulatory regime386.  
Moreover, the Hargreaves Review of Intellectual Property and Growth noted 
that in relation to the level of online copyright infringement and its impact on the UK 
economy, the review team did “not find either a figure for the prevalence and impact 
of piracy worldwide or for the UK in which we can place our confidence”387. 
Therefore, as recommended by the Hargreaves Review of Intellectual Property and 
Growth, the implementation of the online copyright infringement provisions of the 
Digital Economy Act should be “monitored carefully so that the approach can be 
adjusted in the light of evidence”388; otherwise “resources will be wasted and further 
harm may be done to the interests of everyone concerned.”389  
Nonetheless, the judicial review proceedings failed, and so the High Court 
decision represents a significant boost to the record industry and copyright owners390. 
In particular, the High Court held that the processing of personal data by copyright 
owners fell within the scope of the exemption permissible under Article 8(2) (e) of 
the Data Protection Directive 95/46 on the basis that it is necessary for the 
establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims391. This would appear to be the 
precise purpose of the contested provisions of the DEA: the copyright owner will be 
able, through the procedures under the DEA, to establish not only that there has been 
an infringement of copyright, but also who is responsible for the infringement392. 
However, the ISPs’ essential contention is that the judge lost sight of the fact that in a 
substantial proportion of cases the scheme established by the DEA seeks to educate 
users about the legal rights of copyright owners; in fact, 70% of infringers would stop 
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once and for all upon receiving a single notification from their ISP393. In those 
circumstances the processing could not be said to be necessary for the establishment, 
exercise or defence of legal claims, and it would therefore not fall within the 
exemption in Article 8(2) (e) of the Data Protection Directive 95/46. The Court 
observed, on behalf of the copyright owners, that the fact that the scheme seeks to 
encourage copyright owners to desist, without the need for legal action, does not 
mean that the copyright owners are not establishing, exercising or defending their 
legal rights. Therefore, processing would fall within the exception in Article 8(2) (e) 
of the Data Protection Directive 95/46. In addition, the High Court also found that 
such processing by copyright owners fell within the derogation under Article 15(1) of 
the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 2002/58, which permits 
restrictions of data protection principles where these restrictions comprise a 
necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure. The Court relied on the ECJ case 
of Promusicae v. Telefonica to demonstrate that the derogation applies to property 
rights, including copyright394.  
In autumn 2011, BT and TalkTalk won permission to appeal the High Court's 
rejection of their application for a judicial review of the provisions of the DEA395. 
However, the companies lost their battle in a judgment made by the Court of Appeal 
on March 6, 2012396, which ruled that the High Court had reached a correct decision 
and that its ruling was “soundly based” and there was no need to refer the case to the 
European Court of Justice for a final ruling. 
The claimants’ argument that the provisions of the DEA breaching Article 8 of 
the Data Protection Directive 95/46 was again rejected by the Court of Appeal, which 
agreed with the High Court decision on the basis that any data processing required by 
the new provisions was “necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal 
claims even if the beneficial consequence of the sending of a notification by the ISP 
pursuant to a copyright information request will be that in the majority of cases the 
infringing activity ceases and no further action is required”397. Therefore, the High 
Court held that the processing in question in this case would fall within the exception 
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in Article 8(2) (e) of the Data Protection Directive 95/46. The Court of Appeal 
rejected an argument by the appellants that the ruling in Promusicae v. Telefonica 
related only to the protection of property in the context of civil proceedings, where 
there is a sufficient degree of judicial oversight, and that no wider derogation was to 
be read into Article 15(1) of the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 
2002/58 so as to apply in the present context398. Indeed, the court, in Promusicae v. 
Telefonica, interpreted Article 15(1) of the Privacy and Electronic Communications 
Directive 2002/58 correctly as extending to the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others, including the protection of the right to property, and that this was not 
intended to be limited to the context of civil proceedings399. In support of this position 
the court also relied on the ECJ case Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM400, in which 
nothing was found to support the limited scope of the ruling in Promusicae v. 
Telefonica401.  
Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeal confirms that the contested 
provisions of the DEA do not conflict with European law. The decision will be 
welcomed not only by industry groups such as the Motion Picture Association and the 
Federation against Software Theft, but also by copyright holders who continue to 
suffer loss from people illegally downloading and sharing their work for free402.  
Conclusion 
As our analysis indicates, the UK DEA takes a contrasting approach in 
comparison with EU practice. Moreover, while the EU gives priority to the protection 
of privacy and data protection, UK DEA gives priority to the interests of intellectual 
property rights owners.  
Indeed, in spite of criticism by ISPs, the DEA provides a perfect legislative 
stimulus for Britain’s creative industries through a package of measures aimed at 
reducing online piracy in the United Kingdom. This is especially true in the light of 
evidence from France, which has implemented similar legislation. In particular, 
according to the “Hadopi” statute, the principal measure of IP processing is the 
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identification of copyright infringers403, and according to the IFPI Digital Music 
Report 2012404, the French “three strikes” agency, Hadopi, during its first year of 
operation sent more than 700,000 copyright infringement notices, resulting in a 26% 
overall reduction in unauthorised peer-to-peer network activity since October 2010. A 
study commissioned by Hadopi in May 2011 found that among those who had either 
received a notice or knew someone who had received one, 50% said knowledge or 
receipt of said notice made them stop their illegal activity, and a further 22% said it 
reduced their illegal consumption405.  
2.1.1.3.4 Is an IP address personal data? 
In order to identify peer-to-peer users who upload or download illegal content 
on the Internet, the processing of IP addresses is required. However, the possibilities 
of ISPs identifying the user are rather restricted, and as we shall see later, ISPs may 
be required under Article 8 of the Directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights to disclose personal information to investigating 
authorities. Consequently, it is important to consider whether or not IP addresses are 
qualified as personal data and, if so, its collection, storage and use will be subject to 
data protection legislation and subsequently restricted by it. 
Data Protection Directive 95/46 defines personal data as including “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable person; an identifiable person is 
one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, 
mental, economic, culture or social identity.”406  
In the Draft Regulation, which is intended to replace Directive 95/46, data 
subjects will additionally include those that can be identified by reference to “an 
identification number, location data and online identifier,” with the latter given more 
characteristics in Recital 24 with the wording: “When using online services, 
individuals may be associated with online identifiers provided by their devices, 
applications, tools and protocols, such as Internet Protocol addresses or cookie 
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identifiers.”407 Some of these new elements may be used to create profiles of 
individuals and identify them, especially when combined with other data, whilst for 
others it is not clear408.  
Additionally, the details of the person that used a particular IP address at a 
particular time and on a particular day may constitute personal data if such 
information is capable of linking an action to a subscriber. The ECJ, in Promusicae v 
Telefonica, did not confirm whether an IP address by itself could be considered as 
personal data.  
Therefore, the interpretation of the national law of EU Member States is 
required. On the one hand, it has been argued that IP addresses do not constitute 
personal data, since they are not directly linked to a person, and even when they can 
be linked, this can only be done indirectly by a third party409. Indeed, as noted by the 
Information Commissioner, an IP address in isolation is not personal data under the 
UK Data Protection Act 1998, because it is focused on a computer and not on an 
individual410. In addition, according to UK case law, anonymised data are not 
personal data. In particular, in Common Services Agency v Scottish Information 
Commissioner, the court held that “Rendering data anonymous in such a way that the 
individual to whom the information from which they are derived refers is no longer 
identifiable would enable the information to be released without having to apply the 
principles of data protection”411. Moreover, UK data protection laws (Data Protection 
Act 1988412, Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003413 and the 
Digital Economy Act of 2010414) do not relate specifically to the status of an IP 
address as personal data. However, the Code of Practice issued by the Office of 
Communications415 provides inter alia for the supply to copyright owners of details of 
                                                 
407 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data’ COM (2012) 11 final, Recital 24.  
408 Ashley Winton, Neal Cohen, ‘The General Data  Protection Regulation as it applies to online 
advertising, e-commerce and social media’ (2012) 18 C.T.L.R. 97, 97-101. 
409Irini Stamatoudi, ‘Data Protection, Secrecy of Communications and Copyright: Conflict and 
Convergences – The Example of Promusicae v. Telefonica’ in Irini Stamatoudi (ed.), Copyright enforcement and 
the Internet (Kluwer Law International 2010) 203. 
410 Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘The Guide to Data Protection’ (2008) 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/practical_application/the_guide_to_data_protec
tion.pdf> accessed 6 April 2012. 
411 Common Services Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner [2008] UKHL 47, 25. 
412 Data Protection Act 1998, Chapter 29. 
413 Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003, S.I. 2003 N2426 Regulation 18 (8) 
414 Digital Economy Act of 2010.  
415 Digital Economy Act of 2010.  
83 
 
IP addresses related to computers (and individuals) suspected of having been 
involved in copyright infringement on three or more occasions. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the data provided by ISPs to copyright owners (Copyright Infringement 
Reports) are not personal data and thus can be disclosed without reference to the UK 
Data Protection Act 1998416; in fact, the IP address is focused on a computer and not 
on the individual.  
According to another point of view, however, IP addresses can be considered as 
personal data, since they can be linked directly or indirectly to a particular person, 
even if this linkage can take place via a third party processing or controlling 
information that can identify the subscriber417. In particular, Article 29 of the Data 
Protection Working Party418 considers IP addresses attributed to Internet users as a 
personal data419. This interpretation is based on the fact that ISPs are always420 able to 
make a link between the user’s identity and an IP address421, the latter of which 
allows them to track a natural person who has posted content online422. This approach 
has been followed by the Sweden Administrative Court of Appeal, which has stated 
that an IP address is a personal data. It does not matter whether the individual behind 
the IP address is the subscriber or someone else who actually uses the subscription, as 
an IP address refers to an individual, the subscriber423. This decision was confirmed 
also by the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court, which ruled that an IP address is 
personal information424. 
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German law also considers IP addresses as a personal data425, because the ISP 
knows which one of its customers was assigned this IP address at any given point in 
time426. As noted by Germany’s data protection commissioner, when someone is 
identified by an IP address, “then it has to be regarded as personal data”427. The 
qualification of IP addresses as personal data is also confirmed by German court 
practice. In particular, the Berlin court ruled that IP addresses, including dynamic IP 
addresses, are personal data, not only in relation to the access provider but also to the 
telemedia service provider, because the user can be identified through the access 
provider428. In another case the court also came to the conclusion that dynamic IP 
addresses are personal data which are protected as telecommunications secret by 
Article 10 of the German constitution429. The German courts argue that a user’s 
identity, which may be allocated through an IP address, constitutes a user’s data and 
is not traffic data, which should be protected as personal data430. In this regard the 
German courts went even further by instructing the public prosecutor’s office not to 
disclose any requested identification data to the music industry, arguing that the 
requested measure was disproportionate with the user’s privacy431.  
However, the French court practice with regard to the identification of an IP 
address as personal data is very contradictory. On the one hand, there are cases where 
the French courts follow a similar to the UK approach, in that IP addresses do not 
constitute personal data. In particular, the Appeal Court of Paris (France) held that IP 
addresses only allow one to identify a computer, and therefore its processing does not 
allow one to identify its user432. Indeed, IP addresses are linked to a computer and not 
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to a person, meaning that this computer may be used by more than one person or 
simply may not be used by the subscriber indicated by the ISP433. The Supreme Court 
(France) has further indicated that an IP address on its own cannot identify an 
individual and its processing cannot breach data protection rules434. This means that 
an IP address is not personal data, since information manually collected by a 
copyright society’s sworn agent within the scope of his competence does not fall 
under the scope of the French Privacy Act435. 
On the other hand, some French court decisions qualify an IP address as 
personal data. Indeed, the processing of users’ IP addresses by copyright society for 
the purpose of identifying peer-to-peer infringers involves the application of the 
French Privacy Act436. This approach is confirmed also by the Rennes Appeal Court, 
which also stated that the IP address is personal data, as the main purpose of 
collecting the IP address is to identify a copyright infringer437. In this connection the 
Constitutional Court concluded that the IP address is personal data, as authorisation 
given to a copyright society to collect data, thereby allowing the indirect 
identification of an Internet access owner, implies the processing of personal data 
relative to infractions438. 
On the basis on the analysis provided herein, we can conclude that national 
practices with regard to the identification of an IP address as personal information are 
very contradictory. Indeed, while Germany and Sweden consider an IP address as 
personal information, the UK courts do not follow the same approach, by instead 
considering an IP address as not being protected as personal data. The French courts 
also cannot reach a compromise in this regard. However, as our analysis indicates, in 
order to qualify an IP address as personal data, judges need to identify whether it may 
be linked to a specific individual (if not, it is not personal data); the availability of 
other information which, in combination with an IP address, can identify a natural 
person; the goal of processing the IP address is to identify the intellectual property 
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rights infringer behind a specific IP address in civil proceedings and the intention of 
the processor of the IP address to prosecute the IP infringer in civil proceedings. 
In my opinion, IP addresses in combination with other information are personal 
data when they are used to identify the living individual. For example, if the 
processing of an IP address is required by the copyright holder in order to prosecute 
computer users for violating intellectual property rights, the IP address should be 
considered as personal data. However, the IP address along is not a personal data as it 
does not allow to identify an individual behind the IP address.  
In support of this position we might compare IP addresses with the recent 
judgement about anonymous medical statistics. The High Court of Justice (UK) 
stated that the disclosure of anonymised information, extracted from personal data, 
does not constitute the release of personal data439. Therefore, a statistic by itself as 
well as an IP address alone is not personal data, because a person can be identified 
from statistics only when taken together with other information440. 
The same situation applies to IP addresses. In particular, the holder of the IP 
address knows that it definitely forms part of a collection of personal data and that the 
ISP might be able to identify an individual in conjunction with other information in 
its possession. For example, if we purchase something from an online store, and that 
store records our IP address, that database entry now associates our IP address with 
our name, phone number and address441. If that database were breached by hackers, 
then the IP address could be used to identify us. On the other hand, the IP addresses 
recorded by every website on the planet without additional information should not be 
considered personal data, because these websites usually cannot identify the human 
beings behind these number strings442. In addition, an IP address by itself, at least in 
the context of the Internet, would in most cases be unlikely to be personal data443.  
Similarly, Recital 23 of the Proposal for a Regulation on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
                                                 
439 The Queen on the application of Department of Health v Information Commissioner [2011] EWHC 
1430 (Admin). The Department of Health brings an appeal under Section 59 of the Freedom of Information Act 
2000 against the decision of the Information Tribunal which ordered the Department of Health to disclose late-
term abortion statistics.  
440 Ibid, para 38.  
441 Dane Jevans, ‘Privacy and Identity Theft’ (2008) <http://blog.ironkey.com/?p=310> accessed 4 
November 2011. 
442 Alma Whitten, ‘Are IP addresses personal?’ (2008) <http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/ 
2008/02/are-ip-addresses-personal.html> accessed 5 November 2011. 
443 Graham Smith, Internet Law and Regulation (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 696. 
87 
 
of such data (General Data Protection Regulation)444 states that “principles of data 
protection shall not apply to data rendered anonymous in such a way that the data 
subject is no longer identifiable”445. The same wording is used in Recital 26 of the 
Data Protection Directive 95/46. However, it is still an open question as to when data 
are to be regarded as having been rendered anonymous. In particular, according to 
Article 2 (b) of the the Data Protection Directive 95/46, the processing of personal 
data is “any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data.” That 
means that the anonymisation446 of personal data involves the processing of personal 
data. Therefore, the principles of data protection apply to personal data before they 
are rendered anonymous447, at which point they are not governed by the principle of 
data protection. This means that if an IP address is rendered anonymous, it cannot be 
considered as an “online identifier.”  
However, the IP rights owner is interested in prosecuting intellectual property 
rights infringers by identifying a living individual behind the IP address, before it is 
rendered anonymous. Therefore, it would be reasonable to provide an exception to 
the principle of data protection in the case of intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet, particularly when the IP address is used for identifying an IP rights 
infringer. In my opinion, the principle of data protection should not protect the IPRs 
infringer (in spite of the fact that personal data processing is involved).  
Therefore, the General Data Protection Regulation should make it clear that 
when IP addresses or similar identifiers are processed with the intention of targeting 
particular content in the case of intellectual property rights infringement, the principle 
of data protection is not applicable. Indeed, if every rule contains an exemption, this 
principle may also be applicable with regard to the processing of personal data in the 
case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. Thus, if the purpose 
of using an IP address is to identify a living individual in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement, such information should be exempted from the principle 
of data protection. 
                                                 
444 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data’ COM (2012) 11 final. 
445 This is the same wording used in Recital 26 of the  Data Protection Directive, but there is no guidance 
as to how one might not make personal  data indirectly identifiable and for anonymity there is no art.10 assistance. 
446 Rendering personal data non-personal.  
447 D. Beylevel. and D. Townend, ‘When is personal data rendered anonymous? Interpreting recital 26 of 
Directive 95/46/EC.’ (2004) 6 Medical law international. 73, 73-86. 
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Without a uniform European approach, some important online businesses will 
lack the legal certainty required to conduct online business efficiently 448. 
Conclusion 
As shown above, EU Member States follow very contradictory case practices. 
In particular, while Germany and Sweden protect the IP address as personal 
information, the UK courts do not protect the IP address as personal data. The French 
courts also cannot reach a compromise in the same regard. 
Therefore, harmonisation of the practice is required. In my opinion, the General 
Data Protection Regulation should make it clear that when IP addresses or similar 
identifiers are processed with the intention of targeting particular content in the case 
of intellectual property rights infringement, the principle of data protection is not 
applicable (by way of establishing an exemption). Furthermore, without a uniform 
European approach, some important online businesses will lack the legal certainty 
required to conduct online business efficiently449.  
2.1.1.3.5 How to achieve a balance between IP protection and 
data protection law  
The question that arises is whether Member States are allowed under EU law to 
mandate ISPs in their national laws to communicate personal data to right holders, in 
order to ensure the effective protection of intellectual property rights in the context of 
civil proceedings and, in that case, what is the role of the principle of proportionality?  
This question will be discussed at the EU level and national level of the some 
Member States.  
2.1.1.3.6 EU case law  
Some guidance on this question has already been given in the abovementioned 
Promusicae v. Telefonica450. In this case the Spanish right holder group Promusicae 
applied against Telefónica, a Spanish ISP, whereby the copyright society wanted to 
force the latter to disclose the identity data of certain persons engaging in peer-to-peer 
file-sharing practices, in order to be able to bring civil proceedings against them for 
                                                 
448 ICO, ‘Initial Analysis of the European Commission’s Proposals for a Revised Data  Protection 
Legislative Framework’ (2012) <http://www.ico.gov.uk/%EB/media/documents/library/Data_ Protection/ 
Research_and_reports/ico_initial_analysis_of_revised_eu_dp_legislative_proposals.ashx> accessed 26 May 2012.  
449 Ibid. 
450Case C-275/06 Productores de M´usica de Espa˜na (Promusicae) v Telef´onica de Espa˜na SAU [2008] 
ECR I-271.  
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copyright infringement. The question referred to the ECJ for preliminary ruling was 
whether community law, and in particular Directive 2000/31 on certain legal aspects 
of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal 
Market and Directive 2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights in the information society, the Directive 2004/48 on the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, requires ISPs to disclose the identities of 
peer-to-peer Internet users to copyright holders. 
Although the three Directives (Article 1(5) (b) of Directive 2000/31, Article 9 
of Directive 2001/29 and Article 8(3) (e) of Directive 2004/48) mentioned by the 
Spanish Court have as their aim, amongst others, the effective protection of 
copyright, this protection does not prevail over the protection afforded to personal 
data by Directives 1995/46 and 2002/58451.  
The ECJ, in Promusicae v. Telefonica, focused on Article 8(1) of the Directive 
2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, which allows judicial 
authorities to request confidential information about an alleged infringement of 
copyright to be made available, although this does not mean that Member States are 
obliged to provide specific rules for the communication of personal data in the 
context of civil proceedings452. In addition, the TRIPS Agreement does not oblige 
Member States to communicate personal data in the context of civil proceedings453. 
Thus, the ECJ came to the conclusion that EU law does not require Member 
States to lay down an obligation to communicate personal data, in order to ensure the 
effective protection of copyright in the context of civil proceedings. In other words, 
the ECJ acknowledged that Member States have an obligation to protect IP rights 
holders in the information society, but not necessarily at the expense of data 
protection rights.  
The ruling reached in Promusicae v. Telefonica454 was confirmed in another 
judgment of the ECJ, namely LSG v. Tele 2455. LSG is an Austrian collecting society 
                                                 
451 Irini Stamatoudi, ‘Data Protection, Secrecy of Communications and Copyright: Conflict and 
Convergences – The Example of Promusicae v. Telefonica’ in Irini Stamatoudi (ed.), Copyright enforcement and 
the Internet (Kluwer Law International 2010) 213.  
452 Case C-275/06 Productores de M´usica de Espa˜na (Promusicae) v Telef´onica de Espa˜na SAU 
[2008] ECR I-271, para 15.  
453 Ibid, para 60. 
454 Case C-275/06 Productores de M´usica de Espa˜na (Promusicae) v Telef´onica de Espa˜na SAU 
[2008] ECR I-271.  
455 Case C-557/07 LSG-Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung von Leistungsshutzrechten GmbH v Tele2 
Telecommunication gmbH [2008] PJ C 64.  
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which had requested Tele 2, an Austrian Internet access provider, to communicate the 
names and addresses of its subscribers whose IP addresses had been logged by LSG, 
for the purposes of initiating proceedings against them on the grounds of copyright 
infringement. However, Tele2 refused to do so. The Austrian Supreme Court stayed 
proceedings and referred the question to the ECJ. 
The ECJ held that EU law, in particular Article 8(3) of the Directive on the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, read in conjunction with Article 15 (1) of 
Directive on Privacy in Electronic Communications, does not preclude Member 
States from imposing in their national law an obligation to disclose to private third 
parties personal data relating to Internet traffic, in order to enable them to bring civil 
proceedings for copyright infringements456.  
Therefore, as follows from Promusicae v. Telefonica457 and LSG v. Tele 2458, 
there is no direct legal conflict between the European legal framework for online 
copyright enforcement and data protection. Thus, the ECJ seems to hold that the 
European legal framework is neutral in this regard, confirming that EU law, on the 
one hand, does not preclude Member States from imposing an obligation to disclose 
to private third parties personal data relating to Internet traffic, in order to enable 
them to bring civil proceedings for copyright infringements (LSG v.Tele 2), while on 
the other hand, it does not require Member States to lay down that obligation459 
(Promusicae v. Telefonica).  
Consequently, it is possible to conclude that an obligation to communicate 
personal data to right holders, in order to ensure the effective protection of intellectual 
property law on the Internet in the context of civil proceedings, is not dictated by 
European Union law, and Member States are free to decide whether or not they shall 
provide such an obligation in their national laws.  
                                                 
456 Ibid, para 29. 
457 Case C-275/06 Productores de M´usica de Espa˜na (Promusicae) v Telef´onica de Espa˜na SAU 
[2008] ECR I-271.  
458 Case C-557/07 LSG-Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung von Leistungsshutzrechten GmbH v Tele2 
Telecommunication gmbH [2008] PJ C 64.  
459 Commission, ‘Study on online Copyright Enforcement and Data Protection in Selected Member States’ 
(2009) <http://www.hunton.com/files/Publication/85250f09-3c6e-4232-b4f1-eb766f1f5a85/ 
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However, in the above Promusicae v. Telefonica and LSG v. Tele2 cases, the 
ECJ noted, EU law requires that, when transposing Directives 2000/31460, 2001/29461, 
2002/58462 and 2004/48463 into national law, Member States must rely on an 
interpretation of them which allows a fair balance to be struck between the various 
fundamental rights protected by the EU legal order464,465.  
Indeed, in Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM, the ECJ recalled the judgment in 
Promusicae v. Telefonica which requires Member States to balance competing 
interests, namely rights linked to intellectual property and other fundamental rights. 
In particular, the ECJ pointed out specifically, in the context of measures adopted to 
protect copyright holders, that the right to intellectual property, as safeguarded in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, was not an inviolable right 
and should be balanced against the protection of other fundamental rights466. As such, 
national courts must strike a fair balance between the rights of intellectual property 
owners, the rights of ISPs and the rights of individual users 467. 
This case has its origin in a dispute between SABAM, a Belgian collecting 
society which is responsible for authorising the use by third parties of the musical 
works of authors, composers and editors, and Scarlet Extended SA, an Internet 
service provider. SABAM established that users of Scarlet’s services were 
downloading works in SABAM’s catalogue, by using peer-to-peer file-sharing 
software, without authorisation and without paying royalties. SABAM requested an 
order requiring Scarlet to prevent such infringements by blocking or filtering peer-to-
peer file-sharing sites. 
The Brussels Court of First Instance ordered Scarlet to install a filtering system 
which would make it impossible for users to send or receive files containing musical 
                                                 
460 Council Directive (EC) 2000/31 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular 
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000]. O.J. L 178. 
461 Council Directive (EC) 2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights 
in the information society [2001] OJL 167.  
462 Council Directive (EC) 2002/58 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of 
privacy in the electronic communications sector [2002] OJ L336/21. 
463 Council Directive (EC) 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L 157/46. 
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works included in SABAM’s catalogues. The ISPs appealed, and the case was 
referred to the ECJ.  
The ECJ ruled that the proposed measure was in breach of European law. In 
reaching its decision, the court held that copyright had to be balanced with the ISP’s 
freedom to conduct business under Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union, while the injunction at issue would result in a serious 
infringement of that freedom (as well as the requirements of the Directive 2004/48 on 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights), as it would require the ISP to install a 
complicated, costly and permanent filtering system at its own expense468.  
The ECJ also found that installing a filtering system would infringe the 
fundamental rights of the ISP’s customers. First, it would entail the systematic 
analysis of all content transmitted through Scarlet’s network, and thus the collection 
and identification of its users’ IP addresses, contrary to the customers’ right to the 
protection of their personal data, enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union469. Secondly, the filtering system might not be able to 
distinguish adequately between lawful and unlawful content, and its introduction 
could lead to the blocking of lawful communications of information, contrary to the 
customers’ freedom to receive or impart information, enshrined in Article 11 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union470. On this basis, the ECJ 
concluded that EU law precluded the granting of injunctions obliging ISPs to install 
the sort of filtering system stipulated in this instance.  
However, it is still an open question as to whether or not a filtering system 
which is paid for equally by the ISP and the right holder is lawful, or if this applies to 
a filtering system which is put in place by the ISP on a temporary basis for a few 
months.  
The most important rule established by Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM is that 
the protection of intellectual property rights is not inviolable or absolute471. The 
rulings of this case clearly indicate that the protection of copyright must be balanced 
against the protection of other fundamental rights, namely the right of the online 
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service provider to conduct a business and the rights of users to the protection of their 
personal data. 
In addition, the interests of Internet users should also be taken into account not, 
only with regard to privacy protection, but also in relation to access to the Internet472. 
In particular, measures taken by Member States regarding end-users’ access to, or use 
of, services and applications through electronic communications networks shall 
respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and the general principles of community law473. 
Therefore, the ECJ’s decision is hardly surprising, as it provides implications 
not only for the interests of ISPs and their customers, but also for the provision of 
information society services and the interests of Internet users as a whole. 
In another case, SABAM v Netlog BV474, the ECJ followed the approach it had 
taken in Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM, i.e. recalling that Directive 2000/31 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the internal market prohibits any general requirement to monitor 
information, and that the courts must strike a fair balance between the right to 
intellectual property, on the one hand, and the freedom to conduct business, the right 
to protect personal data and the freedom to receive or impart information, on the 
other.  
The SABAM v Netlog BV case475 concerned another claim made by SABAM for 
the imposition of a filter, albeit this time against the social networking website 
Netlog. The ECJ held that imposing an obligation on a social network to install a 
“general filtering system,” to prevent all users from sharing copyrighted music, was 
disproportionate to the extent that such filters may block lawful communications or 
violate users’ privacy rights. It would also be costly for Netlog and “result in a 
serious infringement of the freedom of the company to conduct its business”476.  
                                                 
472 Directive (EC) 2009/140 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic 
communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic 
communications networks and services [2009] OJ L 337, Recital 4.  
473 Directive (EC) 2002/21 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services [2002] OJ L108, Art. 1 (3a).  
474 Case C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog BV [2012] OJ C98, para 51. 
475 Ibid, para 51. 
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The ECJ’s decisions in Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM and SABAM v Netlog BV 
do not mean that injunctions could not be granted against service providers, but the 
ECJ is saying that in granting such orders courts need to strike a fair balance between 
various fundamental rights protected by EU law. Therefore, the Belgian Court had 
struck the wrong balance.  
Indeed, according to L’Oreal v eBay477, the ECJ recognised that EU law did 
provide for trademark holders to apply for injunctions against service providers, 
while national courts were permitted to take measures aimed not just at bringing an 
end to existing infringements, but also to preventing future infringements478. In 
particular, Recital 24 to the Directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights states that such injunctions may include “prohibitory measures” aimed 
at preventing further infringements of intellectual property rights and “corrective 
measures,” such as recalling, removing from distribution or destroying infringing 
goods and materials used to create them479. At the same time, as stated in Article 2(3) 
of the Directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, it “shall 
not affect” the provisions of the Directive 2000/31 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal 
market480. Thus, any injunction granted must not affect the provision in Article 15 of 
the latter, which precludes Member States from imposing a general obligation on 
providers to monitor the information which they transmit or store.  
In L’Oreal v eBay481 the ECJ made clear that the measures which national 
courts may impose on online service providers must be effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive, and they must not create barriers to legitimate trade482. The ECJ does not 
provide an answer about the scope of the injunctions or how the principle of 
proportionality should affect the measures that national courts may impose on online 
service providers. These questions are a matter of national law.  
Conclusion 
                                                 
477 Case C-324/09 L’Oreal v eBay [2011] ECR I-06011. 
478 Ibid.  
479 Council Directive (EC) 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L195/16. 
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Therefore, as ECJ practices indicate (Promusicae v. Telefonica483, LSG v. Tele 
2484, Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM 485, SABAM v Netlog BVcase486, L’Oreal v 
eBay487), national courts must weigh up the interests of the parties involved on the 
ground of the principle of proportionality, which requires that “the measures to be 
taken should be appropriate and necessary to achieve the goal pursued.” Moreover, 
the ECJ did not give prioritise any right, thus recognising them all as being 
fundamental rights488 which benefit from equal protection489. The same approach has 
been taken up in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, which states that in the 
case of any infringement of intellectual property rights in the digital environment, the 
balance of the rights and interests of the relevant right holders, service providers and 
users must be provided490. 
The ECJ has preserved the status quo as a matter of the right to privacy and the 
rights to property, which will be subject to further decisions of national courts. In 
turn, Member States may establish guidelines in respect to balancing the opposing 
rights and interests concerned491. 
2.1.1.3.7 National practice  
The ECJ decisions leave open several important questions, such as how to 
apply the proportionality principle in practice and how to strike a fair balance 
between the data protection right and the right to property492. These issues remain 
unclear at the European Union level, and they seem to be left entirely to Member 
States. 
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Therefore, it would be interesting to analyse how some national courts have 
dealt with the abovementioned issues after the delivery by the ECJ of the Promusicae 
v. Telefonica. As such, we will need to pay attention to the most important case 
practice in this sphere (UK, Sweden, France and Germany).  
In the UK, in Polydor Limited & Others v Brown & Others493, the claimants 
brought infringement proceedings against a Mr Bowles for copyright infringement, 
by providing the public with access to his files over the Internet. Polydor obtained Mr 
Bowles’ identity by obtaining a Norwich Pharmacal Order against various Internet 
service providers, who were required to release the identity of individuals that had 
used their services to connect to the Internet. Also, in Helen Grant v Google UK 
Limited494 Google was ordered to disclose the identity of the person responsible for 
an advertisement on its search engine. The plaintiff discovered that its copyright work 
was available for free download on the Internet, through an advertisement generated 
by the Google Internet search engine which used the name of the plaintiff’s work. 
Also, in Golden Eye (International) Ltd and Others v Telefonica UK Ltd495 and 
Totalise Plc v Motley Fool Ltd496, the court held that the ISPs should disclose the 
identity of wrongdoers. Indeed, as recent UK cases have shown, courts weight the 
balance in favour of IP owners, which means that in the case of intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet, the ISP should disclose the personal data of 
Internet users by virtue of a court order497. 
Similarly, the French court, in Anthony G. vs. SCPP498, ruled that the law 
enforcement authority may obtain a user’s identity from the ISP. The main court’s 
argument was based on the fact that an IP address does not allow the identification of 
the person who has used a computer, since only the legitimate authority for 
investigation may obtain this information from the ISP. Therefore, the French court 
gives priority to the interest of intellectual property rights owners, by stating that the 
IP address can only be used to identify a computer among connected computers on 
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the Internet, while the legitimate authority may disclose the identity of the intellectual 
property rights infringer499.  
Another approach was taken in Sweden. In spite of the country’s very “open” 
and “transparent” attitude to privacy rights, it seems that Swedish ISPs are not 
obliged to disclose information related to their users. For example, in APB v. Perfect 
Communication Sweden AB500, the Swedish ISP ePhone successfully appealed a court 
order demanding it to provide an audiobook publisher with the name and address of 
the user of an IP address. The court ruled that the ISP should not be obliged to hand 
over requested information, since no conclusions could be drawn regarding the size of 
the circle of people with access to the files or regarding the purpose, character or 
terms of admission to the circle. In particular, the publisher had not shown probable 
cause that copyright infringement had been committed501.  
German court practice also does not allow for disclosing the identity of Internet 
users. In particular, as stated by the Berlin Appeal Court, the principle of good faith 
does not oblige a webhosting company to communicate personal data relating to its 
users when such users are responsible for infringing material502. In another case the 
court instructed the public prosecutor’s office not to disclose the requested data to the 
music industry, arguing that the requested measure would obviously be 
disproportionate with respect to the users’ privacy (the case merely concerned two 
uploaded songs)503.  
Conclusion 
As shown, Member States present divergent views and policies in relation to 
reconciling the right to privacy and intellectual property rights protection. Some 
national courts may weigh the balance between the interests of IP owners and the 
privacy of subscribers in favour of IP rights owners (UK504, France505), whereas other 
national courts find in favour of subscribers (Sweden506, Germany507).  
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In my opinion, the main difference between these two approaches is based on 
whether or not one considers an IP address as personal data. In particular, UK 
legislation does not recognise an IP address as personal data but just as information 
identifying the computer in a network508. According to UK law, the disclosure of the 
personal information of Internet users may be obtained following a court order509. 
Moreover, in spite of contradictory French legal practice with regard to 
clarifying an IP address as personal information, recent legal developments indicate 
that it is only an authorised legal authority which is able to disclose the intellectual 
property rights infringer’s identity. In particular, the Commission for Protection of 
Rights, which is an autonomous body within the Hadopi, after verifying ownership, 
identified the individuals concerned by requesting subscriber data from the ISPs510. 
Thus, in France, the authorised legal authority is able to disclose an infringer’s 
identity.  
In contrast, German and Sweden legislation consider an IP address as personal 
information511. This means that the processing of personal information and disclosing 
the identity of Internet users are prohibited by the principle of data protection512.  
2.1.2 Conclusions and recommendations  
As our analysis indicates, applying Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast in the case 
of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet involves additional 
difficulties for intellectual property rights owners. Certainly, in comparison with 
offline intellectual property rights infringements, where ascertaining the domicile of a 
defendant is not difficult, an action can be brought where the natural person is 
domiciled in the Member State (Article 62 of the Brussels I Recast) or where the legal 
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person has its statutory seat513, central administration or principal place of business 
(Art. 63 of the Brussels I Recast). Accessing the domicile of the defendant in Internet 
disputes is a difficult issue, though.  
The CLIP and ALI Principles do not even discuss the application of jurisdiction 
based on the defendant’s domicile in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement on the Internet. In particular, the CLIP Principle just clarifies the 
terminology by changing the term “domicile” to “habitual residence,”514 in order to 
unify the term in common-law countries. In addition, CLIP proposes the uniform 
application of the habitual residence principle for persons acting in the course of a 
business activity (where the principal place of business is relevant) and other natural 
persons (Article 2:102 (2) CLIP)515. A similar solution is found in section 201 of the 
ALI Principles, which also prefer the concept of “residence” (with some minor 
differences, e.g. the additional residence of companies in the country of incorporation 
or formation)516.  
However, by returning to legal barriers for the application of Article 4 of the 
Brussels I Recast, Metzger notes that suing in the defendant’s domicile in Internet 
cases is a possible choice in theory but not in practice517. Currently, there is no case 
law with regard to the application of Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement on the Internet, for which there are a few 
reasons.  
In the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, 
identifying the defendant and the place of his domicile involves additional 
difficulties. Indeed, in spite of the fact that the anonymity on the Internet is not an 
absolute right and the ISP is able to match the relevant Internet Protocol address of a 
computer used on a network with an Internet subscriber518, such a practice is not 
                                                 
513 For the purpose of the United Kingdom and Ireland ‘statutory seat’ means the registered office or, 
where there is no such office anywhere, the place of incorporation or, where there is no such place anywhere, the 
place under the law of which the formation took place. 
514 European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, ‘Principles on Conflict of 
Laws in Intellectual Property’ (Final Text, 1 December 2011). 
515 Ibid. 
516 The American Law Institute, ‘Intellectual property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law 
and Judgments in Transnational Disputes (with Comments and Reporters’ Notes)’ (2008) 
<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=198109> accessed 29 August 2011. 
517 Metzger, ‘Jurisdiction in Cases Concerning Intellectual Property Infringement on the Internet, Brussels 
I Regulation, ALI-Principle and Max Planck Proposal’, in Ohly and Leible (ed.), Intellectual Property and Private 
International Law (Mohr Siebeck 2009) 254. 
518 EMI v UPC [2010] IEHC 377; [2011] E.C.C. 8, para 58.  
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unified and involves additional barriers for intellectual property rights owners. 
Furthermore, the identification of intellectual property rights users involves the issue 
of the privacy and data protection of Internet users. 
On the one hand, EU legislation allows the processing and disclosing of a user’s 
personal information in civil proceedings when this is provided by national 
legislation519. This means that Member States have been given the autonomy to 
decide whether or not they want to legislate this matter. Consequently, only in a 
situation when national law allows the disclosure of personal information, EU 
Member State authorities may require the disclosure of personal data according to 
Article 8 (1) of the Directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights520. However, national authorities are prohibited from retaining the personal 
data of subscribers, as such an act interferes with the fundamental right to the 
protection of personal data521. 
On the other hand, balancing rights with regard to protecting the interests of 
intellectual property rights owners or the data protection of Internet users is not 
unified. In particular, as our finding indicates522, national courts must weigh up the 
interests of the parties involved on the basis of the principle of proportionality, which 
requires that “the measures to be taken should be appropriate and necessary to 
achieve the goal pursued” (Promusicae v. Telefonica523, LSG v. Tele 2524, Scarlet 
Extended SA v SABAM 525, SABAM v Netlog BVcase526, L’Oreal v eBay527). However, 
as duly noted by some scholars, the principle of proportionality can be compared to 
the ambiguous oracle of Pythia, in that it says everything and nothing at the same 
time528. Indeed, the ECJ did not give priority to any right, thus recognising them all as 
                                                 
519 Case C-275/06 Productores de M´usica de Espa˜na (Promusicae) v Telef´onica de Espa˜na SAU 
[2008] ECR I-271.  
520 Council Directive (EC) 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L195/16. 
521 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. and Kärntner Landesregierung 
[2014] OJ C 175. 
522 Please see Chapter 2, paragraph ‘2.1.1.3.6 EU case law’. 
523 Case C-275/06 Productores de M´usica de Espa˜na (Promusicae) v Telef´onica de Espa˜na SAU 
[2008] ECR I-271.  
524 Case C-557/07 LSG-Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung von Leistungsshutzrechten GmbH v Tele2 
Telecommunication gmbH [2008] PJ C 64. 
525Case 70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM [2011] ECR I-11959.  
526 Case C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog BV [2012] OJ C98.  
527 Case C-324/09 L’Oreal v eBay [2011] ECR I-06011. 
528 Irini Stamatoudi, ‘Data Protection, Secrecy of Communications and Copyright: Conflict and 
Convergences – The Example of Promusicae v. Telefonica’ in Irini Stamatoudi (ed.), Copyright enforcement and 
the Internet (Kluwer Law International 2010) 231.  
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being fundamental rights529 which benefit from equal protection530. The same 
approach has been taken in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, which states 
that in the case of any infringement of intellectual property rights in the digital 
environment, the balance of the rights and interests of the relevant right holders, 
service providers and users must be provided531. 
However, the national court has divergent views and policies in regard to 
reconciling the right to privacy and intellectual property rights protection. Some 
national courts may weigh up the balance between the interests of IP owners and the 
privacy of subscribers in favour of IP owners (UK, France) whereas other national 
courts will find in favour of subscribers (Sweden, Germany)532.  
In fact, in contrast to the ECJ’s point of view in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v 
Minister for Communications533, Marine and Natural Resources and 
Ireland v. European Parliament and Council534, which is the clear expression of 
supporting the privacy and data protection of Internet users, the national authority 
(UK, France) shows support for the interests of intellectual property rights owners. 
For example, the UK DEA requires Internet service providers to supply copyright 
owners, if requested by the latter, with anonymised records of a subscriber’s IP 
address who they allege is repeatedly infringing their rights, or upon a court order to 
provide copyright holders with the personal details of persistent alleged infringers, in 
order for said copyright holders to pursue civil actions535. The same approach is taken 
in France. According to the IFPI Digital Music Report 2012536, among those who had 
either received a notice or knew someone who had received one, 50% said knowledge 
or receipt of a notice made them stop their illegal activity, and a further 22% said it 
reduced their illegal consumption537.  
                                                 
529 Case C-275/06 Productores de M´usica de Espa˜na (Promusicae) v Telef´onica de Espa˜na SAU 
[2008] ECR I-271, para 68.  
530 Case C-461/10 Bonnier Audio v. Perfect Communication [2012] ECR:219. 
531 Commission, ‘Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’ (2011) <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/ 
pdf/en/11/st12/st12196.en11.pdf> accessed 12 August 2012, preamble.  
532 Please see Chapter 2, paragraph ‘2.1.1.3.7 National practice’. 
533 Case C-301/06 Ireland v European Parliament and Council [2009] ECR I-593. 
534 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. and Kärntner Landesregierung 
[2014] OJ C 175.  
535 Digital Economy Act 2010 (UK), section 124 A- 124 B 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/24/contents> accessed 15 October 2011. 
536 IFPI, ‘Digital Music Report 2012’ (2012) <http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2012.pdf> 
accessed 6 August 2012.  
537 Ibid.  
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In my opinion, the most important aspect is the right balance of interests of all 
the parties involved. For example, as proposed by Kuschewsky, Member States may 
establish guidelines in respect of balancing the opposing rights and interests 
concerned538. 
However, such a practice may be very contradictory in EU Member States – as 
our analysis indicates. In addition, deciding the issue of balancing the rights involved 
at the national level does not protect the interests of intellectual property rights 
owners on the borders of the EU.  
For my part, in order to ensure more effective intellectual property rights 
protection on the Internet, a uniform, EU-wide solution is needed in this area; 
moreover, the right balance between IP protection and data protection must be 
respected.  
One of the approaches employed in establishing international standards for 
intellectual property rights enforcement in the digital environment is the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement539 (ACTA). ACTA was  signed on October 1, 2011 
by the representatives of eight of the negotiating countries540 and on  January 26, 2012 
by the EU Council and 22 of its Member States541. In particular, section 5 of the 
ACTA, “Enforcement of intellectual property rights in the digital environment,” 
contains two measures specifically designed for facilitating the enforcement of IP 
rights on the Internet. Contracting parties have the ability but not the explicit 
obligation to introduce into their legal system: (i) a mechanism by which an online 
service provider may be ordered by “a competent authority” to disclose the identity of 
a suspected subscriber directly and expeditiously to a right holder542, and (ii) the 
promotion of “cooperative efforts within the business community to effectively 
address trademark and copyright or related rights infringement”543. 
However, the ACTA has been the subject of public criticism due to concerns 
surrounding invasion of privacy and the monitoring of private Internet use. In 
                                                 
538 Monika Kuschewsky ‘ECJ rules on the limits to national variances,’ (2012) P. & D.P. 12(3), 15-16.  
539 Council of the European Union,   ACTA [2011]  12196/11, Interinstitutional file: 2011/0166 (NLE). 
540 Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Kingdom of Morocco, New Zeland, the Republic 
of Singapore and the United States.  
541 These countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
542 ACTA, Art.27 (4).  
543 ACTA, Art. 27 (3).  
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particular, as stated in the Opinion of 24 April 2012 of the European Data Protection 
Supervisor on the proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, “while more international cooperation is needed for 
the enforcement of IP rights, the means envisaged must not come at the expense of 
the fundamental rights of individuals. A right balance between the fight against IP 
infringements and the rights to privacy and data protection must be respected. It 
appears that ACTA have not been fully successful in this respect” 544.  
Most certainly, the Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor warns 
that many of the measures used to strengthen intellectual property enforcement online 
could involve the large-scale monitoring of users’ behaviour and/or electronic 
communications, in relation to trivial, small-scale, not-for-profit infringements which 
would be disproportionate and in breach of Article 8 ECHR, Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Right and the Data Protection Directive. The Opinion also 
says that ACTA measures would entail the processing of personal data by ISPs which 
goes beyond what is allowed under EU law. The ACTA does not contain sufficient 
limitations and safeguards such as effective judicial protection, due process, the 
principle of the presumption of innocence and the right to privacy and data 
protection545. 
However, after discussion at the European and national levels, the European 
Parliament rejected ACTA on July 4, 2012546 with an overwhelming majority547. This 
was the first time that Parliament has used its powers under the Lisbon Treaty to 
reject an international trade agreement. Indeed, the rejection vote means that civil 
liberties and online privacy are more important values for EU Member States than 
effective intellectual property rights enforcement in the digital environment.  
                                                 
544 Opinion of the European Data Protection Superrvisor ‘On the proposal for a Council Decision on the 
Conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, 
Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Mexican States, the Kingdom of Morocco, New 
Zealand, the Republic of Singapore, the Swiss Confederation and the United States of America’ [2012] OJ C 215.  
545 Ibid.  
546 European Parliament legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, Australia, Canada, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, the United Mexican States, the Kingdom of Morocco, New Zeland, the Republic of 
Singapore, the Swiss Confederation and the United States of America [2012] (12195/2011-C7-0027/2012-
2011/0167 (NLE), P7_TA-PROV (2012)0287). 
547 478 MEPs voted against ACTA, 39 in favour, and 165 abstained.   
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At the same time, the protection and enforcement of intellectual property go to 
the heart of the EU’s ability to compete in the global economy548. In addition, EU 
growth and jobs are hampered when our ideas, brands and products are pirated and 
counterfeited549. One of the EU’s objectives is therefore the achievement of finding a 
balance between intellectual property rights enforcement and the fundamental rights 
of alleged infringers. Indeed, as noted in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), EU should to ensure “that a proper balance is struck between the 
interests of rights-holders and users”550. 
This means that EU requires an adequate legal instrument for intellectual 
property rights protection on the Internet. In my opinion, the recent European 
Commission’s proposal for a regulation on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data, and on the free movement of such data (General 
Data Protection Regulation)551, would be the most appropriate EU instrument to 
contain a provision relating to intellectual property rights protection on the Internet.  
Furthermore, all intellectual property rights holders involved with the Internet 
are seeking a solution that ensures a regulatory framework that provides clear and 
workable rules. The key question here is how to safeguard data protection principles 
and yet consider the interests and rights of all IP rights holders at the same time. It is 
important to note that the General Data Protection Regulation will supersede the Data 
Protection Directive 95/46. The most important change is that the new law will 
become a regulation, which will have direct ramifications throughout the EU. This 
means that there will be one single data protection law valid across the EU, and 
companies will no longer have to suffer from the fragmentation resulting from the 
fact that 28 Member States interpret and implement differently the principles set forth 
in Directive 95/46. In addition, the General Data Protection Regulation updates and 
modernises data protection principles which will be applicable even on the 
                                                 
548 Commission, “Intellectual Property” (2013) <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/ 
trade-topics/intellectual-property/index_en.htm> accessed 18 January 2013. 
549 Ibid. 
550 Commission, “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Intellectual property. EU 
position paper” (2015) 
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551 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
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Internet552. And, as stated in the explanatory memorandum of the General Data 
Protection Regulation, “a Regulation is considered to be the most appropriate legal 
instrument to define the framework for the protection of personal data in the 
Union,”553 which is also applicable to “the processing of personal data involving 
online services where individuals are associated with online identifiers provided by 
their devices, applications, tools and protocols, such as Internet Protocol addresses or 
cookie identifiers”554.  
However, in spite of the same improvement in relation to the protection of 
personal data in the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation does 
not provide a principle on how to achieve a balance between the rights to property 
and data protection; instead, it only states that the transparency principle relating to 
personal data processing should be observed555. Therefore, a further development is 
required in order to achieve a balance between the interests of IP rights holders and 
the protection of personal data on the Internet. This is especially important when 
taking into account that the General Data Protection Regulation will have to be 
adopted by the Council and the European Parliament at the end of 2015, and the 
regulation is planned to take effect after a transition period of two years. Thus, the 
General Data Protection is expected to come into force in 2018556. 
In my opinion, balancing the rights involved may be achieved through 
clarifying the issue with regard to the IP address which should be exempted from the 
data protection principle in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over 
the Internet. Indeed, as our analysis indicates, EU Member States follow very 
contradictory practices with regard to the protection of IP addresses as personal 
information. For example, while Germany and Sweden consider the IP address as 
personal information, UK courts do not consider it in such a way. The French courts 
also cannot reach a compromise with regard to the status of the IP address557. In this 
                                                 
552Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation)’ COM (2012) 011 
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553 Ibid, paragraph 3.1. of the Proposal. 
554 Ibid, paragraph 24 of the Proposal. 
555 Ibid, Art. 5. 
556 Commission, ‘Data Protection Day 2015: Concluding the EU Data Protection Reform essential for the 
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regard, the General Data Protection Regulation558 should be modified by adding an 
exemption to the data protection principle in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet.  
Moreover, as stated in Recital 23 of the Proposal for a Regulation on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation)559, “principles of 
data protection shall not apply to data rendered anonymous in such a way that the 
data subject is no longer identifiable”560. The same wording is used in Recital 26 of 
the Data Protection Directive 95/46. However, it is still an open question as to when 
data is to be regarded as having been rendered anonymous. In particular, according to 
Article 2 (b) of the Data Protection Directive 95/46, the processing of personal data is 
“any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data.” This means 
that the anonymisation of personal data involves the processing of personal data. 
Therefore, the principles of data protection apply to personal data before they are 
rendered anonymous561. When this happens, it is not governed by the principle of data 
protection, which means that if an IP address is rendered anonymous, it cannot be 
considered as an “online identifier.”  
However, the IP rights owner is interested in prosecuting the IPRs infringer by 
identifying a living individual behind the IP address, before it is rendered anonymous. 
Therefore, it would be reasonable to provide an exception to the principle of data 
protection in the case of intellectual property rights protection over the Internet when 
the IP address is used for identification an IP rights infringer. In my opinion, the 
principle of data protection should not protect the IPRs infringer.  
Furthermore, the following measures should be taken with regard to data 
protection in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet: 
1. The IP address should be considered as personal data, as in conjunction 
with other information it is possible to identify an intellectual property 
rights infringer. Indeed, the IP address in isolation is not a personal 
                                                 
558 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data’ COM (2012) 011 final. 
559 Ibid. 
560 This is the same wording used in Recital 26 of the  Data Protection Directive--but there is no guidance 
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data as it does not allow to identify an individual behind the IP address. 
Moreover, on the basis of the IP address which is anonymised, it is also 
not possible to identify an intellectual property rights infringer. 
Therefore, the unification of this practice in the Member States of the 
EU is required. 
2. If the purpose of using the IP address is to identify an intellectual 
property rights infringer in the case of a civil proceeding (IPRs 
infringement over the Internet), the IP address should be exempted 
from data protection. In my opinion, the data protection principle 
should not protect the intellectual property rights infringer. 
3. The processing of IP addresses should be allowed by the intellectual 
property rights owners or organisations representing its interests and 
ISPs in civil proceedings.  
4. ISPs should disclose the identity of intellectual property rights 
infringers to the rights holder or organisations representing its interests 
in civil proceedings on the basis of the court order.  
5. The retention of personal data by ISPs should be allowed for the 
specified time necessary to identify an intellectual property rights 
infringer based on their IP address in civil proceedings. In my opinion, 
the main reason for the invalidation of the Data Retention Directive562 
is based on the fact that the scope of this Directive was too broad. 
Without a doubt, the retention time, purpose and procedure with regard 
to the retention of personal data of intellectual property rights 
infringers in civil proceedings should be identified as clearly as 
possible.  
For my part, these measures should be taken into account in the General Data 
Protection Regulation. Additionally, by adapting the General Data Protection 
Regulation the legal barer to application of Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast in the 
case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet will be removed. On 
the one hand, jurisdiction according to Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast is based on 
clear connections between the circumstances of the case and the place of domicile of 
                                                 
562 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. and Kärntner Landesregierung 
[2014] OJ C 175. 
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the defendant. Also, the jurisdiction based on the place of domicile of the defendant is 
predictable for all of the parties involved.  
On the other hand, the modification of the General Data Protection Regulation 
will provide the right balance of interests for all parties involved. In my opinion, the 
data protection principle should not protect the IPRs infringer. At the present stage of 
case law development in the Member States of the EU, Member States present 
divergent views and policies in reconciling the right to privacy and intellectual 
property rights protection. Some national courts may weigh up the balance between 
the interests of intellectual property rights owners and the privacy of subscribers in 
favour of IP rights owners (UK, France), whereas other national courts may find in 
favour of subscribers (Sweden, Germany)563.  
Moreover, as recent ECJ cases indicate (Pinckney564, Hejduk565 and 
Wintersteiger566), in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet, jurisdiction should generally be based on the defendant’s domicile, and 
jurisdiction must always be available on this ground. Therefore, in order to apply 
Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet, the legal basis for its application should be removed. 
This means that the General Data Protection Directive should take into account the 
measures proposed.  
Personally speaking, in comparison with previous EU legislation such as the 
Data Protection Directive 95/46567 and Data Retention Directive 2006/24568, in which 
the main emphases were on the data protection of Internet users, current EU 
initiatives such as the General Data protection Regulation569 and EU Action Plan570 
have taken a more balanced approach, aiming at safeguarding the fundamental rights 
of all the parties concerned by intellectual property rights infringement. Furthermore, 
the main emphasis of these legal instruments rests on the prevention of intellectual 
                                                 
563 Please see Chapter 2, paragraph ‘2.1.1.3.7 National Practice’.  
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565 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published, para 4. 
566 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
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property rights infringement over the Internet rather than on the penalising of 
intellectual property rights infringers. For example, the aim of the new UK 
Government scheme, Creative Content UK, is to reduce online copyright 
infringement by informing account holders that unlawful file-sharing may have taken 
place on their connection and offering advice on where to find legitimate sources of 
entertainment content571.   
Indeed, as noted by the EU Commissioner for Trade, Karel De Gucht, “our 
business, creators and inventors should be duly rewarded for their creative and 
innovating efforts”572. In this regard future legal development should emphasise the 
use of tools available for uncovering IPR infringers, the role of intermediaries in 
assisting the fight against IPR infringement and the allocation of damages in 
intellectual property rights disputes573.  
Therefore, we can conclude that the exemption of the IP addresses from the 
principle of data protection in the case of intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet is correct. In addition, such a rule is not only aimed at protecting the 
interests of intellectual property rights owners, but also allocating jurisdiction in the 
case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet to the court of the 
EU Member State where the defendant is domiciled for all the damage caused by 
such infringement.  
2.2 Consolidation of claims in multi-defendant cases  
The biggest problem with torts committed over the Internet is with multi-
defendant cases, e.g. when defendants come from different countries. The main 
characteristic of Internet-related cases is ubiquitous infringement, and such 
infringement could give jurisdiction to the courts of several countries at the same 
time574. For example, in the case of music-sharing on a peer-to-peer network, a 
claimant may wish to sue illegal downloaders in a number of different Member 
                                                 
571 Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Intellectual Property Office, Department for Culture, 
Media & Sport, The Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable, ‘New education programme launched to combat online piracy’( 
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States, but to have separate actions for marginal amounts in every country in the 
world would be unworkable575. Therefore, the question arises as to whether 
jurisdiction can be consolidated in a single court against all defendants.  
From a theoretical point of view this is possible under Articles 4 and 8 (1) of 
the Brussels I Recant. In particular, Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast is 
specifically concerned with multi-party litigation and allows the claimant to sue a 
defendant that is domiciled in a Member State in the court of the place where one of 
his co-defendants is domiciled, in case there is more than one defendant.  
However, as we know, the application of the traditional jurisdictional principles 
in the case of intellectual property rights infringement involves additional difficulties 
associated with the specific characteristics of the Internet. Consequently, it is 
important to identify where the consolidation of multi-defendant claims is possible in 
the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. In my opinion, 
the possibility of suing in one court rather than in the courts of different Member 
States is in the interest of intellectual property rights owners.  
In this respect it is important to note that Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast 
was interpreted in Roche Nederlands BV v Primus576. However, for better 
understanding of the present situation it is essential to start by briefly presenting the 
Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast through case law development. 
2.2.1 Conditions on the application of Article 8 (1) of the 
Brussels I Recast 
As we have seen, Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast lays down an exception 
to the protective principle contained in Article 4 (1) of the Brussels I Recast. For the 
application of this provision, the ECJ requires a minimum connection between 
claims. As stated by the ECJ in Kalfelis v Schroeder Muenchmeyer Hengst & Co, 
actions brought by the same plaintiff against different defendants must be so closely 
connected that it is appropriate to hear and determine them together, in order to avoid 
the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings577. Therefore, 
                                                 
575 Ibid. 
576 Case C-539/03 Roche Nederlands BV v Primus [2006] ECR I-6535, para 34.  
577 Case 189/87 Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schroder Munchmeyer Hengst & Co [1988] ECR 05565.  
111 
 
the main questions here are how do we interpret the “close connection” requirement 
and what does the “risk of irreconcilable judgments” mean?  
According to Kalfelis v Schroeder Muenchmeyer Hengst & Co, “the task of 
verifying in each individual case whether there is a sufficient connection between the 
claims is left to the national court”578. National case practice has given rise to 
interesting developments in the context of applying Article 8 (1) of the Brussels 
Recast to IP litigation. In particular, national courts have exercised jurisdiction over 
defendants domiciled in different Member States, where one IP right is infringed as 
well as in cases involving the infringement of several national IP rights. In turn, the 
notion of irreconcilable judgments was clarified by the ECJ in its Tatry decision579, in 
which it was stated that the expression “irreconcilable judgments” must be broadly 
interpreted and covers all cases where there is a risk of conflicting decisions, even if 
the judgments can be enforced separately and their legal consequences are not 
mutually exclusive580.  
In this respect it is important to note two kinds of situations involving multiple 
defendants: simple cases involving the infringement of a single IP right, committed 
by several defendants, and complex cases involving the infringement of several 
parallel IP rights, committed by multiple defendants domiciled in their respective 
countries581. 
2.2.1.1 Simple cases  
In the context of Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast simple cases are cases 
where one IP right is infringed by several defendants domiciled in different Member 
States. There are a number of pre-Roche “simple” cases where Article 8 (1) of the 
Brussels I Recast is applicable in England. Such was the situation in the English case 
Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership Ltd582, where a British plaintiff sued several 
defendants, some domiciled in Britain and some in the Netherlands. The plaintiff 
claimed that the defendants had infringed his British copyright on architectural 
drawings when they constructed a building in Rotterdam (in the Netherlands). It was 
                                                 
578 Ibid, para 12. 
579 Case 406/92 The owners of the cargo lately laden on board the ship ‘Tatry’ v the owners of the ship 
‘Maciej Rataj’ [1994] E.C.R. I-5439.  
580 Ibid. para 54. 
581 Fawcett (n 112) 177, 186. 
582 Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership Ltd [2000] Ch 403, CA. 
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accepted that Article 8 (1) applied. It seems evident that in the case of joint tortfeasors 
that when only one right is infringed the claims are closely connected and there is a 
risk of irreconcilable judgments583.  
2.2.1.2 Complex cases 
The joinder of multiple defendants in complex cases involving the infringement 
of several national IP rights in different Member States is a controversial issue, as the 
courts of EU Member States interpret this issue differently. According to one point of 
view the actions raise substantially identical issues584. In particular, in Coin Controls 
Ltd v Suzo International585, the English High Court took the view that, if an English 
defendant is alleged to have infringed the UK portion of a European patent and a 
German defendant the German portion of a European patent (in respect of the same 
invention), there could be irreconcilable judgments, since both actions are, in effect, 
concerned with the same patent. The court observed: “The allegedly infringing 
article… sold in each territory is the same, the patents are identical and the 
similarities in the actions are cemented by the provisions of the European Patent 
Convention… Since the causes of action in relation to infringement here i.e. in the 
United Kingdom, in Germany and in Spain are essentially identical, Article 8 (1) 
allows them to be tied together in one court of the plaintiff’s choice.”586 
In Coin Controls Ltd v Suzo International the court took the view that although 
the patents stemming from a European patent are granted in respect of individual 
countries and, in each, are treated like a national patent, nevertheless those national 
patent rights can be considered as related for the purpose of Article 8 (1) of the 
Brussels I Recast587. Therefore, a patentee ought to be able to obtain cross-border 
relief in a single court against infringements of connected patents. The same approach 
was adopted not only by an English court, but also by the German588 courts. 
However, as shall be discussed later, this approach has not been shared by 
everyone. According to the view of some authors, claims relating to the infringement 
of a bundle of national patents could not fulfil the conditions set out in the Kalfelis v 
                                                 
583 M. Pertegas Sender, Cross-border Enforcement of Patent Rights (Oxford University Press 2002) 91. 
584 Halcon International Inc v The Shell Transport and Trading Co and Others [1979] RPC 97, para 117. 
585 Coin Controls Ltd v Suzo International [1997] F.S.R. 660. 
586 Ibid. 
587 The court assumed jurisdiction over a UK and Dutch defendants for the infringement of the UK patent.  
588 Case 4O 5/59, Reinigungsmittel [1996] (District Court of Dűsseldorf) reported by D. Stauder, P. Von 
Rospatt, ‘Protection transfrontaliere des brevets Europeens’ [1999] RID eco.119,128.  
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Schroeder Muenchmeyer Hengst & Co ruling589. According to this view, since a 
European patent consists of a bundle of national patents, the courts of each 
contracting State would be giving judgment in relation to a different patent and there 
would be no risk of irreconcilable judgments590. This restrictive view on Article 8 (1) 
of the Brussels I Recast finally prevailed in court practice, causing a major problem to 
the joinder of multiple claims. In particular, the UK Court of Appeal, in the Fort 
Dodge Animal Health Ltd v Akzo Nobel NV case591, considered national portions of 
European patents as separate rights protected under respective national laws. 
Furthermore, the court in this case held that there was no risk of irreconcilable 
judgments, because a judgment on infringement in the United Kingdom would 
depend on a national right having effect only in the UK. Accordingly, the UK 
defendants in the Dutch infringement actions were not caught by Article 8 (1) of the 
Brussels I Recast, and so the Article was not applicable in this case. 
According to another point of view it is not necessary for actions to be identical 
in order to be closely connected592. In particular, the so-called “spider in the web” 
doctrine, which was developed for the purposes of Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I 
Recast, permits the joinder of actions but restricts Article 8 (1) of the Brussels 
Convention to specific cases of multiple infringements of a European patent593. 
Indeed, as stated by the court in Expandable Grafts Partnership v Boston Scientific 
BV594, where several companies belonging to one group sold products incorporating 
the same patented invention in different national markets, this will have to be 
considered as one joint action based on a joint business plan. However, this does not 
mean that the plaintiff must have the option of suing all the parties belonging to the 
group in the courts for the domicile of any one of the companies belonging to the 
group, at his own choice. It means instead that all the actions may only be brought in 
                                                 
589 Arnaud Nuyts, Katarzyna Szychowska, Nikitas Hatzimihail, ‘Cross-border Litigation in Intellectual 
Property matters in Europe’ (2006) <http://www.ulb.ac.be/droit/ipit/docs/ 
HeidelbergBackgPaper1.pdf> accessed 11 March 2013; Van Engelen, ‘Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Matters 
of Intellectual Property’ (2010) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, 14.3. 
590 Fawcett (n 112) 178. 
591 Fort Dodge Animal Health Ltd v Akzo Nobel NV [1998] I.L.Pr.732 (CA (Civ Div)). 
592 Fawcett (n 113) 173. 
593 Paul L.C. Torremans, ‘Intellectual property puts art.6 (1) Brussels I Regulation to the test’ [2014] 
I.P.Q., 1-12; Cristina Gonzales Beilfuss (ed.), ‘Is There Any Web for the Spider? Jurisdiction after Roche 
Nederlands’ International Litigation in Intellectual Property and Information Technology (Kluwer Law 
International 2008) 83.  
594 Expandable Grafts Partnership v Boston Scientific BV [1999] F.S.R. 352 (Court of Appeal of the 
Hague) 
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their entirety in the courts of the domicile of the head office which is in charge of the 
business operations and/or from which the business plan originated595. 
In this regard the spider in the web theory has a double effect in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement. On the one hand, it allows the joining of 
defendants belonging to the same group of companies, according to Article 8 (1) of 
the Brussels I Recast, but on the other hand, it limits the effect of this provision by 
taking away the choice given to the plaintiff to sue all the companies in the Member 
State of the domicile of any one of the defendants596. Instead, the action can only be 
brought before the courts in the country where the head office of the group is 
established. 
In a hypothetical case of intellectual property rights infringement on the 
Internet, the spider in the web doctrine may be applicable if several companies 
belonging to the same group infringe corresponding intellectual property rights by 
targeting their respective national markets and selling an identical infringing product 
on the Internet to customers in their respective States. However, as in offline issues, 
the defendants may only join together in an action brought where the head office is 
located. 
The main disadvantage of the spider in the web theory addopted by the 
Expandable Grafts Partnership v Boston Scientific BV rests on the fact that there is 
no uniform definition of what constitutes the “spider,” i.e. the company which 
controls the group. In the eyes of the Dutch courts the management epicentre of a 
company with its statutory seat in the Netherlands and principal place of business in 
Belgium was based in the Netherlands, while in the eyes of the Belgian courts it was 
rather localised in Belgium597. 
2.2.2 The ECJ ruling in Roche and Solvay 
The spider in the web theory was rejected by the decision of the ECJ in Roche 
Nederlands BV v Primus598. The plaintiffs, who were domiciled in the United States 
of America and were proprietors of a European patent, commenced proceedings in 
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596 Fawcett (n 112) 180. 
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the Netherlands for infringement of a family of patents derived from a European 
patent. The action was taken against Roche Nederlands, a company established in the 
Netherlands, and eight other members of the Roche group. Each of the eight 
defendants was alleged to have infringed the patent in one or more States. The 
plaintiff tried to join actions instead of suing each of the defendants individually. 
When the case was finally pending before the Dutch Supreme Court, two questions 
were referred to the ECJ seeking to clarify the conditions under which claims 
concerning the infringement of European bundle patents may be joined before one 
court. In particular, one of these questions was whether the ECJ endorses criteria for a 
joinder of claims that were developed by the Court of Appeal of the Hague in 
Expandable Grafts Partnership v Boston Scientific BV.  
The ECJ rejected the spider in the web rule adopted in the Hague-based case 
above and decided that a consolidation of infringement cases based on the 
infringement of European patents in force in different Member States is not possible 
on the basis of Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast. In particular, the court held that 
the Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast must be interpreted as meaning that it does 
not apply to European patent infringement proceedings involving a number of 
companies established in various contracting States in respect of acts committed in 
one or more of those States and where those companies, which belong to the same 
group, may have acted in an identical or similar manner in accordance with a 
common policy elaborated by one of said organisations.  
The ECJ stuck to the restrictive interpretation of Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I 
Recast given in Kalfelis v Schroeder Muenchmeyer Hengst & Co and considered that 
for judgments to be conflicting or contradictory – and the more so irreconcilable – the 
proceedings leading to them must be placed in the same legal and factual context, 
which is not the case as far as a bundle of national patents is concerned. Therefore, 
the ECJ introduced the twin requirements regarding the infringement of national parts 
of a European patent judgment which are to be regarded as irreconcilable only when 
the proceedings leading to them arise out of the same legal and factual context599.  
As regards the same situation in law, the ECJ adopted the view that a European 
patent, once granted, becomes a bundle of national patents600. The risk for 
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irreconcilable judgement does not exist in the situation at stake here, though, because 
European bundle patents are legally independent of each other, and according to 
Articles 2 (2) and 64 (1) of the European Patent Convention601, the patents are 
governed by national law.  
The factual situation would not be the same as the defendants, involving a 
number of companies established in various contracting States, and the infringements 
they are accused of, committed in different contracting states, would diverge602. In 
light of the Roche Nederlands BV v Primus decision it seemed that the door for 
consolidation in cases of multiple defendant was once and for all closed. However, a 
close inspection shows that the Roche Nederlands BV v Primus decision has only 
limited implications in fields of intellectual property law other than patents603 
In Solvay v Honeywell604, the ECJ had the chance to clarify some questions left 
open related to the Roche Nederlands BV v Primus case. 
The plaintiff, a Belgian company, Solvay SA, brought an action in the District 
Court of The Hague (Netherlands) regarding the infringement of several national 
parts of a European patent605. The defendants were three companies of the Honeywell 
Group, two of them established in Belgium and one in the Netherlands. Solvay 
requested a provisional injunction with cross-border prohibitions against infringement 
for the duration of the main proceedings. One of the questions reffered to the ECJ for 
a preliminary ruling concerned the interpretation of Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I 
Recast, in particular whether it could be applied in a situation where two or more 
companies from different Member States are each separately accused of infringing 
the same national part of a European patent which is in force in yet another Member 
State. 
On the first issue, the Court held that its decision in Roche Nederlands BV v 
Primus still stood. However, in Solvay v Honeywell the ECJ observed that Roche 
Nederlands BV v Primus may be distinguished on the grounds that it follows from 
“the specific features of a case such as that in the main proceedings that potential 
                                                 
601 Convention on the Grant of European Patents of 5 October 1973 (as adopted by the Administrative 
Council of the European Patent Organisation by decision of 28 June 2001) OJ EPO 2001, Special edition No. 4, 
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divergences in the outcome of the proceedings are likely to arise in the same situation 
of fact and law, so that it is possible that they will culminate in irreconcilable 
judgments resulting from separate proceedings”606. 
The ECJ decided that if co-defendants in the main proceedings are each 
separately accused of committing the same infringements with respect to the same 
products, and if such infringements were committed in the same Member States in 
such a manner that they adversely affect the same national parts of the European 
patent at issue, the claims are connected and there is a risk of irreconcilable 
judgments607. The ECJ added that it is for the referring court to assess whether such a 
risk exists, by taking into account all the relevant information in the file608. 
Conclusion 
On the basis of the analysis undertaken herein, we can conclude that in Roche 
Nederlands BV v Primus the ECJ make clear that Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast 
is not applicable to a bundle of infringement actions relating to different companies 
established in different Member States, since each infringed different national part of 
a European patent is governed by different laws. In contrast, in Solvay v Honeywell, 
the ECJ stated that Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast is applicable, as the 
defendants in the main proceedings (one Dutch and two Belgian companies) are 
separately accused of marketing the same infringing products in the same Member 
States and are hence infringing the same national parts of the European patents. In 
this situation the ECJ is willing to accept that the possibility of “irreconcilable 
judgments” exists. Therefore, in spite of the fact that the ECJ in Solvay v Honeywell 
did not overturn the controversial case law in Roche Nederlands BV v Primus 609, it 
has nevertheless reopened the door for cross-border injunctions. In particular, the ECJ 
in Solvay v Honeywell allows cross-border injunctions, but only with regard to 
preliminary injunctions and only in a situation where several defendants from the 
same group of companies are active in the same country.  
                                                 
606 Case C-616/10 Solvay SA v Honeywell Fluorine Products Europe BV and Others [2012] ECR 00000, 
para 27. 
607 Ibid, para 29. 
608 Ibid, para 30. 
609 Thorsten Bausch, Hoffmann Eitle, ‘Court of Justice of the European Union Strengthens the Protection 
of Holders of European Patents in ‘Solvay,’ Case C- 616/10’ (Kluwer Patent Blog, 22 July 2012) 
<http://kluwerpatentblog.com/2012/07/22/court-of-justice-of-the-european-union-strengthens-the-protection-of-
holders-of-european-patents-in-solvay-case-c-61610> accessed 12 July 2013.  
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However, it is up to the national courts to decide the issue of the same situation 
of law and fact.  
2.2.3 Impact of the Roche decision on IP litigation over the 
Internet 
It is important to note that the ECJ decision in Roche Nederlands BV v. Primus 
might also be relevant in cases of intellectual property rights infringement on the 
Internet. As we know from Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership Ltd, the connection 
requirement was not even discussed by the court610, but after the Roche Nederlands 
BV v Primus it has become an important issue. Therefore, the main question here is 
whether any divergence in the outcome of the dispute would arise in the context of 
the same situation of law and fact. 
2.2.3.1 Simple cases 
In the context of Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast simple cases are cases 
where one IP right is infringed by several defendants domiciled in different Member 
States. For example, in the case of copyright infringement over the Internet, one 
infringer, A, domiciled in the UK, creates an infringing file reproducing content 
protected by copyright in UK and then sends the completed file to B, domiciled in 
Ireland. Then, B uploads this file to a bulletin board system operated by a third 
infringer C, domiciled in Germany.  
In this case the legal requirement will be satisfied, as the dispute concerned just 
one right (UK copyright). This means that any divergence in the outcome of the 
dispute would arise in the context of the same situation of law611. However, as we 
know from Roche Nederlands BV v. Primus, the requirement of the same factual 
situation will not be met, as “the defendants are different and the infringements they 
are accused of, committed in different contracting States, are not the same.” 
2.2.3.2 Complex cases  
In complex cases of intellectual property rights infringement on the Internet 
multiple rights are infringed; for example, in a hypothetical case of software patent 
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infringement on the Internet, the defendants are accused of an infringement of patents 
in the UK, Ireland and Germany, each derived from a European patent for the 
automatic downloading of embedded content612. The defendants, who are domiciled 
in the UK and Sweden, develop Internet Explorer and sell it on the Internet. The 
plaintiff sues both defendants for infringing its three patents in an English court. In 
our example the defendants are not connected, but they do develop and sell Internet 
Explorer online. Therefore, the Roche Nederlands BV v. Primus factual requirements 
are not met, as the defendants are all acting independently of each other613. The legal 
requirements are also not met, as different national rights (i.e. different patents) have 
been infringed.  
It is important to note that in Roche Nederlands BV v. Primus the ECJ did not 
discuss the situation where there are parallel national patents; rather, it dealt with a 
European patent granted for a number of Member States. Nonetheless, as truly noted 
by Fawcett, parallel patents are likewise not the same, and therefore any divergences 
between the decisions given by the courts concerned would not arise in the context of 
the same legal situation.614  
In another hypothetical case of patent infringement over the Internet the 
claimants group of companies holds a European patent for a computerised interactive 
gaming system. The defendants group of companies has a rival system and supplies 
to users over the Internet software which enables the latter to use this rival system615. 
In this situation the acts of the different defendants are similar, which means that the 
factual requirement is not met. Indeed, acts committed in different contracting States 
by several defendants concern separate patents, and therefore they are not the same 
and cannot form the basis for a common decision of only one court616.  
Also, the legal situation would remain different because each defendant would 
be infringing a different intellectual property right617. As a result, the Roche 
Nederlands BV v. Primus requirements would not be met and Article 8 (1) of the 
                                                 
612 The facts of this case are based on Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation [2005] No. 04-
1234 (Federal Circuit). 
613 Fawcett (n 112) 567. 
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616 Steven Warner, Susie Middlemiss, ‘Patent litigation in multiple jurisdictions: an end to cross-border 
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Brussels I Recast would not be applicable. In spite of the fact that the ECJ in Roche 
Nederlands BV v. Primus does not refer to trademark or copyright infringement, the 
arguments will be the same in such cases618.  
For example, in the case of copyright infringement over the Internet when a 
Swedish defendant is alleged to have infringed the plaintiff’s Swedish copyright and 
a French defendant the plaintiff’s French copyright, the Roche Nederlands BV v. 
Primus legal requirements will not be satisfied, as different national copyright are 
involved. Moreover, the factual situation is also not satisfied, as copyright 
infringements have been committed in different Member States. In this regard we can 
conclude that Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast is not applicable in the case of 
copyright infringement over the Internet, as the Roche requirements of the same 
factual and legal context would not be satisfied.  
However, cross-border injunctions are still possible under Article 8 (1) of the 
Brussels I Recast in the context of the three community intellectual property rights 
(trademarks, designs and plant variety rights). In particular, the District Court of the 
Hague made it clear in Bacardi & Company Ltd v Bat Beverage GmbH and others619 
that a close reading of Roche Nederlands BV v. Primus posits that there is room for 
the spider in the web doctrine in the context of community IPRs which create truly 
single, supranational IPRs that are effective throughout the entire European Union620.  
In fact, in the hypothetical case of a community trademark or a design 
infringement over the Internet, the requirements of the same legal situation will be 
satisfied, as the defendants have infringes a community intellectual property rights in 
various Member States. Furthermore, as community rights, they are not subject to the 
same rules and restrictions imposed on national bundle patents – they are litigated 
under Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast as unitary rights621. The requirements of 
the same factual situation will be met in the situation where, according to point 37 of 
the Roche Nederlands BV v. Primus 622, the defendants are joint tortfeasors belonging 
to the same group and have acted in an identical or similar manner in accordance with 
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a common policy elaborated by one of them. Reference to the defendants acting in an 
identical or similar manner highlights the point regarding the situation where the 
alleged infringing acts of the various defendants are the same or virtually the same. 
Therefore, in the case of community intellectual property rights infringements over 
the Internet, both requirements for “irreconcilable judgments” – the same factual and 
legal situation – would be satisfied.  
Conclusion 
On the basis of the analysis provided herein, we can conclude that Article 8 (1) 
of the Brussels I Recast does not allow for the consolidation of multi-defendant 
claims in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, as the 
Roche Nederlands BV v. Primus requirements of the same factual and legal situation 
would not be satisfied. However, the Article is applicable in the context of the three 
community IPRs (trademarks, designs and plant variety rights), as both requirements 
for “irreconcilable judgments” – the same factual and legal situation – would be 
satisfied.  
Therefore, in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet, the rights owner will have to bring separate infringement proceedings in 
different Member States. In my opinion, such a rule is not only complex and costly, 
but it may also lead to the fragmentation of litigation. Indeed, as stated in Article 3 
(1) of the Enforcement Directive, measures, procedures and remedies shall be fair and 
equitable and shall not be innecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable 
time limits or unwarranted delays623. 
However, the most critical argument of the ECJ in Roche Nederlands BV v. 
Primus is that a European patent is a bundle of national patents624. In particular, as 
noted by Kur from a patent law perspective, there is no consideration of the fact that 
European patents, although resulting in a bundle of national rights, share a common 
past and are governed by harmonised law625. Moreover, according to Article 2 (2) of 
the European Patent Convention, the so-called “bundle of national patents” under a 
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granted European patent is for all practical purposes subject to unified law as 
provided for in that convention626. 
In this regard there is a little authority to support the argument of the Advocate 
General AG Leger in Roche Nederlands BV v. Primus that this Article only deals with 
the substantive scope of protection and not with the legal scope of the rights 
conferred on the holder of a European patent627. For my part, the legal and 
substantive scope of the protection seem to refer to the same concept; in fact, Article 
69 of the European Patent Convention628 and the Protocol on the interpretation of this 
provision state that the extent of the protection provided by a European patent is the 
same for all national patents forming the bundle. Therefore, as truly noted by 
Tilmann, although significant deviations exist in the practice of the national courts 
regarding the infringement of European patents, under the European Patent 
Convention an obligation exists to achieve uniformity in the application of Article 
69629.  
2.2.4 Conclusions and recommendations 
The consolidation of multi-defendant claims in the case of intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet is the most important issue for the intellectual 
property rights owner. Indeed, the combined effects of Articles 4 and 8 (1) of the 
Brussels I Recast provide such a possibility for intellectual property rights owners, by 
allowing them to sue at the court of the place where one of the defendants is 
domiciled.  
However, as our finding indicates, Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast is not 
applicable in the case of national intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet (patent, trademark or copyright infringement)630. Indeed, the application of 
                                                 
626 According to Article 2 (2) of the European Patent Convention, ‘the European patent shall, in each of 
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the Roche Nederlands BV v. Primus631 requirements of the same factual and legal 
situation in this case are not satisfied, as the actions refer to different, albeit parallel, 
rights.  
At the same time, Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast is applicable in the case 
of community intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet (trademarks, 
designs and plant variety rights)632, as both requirements for “irreconcilable 
judgments,” i.e. the same factual and legal situation, would be satisfied. In particular, 
the requirements of the same legal situation will be satisfied if defendants infringe a 
community intellectual property right which is litigated as a unitary right in various 
Member States. The requirements of the same factual situation will be met in the 
situation where, according to point 37 of the Roche Nederlands BV v. Primus 633, the 
defendants are joint tortfeasors belonging to the same group and have acted in an 
identical or similar manner in accordance with a common policy elaborated by one of 
them.  
In my opinion, in order to allow the consolidation of multiple defendants in the 
case of national intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, Article 8 
(1) of the Brussels I Recast should be modified. However, in order to provide an 
efficient model for adjudicating intellectual property rights disputes over the Internet, 
it is important to take into account not only of these findings here, but also the 
recommendations of the following projects: the Hague Draft of 2001634, CLIP 
Principles635 and ALI Principles636.  
The essential aim of this paper is to analyse these projects in order to offer the 
best possible jurisdictional approach in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet.  
                                                 
631 Case C-539/03 Roche Nederlands BV v Primus [2006] ECR I-6535. 
632 Bacardi & Company Ltd v Bat Beverage GmbH and others [2007] ( District Court of the Hague).  
633 According to the Roche: the factual situation would be the same where defendant companies, which 
belong to the same group, have acted in an identical or similar manner in accordance with a common policy 
elaborated by one of them, so that. 
634 Hague Conference on Private International Law, ‘Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Foreign Judgments in civil and commercial matters adopted by the Special Commission on 30 October 1999’ 
(amended version 11 August 2000) <http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd11.pdf> accessed 4 May 2014. 
635 European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, ‘Principles on Conflict of 
Laws in Intellectual Property’ (Final Text, 1 December 2011).  
636The American Law Institute, ‘Intellectual property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law 
and Judgments in Transnational Disputes (with Commentts and Reporters’ Notes)’ (2008) 
<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=198109> accessed 11 January 2014. 
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For example, Article 2:206 (2) of the CLIP Principles states that the risk of 
incompatible judgments requires the risk of divergence in the outcome of the actions 
against different defendants, which arises in the context of essentially the same 
situation of law and fact. Thus, the main emphasis of the CLIP Principles is on 
“essentially the same situation of law and fact,” while the Roche Nederlands BV v. 
Primus connection requirements were based on “the same situation of law and fact”. 
Therefore, the CLIP Principle, by providing a much wider concept than Roche 
Nederlands BV v. Primus, tries to moderate the restrictive interpretation of Article 8 
(1) of the Brussels I Recast. In fact, by softening the connection requirements for the 
application of Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast the CLIP Principles try to confirm 
the approach taken by the ECJ in Painer v Standard and Freeport v Olle Arnoldsson, 
while the drafters of the Brussels I Recast follow the restrictive interpretation 
provided in Roche.  
The ECJ in Painer v Standard and Freeport v Olle Arnoldsson softened the 
requirements of factual and legal situations for the application of Article 8 (1) of the 
Brussels I Recast. In particular, the ECJ clarified that it is not required that actions 
against different defendants have identical legal bases637. In relation to the factual 
situation, the ECJ in Painer v Standard also highlighted that in an action against 
several newspaper companies for copyright infringement, the fact of whether the 
infringers acted independently or not was irrelevant in determining whether the 
different claims were sufficiently connected638.  
Therefore, the risk of irreconcilable judgments remains a criterion for the 
application of Article 8(1) of the Brussels I Recast when the two requirements of an 
essentially identical situation of law and fact are met. 
In particular, Article 2:206 (2) (a) of the CLIP Principles clarifies that in the 
case of infringement actions, disputes involve essentially the same factual situation if 
the defendants have, even if in different States, acted in an identical or similar manner 
in accordance with a common policy. For example, the requirement of “essentially 
the same factual situation” might be satisfied in a case involving an Internet service 
provider on the basis of its contributory liability. This may be the situation 
concerning hosting activities in cases in which a claim is brought against the direct 
                                                 
637 Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH et al.[2011] ECDR 6, para 80; Case C-
98/06 Freeport plc v Olle Arnoldsson [2007] ECR I -8319, paras 38, 47. 
638 Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH et al.[2011] ECDR 6, para 83. 
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infringer and also against the Internet service provider storing the relevant 
information on its servers, where the information is available to Internet users639.  
Moreover, Article 2:206 (2) (b) of the CLIP Principles also clarifies the same 
legal situation issue. In particular, the legal situation will be essentially the same, 
even if different national laws are applicable to claims against different defendants, 
provided that the relevant national laws are harmonised to a significant degree 
through the rules of a regional economic integration organisation or by international 
conventions which are applicable to the disputes in question. For example, the CLIP 
requirement of “essentially the same legal situation” will be met in the case of 
trademark640, registered design641 and European patent642 infringement over the 
Internet, as the relevant Directives provide complete harmonisation. For my part, 
such rules within the CLIP Principles allow some type of flexibility by opening the 
door for applying Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast when there is a risk of 
irreconcilable judgments.  
However, as noted by Torremans, the legal drawback of such a flexible 
interpretation is the lack of legal predictability and legal certainly, as it is not clear 
“how to balance the two requirements that have to be individually met, on the basis of 
two separate balancing acts performed by national judges, or whether a single 
assessment which considers both factual and legal factors needs now to be 
performed”643. In my opinion, the legal value of Article 2:206 (2) (b) of the CLIP 
Principles for the consolidation of multi-defendant claims prevails over the issue of 
possible legal drawbacks.  
Moreover, a similar rule for the consolidation of multiple defendants is 
contained in Section 206 (1) of the ALI Principles644, which states that personal 
jurisdiction over multiple defendants is affirmed where the claim against the 
defendant, who resides in the forum, and the claim against the other defendants, who 
                                                 
639 Pedro A. De Miguel Asensio, ‘The networked information society: territoriality and beyond’ (Annual 
Kyushu University Law Conference, Fukuoka, February 13-14 2010) 11. 
640 Council Directive (EC) 2008/95 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks 
[2008] OJ 299/25.  
641 Council Directive (EC) 98/71 on the legal protection of designs [1998] OJ L289.  
642Convention on the Grant of European Patents of 5 October 1973 (as adopted by the Administrative 
Council of the European Patent Organisation by decision of 28 June 2001) OJ EPO 2001, Special edition No. 4, 
55. 
643 Paul L.C. Torremans, ‘Intellectual Property Puts Article 6 (1) Brussels I Regulation to the Test,’ 
CREATE Working Paper 8 (September 2013). 
644 American Law Institute, ‘Restatement of the Law, Intellectual Property: Principles Governing 
Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational Disputes’ (St. Paul (Minn.) 2008). § 206 (1). 
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do not reside in the forum, are so closely connected that they should be adjudicated 
together, in order to avoid the risk of inconsistent judgments, so long as other 
requirements are met645.  
However, in spite of the similarity, these proposals differ substantially. In 
particular, while the CLIP Proposal allows for the consolidation of claims only in 
relation to defendants who are habitually resident in a Member State, the ALI 
Proposal allows a joinder of resident and non-resident defendants, as long as the 
connection between the defendants and the forum is proven, along with coordinated 
action among the defendants, even when different intellectual property rights in each 
country are at issue646. Indeed, the possibility of joining resident and non-resident 
defendants in EU Member States is a debatable issue. For example, Dutson follows a 
view allowing the suing of multiple defendants domiciled in a Member State (for 
example, German) together with defendants who are not domiciled in a Member State 
(for example, Japan)647. The same approach is taken by Jurčys, who notes that the 
consolidation of resident and non-resident defendants is especially important in the 
case of intellectual property rights infringement on the Internet, because on the 
Internet, due to its ubiquitous nature, multiple defendants are involved (EU resident 
and non-EU resident) 648.  
Conversely, the courts might find jurisdiction in foreign infringement cases 
against a number of non-EU resident defendants on the mere basis that one national 
resident is involved in the act, even if his contribution is relatively small649. In my 
opinion, such a rule would be unpredictable for all the parties involved and be in 
contradiction with Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast. Indeed, as stated by the German 
court in Reisch Montage AG v Kiesel Baumaschinen Handels GmbH, Article 8 (1) of 
the Brussels I Recast should be interpreted strictly in order to preserve the dominant 
                                                 
645 Other requirements for consolidation of claims: (a) there is a substantial, direct, and foreseeable 
connection between the forum’s intellectual property rights at issue and each nonresident defendant; or (b) as 
between the forum and the States in which the added defendants are resident, there is no forum that is more 
closely related to the entire dispute. § 206 (1) of the ALI Principles.  
646 Ibid.  
647 Stuart Dutson, ‘The Internet, the conflict of laws, international litigation and intellectual property: the 
implications of the international scope of the Internet on intellectual property infringements’ [1997] Journal of 
Business and Law 495.  
648 Paulius Jurčys, ‘International Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property Disputes: CLIP, ALI Principles and 
other Legislative Proposals in a Comparative Perspective’, 3 (2012) JIPITEC 3, 174. 
649 J. H. A. van Loon, ‘The Hague Conference on private international law. Work in progress (2000-
2001)’, Yearbook of Private International Law (Vol. III, Sellier de Gruyter 2009). 
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rule in Article 4 (1) of the Brussels I Recast650. In particular, the rule allowing one to 
sue resident and non-resident defendants was also deleted from the draft Hague 
Convention, as such a rule is unpredictable651. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the CLIP Proposals offer improvements in 
relation to the consolidation of civil actions against multiple defendants, which also 
might be applicable in relation to intellectual property disputes on the Internet. 
Furthermore, Article 2:206 of the CLIP Principles offers a wider interpretation of 
Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I by removing legal barriers to consolidating claims in 
the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. At the same 
time, I do not support the idea of the ALI Principles consolidating residents and non-
resident defendants; as such a rule will be unpredictable for all the parties involved. 
However, Article 2:206 of the CLIP Principles also offers the spider in the web 
approach, by allowing the consolidation of defendants at the court where the 
coordinated defendant is habitually resident. In my opinion, the existence of a link 
between the coordinated defendant and the other defendants is also possible in the 
case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. 
In this regard it would be reasonable to modify Article 8 (1) the Brussels I 
Recast in the light of the CLIP Proposal, because when taking the measures proposed 
in this thesis, the intellectual property rights owner will be able to consolidate 
multiple defendants’ claims before the court of the Member State where one of them 
is domiciled, under Articles 4 and 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast. 
In particular, Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast may be read as follows: 
“A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: 
1) Where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place 
where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely 
connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid 
the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from a separate proceedings;  
2) For the purpose of paragraph 1, a risk of incompatible judgments requires 
a risk of divergence in the outcome of the actions against the different 
defendants which arises in the context of essentially the same situation of 
                                                 
650 Case C-103/05 Reisch Montage AG v Kiesel Baumaschinen Handels GmbH [2006] ECRI–6827. 
651 Annette Kur, ‘International Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments: a way forward 
for I.P.?’ [2002] EIPR 175.  
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law and fact. In particular in infringement disputes and subject to the 
individual circumstances of the case,  
(a) Disputes involve essentially the same factual situation if the defendant 
have, even if in different States, acted in an identical or similar manner 
in accordance with a common policy; 
(b) Disputes may involve essentially the same legal situation even if 
different national law are applicable to the claims against the different 
defendants, provided that the relevant national law are harmonised to a 
significant degree by rules of a regional integration organisation or by 
international conventions which are applicable to the dispute in 
question. 
3) If it is manifest from the facts that one defendant has coordinated the 
relevant activities or is otherwise most closely connected with the dispute 
in its entirety, jurisdiction according to paragraph 1 is only conferred on 
the courts in the State where the defendant is habitually resident. In other 
cases, jurisdiction is conferred on the courts in the State or States of 
habitual residence of any of the defendants, unless 
(a) the contribution of the defendant who is habitually resident in the 
State where the court is located is insubstantial in relation to the dispute in 
its entirety or 
(b) the claim against the resident defendant is manifestly 
inadmissible”652.  
                                                 
652 CLIP Principles, Art. 2:206.  
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Chapter 3 
Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast 
and its applicability to intellectual 
property rights infringement on the 
Internet 
 
3.1 Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast: Introduction 
 Questions regarding appropriate jurisdiction arise with every cross-border 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. Indeed, intellectual 
property rights owners do not want to be sued abroad and infringers prefer to seek 
solutions at home. As a result, the conflicting interests between intellectual property 
owners and infringers generate a problem: what court has jurisdiction in cases of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet?  
Suing at the place of intellectual property rights infringement is usually 
regarded as the most effective way to obtain judicial protection of intellectual 
property rights. Indeed, this is the place that is the most closely connected with the 
factual elements of the dispute and with the evidence653.  
However, does the EU have the appropriate legal instruments in relation to 
jurisdiction in the case of intellectual property rights infringement?  
                                                 
653 Arnaud Nuyts, Suing at the place of infringement: the application of Article 5 (3) of Regulation 
44/2001 to IP Matters and Internet Disputes. in Arnaud Nuyts (ed), International Litigation in Intellectual 
Property and Information Technology (Kluwer Law International 2008) 105.  
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Indeed, we can find traces of such instruments. In particular, intellectual 
property rights owners may bring an action in the Member State in which an act of 
infringement has been committed or threatened, but only in relation to the 
Community Trade Mark654 and Community Design.655 
It is important to note that the Brussels I Recast does not include a specific head 
of jurisdiction at the place of intellectual property rights infringement, but only 
provides a jurisdictional basis in the country of registration or validity of patents, 
trademarks, designs and other similar rights required to be deposited or registered 
according to Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast (which will be discussed in the 
next chapter). Therefore, in the absence of a specific rule dealing with acts of 
infringement, one usually turns to the broader forum of tort provision found in Article 
7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast656.  
Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast derogates from the general rule under 
Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast and allows trial in the courts of a Member State 
other than the one in which the defendant is domiciled. In particular, Article 7 (2) of 
the Brussels I Recast states that: “A person domiciled in a Member State may, in 
another Member State, be sued in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the 
courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur”657. The ECJ 
in Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schröder658, confirmed that three basic requirements were 
necessary to establish a claim in tort under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast. In 
particular, a tort for the purposes of Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast is defined 
and interpreted as “an autonomous independent concept” which establishes the 
”liability of the defendant” and must not be a “matter relating to contract”659. In 
another case, Shevill v Press Alliance SA, the ECJ made clear that Article 7 (2) of the 
Brussels I Recast applies to claims seeking to establish the liability of the defendant 
not only for personal injury or damage to physical property, but also for damage to 
intangible property. Indeed, the ECJ in Shevill v Press Alliance SA explained that 
                                                 
654 Council Regulation (EC) 207/2009 on the Community trade mark [2009] OJ L 78/1, Art 97 (5). 
655 Council Regulation (EC) 6/2002 on Community designs [2002] OJ LEC L 3, Art 82 (5). 
656 Arnaud Nuyts, Suing at the place of infringement: the application of Article 5 (3) of Regulation 
44/2001 to IP Matters and Internet Disputes. in Arnaud Nuyts (ed), International Litigation in Intellectual 
Property and Information Technology (Kluwer Law International 2008) 106. 
 657 Council Regulation (EC) 1215/2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2012] OJ L 351. 
658Case 189/87 Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schroder Munchmeyer Hengst & Co [1988] ECR 05565.  
659 Ibid, para 15. 
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Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast is also applicable to cases of infringement of 
personality rights: an “international libel” through the press660. Therefore, it is widely 
accepted that Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast also applies to proceedings 
relating to the infringement of intellectual property rights, which constitute another 
kind of intangible property661. Indeed, as noted by Fawcett, this solution is widely 
accepted in the case law of the Member States’ courts applying Article 7 (2) of the 
Brussels I Recast with respect to copyright, trade mark and patent infringements662. 
Special jurisdiction is based on the existence of a particularly close link between the 
dispute and the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred, which justifies 
the attribution of jurisdiction to those courts by the sound administration of justice 
and the efficacious conduct of proceedings663. The main issue here is the meaning of 
the phrase “the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur?”  
Indeed, identifying “the place where the harmful event occurred” is very 
important for understanding how this jurisdictional rule applies with respect to an 
alleged infringement of intellectual property rights on the Internet. 
3.2 The place where the harmful event occurred: the 
definition problem and the solution provided by 
the ECJ 
 The meaning of the phrase “the place where the harmful event occurred” in 
Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast is very difficult in cases where there is one event 
but where the place of origin of the damage and the place of its consequences are 
different. This is especially important in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet as the Internet does not know any national borders. As 
a result, intellectual property rights owners face the possibility of being subject to any 
foreign jurisdictions in which their websites can be accessed.  
The first case where the ECJ had to interpret this concept was Handelskwekerij 
G. J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d'Alsace SA664, according to which the expression 
                                                 
660 Case C-68/93 Shevill v Press Alliance SA [1995] ECR-I-415, para 23. 
661 Fawcett (n 113) 150. 
662 Fawcett (n 112) 151-152. 
663 Case C-189/08 Zuid-Chemie v Philippo’s Mineralenfabriek NV/SA [2009] ECR I-6917, para 24. 
664 Case 21/76 Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d’Alsace SA [1976] ECR 1735. 
132 
 
“place where the harmful event occurred” has an autonomous meaning and covers 
both the place where the damage actually occurred and the place of the event giving 
rise to that damage665. The choice between the place of activity and the place of 
damage is for the plaintiff666. In this regard, we need to notice that if the defendant is 
active in the same state there is no difference between both connecting factors 
employed667. Usually, a defendant acts where that person has his domicile, and thus 
Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast comes into play668. This means that in the situation 
where the place of the event giving rise to the damage corresponds with the 
defendant’s domicile, Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast would only allocate 
jurisdiction to the place where the damage occurred.  
However, torts commited over the Internet differ categorically from offline 
infringements because in the former the place of the activity and the place of damage 
may be different. Indeed, the place of the activity becomes relevant when it is located 
neither in the state where the defendant has his domicile (covered by Article 4, not by 
Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast)669 nor in the state where the damage was 
sustained670. This means that a dual jurisdiction is applicable to torts commited over 
the Internet which includes both the place where the damage has taken place as well 
as the place of the damage-causing effect.  
In addition, this duality of jurisdiction is applicable also to cases of non-
physical, receipt-orientated torts, such as defamation671. In particular, the ECJ in 
Shevill and Others v Presse Alliance SA ruled that the expression “place where the 
harmful event occurred” is intended to cover both “the place of the event giving rise 
to the damage and the place where the damage occurred”672. Therefore, the court has 
                                                 
665 Ibid, para 24.  
666 Case 21/76 Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier BV v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA [1976] ECR 1735, 1747 
paras 24-25.  
667 Ulrich Magnus (ed.) and Peter Mankowski (ed.), Brussels I Regulation (2nd edn, Sellier European Law 
Publishers 2012) 191.  
668 Case C-364/93 Antonio Marinari v Lloyd’s Bank plc and Zubaidi Co., [1995] ECR I-2719. I-2739, para 
12.  
669 Case 21/76 Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier BV v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA [1976] ECR 1735, 174, 
paras 20 - 23.  
670 Ulrich Magnus (ed.) and Peter Mankowski (ed.), Brussels I Regulation (2nd edn, Sellier European Law 
Publishers 2012) 191. 
671 Y Farah, ‘Jurisdictional Aspects of Electronic Torts, in the Footsteps of Shevill v Press Alliance SA’ 
(2005) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 198; Leigh Smith, ‘CJEU Clarifies Jurisdiction To 
Award Damages For The Infringement Of “Personality Rights” Online’ (2012) 23 Entertainment Law Review 43, 
46. 
672 Case C-68/93 Shevill and Others v Presse Alliance SA [1995] ECR I-415. 
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found that the victim has two options for bringing an action for compensation against 
the defendant673. 
However, is this dual jurisdiction applicable to cases of intellectual property 
rights infringement?  
This issue is highle debatable. In particular, as noted by some authors, the 
Shevill situation is too different from the matter of intellectual property rights 
infringement to constitute a model in this matter674. Indeed, in contrast to defamation, 
intellectual property rights are territorial in their nature. In particular, according to the 
principle of territoriality, the infringement of intellectual property rights could only 
be on the territory of the country under whose laws those rights are granted and 
exercised, and this territory would necessarily coincide with the place where the 
damage is felt675. This point leads Jooris to the conclusion that the duality of 
jurisdiction is not appropriate in intellectual property matters, where one single 
connecting factor should be used – namely, the act of infringement676. Indeed, as was 
noted previously, in the case of Community trade marks677 or Community designs678 
infringements, jurisdiction is allocated to the Member State where the act of 
infringement occurred. This means that jurisdiction under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels 
I Recast would necessarily lie within the territory of the protection state, namely at 
the place where the right is protected under local law.  
However, while it is true that defamation cases and cases of intellectual 
property rights infringement are quite different, we need to agree that a much bigger 
step was taken when the system of dual jurisidction was extended from Bier to Shevill 
than when it is transposed to intellectual property matters679. Indeed, the jurisdictional 
approach is based on a single connecting factor, the act of infringement, which leads 
to a narrowing of the scope of the court’s authority by comparison with the Shevill 
                                                 
673 Leigh Smith, ‘CJEU Clarifies Jurisdiction To Award Damages For The Infringement Of “Personality 
Rights” Online’ (2012) 23 Entertainment Law Review 34-35.  
674 Arnaud Nuyts, Suing at the place of infringement: the application of Article 5 (3) of Regulation 
44/2001 to IP Matters and Internet Disputes in Arnaud Nuyts (ed), International Litigation in Intellectual Property 
and Information Technology (Kluwer Law International 2008) 127; E. Jooris, ‘Infringement of Foreign Copyright 
and the Jurisdiction of English Courts’ [1996] 3 EIPR 127, 139-140.  
675 Potter v The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd [1906] CLR 476, 494.  
676 E. Jooris, ‘Infringement of Foreign Copyright and the Jurisdiction of English Courts’ [1996] 3 EIPR 
127, 139-140. 
677 Council Regulation (EC) 207/2009 on the Community trade mark [2009] OJ L 78/1, Art. 97 (5). 
678 Council Regulation (EC) 6/2002 on Community designs [2002] OJ LEC L 3, Art. 82 (5). 
679 Arnaud Nuyts, Suing at the place of infringement: the application of Article 5 (3) of Regulation 
44/2001 to IP Matters and Internet Disputes in Arnaud Nuyts (ed), International Litigation in Intellectual Property 
and Information Technology (Kluwer Law International 2008) 127. 
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and Others v Presse Alliance SA ruling. In addition, as stated in Shevill, the cruteria 
for assessing whether the event in question is harmful for the purposes of Article 7 (2) 
“… are not governed by the Convention but the substantive law determined by the 
national conflict of laws rules of the court seised”680. This means that territoriality of 
intellectual property rights, as a principle of substantive law681, is irrelevant for the 
purpose of application of Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast. Indeed, in Marinari, 
the ECJ made clear that the Brussels regime “did not intend to link the rules on 
territorial jurisdiction with national provisions concerning the conditions under which 
non-contractual liability is incurred”682. Therefore, the duality of jurisdiction 
according to Shevill and Others v Presse Alliance SA is also applicable to cases of 
intellectual property rights infringement despite their territorial nature683. Indeed, 
intellectual property rights infringement actions are usually nothing other than actions 
for compensation or prevention of an economic loss684. 
However, the rationale for allocating jurisdiction at the place of economic loss 
is very debatable 685. In particular, with reference to the ECJ case in Dumez, some 
authors noted that jurisidction under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast is provided 
“at the place where the causal event directly produces its harmful effects upon the 
person who is the immediate victim of that event”686. This means that only “initial 
damage”687 is relevant for the purpose of Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast, as 
opposed to resulting economic loss. Thus, the duality of jurisidction in cases of 
intellectual property rights infringement is once again disputed. 
                                                 
680 Case C-68/93 Shevill v Press Alliance SA [1995] ECR-I-415, para 41.  
681 Traditionally, in intellectual property matters the substantive law supposes an infringement within the 
territory where the right is protected. For example, the right in copyright, patent or trade mark is protected only 
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21. 
687 Ibid.  
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Indeed, the difficulties in the notion of damage in intellectual property rights 
infringement lead some authors to reject jurisdiction based on the place of damage688. 
The main argument in support of this approch is based on the fact that there are 
situations where there will be an act of infringement but where no direct initial 
damage is sustained689. For example, in the case of trademark infringement, the 
economic loss is sustained where the sign is used to market or offer products. Thus, 
there is an economic loss but no direct initial damage.  
The ECJ, in the Henkel case690, made the situation clear by providing that the 
rule of special jurisdiction according to Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast applies 
equally to claims seeking to prevent the occurrence of damage as to claims seeking 
compensation for damage that has already occurred. Otherwise there would be a 
paradoxical result whereby the most proficient and efficient way to deal with torts 
would be impeded and limited691. This is also confirmed in the wording of Article 7 
(2) of the Brussels I Recast, which refers to the place where the harmful event 
occurred or may occur.  
It is important to note that the Brussels Convention does not contain a reference 
to the place where the harmful event may occur, which was added to Regulation 
44/2001 and Brussels I Recast in order to make it clear that Article 7 (2) covers an 
action to prevent a threatened wrong692.  
This means that jurisdiction under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast depends 
on “the proximity between the forum and the factual elements of the dispute”693 and 
not on the type of damage involved. Indeed, as noted by Fawcett, it is not appropriate 
to have special definitions of the place of the harmful event for particular torts or for 
cases involving only particular types of damage (non-material or material loss, non-
financial or financial loss)694.  
                                                 
688 Fawcett (n 112). 
689 Arnaud Nuyts, Suing at the place of infringement: the application of Article 5 (3) of Regulation 
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690 Case C-167/00 Verein fur Konsumenteninformation v Henkel [2002] ECR I-8111, para 46. 
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European Law Publishers 2011) 190. 
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Therefore, the duality of jurisdiction adopted in Bier and endorsed in Shevill 
should be applied equally to other cases concerning the infringement of intangible 
property695. This means that in cases of intellectual property rights infringement the 
plaintiff is able to bring proceedings at the place of the causal event or at the place 
where the damage occurred. This idea was applied by the French Cour de Cassation 
in the Wegmann case696 where copyright was infringed by counterfeit publications 
distributed in several contracting states. The court held that the plaintiff could pursue 
its claim for damages either before the court of the place where the author of the 
counterfeit publications was established, or before the court where the counterfeit 
goods were distributed697. 
3.3 Impact of Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast for 
Intellectual Property rights Infringement over 
the Internet 
 For a number of years the special jurisdiction under Article 7 (2) of the 
Brussels I Recast has been at the centre of the debate regarding intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet698. Nothing has been done to adapt the provisions 
relating to non-internet cases of infringement of intellectual property rights to the 
context of the Internet699.  
Intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet is a tort. In spite of 
the fact that it is very difficult to identify the place where intellectual property rights 
infringement occurs over the Internet, the impact of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet is still felt in the real world – people lose real money 
and they are insulted as real, not virtual, persons700. 
                                                 
695 Fawcett (n 112) 156; Miguel Asensio, ‘Cross-border Adjudication of Intellectual Property Rights and 
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699 Arnaud Nuyts, Katarzyna Szychowska, Nikitas Hatzimihail, ‘Cross-border litigation in intellectual 
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Therefore, in the “deliberate” absence701 of an appropriate jurisdictional basis in 
the Brussels I Recast, the most important question here becomes how to apply the 
existing jurisdictional rules. As was discussed previously, in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet, a Shevill-based theory is applicable.  
However, the applicability of a Shevill-based approach to intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet does not mean that this jurisdictional basis gives 
us an adequate picture of the world. Indeed, there are active academic debates about 
the application of Article 7 (2) of the Brussels Regulation to cases of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet702. As our findings indicate, there are 
three main approaches to the application of Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast to 
cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet: a Shevill-based 
approach; a modified version of Shevill and the conventional approach.  
These approaches will be analysed and recommendations on the application of 
Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast to cases of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet will be given. 
The first approach is the Shevill-based approach. As the label indicates, the 
Shevill-based approach is based on the Shevill case and recognises that the rule 
applicable to press media is also applicable to intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet. The well-known decision need not be repeated here. 
The ECJ in the Shevill case ruled that a claimant could bring proceedings either where 
the publisher was established or the place where the damage to the claimant's 
reputation occurred703.  
The Shevill-based approach has received great academic support due to an 
analogy between multi-State defamation and muli-State infringement704. In particular, 
like in the case of defamation, intellectual property rights infringement over the 
                                                 
701 Trevor C Hartley, International Commercial Litigation (Cambridge University Press 2009) 52. 
702 Fawcett (n 112); Torsten Bettinger and Dorothee Thum, ‘Territorial trademark rights in the global 
village: international jurisdiction, choice of law and substantive law for trademark disputes on the Internet: Part 1’ 
(2000) 31(2) IIC 162-182; Svetozara Petkova, ‘The potential impact of the draft Hague Convention on 
International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters on Internet-related disputes 
with particular reference to copyright’ (2004) 2 I.P.Q. 173-197; Oren Bigos, ‘Jurisdiction over cross-border 
wrongs on the Internet’ (2005) 54(3) I.C.L.Q. 585-620; Graham Smith, ‘Here, there or everywhere? Cross-border 
liability on the Internet’ (2007) 13(2) C.T.L.R. 41-51; Pekka Savola, ‘The ultimate copyright shopping 
opportunity - jurisdiction and choice of law in website blocking injunctions’ (2014) 45(3) IIC 287-315.  
703 Case C-68/93 Shevill v Press Alliance SA [1995] ECR-I-415.  
704 Fawcett (n 112) 566; Lilian Edwards, ‘The Scotsman, the Greek, the Mauritian company and the 
Internet: where on earth do things happen in cyberspace?’ (2004) 8(1) Edin. L.R. 99-111; Youseph Farah, 
‘Jurisdictional aspects of electronic torts, in the footsteps of Shevill v Presse Alliance SA’ (2005) 11(6) C.T.L.R. 
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Internet involves multiple damage. This means that the results of intellectual property 
rights infringement (such as trademark infringement) is essentially the same as in 
defamation since both torts involve non-material or non-pecuniary damage705.  
In addition, the rationale behind the application of the Shevill-based approach to 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet is based on the fact that a 
defendant may infringe intellectual property rights both over the Internet (by 
advertising on a website) and by traditional means (sending out brochures)706. Thus, 
for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction it should not be relevant whether the 
matetial is published on the Internet or in the printed press707.  
In my opinion, in spite of the similarities, the jurisdictional approach between 
these two sets of cases cannot be the same. Indeed, as noted by the French Cour de 
Cassation in Castellblanch SA v Champagne Louis Roederer SA, intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet presents different challenges from ordinary 
infringement and therefore needs a different solution708. In this regard some leading 
scholars have proposed a modification of the Shevill-based approach due to its 
insufficient application to cross-border intellectual property rights infringements over 
the Internet709. The modified version of Shevill may decide the problems of multi-state 
distribution and multiple damage in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet710. 
Therefore, the main issue here is how to adapt the Shevill-based approach to 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet where there is a 
geographical separation between the place of the action of the defendant and at the 
origin of the damage. In particular, where is the place of the event giving rise to the 
damage and where does the damage take place in the case of intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet? 
Indeed, as noted by Fawcett, the place of establishement as a jurisdictional basis 
works perfectly in cases of defamation because the defamatory message is generated 
                                                 
705 Case C-68/93 Shevill v Press Alliance SA [1995] ECR-I-415, para 51.  
706 Re The Maritime Trademark Case 416 02924/00 [2003] IL Pr 297 ( Landgericht, Hamburg).  
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at the place of establishement: i.e., the place from which the libel was issued and put 
into circulation711. However, in the case of intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet the place of establishement may not be the place where the harmful 
event originated712. For example, in the case of copyright infringement over the 
Internet, the place where the event which gave rise to and was the origin of the 
damage is the uploading of the photographs to the defendant's website713. The same 
situaton arises in the case of trademark infringement over the Internet. In particular, 
in Sté Agrisilos and SARL Saint Maury v. SA GRE Manufacturas and Sté Kitch the 
French Cour de Cassation confirmed jurisdiction of the French court under Article 7 
(2) of the Brussels I Recast since the act of infringement took place in France. In 
particular, the defendant’s products were displayed and offered for sale in France; this 
was the origin of the damage 714. In this regard Bogdan suggests that the place of the 
event giving rise to the damage and the place where damage occurred should be the 
same715. However, as was discussed previously, such an approcah contradicts the 
principle of the duality of jurisdiction adopted in Shevill, where the court essentially 
stated that Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast gave the plaintiff the option of suing 
either where the publisher of the defamatory publication is established or before the 
courts of each contracting state where damage to reputation occurred. Therefore, it 
would be logical to discuss the wide interpretation of the Shevill case given by 
Bogdan rather than deny the duality of jurisidction based on Shevill. Indeed, in some 
cases, the place of the event giving rise to the damage will coincide with the place of 
establishment, but in some cases it will not. Fawcett also agrees that it is not 
necessary to have the place of establishment as an alternative basis of jurisdiction 
because Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast does not contain a requirement of two 
alternative fora716. Thus, the first limb of the modified version of Shevill is based on 
the place where the act of infringement occurred717. 
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The second limb of the Shevill approach is based on the place where the 
damage occurred, which is defined by the modified version of Shevill as the place of 
distribution718. The place of distribution should provide a solution to multiple damage 
in cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet.  
Therefore, we can conclude that under the modified version of Shevill, the 
claimant has the choice under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast to bring 
proceedings either before the courts of the Member State where where the act of 
infringement occurred or before the courts of the Member State where the infringing 
subject matter is distributed.  
In my opinion, the modified version of Shevill mirrors the Shevill-based 
approach as it does not satisfy the requirement of an information society. Indeed, it 
does not provide rules that would function reasonably well in relation to new 
technologies719. In particular, the determination of the place of the event giving rise to 
the damage and the place where the damage occurred is just to repeat where they are 
in those non-Internet infringement cases.  
Indeed, it is easy enough to say where patents, copyrights and trade mark are 
infringed in offline reality720. However, how can one identify jurisdiction in cases 
where copyright-related issues are involved in making protected material available 
through the Internet, or in cases of online advertisement? In addition, how can one 
decide the problem of multiple acts of intellectual property rights infringement over 
the Internet in different Member States? Indeed, the plaintiff is often interested in 
suing in one Member State in relation to multiple acts of infringement occurring in a 
number of Member States. Moreover, how can one deal with damage in cases of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, damage which is often 
“dematerialised” or has become “delocalised”?  
In this regard we can agree that these legal questions require an adequate legal 
response. In my opinion, the most appropriate response to these problems is the 
adaption of the Shevill which should satisfy the requirement of a new virtual world.  
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Why is the adaption of the Shevill required in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet?  
Indeed, when the jurisdiction based on the Shevill case was established, the 
development of the Internet was in its infancy, and this ruling more or less 
satisfactorily addressed the issue of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet721. However, at the present stage of the Internet’s development, the 
distribution of content on a website is in principle universal722, since it may be 
instantly consulted throughout the world by an unlimited number of Internet users723. 
In addition, the increasing numbers of intellectual property rights infringements over 
the Internet mean that the interests of intellectual property rights owners need 
protecting with clear and predictable legal rules. Moreover, the interests of Internet 
users should also be taken into account in order to avoid suits in multiple Member 
States. Indeed, a balance of the interests of all participants in the online dispute 
should be provided. 
In addition, the adaption of the Shevill rule is called for by developments in ECJ 
case law whereby the identification of jurisdictional rules depends of the nature of the 
intellectual property rights which are being infringed over the Internet724. Indeed, as 
noted by the ECJ in eDate Advertising GmbH v X and Olivier Martinez and Robert 
Martinez v Société MGN Limited (hereafter “eDate”) the new jurisdictional approach 
is required “due to the insufficiency of existing interpretations of Article 7 (2) of the 
Brussels I Recast” in relation to Internet claims725. Indeed, we can agree that taking 
into account the difficulties associated with the identification and prevention of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, the jurisdiction in such 
cases shoud be based on specific connection requirements. In this regard, Fawcett 
even proposes to establish separate jurisdictional rules for cases of intellectual 
property right infringement over the Internet which will be based only on the place of 
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the event giving rise to the damage, not on the place where the damage occurred 
because such a connection may be irrelevant (as the damage may be dematerialised or 
delocalised).726.  
In my opinion, the duality of jurisdiction based on the place of the event giving 
rise to the damage and the place where the damage occurred should be retained since 
such rules provide jurisdictional flexibility, something that is very important in cases 
of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. Indeed, based on the 
circumstances of the case, the court will be able to identify the place of the event 
giving rise to the damage or the place where the damage occurred, whichever is more 
closely linked to resolving the dispute. Moreover, the duality of jurisdiction is an 
expression of the succession of jurisdictional rule. In support this point of view I 
would like to notice that the Internet is “an old wine in new bottles from a conflict 
perspective”727 (as argued in Chapter 1above). In other words, private international 
law principles should apply to this new form of communication but should take into 
account the unique factual circumstances in which infringements of intellectual 
property rights may be committed.  
In this regard, the adapted version of Shevill should be based on more online-
specific jurisdictional rules. In particular, by establishing rules for intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet, it is important to take into account not 
only new Internet participants (such as intermediaries, ISPs) but also the specific 
characteristics of the distribution of content over the Internet (such as the digital 
nature of intellectual property rights and the borderless nature of the Internet). The 
ECJ also supports my approach that the Shevill must be “adapted”728 in order to 
satisfy the requirements of a new virtual world. Indeed, while it is “undesirable” for 
legal rules to be developed for particular technologies, it is necessary to take into 
account the reach of information disseminated by the Internet729.  
All these reasons lead me to the conclusion that it is necessary to adapt the 
Shevill. In my opinion, the EU community requires harmonized jurisdictional rules 
for intellectual property rights infringements over the Internet. Therefore, the 
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adaption of the Shevill rules is one of the necessary steps for reforming the 
jurisdictional rules for intellectual property rights infringements over the Internet 
under the Brussels I Recast.  
What are the connection requirements under the adapted version of 
Shevill? 
For example, in the United States, there are a number of jurisdictional theories 
that have been developed with regard to torts committed over the Internet that take 
into account such issues as the interactivity of the website, the targeted nature (or 
otherwise) of Internet communication, minimum contacts with the forum selected by 
the plaintiff, and the general fairness, in due process terms, of bringing the defendant 
to the courts of the forum730. The ECJ has also tried to develop special jurisdictional 
rules for torts committed over the Internet. However, by contrast with the well-
developed United States practice, the EU is just at the start of its adaptation of the 
existing law to torts committed over the Internet. 
An example of such adaptation may be the recent case eDate where the ECJ 
resolves some of the difficulties involved in torts committed over the Internet731. The 
case involves the infringement of personality rights by means of online content.  
In my opinion, the ECJ decision in eDate represents the adaptation of the 
Shevill rather than the introduction of a new jurisdictional approach to torts 
committed over the Internet. There are a number of facts in support of this point of 
view. 
Indeed, through the close analyse of the ECJ decision in eDate, one can find a 
confirmation of this hypothesis. In particular, at point 48 of eDate, the ECJ says: 
“The connecting criteria referred to in paragraph 42 of the present judgment (the 
Shevill factors) must therefore be adapted in such a way that a person who has 
suffered an infringement of a personality right by means of the Internet may bring an 
action in one forum in respect of all of the damage caused…”732. And then the ECJ 
introduced a new connection requirement: the centre of the claimant’s interest “due to 
the insufficiency of existing interpretations of Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast” 
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in relation to Internet claims733. However, as stated by the ECJ in eDate: “The place 
where a person has the centre of his interests corresponds in general to his habitual 
residence. A person may also have the centre of his interests in a Member State in 
which he does not habitually reside, in so far as other factors, such as the pursuit of a 
professional activity, may establish the existence of a particularly close link with that 
State”734.  
Therefore, the ECJ decision in eDate is the adaptation of the Shevill in the light 
of the changed realities of the digital age by providing some innovative features. In 
particular, the ECJ in eDate recognised the extraterritorial nature of torts committed 
over the Internet by allowing some flexibility for the claimant to sue either at the 
victim’s habitual residence or the victim’s centre of professional activity. 
On the other hand, the ECJ in eDate followed the practice already adopted in 
Shevill by confirming the duality of jurisdiction (based on the place of the event 
giving rise to damage and the place where the damage occurred). Indeed, in addition 
to the introduction of a new jurisdiction based on the claimant’s centre of interest 
(which is in fact just an alternative jurisdictional approach based on the place where 
the damage occurred), the ECJ in eDate stated that in the event of an alleged 
infringement of personality rights by means of content placed online, the person who 
considers that his rights have been infringed has the option of bringing an action for 
liability either before the courts of the Member State in which the publisher of that 
content is established or before the courts of each Member State in the territory of 
which content placed online is or has been accessible735. 
However, the ECJ in eDate have also asserted jurisdiction based on the place of 
establishment of the publisher.736 This means that in the case of torts committed over 
the Internet, the place of the event giving rise to the damage is the place where the 
publisher of the content is established. In such situations, the plaintiff could bring an 
action in respect of all the damage caused in the court of the Member State in which 
the publisher of the content is established. 
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Yet, on the other hand, the ECJ in eDate has adapted the second limb of the 
Shevill-based approach in defining the place where the damage occurred as where the 
content placed online is or has been accessible737. Thus, the accessibility criterion 
results from the transposition to the Internet context of the “distribution” criterion of 
Shevill738. This approach allows the claimant to bring a separate action in each 
jurisdiction where they claim to have suffered damage. 
In my opinion, the ECJ in eDate has adapted the Shevill-based approach. 
Indeed, the ECJ did not even discuss the jurisdictional approach under the modified 
version of Shevill. In this regard, the modified version of Shevill is irrelevant for the 
purpose of establishing jurisdiction in the case of torts committed over the Internet.  
On the basis of this analysis, it seems that according to the adapted version of 
Shevill, in the case of torts committed over the Internet, the claimant may bring 
proceedings either before: 
1) the court of the place of the event giving rise to the damage:  
- where the publisher of that content is established; or  
2) the court of the place where the damage occurred:  
- where the material is (or has been) accessible;  
- where the claimant has his centre of interests. 
Thus, the jurisdictional approach under the adapted version of Shevill (in the 
light of eDate) is more flexible than jurisdiction under the Shevill rule. Indeed, the 
adapted version of Shevill provides two alternative connection requirements for 
identifying the court of the place where the damage occurred: where the material is 
(or has been) accessible, or where the claimant has his centre of interests. In my 
opinion, such flexibility is a way to respond to difficulties in identifying the place 
where the damage occurred from torts committed over the Internet. 
However, the jurisdictional rules adapted by the ECJ in eDate are concerned 
with infringements of personality rights, which differ significantly from intellectual 
property rights infringements since the latter rights are protected on a territorial basis 
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and are concerned with the commercial exploitation of a product739. Therefore, the 
connecting criteria laid down in eDate should be interpreted in the light of particular 
characteristics of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet.  
Moreover, as noted by Fawcett, in some situations where the Shevill-based 
approach is not applicable, there is an alternative approach740. The main emphasis of 
Fawcett’s analysis is on the conventional approach741. In my opinion, rather than to 
continue to analyse the “old” law we need to emphasise our attention on the recent 
case law developments by suggesting the specific connection requirements of 
intellectual property rights infringements over the Internet. Indeed, as noted by the 
Advocate General in Peter Pinckney V KDG Mediatech AG (hereafter Pinckney) the 
ubiquity of content placed online should result in a new definition of the link between 
a virtual behaviour and a territory742. 
The analysis of recent ECJ case law developments demonstrate the desire of the 
courts to provide specific connection requirements for cases of intellectual property 
rights infringements over the Internet743. For example, according to the Advocate 
General’s point of view in Pinckney and Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U 
Sondermaschinenbau GmbH (hereafter Wintersteiger), jurisdiction in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet may be based on the place 
where the intellectual property rights are infringed744,745. According to this approach, 
the place of the event giving rise to the damage is the place where the intellectual 
property rights are infringed. Indeed, it would be logical to establish jurisdiction at 
the court of the Member State in which the intellectual property right is infringed as 
such a court is most closely connected to the circumstances of the dispute. Moreover, 
as noted by Fawcett, the place in which the right is infringed is easy to identify746. 
Therefore, it is important to analyse whether the Advocate General’s propositions in 
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Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117. 
744 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, 
para 29. 
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Pinckney and Wintersteiger to allocate jurisdiction based on the place where the 
intellectual property rights are infringed are an appropriate jurisdictional basis for 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. In particular, is the place of 
the event giving rise to the damage in the meaning of the place where the act of 
intellectual property rights infringement occurred a satisfactory alternative to the 
jurisdiction based on the place where the publisher is established under the adapted 
version of Shevill? These issues will be analysed in the next paragraphs.  
Moreover, there are also active academic discussions about whether the 
targeting or directing activities approach, which is applicable in cases of Internet-
related consumer disputes, is also applicable as a jurisdictional basis in cases of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet747. Indeed, the identification 
of the place where the damage occurred is based on criteria where the website has 
targeted/directed its activities towards a particular Member State748.  
In this regard we can conclude that according to the alternative approach in 
the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, the claimant 
may bring proceedings either before: 
1) the court of the place of the event giving rise to the damage:  
- where the act of infringement occurred; or  
2) the court of the place where the damage occurred:  
- where the website was targeting/directing its activities. 
Therefore, we can conclude that jurisdiction based on the alternative approach 
also recognises the duality of jurisdiction by providing two alternative fora to sue the 
defendant: either at the place of the event giving rise to the damage or at the place 
where the damage occurred. Moreover, as with the adapted version of Shevill, so the 
alternative approach takes into account specific connection requirements of 
intellectual property rights infringements over the Internet: where the act of 
infringement occurred or where the website was targeting/directing its activity 
towards a particular Member State. 
                                                 
747 Adam D Thierer and Clyde Wayne Crews (ed.), Who Rules The Net?: Internet Governance And 
Jurisdiction (Cato Institute 2003) 107; Uta Kohl, Jurisdiction and the Internet – a Study of regulatory competence 
over online activity (Cambridge University Press 2007) 78; Andrej Savin and Jan Trzaskowski (ed.), Research 
Handbook on EU Internet Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) 59;  
748 Case C-585/08 Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof [2010] ECR I-12527; Case C-324/09 L’Oreal v eBay 
[2011] ECR I-06011.  
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The aim of the next paragraphs is to identify how these jurisdictional rules are 
applicable to intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet and where 
these connection requirements are the appropriate jurisdictional choice. In particular, 
the following questions will be analysed: Is the adapted version of Shevill an 
appropriate jurisdictional basis for intellectual property rights infringements 
over the Internet? Is the alternative jurisdictional approch an appropriate 
jurisdictional basis for intellectual property rights infringements over the 
Internet? What is the best approach in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringements on the Internet? What is the direction for future reform of the 
Brussels I Recast?  
3.3.1 Adapted version of Shevill 
3.3.1.1 The place of the event giving rise to the damage: where 
the publisher is established 
In eDate749 the ECJ transposed and adapted the well-known Shevill case to the 
situation where personality rights have been infringed over the Internet. In particular, 
the ECJ held that Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast should be interpreted as 
meaning that a person who considered that his personality rights had been infringed 
by means of content placed online could bring an action in respect of all the damage 
caused in the court of the Member State in which the publisher of the content is 
established750.  
The place of establishment as a jurisdictional basis is based on Article 7 (5) of 
the Brussels I Recast, which provides that as regards disputes arising out of the 
operations of a branch, agency or other establishment, the competent courts are the 
courts for wherever the branch, agency or other establishment is situated751. This 
article covers actions relating to both contractual and non-contractual obligations752. 
Therefore, joint actions of Articles 7 (2) and 7 (5) of the Brussels I Recast allow suits 
against the publisher of the illegal content where its branch, agency or other 
                                                 
749 Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate Advertising GmbH v X (C-509/09) and Olivier Martinez 
and Robert Martinez v Société MGN Limited (C-161/10) [2011] ECR I-10269. 
750 Ibid, para 42. 
751 Council Regulation (EC) on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters 1215/2012 [2012] OJ L 351. 
752 Case 33/78 Somafer SA v Saar-Ferngas AG [1978] ECR 2183, para 5.  
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establishment is situated. For example, a New York incorporated company with an 
establishment in England can be sued in England when the dispute is concerned with 
the operation753.  
This approach does not establish a new connection requirement with regard to 
torts committed over the Internet, but rather adapts the rule754. Indeed, accorded to the 
adapted rule, the publisher of press media is now referred to as a publisher of Internet 
content. In this connection, some may contend that the place of establishment is not 
an appropriate basis in cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet as it would not satisfy the requirements of sound administration of justice, an 
objective explicitly referred to in the preamble to Brussels I Recast755. For example, as 
trademark infringements over the Internet are protected on a territorial basis, the place 
of establishment as a jurisdictional basis may leads to fragmentation of jurisdiction as 
trademarks may be infringed in more than one Member State. 
However, according to the logic of the court in eDate, this approach is still 
relevant in the case of torts committed over the Internet because it allows one to sue 
in the court of one Member State in respect of all the damage caused by the tort756. 
That court would naturally be the one with the closest connection to the evidence of 
the intellectual property rights infringement. Thus, the main focus of this approach is 
to the causal event giving rise to the damage, itself by reference to the person whose 
liability is engaged.757  
However, before we start to analyse whether the place of establishment of the 
publisher of the Internet content is an appropriate jurisdictional basis for intellectual 
property rights infringements over the Internet, it is important to identify who can be 
considered as a publisher in the case of intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet? 
The question of subject matter in cases of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet has long been the subject of active academic 
                                                 
753 Fawcett (n 112) 412. 
754 Andrej Savin and Jan Trzaskowski (ed.), Research Handbook on EU Internet Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2014) 235. 
755 Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate Advertising GmbH v X (C-509/09) and Olivier Martinez 
and Robert Martinez v Société MGN Limited (C-161/10) [2011] ECR I-10269, Opinion of AG Villalón, para 31. 
756 Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate Advertising GmbH v X (C-509/09) and Olivier Martinez 
and Robert Martinez v Société MGN Limited (C-161/10) [2011] ECR I-10269. 
757 Andrej Savin and Jan Trzaskowski (ed.), Research Handbook on EU Internet Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2014) 235. 
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discussion from the early years of the introduction of the Internet758. In particular, it 
turns on who is the publisher of the content: the user who posted the infringing 
content over the Internet or the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) whose services are 
used for posting the information? This question has a significant practical value as a 
publisher may be liable in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over 
the Internet, as the ECJ emphasised in eDate. The Working Group on Intellectual 
Property Rights provides some clarification by comparing the liability of ISPs with 
that of publishers759. On this basis, the liability and limits of ISPs were established. 
The Electronic Commerce Regulations760 and Guidance on the Electronic Commerce 
Regulation761 identify ISPs as any services provided for remuneration, at a distance, 
by means of electronic equipment for the processing (including digital compression) 
and storage of data, at the individual request of a recipient of the service. 
However, when is an ISP liable as a publisher?  
Indeed, like publishers in the press media, ISPs on the Internet are the key links 
in determining which works are to be made available to the public. However, in 
comparison with publishers, ISPs face serious problems unique to this type of 
business: ISPs transmit and store enormous amounts of information, beyond the 
capacity of any person or organization to scrutinize. Inevitably, some of this 
information violates intellectual property rights762. This leads to the liabilities of ISPs 
as publishers on the basis of the facts that ISPs can monitor infringing activity and 
that they have a financial interest in providing their services763. 
Indeed, the issue of the liability of ISPs for the content posted by their 
subscribers is very contentious in legal literature764. On the one hand, there are some 
                                                 
758 I. Trotter Hardy, ‘The Proper Legal Regime for Cyberspace’ (1994) 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993, 1042-
46; Jane C. Ginsburg, ‘Putting Cars on the ‘Information Superhighway’: Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in 
Cyberspace’ (1995), 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1492-95; Assaf Hamdani, ‘Who’s Liable for Cyberwrongs’ 
(2002) 87 Cornell L. Rev. 901. 
758 Information Infrastructure Task Force, Department of commerce, ‘Intellectual Property and the 
national Information Infrastructure: the Report of the working group on Intellectual Property Rights 7-8’ (1995).  
760 Electronic Commerce (EC) Regulations 2002 [2002] S.I. 2013, Art. 2 (1) (b).  
761 A guide for business to the electronic commerce (EC) Regulations 2002 [2002] S.I. 2013, Art 2.13.  
762 Aaron Schwabach, Internet And The Law: Technology, Society, And Compromises (2nd edn, ABC-
CLIO 2006) 158. 
763 Religious Technology Center v Netcom On-Line Communications Services, Inc. [1995] 923 F. Supp. 
1231, 1244.  
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against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators’ (1995) 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 345, 399-410; Kelly 
Tickle, ‘Comment. The Vicarious Liability of Electronic Bulletin Board Operators for the Copyright Infringement 
Occurring on Their Bulletin Boards’ (1995) 80 IOWA L. REV. 391, 416. 
764 Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, Information Infrastructure Task Force, ‘Intellectual 
Property and the National Information Infrastructure’ (1995) 1-6, 114-24.  
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authors who suggest that a possible answer to the problem of the liability of ISPs is to 
bring all ISPs within the scope of “publishers”765: in such a situation ISPs should be 
liable for any material posted on the Internet if it contravenes the rights of others. 
Such an approach has a clear advantage for the rights owners’ interests in protecting 
their rights when the users’ identification is difficult (for example, due to anonymity 
and privacy issues). Indeed, in some cases the liability of ISPs is the single possibility 
for intellectual property rights owners to protect their rights766 and to prevent any 
further intellectual property rights infringement.  
On the other hand, the unlimited liability of ISPs as publishers would impair the 
disseminating process, which is not good for society.767 Indeed, it is hard to imagine 
that Google is to be held liable for every web page it searches where unauthorised, 
copyrighted content is contained768. Even by hiring an army of lawyers, it is still 
extremely difficult for ISPs to scrutinise all illegal activity769.  
In my opinion, ISPs should incur limited liability for the content they distribute 
as such an approach would promote the development of the Internet and information 
dissemination. In particular, when the ISPs are notified of infringing content on their 
services they must remove such content upon receipt of certain guarantees from the 
copyright’s owner. The limited liability of ISPs is confirmed also by the EU770 and 
US771 legislators, which consider ISPs as distributors of information when they have 
acted as mere conduits, cashes and hosts772.  
                                                 
765 Dennis Campbell and Susan Woodley, E-commerce: Law and Jurisdiction (Kluwer Law International 
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768 Ibid, 122-126. 
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770 Directive (EC) 2000/31 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
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However, in this respect some may suggest that an ISP may be liable as a 
publisher even with regard to the content which they host773. For example, YouTube 
can be considered as a publisher on the basis of the licensing agreement on the 
content uploaded by its users774. In this situation YouTube would not just have 
provided the storage space for its users, but would also be involved in the monitoring 
of the content uploaded by its users. 
The ECJ, in its leading case Google v Louis Vuitton, clarified the situation by 
stating that Directive 2000/31 on information society services covers only cases 
where the activity of the ISP has “a mere technical, automatic and passive nature”, 
which implies that the ISP “has neither knowledge of nor control over the information 
which is transmitted or stored” 775. This means that YouTube is exempted from 
liability as a publisher of copyrighted materials because it plays a purely passive role 
in offering its service exclusively for use by its users. Indeed, as noted in Google v 
Louis Vuitton, the ISP is responsible only for the storage of information provided by 
the recipients of its services776. In other words, when a publication contained in 
websites is accessible through Google’s search engine, Google is not liable as a 
publisher777. 
Therefore, we can conclude that ISPs may be qualified as publishers only when 
they have actual knowledge of the infringing activities. However, the question of 
what conduct is required before it can be said that such conduct is something more 
than merely technical, automatic and passive nature remained unanswered by the ECJ 
in Google v Louis Vuitton. For example, does EU legislation allow ISPs to research or 
monitor content to prevent further intellectual property rights infringements?  
The answer to this question is provided by Articles 12 to 15 of the Directive 
2000/31 on information society services, which state that ISPs are prohibited from 
                                                 
773 Roger Miller, Modern Principles of Business Law: Contracts (1st, Cengage Learning 2012) 104. 
774 Sentence 1 of the Terms of Use states that uploaders retain all ownership rights to their user 
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carrying out general monitoring and from researching illegal content778. Such an 
approach is confirmed also by recent ECJ cases such as Sabam779 and Scarlet780, where 
an obligation to implement a filtering system would seriously endanger “the freedom 
to conduct business enjoyed by operators such as ISPs”, also possibly infringe “the 
fundamental rights of that ISP’s customers, namely their right to protection of their 
personal data and their freedom to receive or impart information”781.  
Therefore, we can conclude that the ECJ in Sabam782 and Scarlet783 gave priority 
to the interests of ISPs’ business activities and privacy and the data protection of 
Internet users rather than to the interests of intellectual property rights owners. This 
means that EU legislation is aimed at supporting dissemination of information and 
cultural diffusion784 rather than at protecting the interests of intellectual property 
rights owners. In particular, in order to sue in the court of the Member State in which 
the publisher of the content is established, the intellectual property rights owner 
would have to provide evidence that ISPs were aware of the unlawful activities 
carried out by their users, without which an ISP is not liable for user-generated 
content.  
In this connection the following question has arisen: Is the place of 
establishment of the publisher of content an appropriate jurisdictional basis for 
intellectual property rights infringements over the Internet?  
In spite of the difficulties associated with the substantive law issues,785 the place 
where the publisher of content is established is still a possible jurisdictional basis for 
intellectual property rights infringements over the Internet. Indeed, as noted by 
Thierer, it is appropriate in cyberspace, as in real space, for the law to impose liability 
on the publisher of content that infringes intellectual property rights infringement on 
the Internet786. Such an approach is confirmed also by the American case of Stratton 
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commerce, in the Internal Market. O. J. L 178. 
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Oakmont, Inc. v Prodigly Services Co. where an ISP was found to be acting as a 
publisher with consequently greater liability than an access provider exercising no 
control over content787. 
On the other hand, EU case law has tended to consider ISPs as facilitators of 
information rather than publishers. Indeed, such an approach is confirmed by the ECJ 
in such cases as Google France and Google788 and Wintersteiger 789. This means the 
role of ISPs is the facilitation of information and, because of this role, ISPs cannot be 
parties to a dispute. In this regard the ECJ in Google France and Google790 
emphasised the attention paid to the activities of the advertiser in choosing a keyword 
identical to the trademark, but not to the activities of the provider of a reference 
service who uses it in the course of trade. 
The same approach was taken by the ECJ in Wintersteiger, where the court 
determined the event giving rise to the damage in the terms of the place of 
establishment of the advertiser, but not the place of establishment of the ISP. Indeed, 
according to Wintersteiger791, Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast had to be 
interpreted as meaning that an action relating to infringement of a trademark 
registered in a Member State through the use, by an advertiser, of a keyword identical 
to that trademark792 on a search engine website operating under a country-specific top-
level domain of another Member State might be brought before the courts of the 
Member State of the place of establishment of the advertiser793. This is a mandatory 
interpretation in spite of the fact that it is only “likely” that it will facilitate the taking 
of evidence and the conduct of the proceedings794. The ECJ confirmed that in the case 
of keyword advertising, the relevant event would be “the activation by the advertiser 
of the technical process displaying, according to pre-defined parameters, the 
advertisement”795 (i.e., the reservation of the AdWord). On that basis, the place of the 
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event giving rise to a possible infringement of trademark law would be the place of 
establishment of the advertiser and not of the provider of the referencing service. This 
approach was also supported by the Advocate General in Pinckney, who made 
reference to the jurisdiction of the courts of the place of establishment of the alleged 
infringers as the place where the online sale of CDs – for the act of distribution – or 
the uploading of the songs – for the act of communication – was decided796. In spite of 
the fact that the ECJ in Pinckney did not follow the approach proposed by the 
Advocate General (as such a question was not addressed to the ECJ) this approach is 
supported by the ECJ in another case of copyright infringement over the Internet: Pez 
Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH (hereafter Hejduk)797.  
In particular, in Hejduk, the ECJ made clear that in the case of copyright 
infringement over the Internet, the event giving rise to the damage lies in the actions 
of the owner of that website798. This means that in the case of copyright infringement 
over the Internet the ECJ took the same approach as the ECJ in Wintersteiger in the 
field of trademarks. Indeed, similarly to Wintersteiger, the ECJ in Hejduk stated that 
in the case of copyright infringement over the Internet, the causal event can be 
localised “only at the place where EnergieAgentur has its seat, since that is where the 
company took and carried out the decision to place photographs online on a particular 
website”799. Therefore, the main emphasis here is not on the place where the ISP is 
established but rather on the place “in which the alleged perpetrator of the 
infringement is established”800. 
On the basis of this analysis, we can conclude that jurisdiction based on the 
place of establishment is a relevant connecting factor in intellectual property rights 
infringements over the Internet. However, the place of establishment as a 
jurisdictional basis should be based on where the advertiser or the owner of the 
website is established rather than on the place where the ISP is established. Indeed, 
jurisdiction depends on the nature of the intellectual property rights infringed. This 
means that the matter of this jurisdiction should be adapted. In particular, while in the 
case of trademark infringement over the Internet the causal event leading to the 
infringement is ”the activation by the advertiser of the technical process displaying, 
                                                 
796 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 57. 
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according to pre-defined parameters, the advertisement”801, the situation is different in 
the case of copyright infringement over the Internet as the causal event leading to the 
infringement is the activation by the owner of the website of the technical display of 
the photographs on that website802.  
Conclusion and recommendations 
In my opinion, the place of establishment is a relevant jurisdictional basis for 
intellectual property rights infringements over the Internet since on this jurisdictional 
basis may be established the link between the place of the event giving rise to the 
damage and the territory of a particular Member State where the tortfeasor is 
established. Indeed, as noted by Fawcett, the Internet is not outer space: there is a 
territorial connection with various States803.  
However, in my opinion, modification of this approach is required. Indeed, as 
noted by the ECJ in Wintersteiger,804 the event giving rise to damage in the case of 
trademark infringement over the Internet is the place of establishment of the 
advertiser but not the place of establishment of the ISP. Similarly, the event giving 
rise to damage in the case of copyright infringement over the Internet is the place of 
establishment of the owner of a website805.  
This means that in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet, the place of the event giving rise to damage should be based on the place 
where the advertiser or the owner of a website is established rathen than where the 
ISP is established.  
Indeed, the main role of ISPs is the dessimination of information. In my 
opinion, an ISP may be sued only as a joint infringer, when ISP is involved in editing 
and controlling the information posted on the Internet. For example, as Football 
Dataco Ltd v Sportradar GmbH806 and EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting 
Ltd 807 demonstrate, ISPs may be jointly liable for infringements committed by their 
users. However, in such situations the intellectual property rights owner should 
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provide the necessary evidence that the ISP had “actual knowledge” of another person 
using their service to infringe intellectual property rights808. In other words, the 
intellectual property rights owner is responsible for providing evidence that the ISP is 
a publisher. In my opinion, it is very difficult to imagine a situation when an ISP like 
Google is involved in managing a big amount of information posted on the Internet. 
Indeed, such an approach would not only be a serious step backwards for online 
development but would also be totally unworkable in practice809. On this basis we can 
conclude that an ISP may be sued together with the main infringer (advertiser/ owner 
of a website) but cannot be sued alone.  
Therefore, it seems inconsequential to establish jurisdiction on the basis of 
where the joint infringer (ISP) is established. In my opinion, jurisdiction should be 
based on the place where the advertiser or website owner is established.  
Indeed, the place of establishment of the advertiser or the owner of a website as 
a jurisdictional basis has an additional advantage for the intellectual property rights 
owner as it allows the latter to bring an action in respect of all damage in the court of 
the Member State in which the advertiser or website owner is established (as follows 
from the ECJ case in eDate)810. However, in this respect some may contend that 
jurisdiction based on the place of establishment of the intellectual property rights 
infringer (according to Article 7 (5) of the Brussels I Recast) may involve the same 
forum as jurisdiction based on the domicile, nationality or habital residence of the 
defendant (according to Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast). In particular, as noted by 
Nuyts, the place of establishment very often coincides with the head of jurisdiction 
set out in Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast811. This must not be so because 
establishing jurisdiction based on similar fora would be unpredictable for all the 
parties involved. In this respect Pozdan notes that the term ‘establishment’ cannot be 
assimilated to the concept of domicile as a head of general jurisdiction under the 
Brussels I Recast, for otherwise the court would use identical terms812.  
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Therefore, we can conclude that the place of establishment as a jurisdictional 
basis is an alternative to the general jurisdictional basis. Indeed, as stated in the 16th 
recital of the Brussels I Recast, “in addition to the defendant’s domicile, there should 
be alternative grounds of jurisdiction based on a close link between the court and the 
action or in order to facilitate the sound administration of justice”813. 
Moreover, the reference to the place where the advertiser or the owner of a 
website is established rather than to the place where the ISP is established is 
consistent with ISPs’ responsibility for disseminating information, as confirmed by 
the ECJ in Sabam814 and Scarlet815. In my opinion, jurisdiction cannot be based on the 
place of establishment of the facilitator of information. Indeed, the role of ISPs with 
respect to the dissemination of information and knowledge is like that of a telephone 
operator – they are merely the conduit for the provision of information and, as such, 
should incur no liability for content816. In my opinion, at the present stage of the 
Internet’s development, it is important to create the conditions for free dissemination 
of information and knowledge. This means that ISPs should not be held liable for the 
content posted on websites, as this would lead to increased monitoring of websites 
and increased restrictions on the free operation of the Internet.  
In my opinion, establishing jurisdiction based on the place where the advertiser 
or website owner is established would provide an appropriate balance of interests for 
all parties. On the one hand, intellectual property rights owners will be able to sue in 
the court of the place where the advertiser or website owner is established, which may 
constitute a significant connecting factor from the point of view of evidence and the 
conduct of proceedings817. This is also true in the light of Folien Fischer and Fofitec, 
according to which only the court before which an action may properly be brought is 
the court within whose jurisdiction the relevant connecting factor is to be found818. 
On the other hand, the advertisers and website owners will be more responsible 
for the content placed on a website because, in the case of its infringement, they will 
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be liable as publishers. Moreover, such as approach confirms the role of ISPs as 
facilitators of information (in the absence of “actual knowledge” about the 
infringement).  
Therefore, taking into account the eDate ruling and our arguments, Article 7 (2) 
(1) of the Brussels I Recast may be read as follows: “a person who considers that 
his intellectual property rights have been infringed through ubiquitous media 
such as the Internet could bring an action in respect of all the damage caused in 
the court of the Member State in which the advertiser or website owner is 
established”.  
3.3.1.2 The place where the damage occurred 
3.3.1.2.1 The place where online content is placed or has been 
accessible 
In eDate819the ECJ transposed and adapted the well-known Shevill case to the 
situation where personality rights have been infringed over the Internet. This means 
that the place where the damage occurred is where the content is placed online or has 
been accessible820.  
The main emphasis of this approach is on the human aspects of the act: 
accessibility by humans of the work protected by intellectual property law. Indeed, as 
noted by Rothchild, the accessibility approach seems to be a reasonable result of 
courts’ understanding of the Internet given the number of locations through which the 
data travel and where the data reside on the network821. In practical terms, 
“accessibility” should be understood in its wide interpretation and should allowing 
suits wherever content is accessible822.  
Indeed, the accessibility of a website as a basis of jurisdiction is the topic of 
active academic discussion. On the one hand, as noted by Smith, this approach is 
good news for copyright owners as it allows rights owners to take action against 
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infringements of their works in the courts of the Member States in which the 
infringing contents are made available823. 
For example, a trademark may be infringed by displaying it on a website or 
displaying the sponsored links by using keywords corresponding to the trademarks on 
the websites of search engine operators such as Google. Copyright infringement over 
the Internet may occur by linking, streaming or peer-to-peer file sharing824. In such 
cases an author’s exclusive rights may be infringed: the rights to reproduction, 
communication to the public or distribution825. Therefore, as noted by Sangal, taking 
into account the significance of the Internet in trade and commerce and its possible 
future uses, it seems logical to protect the interests of intellectual property rights 
owners826. 
On the other hand, there are scholars who deny jurisdiction based on the 
accessibility of a website because is not a very useful jurisdictional basis for 
intellectual property rights infringements over the Internet827. For example, as noted 
by Edwards, the accessibility of a website as a basis of jurisdiction may result in a 
lack of foreseeability828. In particular, if the receipt of information through the mere 
availability of the website were enough to satisfy Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I 
Recast, then the potential claimant must be ready to face litigation before the courts 
of any country in the world829.  
In my opinion, jurisdiction based on the accessibility of a website may be a 
potential basis of jurisdiction in cases of intellectual property rights infringement over 
the Internet. However, the connection requirements between the accessibility of a 
website and the territory of a court of a Member State should be established. Indeed, 
it would be more than surprising if eDate830 established jurisdiction based on the 
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accessibility of a website according to Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast without 
any connection to the court of Member State.  
It follows that we must ask whether the mere accessibility of a website in a 
particular Member State is enough to establish jurisdiction on a national level. 
In order to answer this question it is important to analyse the national practices 
of the EU Member States.  
For example, in SG 2 v Brokat, the French court confirmed its international 
jurisdiction on the ground that the defendant’s website could be accessed worldwide 
and hence there had also been a place of infringement on French territory831. Indeed, 
taking into account the worldwide effect of the prohibition issued, the French court 
was able to impose the sanctions provided by French trademark law, since otherwise 
a trademark would no longer be protected on its territory. Consequently, the German 
enterprise was obliged to cease the use of the trademark “payline” in France in any 
form and hence also and in particular on the Internet.  
The Sweden court also confirmed its international jurisdiction on the basis of 
the fact that a photograph was accessible in Sweden although the author’s photograph 
was published in a newspaper in Norway832.  
However, in contrast to the practice in the France and Sweden, the UK courts 
have rejected jurisdiction based on the accessibility of a website. In particular, in 1-
800 Flowers Inc v Phonenames Ltd833, the court considered that merely because a 
website could be accessed from anywhere in the world it did not mean that it should 
be regarded as having been used everywhere in the world. Therefore, the applicant’s 
use of the mark on its website did not constitute sufficient evidence of the requisite 
intention to use the mark in the United Kingdom834. In Euromarket Designs Inc v 
Peters835, the court also stated that the mere accessibility of a website in the UK does 
not leads to trademark infringement in the UK. The same practice exists in the 
US,where personal jurisdiction according to the long-arm statutes has been denied in 
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cases in which the defendants, as in the Bensusan case, had no contact with the forum 
state beyond the mere accessibility of their website836. 
German practice is very contradictory with regard to jurisdiction based on the 
accessibility of a website. On the one hand, there is a case law which indicates that 
mere accessibility alone is not sufficient to support jurisdiction, for then website 
operators would be exposed to the incalculable risk of being sued in every Member 
State837. The most appropriate solution in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet is to consider the place of effect as a basis of 
jurisdiction838. In particular, the place of effect is Germany only if the website was 
intended to have effect there839.  
On the other hand, in Fender Musikinstrumente840 the German court even 
without discussing if the defendant intended any sales in Germany found the 
accessibility of a website as sufficient ground for a trade mark infringement as the 
offer was accessible in Germany. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the jurisdictional practices with regard to the 
accessibility of a website as a basis of jurisdiction are not unified in the Member 
States of the EU. Indeed, while France and Sweden consider the accessibility of a 
website as a relevant factor for establishing jurisdiction, the UK does not support the 
accessibility of a website as a basis of jurisdiction. In Germany it is very difficult to 
reach a consensus with regard to the accessibility of a website as a basis of 
jurisdiction.  
In my opinion, clarification of the following questions is required by the ECJ: 
Is the accessibility of a website an appropriate jurisdictional basis for intellectual 
property rights infringements over the Internet? Is the mere accessibility of a 
website enough to establish jurisdiction, or should some other clear connecting 
factors be established? 
Indeed, the question of jurisdiction based on the accessibility of a website was 
the main issue of discussion by the ECJ in Pinckney841 where copyright was infringed 
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over the Internet. It is important to note that Pinckney842 is the first case concerning 
the criteria for localising the place where the damage occurs in the event of an alleged 
online infringement of an unregistered intellectual property right. Therefore, a 
detailed analysis of this case is necessary. 
The claimant, an author residing in France, discovered that his songs had been 
reproduced without his authority on a compact disc pressed in Austria by Mediatech, 
and then marketed by United Kingdom companies through various websites 
accessible from France. Proceedings against an Austrian company were brought in 
France seeking compensation for the harm which he claimed to have suffered by 
reason of the infringement of his copyright.  
The ECJ in Pinckney favoured jurisdiction based on the mere accessibility of a 
website. Indeed it did not mention any need for a direct causal link between the 
wrongful act by the defendant (not someone else’s wrongful act) and the damage 
relied upon. In particular, the ECJ just mentioned, but did not discuss, “the damage 
resulting from an alleged copyright infringement”843.  
In this connection an interesting question arises: is the accessibility of a 
website a jurisdictional issue or a substantive one? 
On the one hand, as noted by Pryke, the mere accessibility of a website in a 
particular territory as a basis of jurisdiction may open the flood gates to claims of 
online copyright infringement because it is preferable for a claimant to sue in his own 
jurisdiction rather than the defendant’s jurisdiction844. In this regard, Savola compared 
the approach based on the accessibility of a website adopted by the ECJ in Pinckney 
with the effect doctrine established by the ECJ in eDate845 with respect to allegations 
of infringements committed via the Internet and which may, as a result, have had 
effects in numerous places846. Indeed, the indirect evidence of this approach may be 
found in the wording of paragraph 22 of the Pinckney judgment where the ECJ 
reformulated the question by admitting it plans to examine the issue of a “company 
established in another Member State, which has in the latter State reproduced the 
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author’s work on a material support which is subsequently marketed by companies 
established in a third Member State through an Internet site which is also accessible 
in the Member State of the court seised”847.  
On the other hand, as noted by Bettinger and Thum, the accessibility of a 
website is related to the substance of the dispute848. In particular, although the 
accessibility does not of itself establish an infringement, nevertheless where 
the accessibility is lacking, a trademark right would generally not be infringed849. A 
similar approach is supported by Husovec, who emphasises the ECJ ruling in 
Pinckney is connected to the substantive level and has no bearing on jurisdictional 
issues850. Indeed, the indirect evidence of this may be found in paragraph 40 of 
Pinckney where the ECJ, by identifying the place of copyright infringement over the 
Internet, made reference to the place where the damage occurred as a court there is 
“best placed” to ascertain whether the copyrights protected by the Member State 
concerned have been infringed and to determine the “nature of the harm caused”851. 
By contrast, as stated in Wintersteiger, the main emphasis of the court is based on 
identifying “the significant connecting factor from the point of view of 
jurisdiction”852.  
In this regard we can conclude that the approach taken by the ECJ in Pinckney 
with regard to copyright infringement over the Internet is categorically different from 
the approach taken by the ECJ in Wintersteiger with regard to trademark 
infringement over the Internet. Thus, the desire of the court in Pinckney to identify 
the “best placed court”, where the ”copyright…was infringed”, and “the nature of the 
harm caused” may be considered as evidence that the accessibility of a website is 
related to the substance of the dispute rather than to the issue of jurisdiction.  
In this regard Torremans concluded that accessibility of a website may be 
relevant for substantive law analysis, but that it is not a relevant issue to help 
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determine jurisdiction853. For example, in L’Oréal SA v eBay International AG854, the 
court did not even discuss the accessibility of a website as a jurisdictional issue, but 
rather treated it as a substantive issue of a trademark infringement over the Internet. 
Indeed, as stated by the court in L’Oréal SA v eBay International AG, if the fact that 
an online marketplace is accessible from that territory were sufficient for the 
advertisements displayed there to be within the scope of Directive 2008/95855 and 
Regulation 2007/2009856, websites and advertisements which, although obviously 
targeted solely at consumers in third States, are nevertheless technically accessible 
from EU territory, would wrongly be subject to EU law857. 
The same approach is taken by Bettinger, who emphasises that accessibility of a 
website does not lead to jurisdiction in respect of website users858. Indeed, the 
accessibility of a website in a particular Member State is simply a consequence of the 
global nature and operation of the Internet859. It is a well-known fact that the website 
may be accessed worldwide.  
However, in contrast to these arguments, the ECJ in Pinckney made clear that 
the accessibility of a website is a jurisdictional issue860. Indeed, the place where the 
harmful event has occurred or may occur arises from the “possibility of obtaining a 
reproduction of the work to which the rights relied on by the defendant pertain from 
an Internet site accessible within the jurisdiction of the court seized”861. 
On the basis of this analysis we can conclude that the ECJ in Pinckney has 
treated accessibility as the substance of the dispute at a jurisdictional level. As 
was noted previously (at the stage of analysing national law), such a practice exists in 
France and Sweden. However, the UK courts consider the issue of accessibility of a 
website as just the substance of the dispute.  
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In my opinion, such an unpredictable decision of the ECJ as in Pinckney was 
dictated by the necessity to protect the interests of intellectual property rights owners 
with regard to the increasing number of cases of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet. Indeed, due to the absence of jurisdictional rules in the 
case of copyright infringement over the Internet on the one hand, and harmonised 
substantive intellectual property law rules on the other, the ECJ extended the 
application of the substantive law on a jurisdictional level.  
However, as a jurisdictional rule, the accessibility of a website should be based 
on the existence of certain, “sufficient” connecting factors that are especially 
important in the light of the global nature of the Internet862. Such “a sufficient link, 
substantial or significant, between the fact or acts and the alleged damage” should be 
identified in every case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, 
as stated in the French Normalu case863.  
In this respect, we need to notice that the facts of Pinckney do not show a clear 
link between the defendant and the court seized864. In particular, according to the 
ECJ’s logic in Pinckney, an Austrian company which neither acts nor causes any 
effect through its own acts in France can be still be sued in France on the basis that 
some unrelated company from the UK furthered its infringement by making an e-
commerce website (with infringing goods) accessible there865. On the basis of this 
evidence we can conclude that the ECJ in Pinckney extends the application of Article 
7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast by allowing plaintiffs to sue co-defendants on the basis 
of the mere accessibility of their websites.  
However, the current version of the Brussels I Recast does not allow plaintiffs 
to sue co-defendants, according to Article 7 (2). This is only possible according to the 
rules of general jurisdiction in Articles 4 and 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast. Indeed, 
according to Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast, “a person domiciled in a Member 
State may also be sued where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for 
the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely 
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connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings”. Thus, the following 
requirements should be satisfied before suing a co-defendant: 
- The person is one of the number of defendants; 
- The claims are closely connected;  
- There is a risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate 
proceedings. 
Therefore, the ECJ ruling in Pinckney can be considered as an expression of 
direction for further reform and development of the Brussels I Recast. In my opinion, 
it would be reasonable to provide the possibility for claimants to sue all co-defendants 
in the court of one Member State under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast. At the 
same time, I do not think that this will be possible on the basis of the mere 
accessibility of a website as “it is not the most sensible criterion”866. Advocate 
General Jääskinen in Coty has also identified the risk that such a broad interpretation 
will foster litigation, with purported victims merely suing the most solvent opposing 
party before a court in the jurisdiction of which one of the connecting factors arises 
relating to the activity of another person who participated in the event that caused the 
purported damage867. 
Moreover, the possibility of suing co-defendants under Article 7 (2) of the 
Brussels I Recast should also be established. In particular, jurisdiction under Articles 
7 (2) and 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast may be established only if there is a 
“sufficiently clear and direct link” between the actions of the defendant in a first 
Member State and the alleged unlawful act committed by a third party in the Member 
State where the court seized has its seat868. For example, according to the UK 
government’s approach, jurisdiction should be conditional on a defendant’s 
knowledge – “when the defendant sold the products to the third party concerned in 
one Member State... actually knew or could have reasonably foreseen that the sale 
would result directly in the alleged unlawful act committed by that third party in 
another Member State”869.  
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In my opinion, the ECJ in Pinckney, by accepting jurisdiction based on the 
accessibility of a website, has raised more questions than it has provided answers. 
The next important question concerns jurisdiction with regard to the damage 
occurring from the mere accessibility of a website. In particular, in Pinckney the 
damage was limited to those Member States where the physical copies of the CD had 
been received by consumers. The situation may be different where copyright is 
infringed by placing material on a website without the rights owner’s consent. In such 
a situation the damage would be “delocalised”.  
Therefore, the question arises: does the court have jurisdiction over all the 
damage caused from the mere accessibility of a website, or is it limited to the 
damage occurring in the territory of the court seized? 
Indeed, taking into account that copyright is automatically protected in all the 
Member States of the EU, it would be reasonable to propose that the court should 
have jurisdiction with regard to all the damage caused by the mere accessibility of a 
website. In my opinion, such an approach is not only logical but also directed to the 
protection of the interests of intellectual property rights owners. Indeed, it is in the 
interests of intellectual property rights owners to be able to sue in one court with 
respect to all the damage caused. 
Moreover, such an approach was confirmed by the ECJ in Wintersteiger with 
regard to trademark infringement over the Internet. Indeed, as stated by the ECJ in 
Wintersteiger the place where the damage occurred is the Member State where the 
national trademark is registered, and the entire damage may be claimed there870. 
Therefore, as noted by the Advocate General in Pinckney, it would be reasonable to 
take the same approach in respect of copyright as the ECJ took in Wintersteiger in the 
field of trademarks infringement over the Internet by conferring jurisdiction on the 
court before which proceedings may be brought for all the damage sustained871. 
However, in spite of these arguments, the ECJ in Hejduk v 
EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH (hereafter Hejduk )872, by reference to the territorial 
nature of the rights infringed, held that jurisdiction of the court seized on the basis of 
the place where the alleged damage occurred is limited to the damage caused within 
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that Member State873. Therefore, like in Pinckney, the ECJ in Hejduk stated that 
although copyright must be automatically protected in accordance with Directive 
2001/29 in all Member States, it is still subject to the principle of territoriality874. 
In my opinion, the limited jurisdiction of the court seized is also dictated by the 
“delocalized” nature of the damage caused. Indeed, as noted by the Advocate General 
in Hejduk, mere accessibility does not give any hint as to where the damage occurred 
or to its amount875. 
Therefore, the problem of the “delocalized” damage remains open. On the one 
hand, by confirming jurisdiction based on the mere accessibility of a website the 
rights owner is able to protect his rights at the court of any Member State where the 
alleged damage occurred as its occurrence arises from the accessibility of a website 
within the jurisdiction of the court seized876. For this rule to apply, two conditions 
must be satisfied: the website is accessible in the court of the Member State seized; 
the intellectual property rights are protected in the territory of the Member State 
seized. On the other side, the jurisdiction of the court seized is limited to the damage 
occurring in its territory877. This means that copyright owners still need to bring 
multiple actions in different courts in order to obtain redress in all the territories in 
which the infringing content may be accessible online. Thus, it is for the national 
court to decide how to calculate the exact amount of the damage, which in most cases 
will lead to new preliminary questions.  
In my opinion, such multiplication of courts is contradicted to the objectives of 
foreseeability and the sound administration of justice pursued by the Brussels I 
Recast.  
Conclusion and recommendations  
On the basis of the analysis provided we can conclude that the mere 
accessibility of a website is an appropriate basis of jurisdiction under Article 7(2) of 
the Brussels I Recast in the case of copyright infringement over the Internet. Indeed, 
the ECJ in two recent decisions, Pinckney and Hejduk, has confirmed the value as 
                                                 
873 Ibid, para 36. 
874 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 39; Case C-441/13 Pez 
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875 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published, Opinion of AG 
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170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 44. 
877 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published, para 36; Case C-
170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 45. 
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precedents of the accessibility criteria as a jurisdictional basis in cases of copyright 
infringement over the Internet. 
In my opinion, the acceptance by the ECJ of the accessibility approach as a 
basis of jurisdiction is dictated by the necessity to protect the interests of intellectual 
property rights owners having regard to the increasing numbers of cases of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. Indeed, due to the absence 
of jurisdictional rules for copyright infringements over the Internet on the one hand 
and harmonised substantive intellectual property law rules on the other, the ECJ 
extended the application of the substantive law on a jurisdictional level.  
This means that jurisdiction based on the mere accessibility of a website does 
not depend on the requirement of targeting the Member State whose court is seized 
but on the occurrence of damage arising from the accessibility of the website within 
the jurisdiction of the court seized. Therefore, the court of the place where the 
damage occurred only has jurisdiction with regard to the damage occurring in its 
territory878. However, this leads to the multiplication of courts.  
In my opinion, by analogy with jurisdiction based on the place of the event 
giving rise to the damage (where the advertiser or website owner is established), 
jurisdiction based on the website accessibility approach should be modified by 
allowing the court to adjudicate jurisdiction also with regard to any damage occurring 
in another Member State under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast. Indeed, in spite 
of the fact that global jurisdiction was rejected in Pinckney and Hejduk, a practical 
backdoor remains open that would extend damage claims879. 
Indeed, as stated in Wintersteiger880, intellectual property rights protection “in 
principle” is territorially limited and cannot “in general” be relied on outside the 
territory of the granting state. The principle of territoriality was confirmed by the ECJ 
in Pinckney 881 with regard to copyright infringement over the Internet. This means 
that the main barrier to extending jurisdiction under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I 
Recast is the principle of territoriality of intellectual property rights. However, the 
                                                 
878 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published, para 22; Case C-
170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 39. 
879 Pekka Savola, The ultimate copyright shopping opportunity - jurisdiction and choice of law in website 
blocking injunctions (2014) IIC 45(3), 287-315. 
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paras 24-25. 
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171 
 
criteria for assessing whether the event in question is harmful for the purposes of 
Article 7 (2) “…are determined by the substantive law of the court seised”882.  
This means that the territoriality of intellectual property rights as a principle of 
substantive law is irrelevant for the purpose of applying Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I 
Recast. In my opinion, while the accessibility of a website is applicable at the 
jurisdictional level, a similar approach to the principle of territoriality of intellectual 
property rights would be inappropriate. Indeed, the Brussels regime “did not intend to 
link the rules of jurisdiction with national provisions concerning the conditions under 
which non-contractual liability is incurred”883. This means that jurisidctional rules 
should be established on clear connection requirements rather than on the substance 
of the dispute (the protection of intellectual property rights in a particular territory).  
Indeed, the territorial structure of intellectual property is a legal construct rather 
than anything that follows from the nature of the right as such884. This means that 
actions occurring in places where no intellectual property right exists might constitute 
an infringement in foreign countries as a result of extraterritorial application of the 
latter’s intellectual property laws885. Therefore, the jurisdictional problem may be 
decided by deciding the issue of the territoriality of intellectual property rights.  
In my opinion, the necessity to extend jurisdiction under Article 7 (2) of the 
Brussels I Recast to the all the damage caused is dictated also by the argument that 
the effectiveness of intellectual property rights protection and the sound 
administration of justice require the ability to bring all claims in one court. Indeed, as 
noted by Fawcett, effective enforcement means the rights holder must be able to bring 
a single case for all damage886. Such an approach is also supported by Article 41.2 of 
the TRIPS Agreement, which states that “procedures concerning the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights shall be fair and equitable. They shall not be unnecessarily 
complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays”887. 
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Moreover, the accessibility criteria should also be modified. In my opinion, the 
occurrence of damage based on the mere accessibility of a website is not a very 
sensitive connection requirement and a clearer link between the damage in a 
particular Member State and the activity of the defendant is required. 
There are a number of propositions to further develop a jurisdiction based on 
the accessibility of a website in cases of copyright infringement over the Internet. For 
example, according to Advocate General Jääskinen’s suggestion in Coty, the 
occurrence of the damage in the Member State of the Court seized depends on the 
defendant’s “act within the jurisdiction of the court seized”888. Similarly, the CLIP 
Principles provide an “escape clause” by allowing the defendant to escape the court’s 
jurisdiction if “the alleged infringer has not acted in that State to initiate or further the 
infringement and his/her activity cannot reasonably be seen as having been directed 
to that State”889. However, in my opinion, such active acts of the defendant may be 
compared with targeting or directing activities approach which were rejected by the 
ECJ in Hejduk as relating to the subject of the dispute. 
In my opinion, the best solution to develop the accessibility of a website 
approach as a basis of jurisdiction is to determine jurisdiction based on the level of 
interactivity of a website, taking into account the guilty mind of the defendant. 
Indeed, such an approach is not only an expression of the technological aspects of 
posting information on the Internet (which depends on the level of interactivity of 
information that occurs on the website) but also takes into account the guilty mind of 
the defendant (who “knowingly” engage in illegal conduct).  
The legal evidence of such approach may be found in American case law. 
On the one hand, the interactivity of a website as a basis of jurisdiction is 
specified in the Zippo case890. In particular, as American practice indicates, active 
websites891 and interactive websites892 are the basis for personal jurisdiction. However, 
the court is not able to determine jurisdiction in a situation where information is 
simply posted on a website and thus made accessible to everyone, for such 
                                                 
888 Case C-360/12 Coty Germany GmbH v First Note Perfumes NV [2014] not yet published, Opinion of 
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information is passive893. Indeed, passive websites may be accessed by Internet 
browsers, but do not allow interaction between the host of the website and a visitor to 
it. In this regard, as noted by Rosenblatt, the more interactive a site is (i.e. the greater 
the possible exchange of information between the site and the user) the more likely a 
court is to find that contact exists between the site owner and the distant user894. In my 
opinion, jurisdictional rules based on the level of interactivity of a website is a more 
predictable basis of jurisdiction than the simple fact of accessibility of a website. 
On the other hand, the guilty mind of the defendant should also be taken into 
account. Indeed, as recent American cases demonstrate, the courts require additional 
factors as well as the interactivity of the defendant895. However, in my opinion, in 
contrast to the directing or targeting approach taken by the CLIP as an expression of 
the intention of the defendant to connect to the forum, I would rather support the 
approach of “wrongful conduct” accepted in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Lugue Le Racisme et 
L’Antisemitisme896 as the condition to obtaining jurisdiction based on the accessibility 
of a website approach.  
In my opinion, defendants need to be aware that content posted over the 
Internet may infringe the copyright owner’s interest (defendants should know or be 
able to know). For example, if this approach were applied in Pinckney, the website 
owner would not be liable for the content posted on its website.  
Therefore, jurisdiction based on the accessibility of a website should be 
modified in two ways: the level of the interactivity of a website and the guilty mind 
of the defendant should both be taken into account. 
Some may say that the protection of intellectual property rights owners’ 
interests should be the priority of the court of every Member State seized. However, 
in my opinion, the most important task for the court is to balance the interests of all 
the parties involved. Only on the basis of foreseeability and sound administration of 
justice will such balance be guaranteed.  
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Therefore, taking into account the recent ECJ decisions in Pinckney and Hejduk 
and our arguments, Article 7 (2) (1) of the Brussels I Recast may be read as follows:  
“In disputes concerned with intellectual property rights infringement 
carried out through ubiquitous media such as the Internet, the court whose 
jurisdiction arises from the accessibility of a website in the territory of the court 
seized, shall also have jurisdiction in respect of damage occurring in another 
Member State arising from the accessibility of a website in the territory of this 
other Member State provided that:  
1) the website where the content placed online is accessible and 
interactive and 
2) the defendant actually knew or could reasonably have foreseen that 
their act would lead to intellectual property rights infringement.  
The court first seized has the priority for resolving the entire dispute for all 
the damage caused according to the rules of the lis pendens”.  
Moreover, the ECJ in Pinckney raised an interesting question with regard to the 
possibility of suing co-defendants on the basis of the mere accessibility of their 
websites. However, as was noted previously, the facts of the case do not demonstrate 
clear connection requirements. In my opinion, it would be reasonable to allow 
claimants to sue all co-defendants in the court of one Member State under Articles 7 
(2) and 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast. At the same time, I do not think that this will be 
possible on the basis of the mere accessibility of a website as “it is not the most 
sensible criterion”897. In this regard I would rather support the UK government’s 
approach with regard to suing co-defendants which makes a suit conditional on a 
defendant’s knowledge: “when the defendant sold the products to the third party 
concerned in one Member State, it actually knew or could have reasonably foreseen 
that the sale would result directly in the alleged unlawful act committed by that third 
party in another Member State”898.  
In my opinion, the future reform of Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast with 
regard to suing co-defendants in the case of copyright infringement over the Internet 
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may be based on the development of the criterion of the defendant’s knowledge as an 
additional condition of its application.  
Therefore, taking into account the decision of the ECJ in Pinckney and our 
argument with regard to an additional condition of its application in the form of 
defendant’s knowledge, Article 8 (1) (1) of the Brussels I Recast may be read as 
follows: 
“A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued in another 
Member State where he is one of a number of defendants in disputes concerned 
with infringement carried out through ubiquitous media such as the Internet in 
the court whose jurisdiction is based on Article 7 (2) (1) of the Brussels I Recast 
provided that: 
- the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and 
determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting 
from separate proceedings; and 
- the defendant actually knew or could reasonably have foreseen that the 
act committed by third party would result in intellectual property rights 
infringement in another Member State”. 
Indeed, in the situation where the rules of general jurisdiction under Articles 4 
and 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast are difficult to apply (due to the difficulties 
associated with privacy and data protection, as discussed in Chapter 2), Articles 7 (2) 
and 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast should provide an alternative basis of jurisdiction 
for suing co-defendants in cases of intellectual property rights infringement 
committed over the Internet. However, this issue should be further developed by the 
ECJ. Indeed, this work does not discuss this approach in detail because of the absence 
of regulation in this sphere: the current version of the Brussels I Recast does not 
provide the possibility to sue co-defendants at the place of the commission of the tort, 
and the ECJ decision in Pinckney is the first case where such a question was live.  
3.3.1.2.2 Centre of victim’s interest 
The ECJ in eDate not only adapted the traditional Shevill connecting factors 
with regard to infringement of personality rights over the Internet, but also created a 
new jurisdictional basis: the “claimant’s centre of interests” approach. According to 
this approach, in the event of an alleged infringement of personality rights by means 
of content placed online, Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast should grant 
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jurisdiction in respect of all the damage caused to the courts of the Member State in 
which the centre of claimant’s interests is based899. 
The necessity of this approach, as noted by the ECJ in eDate, is dictated by the 
difficulties in quantifying the number of users in cases of the infringement of 
personality rights over the Internet and the instant worldwide availability of the 
content900. The centre of a claimant’s interest is located in the Member State where 
the victim has his place of habitual residence or the place with which the victim has a 
particularly close tie, given other factors such as the pursuit of a professional 
activity901. 
Therefore, the following issue arises: Is the claimant’s centre of interest 
approach the appropriate jurisdictional basis for intellectual property rights 
infringements over the Internet?  
In particular, as noted by the ECJ in eDate, since the court of the place where 
the victim has his “centre of interests” is in the best position to assess the liable 
impact of the material placed online on his personality rights, therefore that court 
should have jurisdiction in respect of all damage caused within the European 
Union902. Thus there is no apparent reason why intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet should be treated differently from the infringement of 
personality rights.  
For example, in a hypothetical case of copyright infringement over the Internet 
this rule means that if a Swedish author, who is domiciled and resident in Sweden but 
derives most of his income from the United States, claims that his copyright has been 
infringed by an English website, he is able to bring proceedings in Sweden for all of 
the damage suffered. Therefore, for a claimant domiciled in a Member State of the 
European Union, Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast allows him to bring an action--
on the basis of the place in which the damage caused in the European Union by that 
infringement occurred – in one court for all such damage.903 
Indeed, it seems reasonable to accept jurisdiction based on the claimant’s centre 
of interest approach for two reasons.  
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Firstly, the claimant’s centre of interest provides an alternative for the claimant 
to sue either at the place of his habitual residence or where he pursues a professional 
activity. Secondly, in comparison with the accessibility approach, jurisdiction at the 
place where an intellectual property rights owner’s interest is based has tangible 
benefits as it limits the risk and cost of fragmented proceedings in multiple 
jurisdictions for all the parties involved. In my opinion, the claimant’s centre of 
interest rule would provide legal certainty for all the parties involved: the right holder 
is able easily to identify the court in which he may sue and the intellectual property 
rights infringer is able reasonably to foresee before which court he may be sued904.  
In my opinion, the claimant’s centre of interest approach is similar to the 
general jurisdiction under Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast in that it emphasises the 
author's domicile rather than the defendant's domicile. In this regard, this approach 
would naturally be the one with the closest connection to the circumstances of the 
dispute905. Indeed, as noted by Gillies, by supplementing the scope of jurisdiction 
under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast to include the claimant's centre of 
interests, the ECJ in eDate has confirmed the necessity to better reflect the 
indeterminate distribution of information via the Internet.906 Thus, jurisdiction based 
on the claimant’s centre of interest approach is the most appropriate jurisdictional 
rule that could be developed for torts committed over the internet. 
However, this is only true in theory but not in practice, as the ECJ in eDate did 
not even discuss in general the application of Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast in 
relation to torts committed by placing content on a website. In particular, the scope of 
the application of Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast was limited to cases of 
infringements of personality rights. Thus, the matter of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet remains unsettled.  
The issue of the application of jurisdiction based on the centre of claimant’s 
interests with regard to trademark infringement over the Internet was clarified by the 
ECJ in Wintersteiger907. The ECJ in Wintersteiger made a distinction between 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet and personality rights 
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infringement by stating that the new connecting factor identified in eDate is to be 
used in “the particular context of infringement of personality rights” and therefore 
“does not apply to the determination of jurisdiction in respect of infringements of 
intellectual property rights”908. The main court’s argument for rejecting jurisdiction is 
the principle of territoriality of intellectual property rights. Indeed, as stated in 
Wintersteiger, “contrary to the situation of a person who considers that there has been 
an infringement of his personality rights, which are protected in all Member States, 
the protection afforded by the registration of a national mark is, in principle, limited 
to the territory of the Member State in which it is registered, so that, in general, its 
proprietor cannot rely on that protection outside the territory” 909.  
Indeed, using the principle of territoriality of intellectual property law for 
determining both the competent courts and the territorial scope of national law 
protection is also supported by the ECJ’s decision in Football Dataco, where the 
principle was coherently demonstrated910. The same approach was taken by the ECJ in 
Google France and Google911 and L’Oréal and Others 912, whereby the courts of the 
Member State in which the trademark is registered are able to assess whether a 
situation actually infringes the protected national mark. Therefore, the ECJ’s desire in 
Wintersteiger to allocate jurisdiction based on the place where damage occurred 
under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast to the court of the Member State in which 
the trademark is registered is unsurprising913. In particular, the ECJ made clear in 
Wintersteiger that an action relating to the infringement of a trademark registered in a 
Member State through the use, by an advertiser, of a keyword identical to that 
trademark on a search engine website operating under a country-specific top-level 
domain of another Member State may be brought before the courts of the Member 
State in which the trade mark is registered914.  
However, the decision in Wintersteiger is quite disturbing because the ECJ 
qualified the impact of the principle of territoriality on international jurisdiction in the 
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case of intellectual property infringement over the Internet915. According to the ECJ’s 
logic in Wintersteiger, due to the difficulties associated with the potentially 
ubiquitous nature of trademark infringement over the Internet and with the territorial 
nature of the trademark, “the trademark may be infringed only on the territory of a 
Member State, where the trademark concerned is protected”916. 
Thus, by establishing jurisdiction based on Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I 
Recast, the ECJ took into account the substance of the dispute, namely the issue of 
whether and where the proprietor can rely on the protection, rather than the issue of 
establishing a link between the forum and the circumstances of the dispute. However, 
it is self-evident that the solutions applied by the court at the level of substantive law 
cannot automatically be transposed to the rules for determining jurisdiction917. 
Indeed, as noted in the Marinari case, the Brussels I Recast did not intend to 
link the rules on territorial jurisdiction with national provisions concerning the 
conditions under which non-contractual liability is incurred918. Therefore, the 
existence of jurisdiction according to Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast should 
depend on the proximity between the forum and the factual elements of the dispute 
rather than on the protection of substantive legal rights919. 
This means that the simple fact of registering a trademark is not by itself 
sufficient to establish jurisdiction of the courts of that Member State; additional 
connection requirements are necessary. This finding is supported by the Football 
Dataco case, which held that registration is not sufficient for jurisdiction to be 
established and that a further link is required between the tort and the forum920. 
In my opinion, the issue of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet calls for a new jurisdictional definition of the link between a dispute and a 
Member State. Indeed, assigning the territoriality principle of intellectual property to 
both the determination of jurisdiction and the application of substantive law seems to 
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contradict with the Advocate General’s opinion in Pinckney, according to which 
intellectual property rights infringements committed via the internet “do imply not a 
revolution in the traditionally territorial approach to that category of rights, but rather 
a new definition of the way in which the link between virtual conduct and a given 
territory manifests itself”921. The contradiction in Wintersteiger between the issue of 
jurisdiction and substantive law was resolved by the ECJ in Pinckney in confirming 
that jurisdiction according to Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast cannot depend on 
criteria which are specific to the examination of the substance of the dispute922. 
This means that jurisdictional rules of intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet should not depend on the substance of a dispute but rather on the 
connection requirements between the dispute and the court of the place where the 
damage occurred. In my opinion, in Wintersteiger the territoriality of the trademark in 
case of its infringement over the Internet is connected with the substance of the 
dispute rather than with any jurisdictional issue.  
Therefore, it is logical to suppose that the claimant’s centre of interest as a 
jurisdictional basis is applicable to cases of copyright infringement over the Internet, 
which is automatically protected in the legal regimes of all Member States923. If this 
logic is true, it would mean that in the case of copyright infringement over the 
Internet, the copyright owner may bring an action in one forum where the claimant 
has his “centre of interests” in respect of all the damage caused. Indeed, as noted by 
the Advocate General in Pinckney, such an approach would help to generalise the 
jurisdiction of the forum actoris and would express the legislature’s intention to 
require a close link between the action and the special court in Article 7 (2) of the 
Brussels I Recast924. 
However, to the disappointment of copyright owners, the ECJ in Pinckney took 
the same approach as it had in Wintersteiger by rejecting jurisdiction based on the 
claimant’s centre of interest approach. According to the ECJ’s argument, copyright, 
like the rights attaching to a national trademark, is subject to the principle of 
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territoriality925. This means that the conclusion in Wintersteiger is also applicable to 
copyright infringement over the Internet926. 
In my opinion, such a conclusion seems contradictory. On the one hand, the 
court stated that the “place where damage occurred” varies according to the nature of 
the rights allegedly infringed927. Indeed, copyright does not require registration and is 
automatically protected in all the EU Member States by virtue of Directive 2001/29 
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society928.  
On the other hand, by contrast with its previous argument, the ECJ in Pinckney 
concluded that the likelihood of the damage occurring in a particular Member State 
depends on the protection of the infringed rights by domestic law, and that the place 
of registration was correctly decided in Wintersteiger as the place where damage 
occurred929. Indeed, in cases of copyright infringement over the Internet, the claimant 
may bring his action before the courts of each Member State in the territory of which 
content placed online is or has been accessible. Those courts have jurisdiction only in 
respect of the damage caused in the territory of the Member State of the court 
seized930. 
In my opinion, the ECJ in Pinckney, like in Wintersteiger, based its conclusion 
on a false argument: the territorial nature of the rights infringed, which is a question 
of the substance of the dispute rather that one of jurisdiction. The argument that the 
very territorial character of copyright implies that it can only be infringed where it is 
protected confuses the issues of liability and the basis of jurisdiction931. Indeed, as 
was noted previously, the substantive law issues should not be taken into account at 
the stage of finding international jurisdiction.  
Moreover, as noted by the Advocate General in Pinckney, the material damage 
resulting from the infringement of copyright does not have the necessary link with the 
localisation of the centre of the author’s interests, but rather with the localisation of 
                                                 
925 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 2013 -00000, para 37. 
926 Ibid, para 38. 
927 Ibid, para 32. 
928 Ibid, para 41. 
929 Ibid, para 33. 
930 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published; Case C-170/12 
Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000. 
931 E. Jooris, ‘Infringement of Foreign Copyright and the Jurisdiction of English Courts’ (1996) 3 EIPR 
127, 139-140. 
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his public932. In this respect, we can point out that there is no material damage in cases 
of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet933. In particular, as noted 
in IBS Technologies Ltd v APM Technologies SA, in cases where it is difficult or 
impossible to prove actual loss, the victim of an infringement of copyright commonly 
obtains a form of user damage, frequently in the form of a royalty, without proof of 
actual loss934. The same approach is taken in Article 13(1)(b) of the Directive 2004/48 
on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, which requires Member States to 
ensure that the judicial authorities can decide to “set the damages as a lump sum on 
the basis of elements such as at least the amount of royalties or fees which would 
have been due if the infringer had requested authorisation to use the intellectual 
property rights in question.”935 
In this regard it is logical to propose that if the plaintiff claims that conduct 
abroad has an effect on the domestic market, he can also claim for the effects of the 
same conduct in other countries under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels Recast936. 
However, the ECJ in Wintersteiger and Pinckney limited jurisdiction to the courts of 
the place where the damage occurred – restricted it to the damage occurring in the 
court of the Member State seized. According to the ECJ in Wintersteiger and 
Pinckney the place where the damage occurred is the Member State in which the 
intellectual property rights are situated. According to this approach, a copyright, 
patent and trademark are situated in the country whose law governs their existence937. 
For example, the English courts have applied this rule to cases of copyright938 and 
trademark939 infringement.  
However, we need to admit that intellectual property rights infringement differ 
enormously between press media and the Internet. In the case of intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet damage is often delocalised and references to the 
                                                 
932 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 2013 -00000, Opinion of AG 
Jääskinen, para 70. 
933 Fawcett (n 112) 163. 
934 IBS Technologies Ltd v APM Technologies SA [2003] All ER (D) 105.  
935 Council Directive (EC) 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] O.J. L 
195/16. 
936 Max Planck Institute, ‘Case Comment. Austria: Regulation 44/2001, art.5(3) – “Wintersteiger III”‘ 
(2013) IIC 44(8), 992-998. 
937 Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws (14th edn, 2006) 22-051. 
938 Novello & Co Ltd v Hinrichsen Edition Ltd and Another [1951] 1 Ch 595, para 604. 
939 Lecouturier and Others v Rey and Others [1910] AC 262, para 273. 
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principle of territoriality of intellectual property rights are not a relevant connection 
requirement to establish jurisdiction.  
Indeed, as our finding indicates, the principle of the territoriality of intellectual 
property is a principle of substantive law rather than of jurisdiction940. Therefore, 
determining jurisdiction in cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet and defamation over the Internet should depend on the nature of the rights 
infringed rather than on the principle of territoriality. In this regard it will be logical 
to reject jurisdiction based on the claimant’s centre of interest in cases of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet on account of the absence of relevant 
connection requirements between the circumstances of the dispute and the court of 
the Member State seized.  
Indeed, in eDate Advocate General Villalón's clarified that establishing the 
centre of gravity for the purposes of Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast would 
require an objective assessment941. This means that the “disputed information should 
be objectively relevant in a given territorial space”942. Only in the situation when it 
would be reasonably foreseeable that accessing information in one Member State 
would, if accessible in another Member State, be capable of causing harm in that 
other State should jurisdiction under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast be 
established. Indeed, as noted by AG Villalón's opinion if the information was indeed 
an objectively relevant dimension in a Member State and that State was precisely 
where the “centre of interests” of the holder of personality rights lay, jurisdiction 
could be established under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast943. 
In contrast to personality rights infringement over the Internet, the criterion of 
objective accessibility of information protected by intellectual property law is not 
required for intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. For example, 
trademark may be infringed by way of the use, by an advertiser, of a keyword 
identical to that trade mark on a search engine website operating under a country-
                                                 
940 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117; 
Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 2013 -00000; Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v 
EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published. 
941 Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate Advertising GmbH v X (C-509/09) and Olivier Martinez 
and Robert Martinez v Société MGN Limited (C-161/10) [2011] ECR I-10269, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz 
Villalón, para 60. 
942 Ibid, paras 65-66. 
943 Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate Advertising GmbH v X (C-509/09) and Olivier Martinez 
and Robert Martinez v Société MGN Limited (C-161/10) [2011] ECR I-10269, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz 
Villalón, para 66. 
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specific top-level domain of another Member State944. Copyright may be infringed by 
accessing the material protected by copyright945. In this regard, the domicile of the 
author and the place where he pursues his professional activity are irrelevant for the 
purpose of establishing jurisdiction under the claimant’s centre of interest approach. 
Indeed, it is not possible to establish connection requirements between the claimant’s 
centre of interest and the damage that has occurred.  
Conclusion and recommendations 
The ECJ in Wintersteiger and Pinckney has rejected the application of 
jurisdiction based on the claimant’s centre of interest approach with regard to 
copyright and trademark infringement over the Internet by distinguishing between 
infringements of personality rights over the Internet and cases infringements of 
intellectual property rights over the Internet. 
On the one hand we need to recognise the necessity of different jurisdictional 
regimes with regard to intellectual property rights infringement and defamation over 
the Internet.  
On the other hand, the ECJ’s reference in Wintersteiger and Pinckney to the 
principle of the territoriality of intellectual property rights as the main argument for 
rejecting jurisdiction based on the claimant’s centre of interest approach is wrong. In 
particular, as noted by the ECJ in Wintersteiger and Pinckney, in contrast to 
personality rights which are protected in all Member States, intellectual property 
rights are subject to the principle of territoriality946.  
In my opinion, the principle of territoriality is an issue of substantive law. In 
particular, by establishing jurisdiction based on Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast, 
the ECJ has taken into account the substance of the dispute, namely the issue of 
whether and where the proprietor can rely on the protection, rather than the issue of 
establishing a link between the forum and the circumstances of the dispute. However, 
it is self-evident that the solutions applied by the court at the substantive level cannot 
automatically be transposed to the rules for determining jurisdiction947. This means 
                                                 
944 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
para 29. 
945 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published; Case C-170/12 
Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000. 
946 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 38; Case C-523/10 
Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, para 25.  
947 Case C-170/12, Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, 
para 62. 
185 
 
that jurisdiction according to Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast cannot depend on 
criteria which are specific to the examination of the substance of the dispute948. 
Therefore, jurisdiction in cases of intellectual property rights infringement over 
the Internet should be based on clear connections between the dispute and the court of 
the place where the damage occurred.  
In my opinion, determining jurisdiction in cases of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet and defamation over the Internet should depend on the 
nature of the rights infringed rather than on the principle of territoriality. In this 
regard it would be logical to reject jurisdiction based on the claimant’s centre of 
interest.  
Indeed, in contrast to personality rights infringement over the Internet, the 
criterion of objective accessibility of the information protected by intellectual 
property law is not required for intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet. For example, trademark may be infringed by way of the use, by an 
advertiser, of a keyword identical to that trademark on a search engine website 
operating under a country-specific top-level domain of another Member State949. 
Copyright may be infringed by accessing the material protected by copyright950. 
Therefore, the domicile of the author and the place where he pursues his professional 
activity are irrelevant for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction under the claimant’s 
centre of interest approach, as it is not possible to establish a connection between the 
claimant’s centre of interest and the damage that has occurred.  
3.3.2 Alternative approach 
3.3.2.1 The place of the event giving rise to the damage: where 
the act of infringement occurred 
Jurisdiction based on the place of the event giving rise to the damage, meaning 
where the act of infringement occurred, is an alternative to jurisdiction under the 
adapted version of Shevill that is based on the place where the publisher is 
established. 
                                                 
948 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 41. 
949 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
para 29. 
950 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published; Case C-170/12 
Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000. 
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It is important to note that jurisdiction based on the place where intellectual 
property rights are infringed has been a topic of active academic discussion according 
to the conventional approach951. However, under the conventional approach the 
jurisdictional issue is limited to cases of offline intellectual property rights 
infringement. For example, jurisdiction based on the place where the act of 
infringement occurred is supported by the English952, French953 and German954 courts. 
In this paragraph, jurisdiction based on the place where the act of infringement 
occurred will be analysed with regard to its applicability to cases of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet. In particular, the main question of our 
discussion is whether the place where the act of infringement occurred is an 
appropriate jurisdictional basis for cases of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet. 
Indeed, the diffuculties associated with establishing jurisdiction based on 
traditional jurisidctional rules and the increasing number of cases of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet force the courts to find an alternative 
jurisdictional basis that is founded on connection requirements specific to cases of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. Indeed, according to the 
Advocate General’s point of view in Pinckney955 and Wintersteiger956, jurisdiction in 
cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet may be based on 
the place where the intellectual property rights are infringed.  
In spite of the fact that jurisdiction based on the place where the act of 
infringement occurred is not yet fully clarified, this approach has received strong 
academic support as far as cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internetare concerned957. In particular, as noted by Nuyts, the court where the causal 
                                                 
951 Fawcett (n 112) 158. 
952 Molnlycke case [1992] 1 WLR 1112; Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership Ltd and Others [1997] Ch 293 
para 302; Knorr-Bremse Systems for Commercial Vehicles Limited v Haldex Brake Products GmbH [2008] 
EWHC 156.  
953 Ideal Clima SpA and Others v SA Ideal Standard Gaz Pal [1982] Somm, 378; GRE Manufacturas and 
Another v Agrisilos [2006] IL Pr27. 
954 Case 5 U 6923/99 [2002] IL Pr 510, Kammergericht (Appeal Court Berlin); Case I ZR 163/02 [2005] 
NJW 1435, Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court). 
955 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, 
para 29. 
956 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
Opinion of Advocate General Villalón, para 26. 
957 Chaen, Kono and Yokomizo, ‘Jurisiction in Intellectual Property Rights Cases’ in Basedow, Kono and 
Metzger (eds.), Intellectual Property in the Global Arena (Mohr Sibeck 2010) 98; Yokomizo, ‘Intellectual 
Property Infringement on the Internet and Conflict of Laws’ (2011) AIPPI Journal 105, 106.  
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event occurred satisfies the requirement of foreseeability if it presides over the 
epicentre of the tortious activity and there is enough evidence to allow the plaintiff to 
bring its claim before that court958. The same approach is supported by Fawcett, who 
notes that in most cases the place of the event giving rise to the damage is the place 
where the act of infringement occurred959. These arguments lead us to the conclusion 
that the court of the Member State where the act of infringement was commited is 
best placed to assess intellectual property rights infringement and to determine the 
extent of corresponding damage960. In this regard Savin also emphasises that Article 7 
(2) of the Brussels I Recast has the potential to provide jurisdiction for the court of 
the place where the infringement took place961.  
Indeed, the allocation of jurisdiction to the place where the act of infringement 
occurred is available in the Trademark Regulation962 and the Design Regulation963. In 
particular, Article 97 (5) of the Community Trademark Regulation contains a specific 
provision on international jurisdiction which provides that infringement actions “may 
also be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the act of infringement 
has been committed or threatened”964. In this regard some may counter that the 
Trademark Regulation and the Design Regulation contain a rule which derogates from 
the special rule of jurisdiction under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast965. This 
means that jurisdiction in cases of infringement of national intellectual property rights 
cannot be established by the way of analogy with the Community Trademark or 
Design regulations.  
In my opinion, in spite of the contention surrounding jurisdiction based on the 
place where the act of infringement occurred, it is still a relevant connection 
requirement for establishing jurisdiction in cases of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet. Indeed, as noted by the Advocate General in Hejduk, 
in circumstances where it is not possible reliably to establish where any “delocalized” 
                                                 
958 Arnaud Nuyts, International Litigation in Intellectual Property and info Technology (Kluwer Law 
International 2008) 128. 
959 Fawcett (n 112) 158. 
960 Fawcett (n 112) 167.  
961 Andrej Savin and Jan Trzaskowski (ed.), Research Handbook on EU Internet Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2014) 60. 
962 Council Regulation (EC) 207/2009 on the Community trade mark [2009] OJ L 78/1, Art 94-98. 
963 Council Regulation (EC) 6/2002 on Community designs [2002] OJ LEC L 3, Art 79-83. 
964 Council Regulation (EC) 207/2009 on the Community trade mark [2009] OJ L 78/1, Art 97(5).  
965 Yasmine Lahlou, Laurence Sinopoli and Philippe Guez, ‘Chronicle on conflict of laws in business 
matters’ [2013] I.B.L.J. 3, 217-241.  
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damage has occurred, jurisdiction based on where the “harmful event has occurred” 
under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast should be based on where the “causal 
event” leading to the alleged infringement occurred966. In spite of the fact that the 
Advocate General does not provide any detail what “causal event” means, it is logical 
to suppose that it is the act of intellectual property rights infringement.  
However, how can one identify the place where the act of infringement 
occurred? According to Bigos’ point of view, the place of the event giving rise to the 
damage may be identified in the light of the place where the act of infringement 
occurred967. Lundstedt also argues that the “event giving rise to the damage” is 
infringement itself, and damage occurs at the place of infringement968. 
The identification of the place where the act of infringement occurred depends 
on the nature of the rights infringed. In this regard I would like to focus our attention 
on cases of copyright infringement over the Internet as they are the most frequent 
way in which intellectual property rights are infringed over the Internet969.  
Indeed, in the case of offline copyright infringement, the identification of the 
place where the act of infringement occurred does not provide any difficulties at it is 
where the act of copying a work970, or issuing copies of a copyrighted work to the 
public971 or public performance of the work takes place972. However, it is very difficult 
to identify the place where the act of copyright infringement occurred over the 
Internet due to the sequence of events973 between the original uploading of 
information and its eventual display on a screen in another country974. 
                                                 
966 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published, Opinion of AG 
Cruz Villalón.  
967 Oren  Bigos, ‘Jurisdiction over  cross- border  wrongs on the  internet’ (2005) 54 I.C.L.Q. 585-620. 
968 Lundstedt, L. ‘Jurisdiction and the Principle of Territoriality in Intellectual Property Law: Has the 
Pendulum Swung Too Far in the Other Direction?’ (2001) IIC, 136-137.  
969 Intellectual Property Office, ‘Annual IP crime report: 2012 to 2013’ (2014) <https://www.gov.uk/ 
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search results from Google directing Internet users to illegal copies of music; the Publishes Association has 
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970Francis, day and Hunter v Bron [1963] Cg 587; Pearce v Ove Arup partnership Ltd and Others [1997] 
Ch 293.  
971 British Northrop v Texteam Blackburn Ltd [1974] RPC 57; HRH Prince of Wales v Associated 
Newspapers Ltd [2006] ECDR, confirmed on appeal [2007] 3 WLR 222. 
972Performing Right Society Ltd v Harlequin Record Shops [1979] FSR 223; Ernest Turner Electrical 
Instruments Ltd v Performing Right Society Ltd [1943] Ch 167, [1943] 1 All ER 413. 
973 Fawcett (n 113) 159. The sequence of events is as follows: uploading of information; digitisation of the 
work; storage of the digitised form of the work; conversion of the digitised form of the work into the carrying 
signal; transmission of the carrying signal; reception of the carrying signal in the receiving machine; downloading 
(storage of information in the memory of the machine); screen display and, possibly, print out of display material.  
974 Fawcett (n 113) 159. 
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In my opinion, only two events in the transmission of information should be 
taken into account: the uploading of the information and its eventual downloading. 
Fawcett and Torremans describe these events as “two constants which will be there 
whenever there is infringement litigation”975. This approach is entirely consistent with 
the decision of the ECJ in Bier, where the place of the original event which caused 
the damage is not where the damage occurred976. 
However, jurisdiction based on two alternative fora (where the content is 
uploaded and where the content is downloaded) is unpredictable for all the parties 
involved.  
Indeed, as noted by Fawcett, jurisdiction based on the place where the act of 
infringement occurred could lead to litigation in any one of the States in which one of 
the events making up this complicated sequence occurred977. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to identify only one event that occurs in all sequences giving rise to the 
damage. The phrase “place where the act of infringement occurred” refers to the 
Member State where the act giving rise to the alleged infringement occurred or may 
occur, not the Member State where that infringement produces its effects978. This 
means that while the act of uploading is the act giving rise to the alleged 
infringement, the act of downloading is just the effect of uploading. Such an approach 
is also supported by Magnus and Mankowski, who make clear that in spite of the fact 
that the Internet allows the circulation of content beyond borders, the act of 
transferring files may be localised at the place of their uploading979. Indeed, in 
comparison with the place of downloading, the place of uploading has the following 
positive characters:  
it corresponds to the State of origin and leads to a single act of 
infringement (while the place of downloading corresponds to the State of reception 
and leads to multiple acts of infringement)980; 
                                                 
975 Fawcett (n 113) 159-160. 
976 Case 21/76 Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d’Alsace SA [1976] ECR 1735, para 13 
977 Fawcett (n 113) 159. 
978 Case C-360/12 Coty Germany GmbH v First Note Perfumes NV [2014] not yet published, para 34 
979 Ulrich Magnus (ed.) and Peter Mankowski (ed.), Brussels I Regulation: Second Revised Edition (2nd 
edn, Sellier European Law Publishers 2012) 250.  
980 Pedro A. De Miguel Asensio, ‘The Networked Information Society: Territoriality And Beyond’ 
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it is based on a defendant’s act of infringement (whereas in the case of 
downloading the main attention is concentrated on the act of the receiver of the 
information (who is not a defendant))981. 
Moreover, while downloading may be permitted for private use982, the courts 
appear reluctant to accept the legitimacy of uploading copyrighted content on online 
networks without authorial consent983. In particular, as stated in Copydan Båndkopi v 
Nokia Danmark A/S984, making protected works available on the internet (by 
uploading) without the right-holders’ authorisation is a clear infringement of 
intellectual property rights. Indeed, the act of uploading over the Internet is not 
equivalent to the loan of one or more CD ROMs or DVDs for private copying985.  
Therefore, we can conclude that in the case of copyright (or patent) 
infringement over the Internet the place where the act of infringement occurred is 
the place where the information is uploaded on the Internet. This is in line with 
the English High Court’s decision in EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting 
Ltd, according to which users and/or operators of websites infringed copyright by 
uploading and communicating sound recordings to the public because they made the 
recordings available by electronic transmission in such a way that members of the 
public could access the recordings at a place and time individually chosen by those 
members of the public986. 
In this respect, the following question arises: how can one identify the place of 
uploading in the case of copyright (patent) infringement over the Internet?  
Indeed, scholars discuss the place of uploading, which can be identified at the 
location of the computer from which the material is sent, the location of the person 
doing the uploading and the location of the server to which the material is 
uploaded987.  
                                                 
981 Oren  Bigos, ‘Jurisdiction over  cross- border  wrongs on the  internet’ (2005) 54 I.C.L.Q. 585-620. 
982 Case 03001251 Ministere Public, FNDF, SEV, Twentieth Century Fox et al. v Aurelien D.T., Rodez 
District Court [2004] (France).  
983 Case 29 U 3282/00 R. v Re Copyright In Files Copied on to the Internet [2002] E.C.C. 15 
(Oberlandesgericht); Magical Marking Ltd v Holly [2008] EWHC (Ch) 2428; R. (on the application of British 
Telecommunications Plc) v Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport [2012] EWCA Civ 232; 
Neij and Sunde Kolmisoppi v Sweden [2013] E.C.D.R. 7 (ECHR).  
984 Case C-463/12 Copydan Båndkopi v Nokia Danmark A/S [2015] not yet published.  
985 Ibid. 
986 EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), paras 24, 27, 39, 42. 
987 Fawcett (n 112) 553; Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet (Kluwer 
Law International 2007) 291; Arnaud Nuyts, International Litigation in Intellectual Property and Info Technology 
(Kluwer Law International 2008) 141; Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet 
(Kluwer Law International 2007) 291.  
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I do not propose to analyse these approaches in detail but should note some 
important conclusions. In my opinion, the location of the computer is not an 
appropriate connection requirement as it may be difficult to identify which particular 
computer constitutes the place of dispatch. Indeed, in the light of possibilities of 
remote control (e.g. through Telnet) the location of the sending computer may be 
misleading988. The location of the person doing the uploading is also irrelevant for 
jurisdictional purposes. On the one hand, as noted by Nuyts, the existence of the link 
between the establishment of the infringer and the place of uploading to a web server 
cannot be denied because uploading to a web server is a part of the commercial 
activity of the tortfeasor which is located in the place of his establishment989. This is 
also true in the light of Pinckney990, which indicates that the “place giving rise to the 
damage” in online communication rights infringement cases is the place where the 
decision to upload content is made991. On the other hand, the infringer of intellectual 
property rights may decide to upload copyright content not in the place of his 
domicile but, say, during his business trip. As a result, the link between the decision 
to upload and the domicile of the defendant cannot be considered as a relevant factor 
for jurisdictional purposes. In my opinion, the most relevant jurisdictional factor for 
identifying the place of uploading is where the web server is located. For example, 
the US courts, in defining the place of wrong, apply the location of the server to 
which the material is uploaded992. The same approach is also confirmed by the courts 
of the EU Member States993 and academic community994. Indeed, the location of the 
server is the place of performance since it is is the place where the infringer takes the 
first substantial steps towards making the digitised products available995.  
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Thus, the place of the event giving rise to the damage is the place where the 
content protected by copyright is uploaded to a server. This approach is supported by 
the Advocate General in Pinckney who stated that placing songs online constituted an 
act of reproduction, which was localised at the place at which it was placed online 
(i.e. uploaded)996. Indeed, in cases of uploading content protected by copyright on the 
Internet, the author’s reproduction right is infringed according to Article 2 of the 
Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society997.  
Similarly, the place of the event giving rise to the damage in the meaning of the 
‘place where the act of infringement occurred’ was considered by the Advocate 
General in Wintersteiger as a possible jurisdictional basis in cases of trademark 
infringement over the Internet. Indeed, he noted that jurisdiction according to the 
Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast may be established in the place of the event 
giving rise to the damage as it is a place “where the means necessary to produce an 
actual infringement of a mark were used”998. 
However, the ECJ, both in Pinckney and in Wintersteiger, did not follow the 
approach proposed by the Advocate General. The main argument for rejecting 
jurisdiction based on the place where the act of infringement occurred was founded 
on the fact that the intellectual property rights infringement is a substantive issue 
rather than a jurisdictional question. Indeed, as noted by the ECJ in Wintersteiger, the 
question of using a trademark on a website falls within the substance of the action999. 
Similarly, the ECJ in Pinckney stated that the issue as to whether the intellectual 
property rights were infringed and whether that infringement may be attributed to the 
defendant falls within the examination of the substance of the action by the court 
having jurisdiction1000. 
Therefore, in cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, 
the event giving rise to a possible infringement of intellectual property lies in the 
actions of the owner of a website in activating the technical display of photographs on 
                                                 
996 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, 
para 20. 
997 Council Directive (EC) 2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights 
in the information society [2001] OJ L 167. 
998 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
Opinion of Advocate General Villalón, para 26. 
999 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
para 26. 
1000 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 40. 
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a website (in the case of copyright infringement)1001 or in activating an advertisement 
(in the case of trademark infringement)1002. This means that the intellectual property 
rights owner may bring the case before the court of the place where the advertiser or 
the owner of a website is established as this is the place where the activation of the 
display process is decided1003. 
Thus, in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet 
the place of the event giving rise to the damage means the place where the advertiser 
or owner of a website is established (this basis of jurisdiction is discussed in 
paragraph 3.3.1.1). 
Conclusion and recommendations 
On the basis of this analysis we can conclude that the place of the event giving 
rise to the damage in the meaning of the ‘place where the act of intellectual property 
rights infringement occurred’ is not applicable as a jurisdictional basis for cases of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet.  
Indeed, the ECJ in Wintersteiger, Pinckney and Hejduk has confirmed that the 
place where the act of infringement occurred is related to the substance of a dispute 
rather than to the issue of jurisdiction1004. This means that the identification of the 
place where the act of infringement occurred for the purposes of Article 7 (2) of the 
Brussels I Recast cannot depend on criteria which are specific to the examination of 
the substance of a dispute. 
In my opinion, the rejection of jurisdiction based on the place where the act of 
infringement occurred is evidence of the necessity of harmonising and unifying the 
jurisdictional rules of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. In 
particular, while in the case of offline intellectual property rights infringement courts 
have tried to identify the connection requirements between a dispute and a court 
seized based on the principles of substantive law (under the law of the country where 
the intellectual property rights are protected), this approach does not fit for cases of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet.  
                                                 
1001 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published, para 24. 
1002 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
para 34. 
1003 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
paras 37, 39; Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 47; Case C-441/13 
Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published, para 25. 
1004Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
paras 31, 36; Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, paras 40-41; Case C-
441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published, para 35. 
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On the basis of this analysis we can conclude that rejecting jurisdiction based 
on the place where the act of infringement occurred is correct, as the latter is an issue 
of the substance of the dispute rather than jurisdiction over it. Indeed, jurisdictional 
rules of cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet should be 
predictable and based on clear links between the event giving rise to the damage and 
the territory of a particular Member State of the court seized. Otherwise, 
jurisdictional rules would be very complex and would flout the principle of 
foreseeability.  
Moreover, the allocation of jurisdiction to the place where the advertiser or 
website owner is established is also dictated by the principle of practical feasibility. 
Indeed, it is not difficult to establish a link between the place where the advertiser or 
website owner is established and the Member State of the court seized. In contrast, 
identifying the place where the act of infringement occurred with regard to 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet is very difficult. For 
example, what is file sharing and how can one identify the place where the act of 
infringement occurred? Indeed, as noted by Fawcett, in Internet cases it is very 
difficult to localise the place where the act of infringement occurred since the act of 
infringement could, or perhaps should, be regarded as being truly multi-national1005. 
However, intellectual property law is still largely national despite more than twenty-
five years of harmonization1006. This means that the law of a particular country 
determines what acts on the Internet constitute intellectual property rights 
infringement1007. In this regard we need to note that national laws protecting 
intellectual property rights are technology-neutral and do not take into account new 
forms of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet1008. Indeed, as the 
opinion of the Advocate General in Wintersteiger indicates, it is very difficult to 
                                                 
1005 Fawcett (n 112) 159. 
1006 Council Directive (EC) 91/250 on the legal protection of computer programs [1991] OJ L 122; 
Council Directive (EC) 96/9 on the legal protection of databases [1996] OJ L 77; Council Directive (EC) 2001/29 
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L 167. 
1007 Irini A. Stamatoudi (ed.), Copyright Enforcement and the Internet (Kluwer Law International 2010) 
311. 
1008 For example, the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 do not regulate the file sharing 
activities (relating to the uploading or downloading of a piece of work in a file sharing network that infringes the 
copyright in that work). 
195 
 
identify which rights are infringed in cases of intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet1009. 
The next important argument for rejecting jurisdiction based on the place where 
the intellectual property rights are infringed is the multiplication of possible fora. 
Indeed, taking into account the territorial nature of the intellectual property rights 
infringed, the jurisdiction of the court seized is limited to the damage resulting in its 
territory1010. Therefore, it is in the interests of intellectual property rights owners to 
bring a case before the court of the Member State where the advertiser or website 
owner is established in respect of all the damage caused.  
Thus, in spite of our desire to propose a jurisdictional approach which would be 
specific to cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, 
practicality requires the adaption of traditional jurisdictional rules for cases of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. Therefore, we can conclude 
that the alternative approach under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast based on the 
place where the intellectual property rights are infringed is not applicable to cases of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet.  
3.3.2.2 The place where the damage occurred: the targeting or 
directing activities approach  
Jurisdiction based on the place where the damage occurred in the sense of the 
place where the website targets or directs its activity towards the public of a particular 
Member State is an alternative to the jurisdiction under the adapted version of Shevill, 
which is based on the place where content is placed online or has been accessible.  In 
this regard it is important to note that the directing/targeting activities approach has 
been recognised by the ECJ in Pammer v Reederei Karl Schluter GmbH & Co KG 
(hereafter Pammer )1011 as a basis of jurisdiction with regard to consumer contracts 
when a trader uses a website to communicate with consumers according to Article 17 
(1) (c) of the Brussels I Recast. The ECJ clearly states that the mere fact that a 
website is accessible from the Member State where the consumer resides is not 
                                                 
1009 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
Opinion of Advocate General Villalón, paras 36-60; Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] 
ECR 00000, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, paras 52-56. 
1010 This approach is based on the ECJ cases such as Pinckney (para 36) and Wintersteiger (para 25) where 
the ECJ has been accepted the territorial nature of the rights infringed.  
1011 Joined cases C-585/08 Pammer v Reederei Karl Schluter GmbH & Co KG and C-144/09 Hotel 
Alpenhof GmbH v Heller [2011] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 888. 
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sufficient to suggest that the owner of the website directs his activities to that 
Member State1012. Indeed, in order for those rules to be applicable to consumers from 
other Member States, the trader must have manifested its intention to establish 
commercial relations with such consumers1013. 
Initially, the so called “targeting” doctrine was developed by the US courts in 
offline (and later online) intellectual property cases1014. According to this approach, a 
defendant can be sued in any forum towards which it specifically directs its business, 
and it can limit its exposure to suit by narrowing its targets1015. Thus, the jurisdictional 
doctrine of targeting allows e-businesses to choose “whether or not they wish to 
become connected to any given sovereign”1016. This means that online activity must 
have been intended to produce effects within the territory of the state asserting 
jurisdiction1017.  
Indeed, the similarities between the US targeting doctrine and the acceptance in 
the EU of the directing activities approach (with regard to online consumer disputes) 
allow us to support a jurisdiction based on the targeting/directing activities approach 
in cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. As noted by 
Kohl, the targeting/directing activities approach is a logical, rationally defensible, 
jurisdictional response to rising ‘transnationality’1018.  
In my opinion, such an approach has also been indirectly supported by the ECJ 
in eDate1019. Indeed, when questioning the utility of the accessibility of a website 
approach, the ECJ in eDate has focused on whether there is “something more” 
needed for the exercise of jurisdiction. In my opinion, this “something more” is the 
targeting/directing activities approach. In particular, there is strong academic support 
for extending jurisdiction based on the targeting/directing activities approach to 
                                                 
1012 Ibid, paras 74-76. 
1013 Ibid, paras 74-76. 
1014 Nintendo of America v Aeropower Co. [1994] 34 F.3d 246 (4th Cir.); Metzke v May Dep’t Stores 
[1995] 878 F. Supp. 756. 
1015 American Bar Association, Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project, ‘Achieving Legal and Business 
Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global Jurisdiction Issues created by the Internet’ (2000), 55 Bus. Law. 1801, 
1828. 
1016 Ibid. 
1017 Gunther Handl, Joachim Zekoll, Peer Zumbansen (ed.), Beyond Territoriality: Transnational Legal 
Authority in an Age of Globalization (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012) 346. 
1018 Uta Kohl, Jurisdiction and the Internet – a Study of regulatory competence over online activity 
(Cambridge University Press 2007) 78. 
1019 Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate Advertising GmbH v X (C-509/09) and Olivier Martinez 
and Robert Martinez v Société MGN Limited (C-161/10) [2011] ECR I-10269. 
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Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast1020. Indeed, as noted by Petkova, when 
information is uploaded over the Internet, it will potentially be accessible all over the 
world. Therefore, the targeting/directing activities approach allows a defendant to 
take reasonable steps to avoid acting in or directing activity into a particular 
jurisdiction1021. In this regard, the targeting/directing activities approach is a way to 
establish a more effective and durable solution to jurisdiction of intellectual property 
rights infringements over the Internet.  
On the other hand, as noted by Tarruella, the interests in consumer contracts are 
not the same as in tort actions1022. This means that the defendant in tort actions cannot 
be protected as a weaker party (in contract, the consumer is protected as the weaker 
party). But Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast is neutral and does not aim to protect 
the victim. The next counterargument with regard to extending jurisdiction based on 
the targeting/directing activities approach is its flexible nature, which does not 
provide legal certainty: the approach may be interpreted either as receipt-oriented or 
origin-oriented1023. However, one can counter that legal certainty may be provided by 
clarifying what does and does not amount to targeting1024. 
Indeed, jurisdiction based on the directing/targeting activities approach is a 
clear move away from traditional territorially based connection requirements and 
towards specific connection requirements for Internet torts. In this regard, the 
targeting/directing activities approach may be a good alternative to jurisdiction under 
the adapted version of Shevill in cases of intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet. 
Therefore, the most important question in our discussion becomes whether the 
jurisdiction based on the targeting/directing activities approach is an 
appropriate jurisdictional basis for cases of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet. 
                                                 
1020 Uta Kohl, Jurisdiction and the Internet – a Study of regulatory competence over online activity 
(Cambridge University Press 2007) 78; Aurelio Lopez-Tarruella, ‘The International Dimension of Google 
Activities: Private International Law and the Need of Legal Certainty’ in Google and the Law (Asser Press 2012) 
352; Andrej Savin and Jan Trzaskowski (ed.), Research Handbook on EU Internet Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2014) 59. 
1021 Svetozara Petkova, ‘The potential impact of the draft Hague Convention on International Jurisdiction 
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters on Internet-related disputes with particular reference to 
copyright’ [2004] I.P.Q. 2, 173-197. 
1022 Aurelio Lopez-Tarruella, ‘The International Dimension of Google Activities: Private International 
Law and the Need of Legal Certainty’in Google and the Law (Asser Press 2012) 339-340.  
1023 Graham J. H. Smith, Internet Law and Regulation (Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 941. 
1024 Paul Torremans, Research Handbook on Cross-border Enforcement of Intellectual Property (Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited 2014) 388. 
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The ECJ in Pammer considered what evidence can demonstrate the existence of 
an activity “directed to” the Member State of a consumer’s domicile. Such evidence 
includes:  
- offering a trader’s services or its goods in one or more Member States 
designated by name; 
- the international nature of the activity in issue; 
- mention of telephone numbers with an international code;  
- using a top-level domain name other than that of the Member State in 
which the trader is established, for example ‘.de’, or neutral top-level 
domain names such as ‘.com’ or ‘.eu’;  
- the description of itineraries from one or more other Member States to the 
place where the service is provided;  
- mention of an international clientele composed of customers domiciled in 
various Member States, in particular by presentation of accounts written by 
such customers1025. 
However, it is important to note that the nature of the disputes in cases of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the internet is cardinally different from 
online consumer disputes. Therefore, the following questions arise: What evidence 
would express the intention of the defendant to target/direct its activity into the 
forum state in cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet? What are the connection requirements between “the facts of 
infringement and the alleged damage”1026? 
Indeed, a clear understanding of what constitutes the targeting/directing 
activities approach with regard to cases of intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet is critical, for without universally applicable standards the 
targeting/directing activities approach is likely to leave further uncertainty in its 
wake1027.  
An example of applying the targeting/directing activities approach to 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet is the Football Dataco 
                                                 
1025 Joined cases C-585/08 Pammer v Reederei Karl Schluter GmbH & Co KG and C-144/09 Hotel 
Alpenhof GmbH v Heller [2011] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 888, paras 81, 83. 
1026 Scherrer et SA Normalu v SARL Acet [2006] (CA Paris, 4th ch.).  
1027 Adam D Thierer and Clyde Wayne Crews (ed.), Who Rules The Net?: Internet Governance And 
Jurisdiction (Cato Institute 2003) 107.  
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case1028. The main question in Football Dataco was to identify where the wrongful act 
of ‘re-utilization’ occurred in order to determine whether so-called sui generis rights 
in a database were infringed1029. According to the ECJ, the English court has 
jurisdiction as the act of re-utilization discloses an intention on the part of the person 
performing the act to target members of the public in the UK1030. In particular, the 
following evidence may constitute the intention of the defendant to target the public 
in the UK: the right to access the server of companies offering betting services to the 
public in the UK and the fact that the defendant is aware, or must have been aware, of 
that specific destination (UK); the prospects of defendant’s website subsequently 
being consulted by internet users in the UK; that the data is accessible by the public 
in the UK in their own language1031. 
Thus, we can conclude that the approach applicable to online consumer disputes 
is also applicable to cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet. However, in spite of some similarities, these approaches are different. In 
particular, the main emphasis of the targeting approach in Pammer was on the nature 
of the relationship between the parties of the dispute. In particular, the existence of a 
contract between the website proprietor and the consumer for the supply of services 
was significant in order to bring the electronic transaction within the scope of Article 
17 (1) (c) of the Brussels I Recast1032. In contrast, in the case of intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet (in our example, the case of the infringement of 
sui generis rights in a database) the main emphasis of the court is on the intention of 
the defendant to target a particular jurisdiction. In this regard the targeting approach 
adopted by the ECJ in Football Dataco may be compared with the American 
International Shoe ‘minimum contacts’ test where the main emphasis is placed on the 
defendant’s intention to reach beyond its boundary to do business, requiring a 
“conscious business activity”1033. Therefore, we can conclude that the most important 
connection requirement in cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet under the targeting approach is the intention of the defendant to target a 
                                                 
1028 Case C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd and Others v Sportradar GmbH and Sportradar AG.[2012] ECR 
00000, para 10. 
1029 Ibid, paras 17-18. 
1030 Ibid, para 47. 
1031 Ibid, paras 41-42. 
1032 Youseph Farah, ‘Allocation of jurisdiction and the internet in EU law.’ (2008) European Law Review, 
33 (2), 257-270. 
1033 International Shoe Co. v. Washington [1945] 326 U.S. 310. 
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particular jurisdiction rather than the nature of the relationship between the parties to 
the dispute. 
However, in my opinion, the intention of the defendant to target a particular 
jurisdiction under the targeting approach in Football Dataco concerned where the act 
of extraction/re-utilisation takes place (in the context of infringement of the sui 
generis database rights) rather than where the damage is sustained in the context of 
Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast. Indeed, as the ECJ indicated in L’Oreal v eBay, 
the targeting/directing activities approach may be relevant to the existence of 
substantive liability for infringement, rather than to jurisdictional issues1034. In this 
regard the ECJ in Football Dataco noted that the question of the localisation of the 
act of “re-utilisation” within the meaning of Article 7 of Directive 96/9 on the legal 
protection of databases is liable to have an influence on the question of 
jurisdiction1035. Indeed, as noted by the Advocate General in Pinckney, such a solution 
could provide a useful inspiration for the interpretation of Article 7 (2) of the Brussels 
I Recast1036. This means that the targeting approach adopted by the ECJ in Football 
Dataco at a substantive law level should be applicable also for the purposes of Article 
7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast in order to identify the place where the damage occurred 
1037. 
In my opinion, jurisdictional rules should be based on a clear connection 
requirement between the act of infringement and the territory of the court of the 
Member State where the damage occurred, rather than on the substantive elements of 
the dispute. In this connection it is important to identify how the targeting/directing 
activities approach is applicable to cases of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet on a national level – are they applicable on a 
substantive level or a jurisdictional level? Indeed, as noted by the ECJ in Titus 
Alexander Jochen Donner, it is for national courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether there is evidence supporting a conclusion that a defendant did actually target 
members of the public in a particular jurisdiction1038. 
                                                 
1034 Case C-324/09 L’Oreal v eBay [2011] ECR I-06011, para 65 
1035 Case C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd and Others v Sportradar GmbH and Sportradar AG.[2012] ECR 
00000, para 30. 
1036 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, 
para 63. 
1037 Ibid, para 64. 
1038 Case C-5/11 Titus Alexander Jochen Donner [2012] ECLI C 370, para 28. 
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For example, in Re the Maritim Trade Mark1039 the German court made clear 
that the targeting/directing activities approach is the substantive element of a 
trademark infringement over the Internet. Indeed, the issue of jurisdiction depends on 
domestic connection requirements with Germany. With regard to the issue of 
trademark infringement over the Internet, the court found no trademark infringement 
in Germany as the website was directed to the Danish market (which the use of the 
.dk domain name indicated) and there were no elements, such as German contact 
addresses, aimed at the German market1040. In this regard, it seems logical that the 
place where infringement actually took place or the extent to which national 
trademarks should be given extraterritorial effect is related to the substance of the 
claim rather than to the jurisdiction of the court1041.  
However, in contrast to the German decision in Re the Maritim Trade Mark1042, 
the English court in EMI Records Ltd & Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors 
confirmed the jurisdiction of an English court based on the targeting approach. In 
particular, the court held that in the case of copyright infringement over the Internet 
by way of communicating to the public, such an act will be treated as occurring 
within the UK if the communication is targeted at the public in the UK1043. Indeed, in 
spite of the fact that the High Court did not specify what evidence led to it having 
jurisdiction (in particular, it did not specify whether the act of communication by the 
uploaders was targeted at members of the public in the UK), it just declared that it 
had jurisdiction because there was copyright infringement taking place in the UK1044. 
However, in another case, Football Association Premier League Ltd v British Sky 
Broadcasting Ltd & Ors1045, the High Court has accepted the following evidence of a 
defendant’s intention to target a particular jurisdiction: the language of a website 
(English); the fact that advertising includes adverts for companies located in the UK 
and products consumed in the UK; providing access to a large number of 
competitions which are extremely popular with UK audiences; the levels of traffic 
                                                 
1039 Case 416 02924/00 Re The Maritime Trademark [2003] IL Pr 297 (Landgericht Hamburg).  
1040 Ibid. 
1041 Graham J. H. Smith, Internet Law and Regulation (Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 464. 
1042 Case 416 02924/00 Re The Maritime Trademark [2003] IL Pr 297 ( Landgericht, Hamburg). 
1043 EMI Records Ltd & Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch) (28 February 
2013), para 38. 
1044 Ibid, paras 41-42. 
1045 The Football Association Premier League Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2013] EWHC 
2058 (Ch), para 46. 
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generated by UK users (between 12 and 13.7% of the worldwide traffic to the site in 
question came from the UK)1046. 
On the basis of this evidence the High Court concluded that English courts have 
jurisdiction over cases of copyright infringement over the Internet as the rights of 
communication with the public are infringed (pursuant to section 97A of the 
Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988)1047. Therefore, the English courts took the 
same approach on targeting as the ECJ did in Football Dataco Ltd, v Sportradar 
GmbH1048 by establishing jurisdiction based on the substance of the dispute. Indeed, 
for some torts, the courts in England and Wales consider whether a website is 
targeted or directed at this jurisdiction since this is a question of the substantive 
components of the tort1049.  
The situation in France with regard to jurisdiction based on the 
targeting/directing activities approach is very complex in comparison with that in the 
UK. On the one hand, there are decisions of the French courts supporting the 
targeting/directing activities approach1050 as a jurisdictional basis in cases of 
trademark infringement over the Internet (for example, Hugo Boss v Reemtsma1051; 
SARL Intermind v SARL Infratest Burke1052; Synergie v Adecco1053). On the other hand, 
there are the decisions of the French courts according to which the targeting approach 
deals with the substance of disputes. Indeed, recent French cases indicate that in order 
to establish jurisdiction, it is necessary to demonstrate a sufficient, substantial and 
significant connection between the alleged acts of infringement and the damage 
alleged, and in particular to adduce that the website was aimed at the French public 
(for example, Ferrara v Ministère public1054; eBay Europe v Maceo; Le Monde v 
Giuliano 1055). 
                                                 
1046 Ibid, para 45.  
1047 Ibid, para 45. 
1048 Case C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd and Others v Sportradar GmbH and Sportradar AG.[2012] ECR 
00000, para 47. 
1049 Graham J. H. Smith, Internet Law and Regulation (Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 463. 
1050 The evidences of targeting the website towards the public in France: the language of the website; offer 
the products for sale in France using the infringing trademark. 
1051 Société Hugo Boss v Société Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken GmbH [2005] World Internet L. Rep. 
(BNA) (French Supreme Court). 
1052 SARL Intermind v SARL Infratest Burke [2003] (TGI Paris, 3rd Ch., 3rd Sect.) 
1053 Synergie v Adecco [2004] (Paris High Court). 
1054 Case 07-87.281 Ferrara v Ministère public [2008] (Criminal Chamber of the French Supreme Court). 
1055 eBay Europe v Mace [2010] (Paris Court of Appeal). 
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In my opinion, such contradictory decisions of the French courts are dictated by 
the fact that the courts are trying to join the substance of the dispute with the issue of 
jurisdiction together in one proceeding (rather than to consider them separately). In 
contrast to France, the English jurisdictional approach of targeting is based on the 
substance of the dispute.  
In this respect, it is important to note that the Swedish courts did not even 
discuss the application of the targeting/directing activities approach with regard to 
cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet.  
On the basis of this analysis, we can conclude that national laws are, on the 
approach of targeting/directing activities, very contradictory: while the German and 
French courts consider the targeting/directing activities approach as a substantive 
element of the dispute (and not a jurisdictional issue), the UK courts consider the 
targeting approach as an issue of the substantive component of the tort (allowing 
them to establish jurisdiction). 
In my opinion, such contradictory approaches towards the targeted/directed 
activities approach at a national law level may be dictated by differences in the legal 
systems in common law and civil law countries. Indeed, as the UK legal system is 
based on precedent, it seems logical to follow the concept proposed by the ECJ in 
Football Dataco Ltd, v Sportradar GmbH by accepting the targeting approach as a 
substantive element of the dispute allowing the courts to establish jurisdiction over a 
case where content is targeted to the public in the UK. In contrast, France, Sweden 
and German are civil law countries. This means that these countries have a stronger 
separation with regard to the issue of jurisdiction and the substance of the dispute. In 
particular, the targeting/directing activities approach may be applicable at the 
substantive law level to cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet (according to Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast) and at a jurisdictional 
level in the case of online consumer disputes (according to Article 17(1) (c) of the 
Brussels I Recast). 
Therefore, taking into account the absence of a unified concept of the 
targeting/directing activities approach to intellectual property rights infringements 
over the Internet, clarification of this approach is required by the ECJ. In particular, it 
is not clear whether the targeting approach deals with the issue of jurisdiction or with 
the substantive aspect of the dispute. In this regard, as noted by Wang, it is important 
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to enhance legal certainty by interpreting and harmonising jurisdictional rules of 
intellectual property rights infringements over the Internet1056. 
As a response to the difficulties associated with establishing jurisdiction in the 
case of intellectual property rights infringements over the Internet, the ECJ in its 
recent decisions, Pinckney1057, Hejduk1058 and Wintersteiger1059, has clarified the issue 
of targeting. 
In particular, in Pinckney and Hejduk the ECJ rejected the directed activities 
approach based on Article 17 (1) (c) of the Brussels I Recast, which was interpreted 
in Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof1060 by way of the argument that Article 7 (2) of the 
Brussels I Recast does not require that the activity concerned be ‘directed to’ the 
Member State in which the court seized is situated1061. The same approach was taken 
by the ECJ in Wintersteiger. In particular, the ECJ in Wintersteiger did not even 
discuss the targeting approach proposed by the Advocate General1062 because the 
question of using a sign identical to a national mark on a website operating solely 
under a country-specific top-level domain is a substantive issue that the court having 
jurisdiction will undertake in light of the applicable substantive law”1063. 
Indeed, as our finding indicates, the targeting/directing activities approach is 
based on the identification of intellectual property rights infringement through the 
link between the territories of the Member State, whether the site in question was 
aimed at the public of the Member State, and the territory the Member State in which 
the court seized is situated1064. However, as noted by the Advocate General in 
Pinckney, it is self-evident that the solutions applied by the Court at the level of 
                                                 
1056 Faye Fangfei Wang, Internet Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Legal Practices in the EU, US and 
China (Cambridge University Press 2010) 74 -75. 
1057 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000. 
1058 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published. 
1059 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117. 
1060Joined cases C-585/08 Pammer v Reederei Karl Schluter GmbH & Co KG and C-144/09 Hotel 
Alpenhof GmbH v Heller [2011] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 888. 
1061 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 42; Case C-441/13 Pez 
Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published, para 32. 
1062 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
Opinion of Advocate General Villalón, para 23. 
1063 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
para 26. 
1064 Case C-324/09 L’Oreal v eBay [2011] ECR I-06011, para 65; Case C-5/11 Titus Alexander Jochen 
Donner [2012] ECLI C 370, para 27; Case C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd and Others v Sportradar GmbH and 
Sportradar AG.[2012] ECR -00000, para 39. 
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substantive law cannot automatically be transposed to the rules for determining 
jurisdiction1065. 
Therefore, it seems logical that the ECJ in Pinckney1066, Hejduk1067and 
Wintersteiger1068 has rejected the targeting approach as a basis of jurisdiction. Indeed, 
the conditions of targeting should apply independently from the rules of jurisdiction. 
This means that Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast must be interpreted 
autonomously and strictly1069.  
Therefore, in cases of copyright infringement over the Internet, the jurisdiction 
of the court is based on the place where damage resulted from placing material 
protected by copyright on a website accessible in its territorial jurisdiction1070. 
Similarly, in the case of trademark infringement over the Internet, the jurisdiction of 
the court is based on the place in which the trademark is registered, as this is the place 
where the damage occurred1071. 
In my opinion, establishing jurisdiction at the place where the damage occurred 
rather than on the place where the website targeted the public of a particular Member 
State is correct because this rule provides more predictability for all the parties 
involved. This is especially important in such a complex issue as intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet.  
Conclusion and recommendations 
On the basis of this analysis (the ECJ’s decisions in Pinckney1072, Hejduk1073 and 
Wintersteiger1074) we can conclude that the targeting/directing activities approach is 
not an appropriate jurisdictional basis for intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet. 
                                                 
1065 Case C-170/12, Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, 
para 62. 
1066 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000. 
1067 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published. 
1068 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117. 
1069 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published, para 16. 
1070 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 47; Case C-441/13 Pez 
Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published, para 38. 
1071 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
para 29. 
1072 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000. 
1073 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published. 
1074 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117. 
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Indeed, the targeting approach is the substance of the dispute rather than an 
issue of jurisdiction. In particular, in contrast to Football Dataco Ltd.1075, where the 
substance of the dispute was analysed (targeting approach), the ECJ’s decisions in 
Pinckney1076, Hejduk1077 and Wintersteiger1078 are based on the analysis of jurisdiction 
under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast. In particular, Article 7 (2) of the Brussels 
I Recast does not require that the activity concerned be “directed to” the Member 
State in which the court seized is situated1079.  
In this regard, it is logical to agree that the targeting/directing activities 
approach may be relevant to the existence of substantive liability for the infringement 
of intellectual property rights, but not to jurisdiction over an action of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet1080. 
In my opinion, the ECJ’s decisions in Pinckney1081, Hejduk1082 and 
Wintersteiger1083 have a historical value for establishing jurisdiction in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet.  
Indeed, by dividing the substance of the dispute and the rules of jurisdiction, the 
ECJ responded to the difficulties associated with establishing jurisdiction in cases of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. In particular, the ECJ’s 
decisions in Pinckney1084, Hejduk1085and Wintersteiger1086 are the first cases where the 
ECJ was called on to adjudicate jurisdiction by localising the place where the damage 
occurred in cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet.  
As a result, the ECJ has adapted the rules according to Article 7 (2) of the 
Brussels I Recast based on the place where the damage occurred by establishing 
special connection requirements with regard to intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet: accessibility of a website (in the case of copyright 
                                                 
1075 Case C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd and Others v Sportradar GmbH and Sportradar AG.[2012] ECR 
00000. 
1076 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 2013 -00000. 
1077 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published. 
1078 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117. 
1079 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 2013 -00000, para 42; Case C-
441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published, para 32. 
1080 Peter Stone, EU Private International Law (3nd Ed., Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) 105. 
1081 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 2013 -00000. 
1082 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published. 
1083 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117. 
1084 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 2013 -00000. 
1085 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published. 
1086 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117. 
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infringement over the Internet) and the place of registration (in the case of trademark 
infringement over the Internet). 
In my opinion, such jurisdictional rules are directed to protect the interests of 
intellectual property rights owners as these rules are clearer and predictable than their 
previous version.  
3.4 Recommendations and Conclusions 
 As our findings indicate, the current version of Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I 
Recast does not satisfy the requirement of a new virtual world. Therefore, Article 7 
(2) of the Brussels I Recast should be adapted. However, in order to provide an 
efficient model for adjudicating intellectual property rights disputes over the Internet, 
it is important to take into account not only these findings here but also the 
recommendations of the following projects: Hague Draft of 20011087, CLIP 
Principles1088 and ALI Principles1089.  
The essential aim of this paper is to analyse these projects in order to offer the 
best possible jurisdictional approach to cases of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet.  
First of all, it is important to note that Article 10 (1) of Hague Draft gives the 
injured party a choice between the forum of the place of the act and the forum of the 
place where its effects are felt1090. The same duality of jurisdiction is confirmed also 
by the recent ECJ decisions on Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast in cases of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, according to which the 
place where the harmful event occurred can be understood in two ways: as the place 
                                                 
1087 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Foreign Judgments in civil and commercial matters adopted by the Special Commission on 30 October 1999 
(amended version, 11 August 2000) <http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd11.pdf> accessed 4 May 2014. 
1088 European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, ‘Principles on Conflict of 
Laws in Intellectual Property’ (Final Text, 1 December 2011).  
1089The American Law Institute, ‘Intellectual property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law 
and Judgments in Transnational Disputes (with Commentts and Reporters’ Notes) (2008) 
<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=198109> accessed 11 January 2014. 
1090 In particular, according to Article 10 (1) of the Hague Draft: “A plaintiff may bring an action in tort or 
delict in the courts of the State– a) in which the act or omission that caused injury occurred, or b) in which the 
injury arose, unless the defendant establishes that the person claimed to be responsible could not reasonably have 
foreseen that the act or omission could result in an injury of the same nature in that State”.  
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of the event giving rise to the damage that has occurred and as the place where the 
damage occurred1091.  
This means that in spite of the fact that the intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet is cardinally different from intellectual property rights 
infringement in press media, the duality of jurisdiction also applies to this new 
method of communication. Once again my proposition that, from a legal perspective, 
“the Internet is an old wine in new bottles” is confirmed. In other words, private 
international law principles should apply to this new form of communication but 
should take into account the unique factual circumstances in which infringements of 
intellectual property rights may be committed.  
Indeed, Article 2:203 (2) of the CLIP Principles establishes a special 
infringement jurisdictional rule with regard to intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet. In particular, according to Article 2:203 (2) of the 
CLIP Principles, in disputes concerned with infringements of an intellectual property 
right carried out through ubiquitous media such as the Internet, the court whose 
jurisdiction is based on the place where the infringement occurs or may occur shall 
also have jurisdiction in respect of infringements that occur or may occur within the 
territory of any other State, provided that the activities giving rise to the infringement 
have no substantial effect in the State, or any of the States, where the infringer is 
habitually resident.  
A similar rule is contained in section 204 (1) of the ALI Principles: “A person 
may be sued in any State in which that person has substantially acted or taken 
substantial preparatory acts, to initiate or to further an alleged infringement”. 
However, in spite of the similarities, the rules in Article 2:203 (2) of the CLIP 
Principles and section 204 (1) of the ALI Principles differ significantly: while in 
Article 2:203 (2) of the CLIP Principles the jurisdiction is established with regard to 
infringement claims, section 204 (1) of the ALI Principles concentrates on the 
infringement activity of a non-resident defendant. For example, a non-resident 
defendant who operates a website in a certain forum and who has placed infringing 
                                                 
1091 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117; 
Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000; Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v 
EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published. 
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material on that website, is amenable to suit in that forum for damages arising out of 
the worldwide communication of the infringement1092.  
In this regard an interesting question arises: does the jurisdiction of the court 
seized have extraterritorial effect in cases of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet? On the one hand, as noted by Kur, the territorial 
limitation does not apply to those cases falling within the scope of Article 2:203 (2) 
of the CLIP Proposals, which give a single court the competence to adjudicate all 
infringements actions1093. Developing this approach, Metzger notes that in cases of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, the concentration of all 
claims in the State of the defendant’s domicile seems inappropriate as that State has 
no interest in litigating the world-wide infringement1094. This argument leads to the 
conclusion that in the case of infringements carried out through ubiquitous media 
such as the Internet, courts may be competent to adjudicate upon foreign and even 
global infringements1095. 
On the other hand, such unlimited jurisdiction is unpredictable for all the parties 
involved. Indeed, according to the objectives of the Brussels I Recast, rules of 
jurisdiction should be highly predictable and based on a close connection between the 
court and the action in order to facilitate the sound administration of justice1096. 
Such connection requirements are established in Article 2:203 (2) of the CLIP 
Principles according to which a competent court seized by an infringement claim can 
exercise jurisdiction with respect to an infringement so long as the infringements 
have no substantial effect in the defendant’s country of habitual residence (if they do, 
only the court of the defendant’s country of habitual residence can decide on 
infringements in foreign countries).  
                                                 
1092 The American Law Institute, ‘Intellectual property Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law 
and Judgments in Transnational Disputes (with Commentts and Reporters’ Notes)’ (2008) 
<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=198109> accessed 11 January 2014. 
1093 Kur Annette, Ubertazzi Benedetta, ‘The ALI Principles and the CLIP Project – a Comparison’ in 
Stefania Bariatti (ed.) Litigating Intellectual Property rights disputes cross-border: EU Regulations, ALI 
Principles, CLIP Project (CEDAM 2010) 101. 
1094 Metzger, ‘Jurisdiction in Cases Concerning Intellectual Property Infringement on the Internet, 
Brussels I Regulation, ALI-Principle and Max Planck Proposal’, in Ohly and Leible (ed.), Intellectual Property 
and Private International Law (Mohr Siebeck 2009) 251, 260. 
1095 Kur Annette, Ubertazzi Benedetta, ‘The ALI Principles and the CLIP Project – a Comparison’ in 
Stefania Bariatti (ed.) Litigating Intellectual Property rights disputes cross-border: EU Regulations, ALI 
Principles, CLIP Project (CEDAM 2010). 
1096 Council Regulation (EC) 1215/2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2012] OJ L 351, preamble 15, 16. 
210 
 
Secondly, substantial activities in furtherance of the infringement in its entirety 
should have been carried out within the territory of the State in which the court is 
situated or the harm caused by the infringement in the State where the court is 
situated should be substantial in relation to the infringement in its entirety (Article 
2:203 (2) of the CLIP Principles).  
Therefore, even in cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet, the CLIP Principles have established jurisdictional limits based on two 
different elements: “the substantiality of action” and “the substantiality of harm”. 
Similiary, the ECJ in Pinckney and Hejduk also contains limitations of jurisiction. In 
particular, the court of the place where the damage occurred from the mere 
accessibility of a website has jurisdiction only over the damage occurring in its 
territory1097. 
This means that the limits imposed on private international law by objective 
territoriality are still well founded in cases of intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet1098. However, in spite of the similarity of the approach towards 
limiting the jurisdiction of the court seized, Article 2:203 (2) of the CLIP Principles 
and the ECJ’s decisions in Pinckney and Hejduk have different connection 
requirements. In particular, the limitation of jurisdiction provided by the ECJ in 
Pinckney and Hejduk is limited to the damage occurring in a particular Member State, 
while the limitations of jurisdiction provided by Article 2:203 (2) of the CLIP 
Principles are more effects-oriented: “the substantiality of action” and “the 
substantiality of harm”. 
In my opinion, the main reason for the difference in jurisdictional approaches 
taken by the ECJ in Pinckney and Hejduk and the CLIP Principles in Article 2:203 (2) 
is the different interpretation of the issue of intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet. In particular, the ECJ decisions in Pinckney and Hejduk are based 
on the fact that intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet are a tort. In 
this regard, the ECJ in Pinckney and Hejduk has adapted the eDate1099 case to 
situations where copyrights are infringed over the Internet by confirming the duality 
of jurisdiction based on place of the event giving rise to the damage as well on the 
                                                 
1097 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000. 
1098 G Dinwoodie, ‘Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of 
Territoriality?’ (2009) 51 Wiiliam & Mary Law Review 711. 
1099 Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate Advertising GmbH v X (C-509/09) and Olivier Martinez 
and Robert Martinez v Société MGN Limited (C-161/10) [2011] ECR I-10269. 
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place where the damage occurred. However, the Max Planck Group in Article 2:203 
(2) of the CLIP Principles does not provide such a distinction because it suggests that 
the territorial structure of intellectual property rights does not allow for the 
establishment of jurisdiction in the State where the right is not protected1100. This 
means that in contrast to general tort law, in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement it is not appropriate to distinguish between physical actions performed 
in one country and their effects in another country1101. In this regard the European 
Max Plank Institute formulated a uniform conception of the act of “infringement” in 
Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles: a person may be sued in the courts of the State 
where the alleged infringement occurs or may occur. Therefore, due to the territorial 
nature of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, the place of 
infringement is always coincident with the place of the results of the infringement.  
However, as our findings indicate, such an approach was rejected by the ECJ in 
Wintersteiger, Pinckney and Hejduk; the ECJ has confirmed that the place where the 
act of intellectual property rights infringement occurred is not a jurisdictional basis 
for intellectual property rights infringements over the Internet. The main argument for 
rejecting this approach is based on the fact that the place where the act of 
infringement occurred is related to the substance of the dispute rather than to the issue 
of jurisdiction1102.  
Indeed, even in spite of the fact that jurisdiction based on the place where the 
act of infringement occurred has been confirmed by national practices1103, the ECJ in 
Wintersteiger, Pinckney and Hejduk drew a distinction between cases of offline 
intellectual property rights infringement, where the jurisdiction was based on the 
substantive law principles (under the law of the country where the intellectual 
property rights are protected), and cases of intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet, where such approach is wrong. 
                                                 
1100 International Law Association, ‘Report. Intellectual property and Private International Law’ (2012) 
<http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1037> accessed 11 January 2014. 
1101 Annette Kur, Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property. The CLIP Principles and Commentary (Oxford 
University Press 2013) 69-70. 
1102Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117; 
Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 2013 -00000; Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v 
EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published. 
1103 Ideal Clima SpA and Others v SA Ideal Standard Gaz Pal [1982] Somm, 378; Molnlycke case [1992] 
1 WLR 1112; Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership Ltd and Others [1997] Ch 293, para 302; GRE Manufacturas and 
Another v Agrisilos [2006] IL Pr27; Case I ZR 163/02 [2005] NJW 1435, Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme 
Court); Case 5 U 6923/99 Kammergericht (Appeal Court) Berlin, [2002] IL Pr 510; Knorr-Bremse Systems for 
Commercial Vehicles Limited v Haldex Brake Products GmbH [2008] EWHC 156.  
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This means that the identification of the place where the act of infringement 
occurred for the purposes of Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast cannot depend on 
criteria which are specific to the examination of the substance of the dispute. Indeed, 
in cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, jurisdictional 
rules should be predictable and based on clear connection requirements between the 
event giving rise to the damage and the territory of a particular Member State of the 
court seized. Otherwise, jurisdictional rules would be very complex and would clash 
with the principle of foreseeability.  
In my opinion, rejecting jurisdiction based on the place where the act of 
infringement occurred is also dictated by practicality. In Internet cases it is very 
difficult to localise the place where the act of infringement occurred since the act of 
infringement could, or perhaps should, be regarded as being multi-national1104. 
Moreover, the law of a particular country (in spite of more than twenty five years of 
harmonization1105) is still largely national law, which is technology neutral and does 
not take into account new forms of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet1106. This means that the court should apply the existing law by identifying 
which rights are infringed in cases of intellectual property rights infringement over 
the Internet – which is a very difficult issue, as recent opinions of the Advocates 
General in Wintersteiger and Pinckney indicate1107. 
However, in contrast to Article 2:203 of the CLIP Principles, which is 
technology specific and applicable to intellectual property rights infringements 
carried out through ubiquitous media such as the Internet, section 204 of the ALI 
Principles seeks to adapt traditional jurisdictional criteria to the digital environment. 
In particular, according to section 204 (2) of the ALI Principles, a person may be sued 
in any State in which that person’s activities give rise to an infringement claim, if that 
person directed those activities towards that State. This means that in the situation 
where a non-resident defendant does not have regular contact with the ‘forum State’, 
                                                 
1104 Fawcett (n 112) 159. 
1105 Council Directive (EC) 91/250 on the legal protection of computer programs [1991] OJ L 122; 
Council Directive (EC) 96/9 on the legal protection of databases [1996] OJ L 77; Council Directive (EC) 2001/29 
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L 167. 
1106 For example, the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 do not regulate the file sharing 
activities (relating to the uploading or downloading of a piece of work in a file sharing network that infringes the 
copyright in that work). 
1107 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
Opinion of Advocate General Villalón, paras 36-60; Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] 
ECR 2013 -00000, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, paras 52-56. 
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but has directed an infringement into the forum State from outside and causes harm, 
the scope of jurisdiction of the court seized is limited and reaches only injuries 
sustained in the forum State.1108 A similar escape clause is provided in Article 2:202 
of the CLIP Principles which provides that when the activity of an alleged infringer 
cannot reasonably be seen as having been directed to that State, or when the alleged 
infringer has not acted in that State to initiate or further the infringement, then the 
jurisdiction of the court seized is limited. 
Thus, as a matter of principle, the competence of the court that is based on 
infringement jurisdiction other than that of the court of the defendant’s habitual 
residence is restricted to the territory of that particular Member State where the 
defendant “directs” its activity1109.  
Therefore, we can conclude that the jurisdiction of the court seized is limited to 
local damage. For example, when the act of infringement occurs in England and 
France, the English court will only have jurisdiction according to Article 2:202 of the 
CLIP Principle in respect of infringements that occurred in England1110. The Hague 
Draft seems to support the limited approach taken in section 204 (2) of the ALI 
Principles and Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles. In particular, Article 10 (3) of the 
Hague Draft states that a defendant cannot be sued in the place of action “where the 
defendant has taken reasonable steps to avoid acting in or directing activity into that 
State”.  
However, as noted by Fawcett, effective enforcement means the right holder 
must be able to bring a single case for all the damage. Indeed, the right holder will 
never be able to enforce its rights effectively if it has to sue in every single country 
for what might be a relatively small amount of local damage in most countries1111. 
Indeed, in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, 
jurisdiction is not only an academic issue, but also a topic of active debates by the 
ECJ.  
In particular, the status of the targeting/directing activities approach as a 
possible jurisdictional basis in cases of intellectual property rights infringement over 
                                                 
1108 The American Law Institute, ‘Intellectual property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law 
and Judgments in Transnational Disputes (with Commentts and Reporters’ Notes) ‘ (2008) 
<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=198109> accessed 11 January 2014. 
1109 Annette Kur, ‘The CLIP Principles – Summary of the project’ <http://www.win-cls.sakura.ne.jp/ 
pdf/29/22.pdf> accessed 11 January 2014. 
1110 Fawcett (n 112) 648. 
1111 Fawcett (n 112) 649. 
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the Internet was active analysed by the ECJ in Pinckney1112, Hejduk1113 and 
Wintersteiger1114. According to the ECJ’s argument, the targeting/directing activities 
approach goes to the substance of a dispute rather than to the issue of jurisdiction. In 
this regard, the targeting/directing activities approach is not an appropriate 
jurisdictional basis for cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet.  
Indeed, while the CLIP Principles considered the directing activities approach 
as a substantive element of the tort, the ECJ in Pinckney1115, Hejduk1116 and 
Wintersteiger1117 made clear that jurisdiction cannot be established on the basis of the 
substance of the dispute because Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast does not 
require that the activity concerned be “directed to” the Member State in which the 
court seized is situated1118. 
This means that the targeting/directing activities approach may be relevant to 
the existence of substantive liability for the infringement of intellectual property 
rights, but not for jurisdiction to entertain an action for intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet1119. Indeed, the jurisdictional rules should be based on a 
special connection requirement between the place of the event giving rise to the 
damage, or the place where the damage occurred, on the one side and the territory of 
the court seized on the other.  
The possibility to sue before the court of one Member State (where the 
claimant’s centre is based) for all the damage caused was also rejected by the ECJ in 
Wintersteiger and Pinckney. The court’s main argument for rejecting jurisdiction 
under the claimant’s centre of interest was based on a distinction between an 
infringement of a personality right by means of the Internet and cases of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet.  
Indeed, as noted by the ECJ in Wintersteiger and Pinckney, in contrast to 
personality rights, which are protected in all the Member States, intellectual property 
                                                 
1112 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000. 
1113 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published. 
1114 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117. 
1115 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000. 
1116 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published. 
1117 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117. 
1118 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 2013 -00000, para 42; Case C-
441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published, para 32. 
1119 Peter Stone, EU Private International Law (3nd Ed., Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) 105. 
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rights are subject to the principle of territoriality1120. This means that an intellectual 
property rights owner needs to apply to the court of each Member State where 
damage has occurred. However, this leads to fragmented litigation under Article 7 (2) 
of the Brussels I Recast. 
In my opinion, referring to the principle of territoriality to reject jurisdiction 
based on the claimant’s centre of interest, as the ECJ did in Wintersteiger and 
Pinckney, is wrong. Indeed, the territoriality of intellectual property rights is an issue 
of the substance of a dispute, namely whether and where the proprietor can rely on 
the protection of those rights.  
In my opinion, it would be more logical to reject jurisdiction based on the 
centre of interest approach in cases of intellectual property rights infringement over 
the Internet by referring to the nature of the rights infringed, rather than to the 
principle of territoriality. Indeed, in contrast to personality rights infringement over 
the Internet, the criterion of the objective accessibility of information protected by 
intellectual property law is not required for intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet. For example, trademarks may be infringed by way of use, by an 
advertiser, of a keyword identical to that trademark on a search engine website 
operating under a country-specific top-level domain of another Member State1121. 
Copyright may be infringed by way of accessing the material protected by 
copyright1122. Therefore, the domicile of the author and the place where he pursues his 
professional activity are irrelevant for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction under 
the claimant’s centre of interest approach because it is not possible to establish 
connection requirements between the claimant’s centre of interest and the damage 
that has occurred.  
Therefore, we can conclude that academic projects differ significantly from the 
approach taken by the ECJ in its recent decisions in Pinckney1123, Hejduk1124 and 
Wintersteiger1125. In particular, the ECJ has rejected jurisdiction based on the place 
                                                 
1120 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
para 25; Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 38. 
1121 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
para 29. 
1122 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000; Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk 
v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published. 
1123 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000. 
1124 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published. 
1125 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117. 
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where the act of infringement occurred, on the targeting/directing activities approach 
and on the centre of claimant’s interest. The main argument for rejecting jurisdiction 
based on the place where the act of infringement occurred and according to the 
targeting/directing activities approach is that these issues are related to the substance 
of the dispute rather than the issue of jurisdiction. 
Thus, the ECJ makes clear that cases of intellectual property rights infringed 
over the Internet differ significantly from other torts committed over the Internet. 
Indeed, such cases involve additional difficulties associated with delocalised damage 
and with identifying what is the act of intellectual property rights infringement over 
the Internet. This means that cases of intellectual property rights infringement over 
the Internet require special jurisdictional rules that will be based on clear connection 
requirements “between ... virtual behaviour and a territoriality”1126. 
In my opinion, such an approach has a historical value, as the ECJ distinguishes 
cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet from infringement 
in press media, and even from defamation over the Internet, by establishing 
jurisdictional rules dependant on the nature of the rights infringed. In particular, 
different jurisdictional rules are apply to cases of copyright1127 and trademark 
infringement over the Internet1128.  
As our finding indicates, the ECJ has confirmed the following bases of 
jurisdiction for cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet: 
- The place of the event giving rise to the damage: where the publisher 
is established; 
- The place where the damage occurred: where the content is placed 
online or has been accessible.  
This means that the duality of jurisdiction established in Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels I Recast is applicable also to cases of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet. However, such jurisdiction is based on special 
connection requirements specific to such cases: the place of establishment of the 
publisher and the accessibility of a website.  
In this regard Article 7 (2) (1) of the Brussels I Recast may be read as follows:  
                                                 
1126 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, Opinion of AG Jääskinen. 
1127 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 2013 -00000; Case C-441/13 Pez 
Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published.  
1128 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117. 
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“1. A person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member 
State in disputes concerned with infringement carried out through ubiquitous 
media such as the Internet in the court for the place of the event giving rise to 
the damage or the place where the damage occurred”. 
Indeed, the place of establishment is relevant to jurisdiction under Article 7(2) 
of the Brussels I Recast in cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet since this jurisdiction may establish the link between the place of the event 
giving rise to the damage and the territory of a particular Member State where the 
tortfeasor is established. Indeed, as noted by Fawcett, the Internet is not outer space; 
there is a territorial connection with various States1129.  
However, in my opinion, the modification of this approach is required. Indeed, 
as noted by the ECJ in Wintersteiger1130, the ‘event’ giving rise to damage in cases of 
trademark infringement over the Internet is the place of establishment of the 
advertiser, but not the place of establishment of the ISP. Similarly, the event giving 
rise to damage in cases of copyright infringement over the Internet is the place of 
establishment of the owner of a website1131.  
This means that in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet, the place of the event giving rise to the damage should be determined by the 
place where the advertiser or the owner of a website is established rather than where 
the ISP is established1132.  
Indeed, the main role of ISPs is the dessimination of information. In my 
opinion, ISPs may be sued only as joint infringers, when they are involved in editing 
and controlling information posted on the Internet. For example, as Football Dataco 
Ltd v Sportradar GmbH1133 and EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd 1134 
demonstrate, ISPs may be jointly liable for infringements committed by Internet 
users. However, in such situations, the intellectual property rights owner should 
provide the necessary evidence that the ISP had “actual knowledge” of another person 
                                                 
1129 Fawcett (n 113) 236. 
1130 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117. 
1131 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published, para 24. 
1132 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117; 
Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published. 
1133 Case C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd and Others v Sportradar GmbH and Sportradar AG.[2012] ECR 
00000, para 13. 
1134 EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), para 46. 
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using their service to infringe others’ intellectual property rights1135. In other words, 
the intellectual property rights owner is responsible for providing evidence that ISPs 
are publishers. In my opinion, it is very difficult to imagine a situation when an ISP 
like Google is involved in managing a big amount of information posted on the 
Internet. Indeed, such an approach would not only be a serious step backwards for 
online development, but would also be totally unworkable in practice1136. On this basis 
we can conclude that ISPs may be sued together with the main infringer 
(advertiser/owner of a website) but not alone.  
Therefore, it seems inconsequential to establish jurisdiction on the basis of 
where the joint infringer (ISP) is established. In my opinion, jurisdiction should be 
based on where the advertiser or website owner (main infringer) is established.  
Indeed, as a jurisdictional basis the place of establishment of the advertiser or 
owner of a website has an additional advantage for the intellectual property rights 
owner since it allows him to bring an action in the court of the Member State in 
which the advertiser or website owner is established in respect of all the damage 
caused; this follows from eDate1137. This is also confirmed by the 16th recital of the 
Brussels I Recast, “in addition to the defendant’s domicile, there should be alternative 
grounds of jurisdiction based on a close link between the court and the action or in 
order to facilitate the sound administration of justice”1138. 
Moreover, the reference to the place where the advertiser or the owner of a 
website is established, rather than to the place where the ISP is established, is 
consistent with the role of ISPs in disseminating information (as confirmed by the 
ECJ in Sabam1139 and Scarlet1140). In my opinion, jurisdiction cannot be based on the 
place of establishment of the facilitator of information. Indeed, the role of ISPs with 
respect to the dissemination of information and knowledge is like that of a telephone 
operator – they are merely the conduit for the provision of information and, as such, 
                                                 
1135 EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch).  
1136 Ashley Hurst, ‘ISPs and defamation law: hold fire, Robert Jay’ The Guardian (London, 25 January 
2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/jan/25/defamation-law-robert-jay> accessed 3 March 2015. 
1137Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate Advertising GmbH v X (C-509/09) and Olivier Martinez 
and Robert Martinez v Société MGN Limited (C-161/10) [2011] ECR I-10269, para 42. 
1138 Council Regulation (EC) 1215/2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2012] OJ L 351.  
1139 Case C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog BV [2012] OJ C98. 
1140 Case 70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM [2011] ECR I-11959. 
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should have no liability for content1141. In my opinion, at the present stage of the 
Internet’s development, it is important to create the conditions for free dissemination 
of information and knowledge over the Internet. This means that ISPs should not be 
held liable for content posted on websites, as this would lead to increased monitoring 
of websites and increased restrictions on the free operation of the Internet.  
In my opinion, establishing jurisdiction based on the place where the advertiser 
or website owner is established would provide an appropriate balance of interests for 
all the parties involved. On the one hand, intellectual property rights owners will be 
able to sue in a court in the place where the advertiser or website owner is 
established, which may constitute a significant connecting factor from the point of 
view of evidence and the conduct of proceedings1142. This is also true in the light of 
Folien Fischer and Fofitec, according to which only the court before which an action 
may properly be brought is the court within whose jurisdiction the relevant 
connecting factor is to be found1143. 
On the other hand, advertisers and website owners will be more responsible for 
content placed online on a website if they will be liable as publishers in case of 
infringement. Moreover, such an approach confirms the role of ISPs as facilitators of 
information (in the absence of “actual knowledge” about the infringement).  
Therefore, Article 7 (2) (1) of the Brussels I Recast may be read as follows: “A 
person who considered that his intellectual property rights had been infringed 
through ubiquitous media such as the Internet could bring an action in respect 
of all the damage caused in the court of the Member State in which the 
advertiser or website owner is established”. 
Moreover, the mere accessibility of a website is also an appropriate basis of 
jurisdiction under Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Recast for cases of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet1144.  
Indeed, in contrast to the targeting/directing activities approach or the place of 
intellectual property rights infringement (which have been rejected as bases of 
jurisdiction), the ECJ in Pinckney and Hejduk has confirmed the precedential value of 
                                                 
1141 Dennis Campbell and Susan Woodley, E-commerce: Law and Jurisdiction (Kluwer Law International 
2003) 96. 
1142 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
para 32. 
1143 Case C-133/11 Folien Fischer and Fofitec [2012] ECR. 
1144 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000.  
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accessibility criteria as a jurisdictional basis in cases of copyright infringement over 
the Internet. 
In my opinion, the acceptance by the ECJ of the accessibility of a website 
approach is dictated by the necessity to protect the interests of intellectual property 
rights owners against increasing numbers of cases of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet. Indeed, due to the absence of jurisdictional rules of 
cases of copyright infringement over the Internet on the one hand and of harmonised 
substantive intellectual property law rules on the other, the ECJ extended the 
application of the substantive law at a jurisdictional level.  
This means that jurisdiction based on the mere accessibility of a website does 
not depend on the requirement of targeting the Member State of the court seized. 
Indeed, the occurrence of damage arises from the accessibility of a website within the 
jurisdiction of the court seized. Therefore, the court of the place where the damage 
occurred only has jurisdiction in respect of damage occurring in its territory1145. 
However, this leads to the multiplication of suits.  
In my opinion, by analogy with jurisdiction based on the place of the event 
giving rise to damage (i.e. where the advertiser or website owner is established), 
jurisdiction based on the approach of websites’ accessibility should be modified by 
allowing the court to adjudicate jurisdiction by having regard to the damage occurring 
in other Member States under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast. Indeed, in spite 
of the fact that global jurisdiction was rejected in Pinckney and Hejduk, a practical 
backdoor remains open to extend damage claims1146. 
Indeed, as stated in Wintersteiger1147, intellectual property rights protection “in 
principle” is territorially limited and cannot “in general” be relied on outside the 
territory of the granting state. The principle of territoriality has been confirmed by the 
ECJ in Pinckney 1148 with regard to copyright infringement over the Internet. This 
means that the main barrier for extending jurisdiction under Article 7 (2) of the 
Brussels I Recast is the principle of the territoriality of intellectual property rights. 
However, the criteria for assessing whether the event in question is harmful for the 
                                                 
1145 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published, para 22; Case C-
170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 39. 
1146 Pekka Savola, The ultimate copyright shopping opportunity - jurisdiction and choice of law in website 
blocking injunctions (2014) IIC 45(3), 287-315. 
1147 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
paras 24-25. 
1148 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 2013 -00000, paras 32, 35-37. 
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purposes of Article 7 (2) “… are determined by the substantive law of the court 
seised”1149.  
This means that the territoriality of intellectual property rights as a principle of 
substantive law is irrelevant to the application of Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I 
Recast. In my opinion, while the accessibility of a website is applicable at 
jurisdictional level, the similar approach to the principle of the territoriality of 
intellectual property rights would be inappropriate. Indeed, the Brussels regime “did 
not intend to link the rules of jurisdiction with national provisions concerning the 
conditions under which non-contractual liability is incurred”1150. This means that 
jurisidctional rules should be established on clear connection requirements rather than 
on the substance of the dispute (the protection of intellectual property rights in a 
particular territory). Indeed, even in the light of the rejection by the ECJ of the 
targeting/directing activities approach (as relating to the sibstance of the dispute) it 
would be reasonable to propose that the same approach is applicable also to the 
principle of the territoriality of intellectual property rights.  
Indeed, the territorial structure of intellectual property is a legal construct rather 
than something following from the nature of intellectual property rights as such1151. 
 This means that actions occurring in places where no intellectual property 
right exists might constitute an infringement in foreign countries as a result of the 
extraterritorial application of the latter’s intellectual property laws1152. Therefore, the 
jurisdictional problem may be resolved by deciding the issue of the territoriality of 
intellectual property rights.  
In my opinion, extending jurisdiction under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I 
Recast to include all damage caused is also dictated by the argument that the 
effectiveness of intellectual property rights protection and sound administration of 
justice requires the ability to make all claims in one court. In particular, as noted by 
Fawcett, effective enforcement means that the rights holder must be able to bring a 
                                                 
1149 Case C-68/93 Shevill v Press Alliance SA [1995] ECR-I-415, para 41. 
1150 Case C-364/93 Antonio Marinari v Lloyd’s Bank plc and Zubaidi Co., [1995] ECR I-2719. I-2739, 
para 18. 
1151 Annette Kur, Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property. The CLIP Principles and Commentary. 
Europeam Max Planck Group on conflict of laws in intellectual property (Oxford University Press 2013) 70. 
1152 Heinze, C., ‘The CLIP Principles on Jurisdiction’, in Basedow, J., Kono, T. and Metzger, A. 
(eds.), Intellectual Property in the Global Arena. Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and the Recognition of Judgments 
in Europe, Japan and the US ( Mohr Siebeck 2010). 
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single case for all damage1153. Such an approach is also supported by Article 41.2 of 
the TRIPS Agreement which states that “procedures concerning the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights shall be fair and equitable. They shall not be unnecessarily 
complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays”1154. 
Moreover, the accessibility criteria should also be modified. In my opinion, the 
occurrence of damage based on the mere accessibility of a website is not a very 
sensitive connection requirement, and a clearer link between the damage in a 
particular Member State and the activity of a defendant is required. 
There are a number of proposals for the further development of jurisdiction 
based on the accessibility of a website approach in cases of copyright infringement 
over the Internet. For example, according to Advocate General Jääskinen’s 
suggestion in Coty, the occurrence of damage in the Member State of the Court seized 
depends on a defendant’s “act within the jurisdiction of the court seised”1155. 
Similarly, the CLIP Principles provides an “escape clause” by allowing the defendant 
to escape the court’s jurisdiction if “the alleged infringer has not acted in that State to 
initiate or further the infringement and his/her activity cannot reasonably be seen as 
having been directed to that State”1156. However, in my opinion, such ‘active’ acts of 
the defendant may be compared with the targeting or directing activities approach, 
which was rejected in Hejduk as relating to the substance of the dispute. 
In my opinion, the best solution to develop the accessibility of a website 
approach as a basis of jurisdiction is to determine jurisdiction based on how 
interactive a website is, taking into account the guilty mind of the defendant. Indeed, 
such an approach is not only an expression of the technological aspects of posting 
information on the Internet (which depends on the level of interactivity of 
information on the website) but also takes into account the guilty mind of the 
defendant who “knowingly” engages in illegal conduct.  
The legal evidence of such an approach may be found in American case law. 
                                                 
1153 Fawcett (n 112) 649. 
1154 WTO, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
<https://www.wto.org/ENGLISH/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/trips_03_e.htm> accessed 11 June 2014. 
1155 Case C-360/12 Coty Germany GmbH v First Note Perfumes NV [2014] not yet published, Opinion of 
AG Jääskinen, para 71 (2). 
1156 European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, ‘Principles on Conflict of 
Laws in Intellectual Property’ (Final Text, 1 December 2011), Art 2:202. 
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On the one hand, the interactivity of a website is adopted by the United States 
as a basis for jurisdiction – and is specified in the Zippo case1157. In particular, as 
American practice indicates, active websites1158 and interactive websites1159 provide a 
basis for personal jurisdiction. However, the court is not able to adjudicate 
jurisdiction where the information is simply posted on the website and thus made 
accessible to everyone, for such information is passive1160. Indeed, passive websites 
may be accessed by Internet browsers, but do not allow interaction between the host 
of the website and a visitor to the site. In this regard, as noted by Rosenblatt, the more 
interactive a site is (i.e. the more exchange of information is possible between the site 
and the user), the more likely a court is to find that ‘contact’ exists between the site 
owner and the distant user1161. In my opinion, jurisdictional rules based on the level of 
interactivity of a website are a more predictable basis of jurisdiction than the simple 
fact of a website’s accessibility. 
On the other hand, the guilty mind of the defendant should also be taken into 
account. Indeed, as recent American cases demonstrate, the courts require additional 
factors to the interactivity of the defendant1162. However, in my opinion, in contrast to 
the directing or targeting approach, taken by the CLIP Principles as an expression of 
the intention of the defendant to connect to the forum, I would rather support the 
notion of “wrongful conduct”, accepted in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Lugue Le Racisme et 
L’Antisemitisme1163, as the condition to receiving jurisdiction based on the 
accessibility of a website approach.  
In my opinion, defendants need to be aware that content posted over the 
Internet may infringe the copyright owner’s interests (defendant’s “actual 
knowledge” about the infringement). For example, if this approach were applicable in 
Pinckney, the website owner would not be liable for the content posted on his 
website.  
                                                 
1157 Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. [1997] 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W. D. Pa), para 1124. 
1158 CompuServe. Inc. v. Patterson [1996] 89 F. 3d. 1267 (6th Cir.). 
1159 Maritz Inc. v. Cybergold Inc [1996] 947 F Supp 1328 (ED Mo). 
1160 McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc. [1996] U.S. Dist. Lexis 15139 (S.D. Cal.); Bensusan 
Restaurant Corp. v. King [1997] 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir). 
1161 Betsy Rosenblatt, ‘Principles of Jurisdiction’ <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ 
property99/domain/Betsy.html> accessed 15 March 2015. 
1162 Revell v Lidov [2002] 317 F.3d 467, 473 (5th Cir.); Pavlovich v Superior Court [2002] 58 P.3d 2 
(Cal.); Young v New Haven Advocate [2002] 315 F.3d 256, 264 (4th Cir.); Best Van Lines, Inc. v Walker [2004] 
WL 964009 (S.D.N.Y.). 
1163 Yahoo! Inc. v. La Lugue Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme [2006] 433 F.3d 1199, 1209 (9 th Cir). 
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Therefore, jurisdiction based on the accessibility of a website should be 
modified in two ways: both the level of interactivity of a website and the guilty mind 
of the defendant should be taken into account. 
In this respect, some may suggest that the protection of intellectual property 
rights owners’ interests should be the priority of the courts of every Member State. 
However, in my opinion, the most important task for the court is to balance the 
interests of all the parties involved. Only on the basis of foreseeability and the sound 
administration of justice will such balance be guaranteed.  
Therefore, taking into account the recent ECJ decisions in Pinckney and Hejduk 
and our arguments, Article 7 (2) (1) of the Brussels I Recast may be read as follows: 
“In disputes concerned with intellectual property rights infringement carried 
out through ubiquitous media such as the Internet, the court whose jurisdiction 
arises from the accessibility of a website in the territory of the court seized, shall 
also have jurisdiction in respect to damage occurring in another Member State 
arising from the accessibility of a website in the territory of this other Member 
State, provided that: 
1) the website where the content placed online is accessible and interactive 
and 
2) the defendant actually knew or could reasonably have foreseen that 
their act would lead to intellectual property rights infringement. 
The court first seized has the priority for resolving the entire dispute for all 
of the damage caused according to the rules of the lis pendens.” 
Moreover, Pinckney raised an interesting question with regard to the possibility 
of suing co-defendants on the basis of the mere accessibility of their websites. 
However, the facts of the case did not demonstrate clear connection requirements. In 
my opinion, it would be reasonable to allow claimants to sue all co-defendants in the 
court of one Member State under Articles 7 (2) and 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast. At 
the same time, I do not think that this will be possible on the basis of the mere 
accessibility of a website because “it is not the most sensible criterion”1164. In this 
regard I would rather support the UK government’s approach to suing co-defendants 
whereby jurisdiction is conditional on a defendant’s knowledge: “when the defendant 
                                                 
1164 Martin, Husovec, ‘Case Comment. European Union: comment on Pinckney’ (2014) IIC 45(3), 370-
374. 
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sold the products to the third party concerned in one Member State, it actually knew 
or could have reasonably foreseen that the sale would result directly in the alleged 
unlawful act committed by that third party in another Member State”1165.  
In my opinion, the future reform of Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast with 
regard to suing co-defendants in the case of copyright infringement over the Internet 
may be based on the additional criterion of the defendant’s knowledge.  
Therefore, taking into account the decision of the ECJ in Pinckney and our 
argument on an additional condition of a defendant’s knowledge, Article 8 (1) (1) of 
the Brussels I Recast should be read as follows: “A person domiciled in a Member 
State may also be sued in another Member State where he is one of a number of 
defendants in disputes concerned with infringement carried out through 
ubiquitous media such as the Internet in the court whose jurisdiction is based on 
Article 7 (2) (1) of the Brussels I Recast provided that: 
- the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and 
determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting 
from separate proceedings; and 
- the defendant actually knew or could reasonably have foreseen that the 
act committed by third party would result in intellectual property rights 
infringement in another Member State.” 
Indeed, where the rules of general jurisdiction under Articles 4 and 8 (1) of the 
Brussels I Recast are difficult to apply (due to the difficulties associated with privacy 
and data protection as discussed in Chapter 2), Articles 7 (2) (1) and 8 (1) (1) of the 
Brussels I Recast should provide an alternative jurisdictional basis to sue co-
defendants in cases of intellectual property rights infringements committed over the 
Internet. However, this issue should be further developed by the ECJ. Indeed, this 
work does not discuss this approach in detail because of the absence of regulation in 
this sphere: the current version of the Brussels I Recast does not provide the 
possibility to sue co-defendants at the place of the commission of the tort and the 
ECJ’s decision in Pinckney is the first case where such a question was live.  
On the basis of this analysis we can conclude that jurisdiction based on the 
accessibility of a website and on the place where the advertiser or website owner is 
                                                 
1165 Case C-360/12 Coty Germany GmbH v First Note Perfumes NV [2014] not yet published, Opinion of 
AG Jääskinen, para 60. 
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established are an appropriate jurisdictional basis for cases of intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet – appropriate from the view of foreseeability and 
the sound administration of justice.  
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Chapter 4.  
Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I 
Recast and its applicability to 
intellectual property rights 
infringement on the Internet  
 
4.1  Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast: 
Introduction  
In addition to general (Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast) and special 
jurisdiction rules (Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast) Article 24 (4) of the Brussels 
I Recast provides for exclusive jurisdiction of national courts.  
According to Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast, in proceedings concerned 
with the registration or validity of patents, trade marks, designs, or other similar 
rights required to be deposited or registered … the courts of the Member State in 
which the deposit or registration has been applied for, has taken place or is under the 
terms of an instrument of the Union or an international convention deemed to have 
taken place have exclusive jurisdiction. The mandatory character of this exclusive 
jurisdictional rule is underscored by the circumstance that Article 27 of the Brussels I 
Recast, which provides that if a court is confronted with a claim that is principally 
concerned with a matter over which the court of another Member State have 
exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast, it shall of its 
own motion declare that it has no jurisdiction.  
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This means that if the court’s jurisdiction is based on Article 24 (4) of the 
Brussels I Recast, the courts of the Member States with infringement jurisdiction 
under Articles 4 or 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast lose this jurisdiction when the issue 
of validity is raised. The rationale behind the exclusive jurisdiction is justified by the 
fact that the courts of the Member State in which the deposit or registration has been 
applied for are best placed to adjudicate upon cases in which the dispute itself 
concerns the validity or registration of the intellectual property rights.1166 This means 
that exclusive jurisdiction granted under Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast is 
available only in relation to industrial property rights, which are subject to 
registration such as patent, trademark and designs, where some formalities are 
required. However, this also means that Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast does 
not apply to copyright and related rights, since copyright is protected without any 
formalities, as stated in Article 5 (2) of the Berne Convention, and its existence is not 
subject to a procedure of registration.1167 
However, exclusive jurisdictional rule has a restrictive character, as it is only 
applicable with regard to pure validity or registration issues. In particular, as noted by 
the ECJ in the Duijnstee case,1168 if the dispute does not concern the validity of the 
patent or the existence of the deposit or registration, there is no special reason to 
confer exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of the contracting state in which the patent 
was applied for or granted. 
In this regard, it is important to note that compared with tort or general 
jurisdiction, exclusive jurisdiction is more controversial in nature. In the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, the applications of these 
jurisdictional bases are different. Exclusive jurisdiction refers to the ability of states 
to provide judicial remedies for the validity or registration of intellectual property 
rights issues without requiring a link between the subject matter of the dispute or the 
parties on the one hand and the forum on the other. Indeed, it is objectively pursued 
hat the exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerned with the registration or 
validity of patents conferred upon the courts of the Contracting State in which the 
deposit or registration has been applied for or made is justified by the fact that those 
                                                 
1166 Case 288/82 Ferdinand Duijnstee v Lodewijk Goderbauer [1983] ECR 3663, para 22. 
1167 Miguel Asensio, ‘Cross-border Adjudication of Intellectual Property Rights and Competition between 
Jurisdictions’ (2007) 41 AIDA 117. 
1168 Case 288/82 Ferdinand Duijnstee v Lodewijk Goderbauer [1983] ECR 3663. 
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courts are best placed to adjudicate upon cases in which the dispute itself concerns 
the validity of the patent or the existence of the deposit or registration.1169 
At the same time, tort jurisdiction should be based on a close connection 
between the court and the action in order to facilitate the sound administration of 
justice.1170 Similarly, the general jurisdiction should be based on different connecting 
factors between the subject-matter and the parties of the dispute.1171 This means that 
the evidence of clear connection requirements should be established between the 
subject matter of the dispute or the parties on the one hand and the forum on the 
other. 
Therefore, the most important aspect in our discussion is the interaction of 
exclusive jurisdiction with general and tort jurisdictions with particular emphasis on 
the validity issue arising in the context of an action for infringement of intellectual 
property rights on the Internet.  
 
4.2 Application of Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I 
Recast to intellectual property rights 
infringement on the Internet  
The applicability of the rule of exclusive jurisdiction in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet is a question that is worthy of 
discussion.  
Indeed, as noted in the previous paragraph, the jurisdictional rules under the 
Brussels I Recast clearly distinguish the issues of infringement and validity and there 
are separate rules for each issue. Thus, the position is very straightforward when there 
is an action in relation to pure validity or pure infringement issues.  
However, the position is more problematic when a validity issue arises in the 
context of intellectual property rights infringement on the Internet. Indeed, as 
discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis (Chapters 2-3), it is very difficult to 
establish general or tort jurisdiction in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement on the Internet. In particular, the establishment of general jurisdiction is 
                                                 
1169 Ibid, para 22. 
1170 Brussels I Recast, preamble 16. 
1171 Brussels I Recast, preamble 15. 
230 
 
difficult due to the issues of privacy and data protection with regard to Internet 
users.1172 Moreover, the ECJ has just begun the process of establishing special 
jurisdictional rules in the case of intellectual property rights infringement on the 
Internet. Indeed, the jurisdiction rules based on the accessibility of a website and on 
the place of establishment of the advertiser or the owner of a website were established 
only a few years ago1173 and many questions in this regard still remain 
unanswered.1174  
Thus, even in the situation were the jurisdiction in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet is established according to Articles 4, 7 
(2) and 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast, Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast may put 
a stop to this practice. Indeed, the question of the validity of intellectual property 
rights arises in almost all proceedings with regard to infringement of registered 
intellectual property rights.1175 This means that the right holder “will not be able to 
bring his case in an effective way in any jurisdiction, and the right will become 
unenforceable”.1176 Therefore, Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast not only limits 
jurisdiction under Articles 4, 7 (2) and 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast; it also violates a 
fundamental human right of access to courts.  
For example, in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet, the defendant may invoke an argument of invalidity of registered rights as a 
claim or a defence under Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast. Indeed, as noted by 
Fawcett, in the Internet environment Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast may be 
used in bad faith when the invalidity defence is raised without any chance of 
success.1177  
As a way of protecting against such practice, there is an approach, which is that 
the rule of exclusive jurisdiction is not applicable in the case of intellectual property 
                                                 
1172 Please see Chapter 2. “Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast and its applicability in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement on the Internet”. 
1173 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117; 
Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000; Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v 
EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published.  
1174 Please see Chapter 3. “Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast and its applicability to intellectual 
property rights infringement on the Internet”. 
1175 Toshiyuki Kono, Intellectual Property and Private International Law: Comparative Perspectives 
(Hart Publishing 2012) 39.  
1176 Benedetta Ubertazzi, ‘Exclusive Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property’ (2013) IIC 44 (1), 134-136.  
1177 Fawcett (n 112) 350. 
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right infringement over the Internet.1178 In particular, as noted by Slováková, only 
general or special jurisdiction is applicable in cases involving intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet.1179 However, Slováková does not provide an 
answer regarding whether the court with infringement jurisdiction also has 
jurisdiction in relation to the validity issue.  
The WIPO has clarified the application of the rules of exclusive jurisdiction in 
the Internet environment by stating that the rules of exclusive jurisdiction are also 
applicable “to intellectual property disputes over the Internet”.1180 Therefore, the most 
important question in this regard is the extension of the rules of exclusive or 
infringement jurisdiction in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over 
the Internet. This is especially important in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet as all of the claimants are interested in suing before 
one court. Indeed, the high costs of country by country litigation have often been 
described as an Achilles heel, whereas proceedings before one court could be one of 
the most promising measures for creating an efficient cross-border IP litigation 
system.1181 
The nature of this jurisdictional problem can be illustrated by the following 
example of patent infringement over the Internet. For example, a patent infringement 
claim is brought in Sweden. Jurisdiction for this claim is based on Article 4 of the 
Brussels I Recast as the defendant is domiciled in Sweden. However, by way of 
defence the defendant has raised the issue of validity of the patent in the UK, where it 
is registered. In this regard the following question arises: Which court has 
jurisdiction? In particular, should the courts of the country of registration (UK) 
also have exclusive jurisdiction over infringement issues? Can the court with 
infringement jurisdiction (Sweden) also try the issue of validity?  
In order to answer the above-mentioned questions it is important to analyse 
national practice (UK, Germany, France, and Sweden) and the ECJ point of view.  
 
                                                 
1178 Zuzana Slováková, ‘International Private Law Issues regarding Trademark Protection and the Internet 
within the EU’ (2008) Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology Vol. 3, Issue 1, 77. 
1179 Ibid, 77-78. 
1180 WIPO, ‘Intellectual Property on the Internet; A Survey of Issues’ (2002) 
<www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/856/wipo_pub_856.pdf > accessed 9 July 2014.  
1181 Kur A, ‘A Farewell to Cross-Border Injunctions? The ECJ Decisions GAT v Luk and Roche 
Nederland v Primus Goldenberg’(2006) 7 IIC, 854, 855. 
232 
 
4.2.1 National practice 
Indeed, the interpretation and practical application of the issue of invalidity 
arising in the context of an infringement claim has not been straightforward. Prior to 
the decision of the ECJ in GAT v LuK, different national courts have taken different 
approaches with respect to the issues of infringement and validity.1182 
For example, as UK practice indicates, the issue of invalidity arising in the 
context of an infringement claim is a very contradictory issue. On the one hand, as 
noticed by Fawcett, if the court with infringement jurisdiction has a basis of 
jurisdiction to try the validity issue the jurisdiction is channeled into the one Member 
State.1183 In such a situation there is no question of the defendant being able to freeze 
or delay the trial of the validity issue.1184 Moreover, the defence of invalidity in an 
infringement action is treated like any other defence of any other tort claim.1185 For 
example, as stated by the German Federal Supreme Court, even in the situation where 
the rules of the Brussels I Recast in relation to special jurisdiction for an action in 
contract are different from those for an action in tort, the court with infringement 
jurisdiction is able to try a contractual defence, alleging that the contract is 
authorised.1186  
In my opinion, the issue of invalidity is different from other defences in other 
torts. Indeed, the invalidity issue can arise as a cause of action in its own right, but 
when it is raised as a defence it does not arise in its own way1187. In my opinion, the 
court with infringement jurisdiction is able to have jurisdiction with regard to the 
invalidity claim arising as a defence and binding the parties of the dispute. However, 
when the invalidity is raised in its own way only the court where the rights are 
registered has jurisdiction under Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast. Such an 
approach is also supported by Hill and Chong, who noted that Article 24 (4) of the 
                                                 
1182 CLIP, ‘Exclusive jurisdiction and cross border IP (patent) infringement: Suggestions for amendment 
of the Brussels Regulation’ (2006) <http://www.ivir.nl/publications/ 
eechoud/CLIP_Brussels_%20I.pdf> accessed 10 August 2013. 
1183 Fawcett (n 112) 630. 
1184 Fawcett (n 112) 388. 
1185 Fawcett (n 112) 400. 
1186 Re jurisdiction in Tort and Contract [1988] IZR 201/86, ECC 415 (German Federal Supreme Court).  
1187 Fawcett (n 112) 400. 
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Brussels I Recast has no application to proceedings relating to the infringement of 
patents.1188  
However, in contrast to these arguments the English courts are precluded from 
trying an infringement claim where the invalidity is raised as a defence in an 
infringement claim brought in England.1189 Indeed, the court in Coin Controls Ltd v 
Suzo International Ltd and Others made clear that once the defendant challenges the 
validity of the patent in the context of the English infringement proceedings, the court 
is required to decline jurisdiction on the basis that the proceedings fall within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the German courts.1190 This means that once the defendant 
“raises” the validity issue, the court with infringement jurisdiction must hand the 
proceedings over to the courts that have exclusive jurisdiction over that issue.1191 
Thus, in spite of Fawcett’s support for an infringement jurisdiction of an 
English court, the English courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the infringement 
claim. Indeed, in Fort Dodge Animal Health Ltd v Akzo Nobel NV,1192 the Court of 
Appeal expressly approved the decision in Coin Controls by stating that the 
infringement claim by the respondents in respect of acts carried out in the United 
Kingdom is principally concerned with the validity of the UK patent. This means that 
no infringement could be reached without consideration of the validity of the patent 
as a patent infringement action is always “principally concerned with validity”.1193  
Therefore, in the case of infringement of registered intellectual property rights 
over the Internet, an English court with exclusive jurisdiction also has jurisdiction to 
hear the infringement claim. In our hypothetical case of patent infringement over the 
Internet, this rule means that the English court, as the court of the country of the 
patent registration, should also have jurisdiction over the infringement issue as the 
issues of infringement and validity are so closely interrelated that they should be 
                                                 
1188 Jonathan Hill, Adeline Chongm , International Commercial Disputes: Commercial Conflict of Laws in 
English Courts (4th edn, Hart Publishing 2010) 104. 
1189 Controls Ltd v Suzo International (UK) and Others [1999] Ch 33. 
1190 Ibid. 
1191 Sandisk Corporation v Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV & Ors [2007] EWHC 332 (Ch). 
1192 Fort Dodge Animal Health Ltd. V Akzo Nobel [1998] FSR 222. 
1193 Joseph Straus, ‘Patent Litigation in Europe – A Glimmer of Hope? Present Status and Future 
Perspectives’ (2000) 2 Wash. U.J.L & Pol’y 103. 
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treated for jurisdiction purposes as one issue or claim1194. There is only one issue: 
whether it is raised by way of claim or defence.1195  
Indeed, as noted by Arnolds, the combined effect of Articles 24 (4) and 27 of 
the Brussels I Recast leads us to the conclusion that the courts in the country where 
the patent was registered always have exclusive jurisdiction, including over the 
infringement part, even if the validity is questioned by exception1196. Luginbuehl and 
Beilfuss also support such a point of view; they state that taking into account the fact 
that nullity is brought up in most infringement cases, the court having jurisdiction 
according to Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast would essentially always have to 
waive jurisdiction.1197  
The situation is the same in France. In particular, in the case of patent 
infringement, the defendant may bring a counterclaim for invalidity and the court will 
assess the infringement of the patent simultaneously with the issue of validity.1198 
This means that in France, the civil district court has exclusive jurisdiction over 
infringement and validity matters.1199 Since an invalid patent cannot be infringed, the 
court will start with the determination of the patent’s validity and will only afterwards 
deal with its infringement.  
In my opinion, such a “combined” system has some advantages. In particular, it 
allows a patent to be “tested” for validity before being asserted for infringement. 
Moreover, it prevents the patentee from adopting different positions in relation to 
validity on the one hand and the infringement on the other. Indeed, as stated in 
English case European Central Bank v Document Security Systems Incorporated,1200 
it is desirable to try infringement and validity issues together as otherwise it is too 
                                                 
1194 Thomas Cottier, Pierre Véron (ed.) Concise International and European IP Law: TRIPS, Paris 
Convention, European (Kluwer Law International 2008) 318. 
1195 JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, JP Morgan Securities Ltd v Berliner Verkehrsbertriebe [2010] EWCA 
Civ, para 69. 
1196 Arnold R, ‘Can one sue in England for infringement of foreign intellectual property rights’ (1990) 
EIPR 254-263. 
1197 Stefan Luginbuehl, European Patent Law: Towards a Uniform Interpretation (Elgar Publishing 2011) 
100; Cristina Conzalez Beilfuss, ‘Is there any web for the spider? Jurisdction over co-defendants after Roche 
Nederlands’ in Arnaud Nuyts (ed), International Litigation in Intellectual Property and Information 
Technology (Kluwer Law International 2008) 86.  
1198 Ste Belge Rossell v Ste Produits Avicoles Lillois Pal [2002] RDPI 131, 18-28 (Tribunal de Grande 
Instance de Paris); Bouillard Feres SA v Bonnano SARL [2004] PIBD 788 III, 351-5 (Tribunal de Grande de 
Paris). 
1199 Thomas F. Cotter, Comparative Patent Remedies: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Oxford University 
Press 2013) 234. 
1200 European Central Bank v Document Security Systems Incorporated [2007] EWHC 600 (Pat), para 88.  
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easy for the patentee to agree to a narrow interpretation of his claim when defending 
it but an expansive interpretation when asserting infringement. 
In contrast to the situation in the UK and France, in Germany two separate 
courts try the infringement and validity issues. According to this approach, 
infringement proceedings can be conducted outside the country granted the patent, 
but when invalidity is raised, the court must stay the proceedings and wait for the 
respective foreign authority to decide the question of patent validity.1201  
However, some German courts have gone even further by emphasizing their 
discretion in the matter and freedom to choose either to stay or continue the 
infringement proceedings based on their assessment of the likelihood of success of 
the patent invalidity claim.1202 In particular, the Dusseldorf court has granted stays 
and directed parties to resolve the validity issue in the country where the patent was 
granted only if the court considered the invalidity arguments to have merit.1203 Thus, 
the invalidity of a foreign patent does not automatically trigger the exclusive 
jurisdiction of a foreign court.1204 
On the other hand some courts are continuing infringement proceedings when 
validity is raised as an incidental matter within the framework of the infringement 
proceedings. In such a situation the court with infringement jurisdiction is able to 
access the validity if this is permissible in terms of the law applicable in the country 
where the right existed.1205 For example, in our hypothetical case of UK patent 
infringement over the Internet, the German court dealing with such an infringement 
should apply UK substantive law to such an infringement in order to decide whether 
the validity defence can be dealt with the infringement case. The decision in relation 
to the validity issue binds only the parties of the dispute and not the third parties.  
However, the German courts show a tendency to give exclusive jurisdiction to 
the validity court under Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast if a decision has an 
erga omnes effect, i.e. binding third parties.1206 Indeed, the validity issue is reserved 
                                                 
1201 Landgericht Mannheim [2002] 7 O 235/01. 
1202 Marketa Trimble, Global Patents: Limits of Transnational Enforcement (Oxford University Press 
2012) 51.  
1203 Kettenbandforderer III, Landgericht Dusseldorf [1994] 4 O 193/87.  
1204 Schwungrad, Landgericht Dusseldorf [2001] 4 O 128/00, GRUR Int. 983.  
1205 Kettenbandförderer III, [1996] ( Düsseldorf district court); I-Schussfadengreifer [1999] GRUR Int 455 
(Düsseldorf district court:). 
1206 Fawcett (n 112) 345, 346. 
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for the specialised German courts (the Patent Office and the Federal Patent Court).1207 
This exclusive jurisdiction is conferred upon twelve District Courts, which are 
distributed geographically throughout Germany.1208 For example, when a suit for 
declaration of invalidity was brought before a Belgian court, the Dusseldorf court 
stayed its proceedings to wait for the Belgian decision.1209 Such an approach is also 
confirmed by the German Supreme Court.1210  
Thus, in Germany, in the case of patent infringement over the Internet, two 
separate courts deal with infringement and validity issues. In particular, the court with 
infringement jurisdiction may stay its proceedings and wait for the conclusion of the 
separate validity proceedings if it estimates that there is a fair chance that the patent 
will be declared invalid.1211 Similarly, in Sweden, it is possible to try the validity of 
intellectual property rights inter parties in a case concerning infringement of 
intellectual property rights where the question of validity is raised as a defence.1212 
The advocates of the bifurcated system adopted in Germany argue that 
infringement proceedings can be resolved much more quickly if the often complex 
validity issues are deferred to separate proceedings in a specialist court. Indeed, in a 
situation when the patent is presumed to be valid the defendant will not delay the 
enforcement of the patent by raising many arguments against its validity. However, 
the opponents of the system argue that bifurcation allows weak patents to be enforced 
since the infringement court may issue an injunction before the patent court has ruled 
on validity, thus giving the patentee an instrument with to which apply pressure to the 
defendant to settle.1213  
Conclusion 
As our analysis indicates, there is no uniform concept with regard to the issue 
of validity arising in the case of infringing proceedings through Member States of the 
EU. Indeed, in the UK and France, one court (the court of the country where the 
                                                 
1207 WIPO, ‘Intellectual Property Litigation under the Civil Law Legal System, Experience in Germany’ 
(2004) <www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/enforcement/en/wipo.../wipo_ace_2_3.doc>accessed 10 July2014.  
1208 Alexander Harguth, S Carlson, Patents in Germany and Europe: Procurement, Enforcement and 
Defense (Kluwer Law International 2011) 113.  
1209 Torsionsschwingungsdampfer [2003] 4a O 61/02 (Landgericht Dusseldorf).  
1210 Druckmaschinentemperierungssystem [2004] GRUR 710 (Bundesgerichtshof).  
1211 Fawcett (n 112) 340.  
1212 Toshiyuki Kono, Intellectual Property and Private International Law: Comparative Perspectives 
(Hart Publishing 2012) 1039.  
1213 Clemens Tobias Steins, Heike Alps, The EU Patent Package Handbook: A Practitioner’s Guide 
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rights are registered) has jurisdiction over the issue of infringement and validity, as 
these issues are so closely interrelated that they should be treated for jurisdiction 
purposes as one issue or claim. German courts take a contrasting point of view by 
allowing two separate courts to try the infringement and validity issues. In such a 
situation the German court with the infringement jurisdiction may stay its 
proceedings and wait for the conclusion of the separate validity proceedings if it 
estimates that there is a fair chance that the patent will be declared invalid.  
However, such a practice also means that the issues of infringement and 
validity cannot be considered by the court with infringement jurisdiction. Indeed, 
even in the UK and France, where one court is competent to decide the issue of 
infringement and validity, the jurisdiction of this court is based on Article 24 (4) of 
the Brussels I Recast. Moreover, the German practice also indicates that the court 
with infringement jurisdiction only has jurisdiction over the issue of infringement. 
However, the door for considering the issue of validity by the court with infringement 
jurisdiction is not fully closed. Indeed, in some situations, when the issue of validity 
is raised as an incidental matter within the framework of infringement proceedings, 
the German court is able to assess the validity if this is permissible in terms of the law 
applicable in the country where the right existed.1214 The decision in relation to the 
validity issue binds only the parties of the dispute and not the third parties.  
Moreover, in spite of the fact that the English Court of Appeal in Fort Dodge 
Animal Health Ltd. V Akzo Nobel confirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of an English 
court in relation to the revocation proceedings by virtue of Article 24 (4) of the 
Brussels I Recast, it also recognised that “a contrary opinion is tenable”.1215 Indeed, 
as noted by Fawcett, the reasoning for consolidation of validity and infringement 
claims is equally applicable before either the court with infringement jurisdiction or 
that with exclusive jurisdiction.1216  
Therefore, taking into account the different interpretations of Articles 24 (4) 
and 27 of the Brussels I Recast by national courts, there is a corresponding need for a 
reference to the ECJ. The ECJ in GAT v Luk clarified the issue of validity raised in 
the infringement proceedings.  
                                                 
1214 Kettenbandförderer III [1996] (Düsseldorf district court); I-Schussfadengreifer [1999] GRUR Int 455 
(Düsseldorf district court).  
1215 Fort Dodge Animal Health Ltd. V Akzo Nobel [1998] FSR 222.  
1216 Fawcett (n 112) 374. 
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4.2.2 The ECJ ruling in GAT, Roche and Solvay 
The ECJ in GAT v Luk adopted a wider interpretation of Article 24 (4) of the 
Brussels I Recast according to which the rule of exclusive jurisdiction concerns all 
proceedings relating to the registration or validity of a patent, irrespective of whether 
the issue is raised by way of an action or a plea in objection.1217 
In this regard, it is important to note that in comparison with the Brussels I 
Regulation, the Brussels I Recast makes clear the irrelevance of the ways in which the 
issue of invalidity is raised in infringement proceedings: by the way of an action or as 
a defence.1218 On the one hand, such an approach clarifies the linguistic differences in 
Article 22 (4) of the Brussels I Regulation. In particular, according to the English 
version of Article 22 (4) of the Brussels I Regulation, exclusive jurisdiction applies to 
proceedings that are “concerned with validity”, while in French and German versions 
the rule of exclusive jurisdiction is applicable only to proceedings that have as their 
object validity matters. Indeed, the differences in these linguistic interpretations have 
led some authors to the conclusion that courts other than the courts in the country of 
registration are competent to adjudicate invalidity as an incidental matter.1219  
Therefore, taking into account the irrelevance of the ways in which the issue of 
validity is raised, the drafters of the Brussels I Recast finally ended the possibility of 
the court with infringement jurisdiction trying the issue of validity when such an issue 
is raised in the infringing proceedings. This is also confirmed by Kur, who states that 
now courts with infringement jurisdictions are prohibited from establishing the 
validity of the patent.1220 This means that the binding nature of Article 24 (4) of the 
Brussels I Recast was confirmed by the ECJ in GAT v LuK. Indeed, only the court 
with exclusive jurisdiction is able to decide on the issue of validity of registered 
intellectual property rights.  
However, how is the GAT v Luk ruling applicable in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet? Does the court with exclusive 
jurisdiction also have jurisdiction over the infringement issue? 
                                                 
1217 Case 4/03 GAT v LuK [2007] ECR I-6509, para 31. 
1218 Brussels I Recast, Art. 24 (4). 
1219 Kur A, ‘A Farewell to Cross-border Injunctions? The ECJ decisions GAT v LuK and Roche 
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For example, when the issue of patent validity is raised in the process of 
infringement proceedings, it would be logical to consolidate the rule of exclusive 
jurisdiction with the rule of infringement jurisdiction before the one court. However, 
this is not possible in the light of Roche Nederland BV v Primus, Goldenberg,1221 
where the ECJ made clear that the invalidity issue, whether it is raised by way of an 
action or plea in objection, is a matter of exclusive jurisdiction laid down by Article 
24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast in favour of the courts of the contracting state in which 
the deposit or registration has taken place or is deemed to have taken place. This 
means that Roche Nederland BV v Primus, Goldenberg supports the splitting of 
infringement and validity proceedings by reference to the situation where “the 
defendant disputes the validity of a patent in the context of an infringement 
action”.1222  
Therefore, the combined effects of the GAT v LuK and Roche Nederland BV v 
Primus, Goldenberg decisions in the case of intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet create legal barriers to the application of general and special 
jurisdiction. Indeed, Articles 4 and 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast are not applicable if 
infringement claims are concerned with validity proceedings, irrespective of whether 
the issue is raised by way of an action or as a defence.1223 In such a situation, the 
court with general and special jurisdiction shall declare of its own motion that it has 
no jurisdiction.1224  
In my opinion, the application of Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast, in the 
case of intellectual property right infringement over the Internet, not only 
demonstrates the loss of legal certainty but also affects infringement proceedings. 
Indeed, as the court with infringement jurisdiction cannot try the validity issue, 
raising the idea of invalidity, even without any argument to support it, is enough to 
affect infringement proceedings.1225 This means that the exclusive jurisdiction rule 
would turn jurisdiction into only one jurisdictional rule for all registered intellectual 
                                                 
1221 Case C-539/03 Roche Nederland BV v Primus, Goldenberg [2006] ECR I-6535, para 40. 
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property rights infringement cases.1226 However, such an approach is a step 
backwards into the nineteenth century.1227  
In this regard it is important to mention the ECJ decision in Solvay v 
Honeywell, according to which a preliminary injunction with a cross-border effect is 
allowed in line with Article 35 of the Brussels I Recast, even if a validity defence is 
raised1228. Furthermore, the main argument of the ECJ in Solvay v Honeywell is based 
on the fact that Article 35 of the Brussels I Recast has an autonomous ground for 
jurisdiction that is not subject to limitation under Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I 
Recast. Thus, the court, having infringement jurisdiction, is able to provide a 
preliminary evaluation of the validity argument. However, in my opinion, the 
preliminary evaluation of the validity of intellectual property rights cannot be 
considered as a provisional measure in light of the Brussels I Recast. In fact, 
according to point 25 of the preamble to the Brussels I Recast, “the notion of 
provisional, including protective, measures should include, for example, protective 
orders aimed at obtaining information or preserving evidence as referred to in Articles 
6 and 7 of Directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights… It 
should not include measures which are not of a protective nature, such as measures 
ordering the hearing of a witness”. This means that the aim of the provisional 
measures is obtaining information or preserving evidence, rather than the evaluation 
of the validity arguments. In this regard, the Solvay v Honeywell decision does not 
change the binding nature of Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast.  
Conclusion 
As our analysis indicates, the combined effects of the GAT v LuK and Roche 
Nederland BV v Primus, Goldenberg decisions in the case of intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet create legal barriers to the application of general 
and special jurisdiction. Indeed, Articles 4 and 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast are not 
applicable if infringement claims are concerned with validity proceedings, 
irrespective of whether the issue is raised by way of an action or as a defence.1229 In 
such a situation the court with general and special jurisdiction shall declare of its own 
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motion that it has no jurisdiction.1230 The Solvay v Honeywell decision does not 
change the binding nature of Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast.  
4.3  Conclusions and recommendations  
The analysis above clearly demonstrates that the ECJ decision in Solvay v 
Honeywell does not change the binding nature of Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I 
Recast, which is confirmed also by the ECJ in GAT v LuK. 
Therefore, the issue of whether the court with infringement jurisdiction loses its 
jurisdiction as soon as the issue of validity arises is still an open question. As such, in 
order to provide an efficient model for adjudicating intellectual property rights 
disputes over the Internet, it is important to take into account not only these findings 
here, but also the recommendations of the following projects: The Hague Draft of 
20011231, CLIP Principles1232 and ALI Principles1233. Moreover, the issue of 
intellectual property rights infringement and the scope of exclusive jurisdiction in the 
case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet is an issue of active 
debate, not only at the EU level, but also with regard to the global perspective. 
In particular, and in spite of the fact that the rule of exclusive jurisdiction under 
Article 12 of the Hague Draft of 2001 does not extend its scope to the issue of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, its analysis is relevant for 
the purpose of this thesis. Indeed, as our analysis indicates1234, the national practices 
of the EU Member States are highly contradictory with regard to the scope of 
exclusive jurisdiction. However, according to Article 12 (4) of the Hague Draft of 
2001, in proceedings with regard to the registration or validity – as well as the 
infringement of patents, trademarks, designs or other similar rights – the court has 
exclusive jurisdiction. This means that only one court with exclusive jurisdiction is 
able to decide on the issues of validity and infringement. However, as noted by 
                                                 
1230 Brussels I Recast, Art. 27.  
1231 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Foreign Judgments in civil and commercial matters adopted by the Special Commission on 30 October 1999 
(amended version, 11 August 2000) <http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd11.pdf> accessed 4 May 2014. 
1232 European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, ‘Principles on Conflict of 
Laws in Intellectual Property’ (Final Text, 1 December 2011).  
1233 The American Law Institute, ‘Intellectual property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law 
and Judgments in Transnational Disputes (with Comments and Reporters’ Notes) ‘ (2008) 
<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=198109> accessed 11 January 2014.  
1234 Please see Chapter 4, paragraph ‘4.2.1. National practice’.  
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Fawcett, although validity and infringement are independent, it does not follow that 
the two have to be tried in the same court or in the same State1235. Indeed, one of the 
arguments for abandoning exclusive jurisdiction with regard to the issue of 
intellectual property rights infringement and validity is based on the fact that such 
rules are contrary to public international law rules on the avoidance of a denial of 
justice and on the fundamental human right of access to a court1236. Moreover, 
granting exclusive jurisdiction for pure infringement proceedings could lead to a 
proliferation of litigation1237. For example, when infringement proceedings involve 
the validity of a European patent, the parties would need to bring validity proceedings 
in each of the countries concerned with a national bundle of rights1238.  
Therefore, a more flexible approach with regard to exclusive jurisdiction should 
be taken1239. In this regard the ALI Principles almost entirely reject the exclusive 
jurisdiction rule with respect to pure infringement claims for registered intellectual 
property rights1240. In fact, section 211 (1) of the ALI Principles permits an 
adjudication of claims arising under foreign intellectual property laws but grants 
effectiveness to the adjudication of the validity of registered rights only, in order to 
resolve a dispute between the parties to the action (paragraph 211 (2) of the ALI 
Principles). This means that the court with infringement jurisdiction is able to decide 
on the issue of the validity of registered intellectual property rights, but the effect of 
such a decision is binding only to the parties involved in the dispute. However, the 
main counterargument of this approach is based on the fact that the patentee will be 
hampered in his ability to enforce rights declared invalid in a proceeding with limited 
effect, as licensees who continue to license the patent compete at a disadvantage with 
respect to the judgment winner1241. Furthermore, such an approach does not stimulate 
                                                 
1235 Fawcett (n 112) 623. 
1236 Benedetta Ubertazzi, ‘Infringement and Exclusive Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property: a Comparison 
for the International Law Association’ (2012) 3 JIPITEC, 252. 
1237 Permanent Bureau, ‘Report of the experts meeting in the intellectual property aspects of the future 
Convention on jurisdiction and foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters’ Preliminary Document number 
13 (1 February 2001 <http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd13.pdf> accessed 11 March 2013. 
1238 Ibid. 
1239 Permanent Bureau, ‘Report of the experts meeting in the intellectual property aspects of the future 
Convention on jurisdiction and foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters’ Preliminary Document number 
13 (1 February 2001) <thhp://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd13.pdf> accessed 11 March 2013.  
1240 The American Law Institute, ‘Intellectual property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law 
and Judgments in Transnational Disputes (with Comments and Reporters’ Notes) ‘ (2008) 
<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=198109> accessed 11 January 2014.  
1241 Ibid. 
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innovation by rewarding innovators1242, and moreover, the ECJ, in GAT v LuK, 
rejected such an approach by stating that limiting the effect of the decision to the 
parties involved in the dispute would lead to distortions, thereby undermining the 
equality and uniformity of rights and obligations arising from the Convention for the 
Contracting States and the persons concerned1243. In this regard, the CLIP Principles 
propose a more balanced approach, in that the exclusive jurisdiction of the State 
granting the registered right is respected albeit limited1244. Specifically, Article 2:401 
(1) of the CLIP Principles establishes exclusive jurisdiction in disputes on the 
granting, registration, validity, abandonment or revocation of a patent, a mark, an 
industrial design or any other intellectual property right protected on the basis of 
registration to the courts in the State where the right has been registered, or is deemed 
to have been registered, under the terms of an international Convention1245. However, 
exclusive jurisdiction does not apply to disputes where validity or registration arise in 
a context other that by principal claim or counterclaim (Article 2:401 (1) of the CLIP 
Principles).  
The main difference between the ALI and CLIP Principles is that while the ALI 
Principle adopts the notion of subject-matter jurisdiction, the CLIP Principles refer to 
exclusive jurisdiction. These differences are linked more to a matter of terminology 
rather than content, due to the fact they are rooted in different legal systems. 
Nonetheless, the legal result will be the same: the court with exclusive jurisdiction is 
able to decide on the issue of the registration and validity of registered intellectual 
property rights, while the court with infringement jurisdiction is able to decide on the 
issue of the validity or registration of registered intellectual property rights arising in 
the infringement proceedings with inter-party effects. The solution provided by the 
ALI and CLIP Principles gives the court of the Member State with infringement 
jurisdiction non-exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of validity when it is raised in 
the context of infringement proceedings. This solution ensures that the same court, 
namely with infringement jurisdiction, will try both the infringement claim and the 
                                                 
1242 Ibid. 
1243 Case 4/03 GAT v LuK [2007] ECR I-6509.  
1244 Christiab Heinze, ‘A Framework for International Enforcement of Territorial Rights: The CLIP 
Principles on Jurisdiction’ in Jurgen Basedow, Toshiyuki Kono and Axel Metzger (eds.), Intellectual Property in 
the Global Arena. Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of Judgments in Europe, Japan and the US 
(Mohr Siebeck 2010) 61. 
1245 European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, ‘Principles on Conflict of 
Laws in Intellectual Property’ (Final Text, 1 December 2011). 
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validity issue1246. However, the legal effect of decisions resulting from the validity of 
foreign intellectual property rights in infringement disputes should bind the parties 
involved in the dispute, rather than having an erga omnes effect, i.e. binding third 
parties.  
Indeed, by supporting the approach proposed by the CLIP Principles, 
Torremans notes that in such a situation there is no interference with the national 
sovereignty of the court having exclusive jurisdiction under Article 24 (4) of the 
Brussels I Recast, as the effect of the decision on validity is limited to the parties in 
the dispute1247. However, in my opinion, the binding nature of Article 24 (4) of the 
Brussels I Recast prevents such a practice. Furthermore, as stated in Article 24 (4) of 
the Brussels I Recast, the rules of infringement jurisdiction under Articles 4 and 7 (2) 
of the Brussels I Recast are not applicable if infringement claims are concerned with 
validity proceedings, irrespective of whether the issue is raised by way of an action or 
as a defence.1248 Thus, only a court with exclusive jurisdiction is able to decide on the 
issue of the validity or registration of registered intellectual property rights.  
Therefore, academic projects do not provide a decision with regard to the issue 
of validity arising in infringement proceedings. From my point of view, the 
jurisdictional solutions proposed by the Hague Draft of 2001, CLIP Principles and 
ALI Principles are not applicable in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet. First of all, the relevant rules of the above are not 
related to disputes in the Internet environment. Moreover, the academic projects in 
question were drafted at a time when the Internet was only in the process of 
development, and so many of the problems we see today did not exist at that time.  
Secondly, different rules are applicable depending on the nature of the 
intellectual property rights infringed: national intellectual property rights or 
Community intellectual property rights. For example, when the issue of validity arises 
during a trademark infringement proceeding, only the courts of the Member State 
where the trademark was registered are allowed to consider the case concerned with 
                                                 
1246 Fawcett (n 112) 632.  
1247 Torremans, ‘The way Forward for Cross-Border Intellectual Property Litigation: Why GAT Cannot be 
the Answer’, in Leible and Ohly (eds), Intellectual Property and Private International Law ( Mohr Siebeck 2009) 
191-210. 
1248 Brussels I Recast, Art. 24 (4).  
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regard to the revocation or the invalidity of trademarks acquired by registration.1249 
Similarly, according to Directive 98/71 on the legal protection of designs,1250 the 
issues concerning the registration, renewal and invalidation of design rights are 
considered by the court of a Member State where such a right is registered.1251   
However, the situation is different in the case of Community intellectual 
property rights infringement.  In particular, according to Article 96 of Regulation 
207/2009 on the Community trademark,1252 the Community trademark courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction not only in respect of all infringement proceedings regarding 
Community trademarks but also with regard to the declaration of non-infringement 
and in respect of counterclaims for revocation or for the declaration of invalidity of 
the Community trademark.  Article 107 of Council Regulation 207/209 stipulates that 
the national court dealing with a legal claim referred to in Article 96 must treat this 
trademark as valid. This means that in the case of Community trademark 
infringement the Community trademark court (which are national courts designated 
by the Member States) have exclusive jurisdiction with regard to the actions of 
infringement and invalidity.   
Similar to the law of Community trademarks, the registration and revocation 
of Community design rights is affected by the Office for the Harmonisation in the 
Internal Market in Alicante, Spain. In particular, according to Article 81 of the 
Council Regulation 6/2002 on Community designs1253 with regard to infringement 
procedures, counterclaims for the declaration of invalidity and claims for the 
declaration of invalidity of unregistered Community design rights, the Community 
design courts have exclusive jurisdiction.  
 Therefore, when the issue of validity arises during the infringement of 
Community intellectual rights, only one court - a Community court - has jurisdiction 
in respect of acts of infringement and validity. However, in the case of infringement 
of national rights, two different courts may be involved: the court of the Member 
State where the right is infringed with regard to infringement proceedings and the 
                                                 
1249 Council Directive (EC) 2008/95 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade 
marks [2008] OJ 299/25,  Preamble, points 6, 9. 
1250 Council Directive (EC) 98/71 on the legal protection of designs [1998] OJ L289. 
1251 Directive 98/71 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on the legal 
protection of designs [1998] OJ L 289, Preamble, Article 11. 
1252 Council Regulation (EC) 207/2009 on the Community trade mark [2009] OJ L 78/1. 
1253 Council Regulation (EC) 6/2002 on Community designs [2002] OJ LEC L 3. 
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court of the Member State where the right is registered with regard to the issue of 
validity of registered rights.  
With regard to patent protection in the EU it is important to note that in 
December 2012 the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament 
agreed on two regulations laying the foundation of unitary patent protection in the 
EU.1254  The main aim of this reform was to offer businesses an alternative by 
simplifying the existing system and supporting a cost effective route to patent 
protection and dispute settlement.1255 As a result of this reform, a Unified Patent 
Court with exclusive jurisdiction was established.1256 Article 32 of the Agreement on 
the Unified Patent Court grants exclusive competence to the UPC in respect of, 
among others, actions for actual or threatened infringements; actions for declarations 
of non-infringement; actions for provisional and protective measures and injunctions; 
actions and counterclaims for the revocation of patents and for the declaration of 
invalidity of supplementary protection certificates; actions for damages or 
compensation derived from the provisional protection conferred by a published 
European patent application; and, actions relating to the use of the invention prior to 
the granting of the patent or to the right based on prior use of the invention.1257 
Therefore, the Unified Patent Court is competent with regard to issues of 
infringement and validity of Unitary Patents.   In addition to that, the Unified Patent 
Court is intended to have exclusive jurisdiction for traditional European patents, 
which will remain a permanent alternative to the Unitary Patent. The Agreement on 
the Unified Patent Court entered into force on the same date as the amendments to the 
Brussels I Regulation: January 10, 2015.1258  
However, this means that central attacks on the validity of European patents 
before the Unified Patent Court will become possible whereas currently these are the 
                                                 
1254 Council Regulation (EC) 1257/2012   implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of 
the creation of unitary patent protection [2012] OJ L361/89; Council Regulation (EC) 1260/2012 
implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard 
to the applicable translation arrangements [2012] OJ L361/89.  
1255 Ministry of Justice, Government Offices of Sweden, “An Enhanced European Patent System” 
(2014)   https://www.unified-patent-court.org/sites/default/files/enhanced-european-patent-system.pdf accessed 
January 12, 2016. 
1256 Council Regulation (EC) 542/2014   amending Council Regulation   1215/2012 as regards the 
rules to be applied with respect to the Unified Patent Court and the Benelux Court of Justice [2014] OJ L 163.   
1257 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court   [2013] OJ C 175/1. 
1258 Council Regulation (EC) 542/2014   amending Council Regulation   1215/2012 as regards the 
rules to be applied with respect to the Unified Patent Court and the Benelux Court of Justice [2014] OJ L 163, 
Article 2.    
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exclusive jurisdiction of each country of registration of the national parts of such a 
patent according to Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Regulation.1259  In this regard 
Article 83 (1) of the Agreement on a unified patent court provides that during a 
transitional period of seven years after the date of entry into force of the UPC 
Agreement it will be possible to use the national route for those preferring to seek 
protection in individual Member States and to validate a European patent in one or 
several Member States.1260 Moreover, Article 83 (3) of the Agreement on a Unified 
Patent Court states that a proprietor of or an applicant for a European patent granted 
or applied for prior to the end of the transitional period under paragraph 1 and, where 
applicable, paragraph 5, as well as the holder of a supplementary protection certificate 
issued for the protected by a European patent, shall have the possibility of opting out 
of the exclusive competence of the Court. 
In this regard an interesting question arises: whether opting out completely 
blocks the competence of the Unified Patent Court and whether the patentee is still 
able to bring an action for infringement after he has opted out. Indeed, the phrase in 
Article 32 of the Agreement on the Unified Patent Court that “the Court shall have 
exclusive competence in respect of” may be interpreted as a reference to the 
competence of the Court in general.1261 This means that the provision of Article 83 
(3) of the Agreement on the Unified Patent Court to opt out for a given European 
patent fully blocks the jurisdiction of the Unified Patent Court with regard to the 
validity of a traditional European patent.1262 
In my opinion, the intention of Article 83 (3) of the Agreement on the Unified 
Patent Court is to provide a choice during the transitional period to bring actions 
either before the national courts or before the Unified Patent Court. Therefore, Article 
83 (3) of the Agreement on the Unified Patent Court deals with the issue of the 
UPC’s competence rather than the issue of jurisdiction. Indeed, as noted by Asensio, 
                                                 
1259 Peter van Gemert, Wouter Pors, “The effect of an opt out under Article 83 of the Agreement on a 
unified patent court on jurisdiction for decisions on the merits and preliminary injunctions” (Bied & Bird 2013) 
http://www.twobirds.com/~/media/pdfs/brochures/intellectual-property/upc/2013-08-28-the-effect-of-an-opt-out-
under-article-83-upc-agreement.pdf?la=en  accessed January 12, 2016. 
1260 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court   [2013] OJ C 175/1, Article  83(1).  
1261  Peter van Gemert, Wouter Pors, “The effect of an opt out under Article 83 of the Agreement on a 
unified patent court on jurisdiction for decisions on the merits and preliminary injunctions” (Bied & Bird 2013) 
http://www.twobirds.com/~/media/pdfs/brochures/intellectual-property/upc/2013-08-28-the-effect-of-an-opt-out-
under-article-83-upc-agreement.pdf?la=en  accessed January 12, 2016. 
1262 Peter van Gemert, Wouter Pors, “The effect of an opt out under Article 83 of the Agreement on a 
unified patent court on jurisdiction for decisions on the merits and preliminary injunctions” (Bied & Bird 2013) 
http://www.twobirds.com/~/media/pdfs/brochures/intellectual-property/upc/2013-08-28-the-effect-of-an-opt-out-
under-article-83-upc-agreement.pdf?la=en  accessed January 12, 2016.  
248 
 
the UPC Agreement provides for the distribution of competences between the UPC 
and the national courts of the Contracting Member States.1263 Therefore, while the 
main aim of Article 83 (1) of the Agreement on the Unified Patent Court is the issue 
of competence between the Unified Patent Court on the one hand and before the 
national courts of Contracting Member States on the other, the Brussels I Recast deals 
with the issue of jurisdiction.  
 In my opinion, in the light of establishing the Unified Patent Court and also 
taking into account the existing practice with regard to Community trademark and 
Community design infringement when the issue of validity arises during the 
infringement proceedings it would be reasonable to transfer the same practice in the 
case of the infringement of national registered rights. In such a case should a 
specialised court have exclusive jurisdiction: a patent or design or trademark court.  
Indeed, as noted by Fawcett and Torremans this is a welcome innovation that will end 
uncertainty with regard to international jurisdiction.1264  Indeed, the exclusive 
jurisdiction of a specialised court rather than a national court is a quicker and 
economically effective way to solve complex jurisdictional issues in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement   when the issue of validity arises.  
 Thirdly, the rule on exclusive jurisdiction in Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I 
Recast is not applicable in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over 
the Internet. Indeed, the recent ECJ decisions in Pinckney1265, Hejduk1266 and 
Wintersteiger1267 have clarified the issue of jurisdiction in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet.  
In particular, in the light of the recent ECJ cases, Pinckney1268, Hejduk1269 and 
Wintersteiger,1270 the application of the rules on exclusive jurisdiction in cases of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet goes against the scheme of 
                                                 
1263 Pedro A. De Miguel Asensio, “Regulation 542/2014 and the international jurisdiction of the Unified 
Patent Court” (2014) IIC  45(8), 868-888. 
1264 James J. Fawcett, Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law (2nd, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011) 418. 
1265 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000. 
1266 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published.  
1267 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117.  
1268 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 3.  
1269 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published, para 4. 
1270 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
para 4. 
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the Brussels I Recast. Specifically, as stated by the ECJ in Pinckney1271, Hejduk1272 
and Wintersteiger,1273 jurisdiction should generally be based on the defendant’s 
domicile, and jurisdiction must always be available on this ground. The same 
approach is also supported by Fawcett, who notes that the place of Article 4 within 
the scheme of the Brussels I Recast was ignored by the ECJ in GAT v LuK.1274 
Indeed, the defendant should be sued in the Member State of his domicile rather than 
at the place in which the deposit or registration of intellectual property rights has 
taken place or is deemed to have taken place.1275 Similarly, Slováková also makes 
clear that only the rules of general or special jurisdiction are applicable in cases 
involving intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet.1276 
Moreover, the rejection of the rule of exclusive jurisdiction in intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet is dictated by the fact that Article 24 (4) 
in the Brussels I Recast contradicts the recent ECJ decisions in Wintersteiger, 
Pinckney and Hejduk. In fact, the ECJ in Wintersteiger, Pinckney and Hejduk made a 
distinction between cases of offline intellectual property rights infringement, where 
jurisdiction is based on substantive law principles (under the law of the country where 
the intellectual property rights are protected), and cases of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet, where such an approach is wrong. 
For example, in Wintersteiger, Pinckney and Hejduk, the ECJ rejected the 
jurisdiction based on the place where the act of infringement occurred, a 
targeting/directing activities approach and also the claimant’s centre of interest, as 
these jurisdictional rules are based on the substance of the dispute rather than on 
jurisdictional connection.1277  
In my opinion, in spite of the fact that the main emphasis in Wintersteiger, 
Pinckney and Hejduk was based on Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast, by way of 
                                                 
1271 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 3. 
1272 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published, para 4. 
1273 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
para 4. 
1274 Fawcett (n 112) 348. 
1275 Ibid. 
1276 Zuzana Slováková, ‘International Private Law Issues regarding Trademark Protection and the Internet 
within the EU’ (2008) Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology Vol. 3, Issue 1, 77.  
1277 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117; 
Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, Opinion of AG Jääskinen; Case C-
441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published.  
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analogy the same principle is also applicable with regard to Article 24 (4) of the 
Brussels I Recast.  
In particular, as stated in Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast, the court has 
exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of 
patents, trade marks, designs, or other similar rights required to be deposited or 
registered. Thus, the jurisdictional rule under Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast is 
based on the principle of territoriality of intellectual property rights, which means that 
the existence and protection of the rights in a particular territory depends on the fact 
of their registration. Indeed, as noted by Fumagalli, the monopoly granted to the 
owner of intellectual property rights consists in the attribution of exclusive rights in 
the territory of the State for and by which they are granted.1278 However, while the 
aim of substantive law is to determine whether and where the proprietor can rely on 
the protection, the aim of the jurisdictional rule is to establish a link between the 
forum and the circumstances of the dispute. Therefore, it is self-evident that the 
solutions applied by the court at the level of substantive law cannot automatically be 
transposed to the rules for determining jurisdiction.1279  
In my opinion, the rules of jurisdiction under Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I 
Recast are based on the substance of the dispute. Indeed, the simple fact of registering 
patents, trade marks, designs, or other similar rights is not in itself sufficient to 
establish the jurisdiction of the courts of that Member State and additional connection 
requirements are necessary. This finding is also supported by the Football Dataco 
case, which held that registration is not sufficient for jurisdiction to be established 
and that a further link is required between the tort and the forum.1280 Indeed, as noted 
in the Marinari case, the Brussels I Recast did not intend to link the rules on 
territorial jurisdiction with national provisions concerning the conditions under which 
non-contractual liability is incurred.1281 This means that jurisdictional rules cannot 
depend on any preliminary conditions such as the validity of registered intellectual 
property rights. Indeed, the validity of intellectual property rights may be relevant to 
the existence of substantive liability for the infringement of intellectual property 
                                                 
1278 Stefania Bariatti, Litigating Intellectual Property Rights Disputes Cross-border: EU Regulations, ALI 
Principles, CLIP Project (Wolters Kluwer 2010) 33. 
1279 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, 
para 62. 
1280 Case C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd and Others v Sportradar GmbH and Sportradar AG.[2012] ECR 
00000, paras 36, 47. 
1281 Case C-364/93 Antonio Marinari v Lloyd’s Bank plc and Zubaidi Co. [1995] ECR I-2719, para 18. 
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rights, but not for jurisdiction to entertain an action for intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet.1282 In my opinion, at the stage of finding international 
jurisdiction the substantive elements of the dispute are irrelevant. This is also 
supported by the argument that the rules of jurisdiction and the rules of substantive 
law are two independent sets of rules.1283  
Therefore, jurisdictional rules based on the substance of the dispute under 
Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast are not applicable in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet. Indeed, as noted by the Advocate 
General in Pinckney, cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet require special jurisdictional rules based on clear connection requirements 
“between ... virtual behaviour and a territoriality”.1284 This means that jurisdictional 
rules applicable in the case of offline intellectual property rights infringement are not 
applicable in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet as 
jurisdiction is based on different principles. Thus, only general and special 
jurisdictional rules are applicable in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet. The application of exclusive jurisdictional rule in the 
case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet should be prohibited 
as its application contradicts the scheme of the Brussels I Recast and such jurisdiction 
is based on the substance of the dispute rather than on jurisdictional connection.  
This means that jurisdictional rules in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet should be based on special and general jurisdiction as 
such rules are predictable and based on clear connection requirements between the 
parties of the dispute or circumstances of the case and the territory of a particular 
Member State of the court seized. Otherwise, jurisdictional rules would be very 
complex and would clash with the principle of foreseeability. 
                                                 
1282 Peter Stone, EU Private International Law (3 Ed., Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) 105. 
1283 Stefania Bariatti, Litigating Intellectual Property Rights Disputes Cross-border: EU Regulations, ALI 
Principles, CLIP Project (Wolters Kluwer 2010) 33. 
1284 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, Opinion of AG Jääskinen.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
To return to the quote that began this thesis, what is the impact of the Internet 
on the private international law of intellectual property, we need to state that the 
Internet has not only revolutionized our society but has also affected the legal 
regulation of the private international law of intellectual property.  
 
5.1. The main problems of application of the existing 
jurisdictional rules  
Indeed, the Brussels I Recast does not contain any special jurisdictional rules 
with regard to intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. Moreover, 
the application of the existing jurisdictional rules in the case of intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet is problematic. In this chapter I would like to 
draw attention to the main finding as the more detailed analysis in support of this 
research is provided in the relevant chapters of the thesis. First of all, it is important 
to note the main problems with regard to  application of the general, special and 
exclusive jurisdiction in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet. In spite of the fact that the project deals with the issue of jurisidction, a brif 
discussion of substantial law issues is required.  
For example, the application of the general jurisdiction, which is based on the 
defendant’s domicile, is problematic in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet. Indeed, there is no case law with regard to the 
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application of Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast in the case of intellectual property 
rights infringement on the Internet. As our findings indicate, there are a few reasons 
for this. In particular, in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet, identifying the defendant and the place of his domicile is difficult as this 
involves the issues of privacy and data protection regarding Internet users.1285  
On the one hand, the EU legislation allows for the processing and disclosing 
of the user’s personal information in civil proceedings when this is provided by 
national legislation.1286 This means that Member States have been given autonomy as 
to whether or not they want to legislate this matter. Consequently, only in a situation 
where national law allows the disclosure of personal information, EU Member States 
authorities may require the disclosure of personal data according to Article 8 (1) of 
Directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights.1287 However, the 
national authorities are prohibited from retaining the personal data of subscribers as 
the retaining of such data contravenes the fundamental right to the protection of 
personal data.1288 
On the other hand, the balancing of rights with regard to the protection of the 
interests of intellectual property rights owners or the data protection of Internet users 
is not unified. As our findings indicate, the national courts must weigh up the 
interests of the parties involved on the grounds of the principle of proportionality, 
which requires that “the measures to be taken should be appropriate and necessary to 
achieve the goal pursued” .1289 However, as noted by some scholars, the principle of 
proportionality can be compared to the ambiguous oracle of Pythia: it says everything 
and nothing at the same time.1290 Indeed, the ECJ did not give priority to any right, 
thus recognizing them all as fundamental rights1291 that benefit from equal 
                                                 
1285 Please see Chapter 2 “Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast and its applicability in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement on the Internet”  
1286 Case C-275/06 Productores de M´usica de Espa˜na (Promusicae) v Telef´onica de Espa˜na SAU 
[2008] ECR I-271.  
1287 Council Directive (EC) 2004/48 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ 
L195/16. 
1288 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. and Kärntner Landesregierung 
[2014] OJ C 175.  
1289 Please see Chapter 2, paragraph ‘2.1.1.3.6 EU case law’.  
1290 Irini Stamatoudi, ‘Data Protection, Secrecy of Communications and Copyright: Conflict and 
Convergences – The Example of Promusicae v. Telefonica’ in Irini Stamatoudi (ed.), Copyright enforcement and 
the Internet (Kluwer Law International 2010) 231. 
1291 Case C-275/06 Productores de M´usica de Espa˜na (Promusicae) v Telef´onica de Espa˜na SAU 
[2008] ECR I-271.  
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protection.1292 The same approach has been taken in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, which states that in the case of the infringement of intellectual property 
rights in the digital environment the balance of the rights and interests of the relevant 
right holders, service providers and users must be provided.1293 
However, the national court shows divergent views and policies in reconciling 
the right to privacy and intellectual property rights protection. Some national courts 
may weigh up the balance between the interests of IP owners and the privacy of 
subscribers in favour of intellectual property rights owners (the UK, France) whereas 
other national courts will do so in favour of subscribers (Sweden, Germany).1294 
Moreover, the application of the special jurisdiction rule1295 in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet is also problematic in the 
light of the recent ECJ cases Pinckney1296, Hejduk1297 and Wintersteiger,1298 in which 
the ECJ makes clear that cases of intellectual property rights infringed over the 
Internet differ significantly from other torts committed over the Internet. Indeed, 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet involves additional 
difficulties associated with delocalized damage and with identifying the act of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. This means that cases of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet require special 
jurisdictional rules based on clear connection requirements “between ... virtual 
behaviour and a territoriality”.1299 Such an approach has historical value for 
establishing special jurisdictional rules in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet. 
However, the application of the rules of exclusive jurisdiction1300 is also 
problematic in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet 
as this rule creates legal barriers to the application of general and special jurisdiction. 
 
                                                 
1292 Case C-461/10 Bonnier Audio v. Perfect Communication [2012] ECR 219. 
1293 Commission (EC), ‘Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’ (23 August 2011), 
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st12/st12196.en11.pdf> accessed 12 August 2012, preamble. 
1294 Please see Chapter 2, paragraph ‘2.1.1.3.7 National practice’. 
1295 Please see Chapter 3 “Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast and its applicability to intellectual property 
rights infringement on the Internet” 
1296 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000. 
1297 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published. 
1298 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117 
1299 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, Opinion of AG Jääskinen 
1300 Please see Chapter 4 “Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast and its applicability to intellectual 
property rights infringement on the Internet” 
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5.2. Jurisdictional solution in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet 
In this chapter the main emphasis will be on the conclusions reached in 
Chapters 2-4 with critical considerations of the implications that the proposed 
recommendations will have for society.  
As our finding indicates, the jurisdictional rules under the Brussels I Recast 
should be adapted in order to satisfy the requirements of a new virtual world. In my 
opinion, the modification of the Brussels I Recast would be a logical and cost 
effective way of adapting the existing jurisdictional rule in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet compared with passing separate 
regional conventions to deal with torts committed over the Internet. Indeed, the 
failure of the Hague Draft proposal on International Jurisdiction and Enforcement in 
Civil and Commercial Matters has shown how difficult it is to find a consensus with 
regard to international jurisdiction due to legal, cultural and economic differences. 
Moreover, even within the Member States of the EU (this thesis includes the UK, 
Sweden, France, Germany), the traditional jurisdictional rules under the Brussels I 
Recast may be interpreted differently.1301 However, it is evident that without clear 
jurisdictional rules in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet, the internal market cannot function effectively. Indeed, as stated in the 
preamble to the Brussels I Recast, the rules of jurisdiction should be highly 
predictable.1302 The European Commission, in its Action Plan, also highlighted the 
importance of intellectual property rights protection on the Internet due to the 
increasing level of IP rights violations. In particular, at the EU level, the estimated 
revenue lost to legitimate businesses from intellectual property rights violations on 
the Internet is about €470 million annually.1303 Therefore, the building of an effective 
mechanism of intellectual property rights protection that “is realistic, balanced, 
                                                 
1301 Chapters 2-4 of this thesis. 
1302 Brussels I Recast, Preamble 15. 
1303 Commission, “Towards a renewed consensus on the enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: An 
EU Action Plan” COM (2014) 0392 final. 
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proportionate and fair” is of primary importance at the EU level.1304 In this regard it 
seems that the jurisdictional solution proposed in this thesis in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet is one of the steps towards effective 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
Indeed, in the “big picture” of intellectual property rights protection on the 
Internet, the issue of jurisdiction is just the first step towards intellectual property 
rights protection on the Internet. In order to provide a balanced approach to 
intellectual property rights protection on the Internet, the issues of applicable law and 
recognition and enforcement of judgment should also be taken into account. 
However, this thesis emphasizes only the issue of jurisdiction in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet by analysing the problems 
with regard to the application of the Brussels I Recast and providing a jurisdictional 
solution in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. 
In my opinion, at the present stage of the Internet and the private international 
law of intellectual property development, the amending of the Brussels I Recast is the 
logical step that recognizes the problems of application of the traditional 
jurisdictional rules (at the national and EU level) and also the necessity of specific 
jurisdictional rules in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet (as the recent ECJ cases Pinckney1305, Hejduk1306 and Wintersteiger1307 
indicate). Moreover, new participants, such as ISPs - hosting providers - are involved, 
which also require an adequate response by the legal authority. Therefore, the 
statement expressed in the Introduction Chapter of this thesis that the Internet is just 
“an old wine in new bottles from a conflict perspective”1308 is confirmed by the 
findings of this thesis. This means that private international law principles (in 
particular, the Brussels I Recast) should apply to this new form of communication but 
should take into account the unique factual circumstances in which infringements of 
intellectual property rights may be committed. 
Indeed, the Internet environment does not create an additional international 
space such as Antarctica, international space and high sears. In particular, the non-
                                                 
1304 Ibid. 
1305 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000. 
1306 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published. 
1307 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117. 
1308 Stuart Dutson, “The Internet, the Conflict of Laws, International Litigation and Intellectual 
Property: the Implications of the International Scope of the Internet on Intellectual Property Infringements” (1997) 
Journal of Business Law, 495. 
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physical nature of the Internet precludes a comparison between physical international 
spaces and cyberspace.1309 In this regard we need to agree with the statement that “no 
one lives or works in cyberspace” and that “no nation can reasonably be expected to 
agree to give up significant portions of their sovereignty to some newly conceived 
realm of existence”.1310 Therefore, as a method of communication, the Internet differs 
from other media in a variety of respects, but “not so radically that a declaration of 
sui generis jurisdictional status is required”.1311 
Thus, in spite of the fact that intellectual property rights infringement happens 
in the Internet environment, the jurisdictional rules should be based on clear 
connection requirements between the parties or circumstances of the dispute (under 
Articles 4 and 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast) and the territory of the court seized. This 
means that territorial connection requirements are still relevant in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, but these connection 
requirements should be modified in the light of their applicability to cases of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. Indeed, as noted by 
Dinwoodie, the limits imposed on private international law by objective territoriality 
are still well founded in cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet.1312 
In my opinion, in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet, only general and special jurisidction should be applicable for the reasons 
provided below. Moreover, the consolidation of multi-defendant claims in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet should be provided under 
general and special jurisdiction. For the purpose of the present chapter, the issue of 
the consolidation of multi-defendant claims is included under general or special 
jurisdiction rather than in separate paragraphs.  
As our finding indicates, the jurisdictional rules under the Brussels I Recast 
should be modified in the following way: 
 5.2.1 Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast 
                                                 
1309Den Jerker B. Svantesson, ‘Borders On, or Border Around – The Future of the Internet’ (2006) 16 
Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 343, 366.  
1310 Dan L. Burk, ‘Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce’ (1998) 49 S.C. L. REV., 695- 
699.  
1311 Ibid. 
1312 G Dinwoodie, “Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of 
Territoriality? “(2009) 51 Wiiliam & Mary Law Review 711.  
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 As our finding indicate in order to apply Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast in 
the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet it is important to 
provide the right balance of interests of all the parties involved. For example, as 
proposed by Kuschewsky, Member States may establish guidelines in respect of the 
balancing of the opposing rights and interests concerned.1313 However, such an 
approach may be very contradictory in the Member States of the EU and does not 
protect the interests of intellectual property rights owners on the borders of the EU. 
In this regard, in order to ensure more effective intellectual property rights 
protection on the Internet, a uniform EU-wide solution is needed in this area. Indeed, 
the right balance between IP protection and data protection must be respected. In 
particular, the recent Proposal for a Regulation by the European Commission on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation)1314 would be the 
most appropriate EU instrument to contain a provision relating to intellectual property 
rights protection on the Internet. 
It is important to note that the General Data Protection Regulation will 
supersede the Data Protection Directive 95/46. The most important change is that the 
new law to be a Regulation will have a direct effect throughout the EU. This means 
that there will be one single data protection law valid across the EU, and companies 
will no longer have to suffer from the fragmentation resulting from the fact that the 
28 Member States interpret and implement differently the principles set forth in 
Directive 95/46. In addition, the General Data Protection Regulation updates and 
modernizes the data protection principles, which will be applicable even on the 
Internet.1315 
However, in spite of the same improvement in relation to the protection of 
personal data in the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation does 
not provide a principle regarding how to achieve a balance between the rights to 
property and data protection; it only states that the transparency principle relating to 
personal data processing should be observed.1316 Therefore, a further development is 
required in order to achieve a balance between the interests of IP rights holders and 
                                                 
1313 Monika Kuschewsky ‘ECJ rules on the limits to national variances’ (2012) P. & D.P. 12(3), 15-16.  
1314 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data’ COM (2012) 11 final. 
1315 Ibid. 
1316 Ibid, Art. 5. 
259 
 
the protection of personal data on the Internet. This is especially important taking into 
account that the General Data Protection Regulation will have to be adopted by the 
Council and the European Parliament at the end of 2015 and the Regulation is 
planned to take effect after a transition period of two years. Thus, the General Data 
Protection is expected to come into force in 2018.1317 
In my opinion, the balance of the rights involved may be achieved through the 
clarification of the issue with regard to the IP address that should be exempted from 
the data protection principle in the case of intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet. Indeed, as our analysis indicates, EU Member States follow very 
contradictory case practice with regard to the protection of IP addresses as personal 
information.1318 For example, while Germany and Sweden consider the IP address to 
be personal information, the UK courts do not consider the IP address to be a 
personal data. The French courts cannot reach a compromise regarding whether or not 
the IP address is personal data. 
Indeed, as stated in Recital 23 of the Proposal for a Regulation on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, “principles of data protection shall not apply to data rendered 
anonymous in such a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable”. The same 
wording is used in Recital 26 of the Data Protection Directive 95/46. However, it is 
still an open question as to when data is to be regarded as having been rendered 
anonymous. In particular, according to Article 2 (b) of the Data Protection Directive 
95/46, the processing of personal data is “any operation or set of operations which is 
performed on personal data”. That means that the anonymisation of personal data is 
the processing of personal data. Therefore, the principles of data protection apply to 
personal data before it is rendered anonymous.1319 When the data is rendered 
anonymous it is not governed by the principle of data protection. That means that if 
an IP address is rendered anonymous it cannot be considered as an “online identifier”. 
However, the IP rights owner interested in prosecuting the intellectual property 
rights infringer. This means that IP address is necessity for identification of 
                                                 
1317 European Commission , ‘Data Protection Day 2015: Concluding the EU Data Protection Reform 
essential for the Digital Single Market’ (2015) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-3802_en.htm> 
accessed 11 May 2015 
1318 Please see Chapter 2, paragraph ‘2.1.1.3.4 Is an IP address personal data?’.  
1319 D. Beylevel. and D. Townend, ‘When is personal data rendered anonymous? Interpreting recital 26 of 
Directive 95/46/EC.’ (2004) 6 Medical law international, 73-86. 
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intellectual property rights infringer. Therefore, it would be reasonable to provide an 
exception to the principle of data protection in the case of intellectual property rights 
protection over the Internet, when the IP address is used for the identification of the 
intellectual property rights infringer. In my opinion, the principle of data protection 
should not protect the intellectual property rights infringer. 
In my opinion, the following measures should be taken with regard to data 
protection in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet: 
1) The IP address should be considered as personal data in conjunction with 
other information as it is possible to identify an intellectual property rights 
infringer. Indeed, the IP address in isolation or anonymised IP address is 
not a personal data, as it does not allow to identify the intellectual property 
rights infringer. Therefore, the unification of this practice in the Member 
States of the EU is required; 
2) If the purpose of using the IP address is to identify an intellectual property 
rights infringer in the case of civil proceedings (intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet) the IP address should be exempted from 
data protection principle. In my opinion, the data protection principle 
should not protect the intellectual property rights infringer; 
3) The processing of IP addresses should be allowed by the intellectual 
property rights owners or organisations representing their interests and 
ISPs in civil proceedings; 
4) The ISPs should disclose the identity of intellectual property rights 
infringers to the rights holder or organisations representing their interests 
in civil proceedings on the basis of the court order; 
5) The retention of personal data by ISPs should be allowed for the specified 
time necessary for identification of the intellectual property rights 
infringer, based on their IP address, in civil proceedings. In my opinion, 
the main reason for invalidation of the Data Retention Directive1320 is 
based on the fact that the scope of this Directive was too broad. Indeed, 
the retention time, purpose and procedure with regard to the retention of 
                                                 
1320 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. and Kärntner Landesregierung 
[2014] OJ C 175. 
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personal data of intellectual property rights infringers in civil proceedings 
should be identified as clearly as possible. 
In my opinion, these measures should be taken into account in the General Data 
Protection Regulation. Indeed, by adapting the General Data Protection Regulation, 
the legal barriers to the application of Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet would be removed. Indeed, 
as recent ECJ cases indicate,1321 in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet, jurisdiction should generally be based on the 
defendant's domicile and jurisdiction must always be available on this ground. 
In this regard it is important to notice that in comparison with the previous EU 
legislation, such as the Data Protection Directive 95/461322 and Data Retention 
Directive 2006/24,1323 where the main emphasis was on the data protection of Internet 
users, the current EU initiatives, such as the General Data Protection Regulation1324 
and EU Action Plan,1325 take a more balanced approach, aiming to safeguard the 
fundamental rights of all the parties concerned with intellectual property rights 
infringement. Indeed, the main emphasis of these legal instruments is on the 
prevention of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet rather than on 
penalising intellectual property rights infringers. Indeed, as noted by the EU 
Commissioner for Trade Karel De Gucht, “our business, creators and inventors 
should be duly rewarded for their creative and innovating efforts”.1326 In this regard, 
future legal development should emphasise the use of the tools available to identify 
IPR infringers; the role of intermediaries in assisting the fight against IPR 
infringement; and the allocation of damages in IPR disputes.1327 
Therefore, we can conclude that the exemption of IP addresses from the 
principle of data protection in the case of intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet is correct, as such rule is not only aimed at protecting the interests of 
                                                 
1321 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
para 4; Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 3; Case C-441/13 Pez 
Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published, para 4.  
1322 Will be replaced by the General Data Protection Regulation 
1323 This was recognized as invalid by the ECJ in Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights 
Ireland Ltd. and Kärntner Landesregierung [2014] OJ C 175. 
1324 General Data protection Regulation 
1325 Commission, ‘Towards a renewed consensus on the enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: An 
EU Action Plan’ COM (2014) 0392 final.  
1326 Commission, ‘Commission presents actions to better protect and enforce intellectual property rights’ 
(press relise) (2014) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-760_en.htm> accessed 12 July 2014.  
1327 Commission, “Draft Council Conclusions on IPR enforcement” [2014] 14997/14. 
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intellectual property rights owners but also allocates jurisdiction in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet to the court of the EU 
Member State where the defendant is domiciled, for all of the damage caused by such 
an infringement. 
Moreover, in addition to removing the legal barriers with regard to the 
application of Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast, the intellectual property rights owner 
is interested in consolidating the multi-defendants claims before the court in the place 
where one of the defendants is domiciled under Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast. 
However, as our finding indicates, Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast is not 
applicable in the case of national intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet (patent, trademark or copyright infringement).1328 Indeed, the application of 
the Roche Nederland BV v. Primus1329 requirements of the same factual and legal 
situation in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet are 
not satisfied, as the actions refer to different, although parallel rights. 
At the same time, Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast is applicable in the case 
of Community intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet (trademarks, 
designs, plant variety rights),1330 as both requirements for “irreconcilable judgments” 
- the same factual and legal situation - would be the satisfied. In particular, the 
requirements of the same legal situation will be satisfied as defendants infringe a 
Community intellectual property rights, which is litigated as unitary rights in various 
Member States. The requirements of the same factual situation will be met in the 
situation where, according to point 37 of the Roche decision,1331 the defendants are 
joint tort-feasors that belong to the same group, and have acted in an identical or 
similar manner in accordance with a common policy elaborated by one of them. 
In my opinion, Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast should be modified to 
allow a wider interpretation of the term “essentially the same legal and factual 
sitiation” as proposed by the CLIP Principles.1332 Indeed, the CLIP Principles try to 
moderate the restrictive interpretation of Roche Nederland BV v. Primus by allowing 
                                                 
1328 Please see Chapter 2, paragraph ‘2.2.3. Impact of the Roche decision on IP litigation over the 
Internet’. 
1329 Case C-539/03 Roche Nederland BV v Primus, Goldenberg [2006] ECR I-6535.  
1330 Bacardi & Company Ltd v Bat Beverage GmbH and others [2007] (District Court of the Hague).  
1331 According to the Roche decision, the factual situation would be the same where defendant companies, 
which belong to the same group, have acted in an identical or similar manner in accordance with a common policy 
elaborated by one of them. 
1332 Please see Chapter 2, paragraph ‘2.2.4. Conclusions and recommendations’.  
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the intellectual property rights owner to consolidate multiple defendants’ claims 
before the court of the Member State where one of them is domiciled under Articles 4 
and 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast when the risk of incompatible judgments arises in 
the context of “essentially the same situation of law and fact”.1333 However, it does 
not see reasonable to consolidate claims against resident and non-resident defendants 
as proposed in Section 206 (1) of the ALI Principles,1334 as such an approach would 
be unpredictable for all of the parties involved. Indeed, according to the objectives of 
the Brussels I Recast, the rules of jurisdiction should be highly predictable and based 
on a close connection between the court and the action in order to facilitate the sound 
administration of justice.1335 
5.2.2 Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast 
 As our findings indicate, the current version of Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I 
Recast does not satisfy the requirements of a new virtual world. Therefore, Article 7 
(2) of the Brussels I Recast should be adapted. 
On the one hand, the duality of jurisdiction established in Article 7 (2) of the 
Brussels I Recast is also applicable to cases of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet.1336 
On the other hand, such jurisdiction is based on special connection 
requirements specific to such cases: the place of establishment of the publisher and 
the accessibility of a website. Indeed, the ECJ in Wintersteiger, Pinckney and Hejduk 
drew a distinction between cases of offline intellectual property rights infringement, 
where the jurisdiction was based on the substantive law principles (for example, 
under the law of the country where the intellectual property rights are protected), and 
cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet, where such an 
approach is wrong1337 
                                                 
1333 CLIP Principle, Art.2:206 (2) 
1334 American Law Institute, “Restatement of the Law, Intellectual Property: Principles Governing 
Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational Disputes” (St. Paul Minn. 2008). § 206 (1). 
1335 Council Regulation (EC) 1215/2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2012] OJ L 351, preamble 15, 16. 
1336 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117; 
Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000; Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v 
EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published.  
1337 Ibid. 
264 
 
In this regard, jurisdiction based on the place where the act of infringement 
occurred,1338 and jurisdiction under the targeting/directing activities approach1339 are 
rejected by the ECJ as the place where the act of infringement occurred as well as the 
targeting/directing activities approach are related to the substance of the dispute 
rather than to the issue of jurisdiction.1340 This means that the place where the act of 
infringement occurred, and the targeting/directing activities approach may be relevant 
to the existence of substantive liability for the infringement of intellectual property 
rights, but not for jurisdiction to entertain an action for intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet.1341 
The claimant’s centre of interest1342 was also rejected by the ECJ in 
Wintersteiger and Pinckney as, in contrast to personality rights, which are protected 
in all of the Member States, intellectual property rights are subject to the principle of 
territoriality.1343 In my opinion, referring to the principle of territoriality is wrong as 
is the issue of the substance of a dispute, namely whether and where the proprietor 
can rely on the protection of those rights. In this regard it would be more logical to 
reject jurisdiction based on the centre of claimant’s interest by referring to the nature 
of the rights infringed, rather than to the principle of territoriality. Indeed, in contrast 
to personality rights infringement over the Internet, the criterion of the objective 
accessibility of information protected by intellectual property law is not required for 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. Therefore, the domicile of 
the author and the place where he pursues his professional activity are irrelevant for 
the purposes of establishing jurisdiction under the claimant’s centre of interest 
approach because it is not possible to establish connection requirements between the 
claimant’s centre of interest and the damage that has occurred. 
Thus, the jurisdictional rules in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet cannot be based on the substance of the dispute but 
                                                 
1338 Please see Chapter 3, paragraph ‘3.3.2.1 The place of the event giving rise to the damage: where the 
act of infringement occurred’. 
1339 Please see Chapter 3, paragraph ‘3.3.2.2 The place where the damage occurred: the targeting or 
directing activities approach’.  
1340 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117; 
Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 2013 -00000; Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v 
EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published.  
1341 Peter Stone, EU Private International Law (Third Ed., Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) 105 
1342 Please see Chapter 3, paragraph ‘3.3.1.2.2 Centre of victim’s interest’. 
1343 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
para 25; Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 2013 -00000, para 38.  
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rather on clear connection requirements between the event giving rise to the damage 
and the territory of the particular Member State of the court seized. Otherwise, the 
jurisdictional rules would be very complex and would clash with the principle of 
foreseeability. 
As our finding indicates, the ECJ has confirmed the following basis of 
jurisdiction for cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet: 
- The place of the event giving rise to the damage: where the publisher is 
established;1344 
- The place where the damage occurred: where the content is placed online or 
has been accessible.1345 
In this regard Article 7 (2)(1) of the Brussels I Recast may be read as follows: 
“1. A person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member 
State in disputes concerned with infringement carried out through ubiquitous 
media such as the Internet in the court for the place of the event giving rise to 
the damage or the place where the damage occurred”. 
Indeed, the place of establishment is relevant to jurisdiction under Article 7 (2) 
of the Brussels I Recast in cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet since this jurisdiction may establish the link between the place of the event 
giving rise to the damage and the territory of a particular Member State where the 
tortfeasor is established. Indeed, as noted by Fawcett, the Internet is not outer space; 
there are territorial connections with various States.1346 
However, in my opinion, the modification of this approach is required. Indeed, 
as noted by the ECJ in Wintersteiger,1347 the “event giving rise to damage” in cases of 
trademark infringement over the Internet is the place of establishment of the 
advertiser, not the place of establishment of the ISP. Similarly, the event giving rise 
to damage in cases of copyright infringement over the Internet is the place of 
establishment of the owner of a website1348. 
This means that in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet, the place of the event giving rise to the damage should be determined by the 
                                                 
1344 Please see Chapter 3, paragraph ‘3.3.1.1 The place of the event giving rise to the damage: where the 
publisher is established’.  
1345 Please see Chapter 3, paragraph ‘3.3.1.2.1 The place where online content is placed or has been 
accessible’. 
1346 Fawcett (n 113) 236. 
1347 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117 
1348 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH.[2015] not yet published, para 24 
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place where the advertiser or owner of a website is established rather than where the 
ISP is established.1349 
Indeed, the main role of ISPs is the dessimination of information. In my 
opinion, ISPs may be sued only as joint infringers, when they are involved in editing 
and controlling information posted on the Internet. For example, as Football Dataco 
Ltd v Sportradar GmbH1350 and EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd 1351 
demonstrate, ISPs may be jointly liable for infringements committed by Internet 
users. However, in such situations, the intellectual property rights owner should 
provide the necessary evidence that the ISP had “actual knowledge” of another person 
using their service to infringe others’ intellectual property rights.1352 In other words, 
the intellectual property rights owner is responsible for providing evidence that ISPs 
are publishers. In my opinion, it is very difficult to imagine a situation in which an 
ISP like Google is involved in managing a large amount of information posted on the 
Internet. Indeed, such an approach would not only be a serious step backwards for 
online development, but would also be totally unworkable in practice.1353 On this 
basis we can conclude that ISPs may be sued together with the main infringer 
(advertiser/owner of a website) but not alone. 
Therefore, it seems inconsequential to establish jurisdiction on the basis of 
where the joint infringer (ISP) is established. In my opinion, jurisdiction should be 
based on where the advertiser or website owner (main infringer) is established. 
Indeed, as a jurisdictional basis, the place of establishment of the advertiser or 
owner of a website has an additional advantage for the intellectual property rights 
owner since it allows him to bring an action in the court of the Member State in 
which the advertiser or website owner is established in respect of all of the damage 
caused; this follows from eDate.1354 It is also confirmed by the 16th recital of the 
Brussels I Recast: “in addition to the defendant’s domicile, there should be alternative 
                                                 
1349 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117; 
Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH.[2015] not yet published. 
1350 Case C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd and Others v Sportradar GmbH and Sportradar AG.[2012] ECR 
00000, para 13.  
1351 EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), para 46. 
1352 EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch).  
1353 Ashley Hurst, ‘ISPs and defamation law: hold fire, Robert Jay’ The Guardian (London, 25 January 
2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/jan/25/defamation-law-robert-jay> accessed 3 March 2015. 
1354Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate Advertising GmbH v X (C-509/09) and Olivier Martinez 
and Robert Martinez v Société MGN Limited (C-161/10) [2011] ECR I-10269, para 42  
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grounds of jurisdiction based on a close link between the court and the action or in 
order to facilitate the sound administration of justice”.1355 
Moreover, the reference to the place where the advertiser or the owner of a 
website is established, rather than to the place where the ISP is established, is 
consistent with the role of ISPs in disseminating information (as confirmed by the 
ECJ in Sabam1356 and Scarlet1357). In my opinion, jurisdiction cannot be based on the 
place of establishment of the facilitator of information. Indeed, the role of ISPs with 
respect to the dissemination of information and knowledge is like that of a telephone 
operator – they are merely the conduit for the provision of information and, as such, 
should have no liability for the content.1358 Indeed, at the present stage of the 
Internet’s development, it is important to create conditions for the free dissemination 
of information and knowledge over the Internet. This means that ISPs should not be 
held liable for content posted on websites, as this would lead to increased monitoring 
of websites and increased restrictions on the free operation of the Internet. 
In my opinion, establishing jurisdiction based on the place where the advertiser 
or website owner is established would provide an appropriate balance of interests for 
all of the parties involved. On the one hand, intellectual property rights owners would 
be able to sue in a court in the place where the advertiser or website owner was 
established, which may constitute a significant connecting factor from the point of 
view of evidence and the conduct of proceedings.1359 This is also true in the light of 
Folien Fischer and Fofitec, according to which only the court before which an action 
may properly be brought is the court within whose jurisdiction the relevant 
connecting factor is to be found.1360 
On the other hand, advertisers and website owners would be more responsible 
for content placed online on a website if they were liable in the same way as 
publishers in case of infringement. Moreover, such an approach confirms the role of 
                                                 
1355 Council Regulation (EC) 1215/2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2012] OJ L 351. 
1356 Case C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog BV [2012] OJ C98.  
1357 Case 70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM [2011] ECR I-11959. 
1358 Dennis Campbell and Susan Woodley, E-commerce: Law and Jurisdiction (Kluwer Law International 
2003) 96. 
1359 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
para 32 
1360 Case C-133/11 Folien Fischer and Fofitec [2012] ECR 
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ISPs as facilitators of information (in the absence of “actual knowledge” about the 
infringement). 
Therefore, Article 7 (2) (1) of the Brussels I Recast may be read as follows: 
“2. For the purpose of paragraph 1 the place of the event giving rise to the 
damage is the place where the advertiser or website owner is established. In 
particular, a person who considered that his intellectual property rights had 
been infringed through ubiquitous media such as the Internet could bring an 
action in respect of all the damage caused in the court of the Member State in 
which the advertiser or website owner is established”. 
Moreover, the mere accessibility of a website is also an appropriate basis for 
jurisdiction under Article 7(2) of the Brussels I Recast for cases of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet.1361 
In my opinion, the acceptance by the ECJ of the accessibility of a website 
approach is dictated by the necessity to protect the interests of intellectual property 
rights owners against increasing numbers of cases of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet. Indeed, due to the absence of jurisdictional rules in the 
case of copyright infringement over the Internet on the one hand, and of harmonised 
substantive intellectual property law rules on the other, the ECJ extended the 
application of the substantive law at a jurisdictional level. 
This means that jurisdiction based on the mere accessibility of a website does 
not depend on the requirement of targeting the Member State of the court seized. 
Indeed, the occurrence of damage arises from the accessibility of a website within the 
jurisdiction of the court seized. Therefore, the court of the place where the damage 
occurred only has jurisdiction in respect of damage occurring in its territory.1362 
However, this leads to the multiplication of suits. 
In my opinion, by analogy with jurisdiction based on the place of the event 
giving rise to damage (i.e. where the advertiser or website owner is established), 
jurisdiction based on the approach of websites’ accessibility should be modified by 
allowing the court to adjudicate jurisdiction by having regard for the damage 
occurring in other Member States under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast. Indeed, 
                                                 
1361 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000. 
1362 Case C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published, para 22; Case C-
170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 39. 
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in spite of the fact that global jurisdiction was rejected in Pinckney and Hejduk, a 
practical backdoor remains open to extend damage claims.1363 
In particular, as stated by the ECJ in Wintersteiger1364 and Pinckney,1365 
intellectual property rights protection “in principle” is territorially limited and cannot 
“in general” be relied on outside of the territory of the granting state. This means that 
the main barrier to extending jurisdiction under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast 
based on the accessibility of a website is the principle of the territoriality of 
intellectual property rights. 
However, in my opinion, the principle of territoriality of intellectual property 
law is the issue of the substance of the dispute rather than a jurisdictional issue. 
Indeed, the criteria for assessing whether the event in question is harmful for the 
purposes of Article 7 (2) “… are determined by the substantive law of the court 
seized”.1366 This means that the territoriality of intellectual property rights as a 
principle of substantive law is irrelevant to the application of Article 7 (2) of the 
Brussels I Recast. In my opinion, while the accessibility of a website is applicable at 
the jurisdiction level, a similar approach to the principle of the territoriality of 
intellectual property rights would be inappropriate. Indeed, the Brussels regime “did 
not intend to link the rules of jurisdiction with national provisions concerning the 
conditions under which non-contractual liability is incurred”.1367 In particular, as 
noted by Kur, the territorial structure of intellectual property is a legal construct rather 
than something following from the nature of intellectual property rights as such.1368 
Therefore, the jurisdictional problem may be resolved by deciding the issue of 
the territoriality of intellectual property rights. This means that rejecting the principle 
of territoriality of intellectual property rights will allow extending jurisdiction under 
Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast to include all damage arising from the 
accessability of a website.  
                                                 
1363 Pekka Savola, “The ultimate copyright shopping opportunity - jurisdiction and choice of law in 
website blocking injunctions” (2014) IIC 45(3), 287-315. 
1364 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
paras 24-25.  
1365 Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, paras 32, 35-37 
1366 Case C-68/93 Shevill v Press Alliance SA [1995] ECR-I-415, para 41. 
1367 Case C-364/93 Antonio Marinari v Lloyd’s Bank plc and Zubaidi Co., [1995] ECR I-2719, para 18.  
1368 Annette Kur, Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property. The CLIP Principles and Commentary. 
European Max Planck Group on conflict of laws in intellectual property (Oxford University Press 2013), 70. 
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Moreower, extending jurisdiction under Article 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast to 
include all damage caused is also dictated by the argument that the effectiveness of 
intellectual property rights protection and sound administration of justice require the 
ability to make all claims in one court. In particular, as noted by Fawcett, effective 
enforcement means that the rights holder must be able to bring a single case for all 
damage.1369 Such an approach is also supported by Article 41.2 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which states that “procedures concerning the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights shall be fair and equitable. They shall not be unnecessarily 
complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays”.1370 
Thus, on the basis of the arguments provided, we can conclude that the 
accessibility criteria should also be modified. In my opinion, the occurrence of 
damage based on the mere accessibility of a website is not a very sensitive connection 
requirement, and a clearer link between the damage in a particular Member State and 
the activity of a defendant is required. 
There are a number of proposals for the further development of jurisdiction 
based on the accessibility of a website approach in cases of intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet. For example, according to Advocate General 
Jääskinen’s suggestion in Coty, the occurrence of damage in the Member State of the 
Court seized depends on a defendant’s “act within the jurisdiction of the court 
seized”.1371 Similarly, the CLIP Principles provide an “escape clause” by allowing the 
defendant to escape the court’s jurisdiction if “the alleged infringer has not acted in 
that State to initiate or further the infringement and his/her activity cannot reasonably 
be seen as having been directed to that State”.1372 However, in my opinion, such 
‘active’ acts of the defendant may be compared with the targeting or directing 
activities approach, which was rejected in Hejduk as relating to the substance of the 
dispute. 
In my opinion, the best solution to developing the accessibility of a website 
approach as a basis of jurisdiction is to determine jurisdiction based on how 
interactive a website is, taking into account the guilty mind of the defendant. Indeed, 
                                                 
1369 Fawcett (n 112) 649. 
1370 WTO, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
<https://www.wto.org/ENGLISH/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/trips_03_e.htm> accessed 11 June 2014. 
1371 Case C-360/12 Coty Germany GmbH v First Note Perfumes NV [2014] not yet published, Opinion of 
AG Jääskinen , para 71 (2). 
1372 European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, “Principles on Conflict of 
Laws in Intellectual Property” (Final Text, 1 December 2011), art 2:202  
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such an approach is not only an expression of the technological aspects of posting 
information on the Internet (which depends on the level of interactivity of 
information on the website) but also takes into account the guilty mind of the 
defendant who “knowingly” engages in illegal conduct. 
The legal evidence for such an approach may be found in American case law. 
On the one hand, the interactivity of a website is adopted by the United States 
as a basis for jurisdiction – and is specified in the Zippo case.1373 In particular, as 
American practice indicates, active websites1374 and interactive websites1375 provide a 
basis for personal jurisdiction. However, the court is not able to adjudicate 
jurisdiction where the information is simply posted on the website and thus made 
accessible to everyone, for such information is passive.1376 Indeed, passive websites 
may be accessed by Internet browsers, but do not allow interaction between the host 
of the website and a visitor to the site. In this regard, as noted by Rosenblatt, the more 
interactive a site is (i.e. the more exchange of information is possible between the site 
and the user), the more likely a court is to find that ‘contact’ exists between the site 
owner and the distant user.1377 In my opinion, jurisdictional rules based on the level 
of interactivity of a website are a more predictable basis for jurisdiction than the 
simple fact of a website’s accessibility. 
On the other hand, the guilty mind of the defendant should also be taken into 
account. Indeed, as recent American cases demonstrate, the courts require additional 
factors to the interactivity of a website.1378 However, in my opinion, in contrast to the 
directing or targeting approach, taken by the CLIP Principles as an expression of the 
intention of the defendant to connect to the forum, I would rather support the notion 
of “wrongful conduct” accepted in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Lugue Le Racisme et 
L’Antisemitisme1379, as the condition to receive jurisdiction based on the accessibility 
of a website approach. 
                                                 
1373 Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. [1997] 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W. D. Pa), para 1124. 
1374 CompuServe. Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F. [1996] 3d. 1267 (6th Cir.)  
1375 Maritz Inc. v. Cybergold Inc. [1996] 947 F Supp 1328 (ED Mo) 
1376 McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc. [1996] U.S. Dist. Lexis 15139 (S.D. Cal.); Bensusan 
Restaurant Corp. v. King [1997] 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir). 
1377 Betsy Rosenblatt, ‘Principles of Jurisdiction’ <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/property99/ 
domain/Betsy.html> accessed 15 March 2015. 
1378 Revell v Lidov [2002] 317 F.3d 467, 473 (5th Cir.); Pavlovich v Superior Court [2002] 58 P.3d 2 
(Cal.); Young v New Haven Advocate [2002] 315 F.3d 256; Best Van Lines, Inc. v Walker [2004] WL 964009 
(S.D.N.Y.).  
1379 Yahoo! Inc. v. La Lugue Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme [2006] 433 F.3d 1199, 1209 (9 th Cir).  
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In my opinion, defendants need to be aware that content posted over the 
Internet may infringe the copyright owner’s interests (the defendant’s “actual 
knowledge” about the infringement). For example, if this approach were applicable in 
Pinckney, the website owner would not have been liable for the content posted on his 
website. 
Therefore, jurisdiction based on the accessibility of a website should be 
modified in two ways: both the level of interactivity of a website and the guilty mind 
of the defendant should be taken into account. 
In this respect, some may suggest that the protection of intellectual property 
rights owners’ interests should be the priority of the courts of every Member State. 
However, in my opinion, the most important task for the court is to balance the 
interests of all of the parties involved. Only on the basis of foreseeability and the 
sound administration of justice can such a balance be guaranteed. 
Therefore, taking into account the recent ECJ decisions in Pinckney and Hejduk 
and our arguments, Article 7 (2) (1) of the Brussels I Recast may be read as follows: 
“3. For the purpose of paragraph 1 the place where the damage occurred is 
the place where the content is placed online or has been accessible. In particular, 
in disputes concerned with intellectual property rights infringement carried out 
through ubiquitous media such as the Internet, the court whose jurisdiction 
arises from the accessibility of a website in the territory of the court seized, shall 
also have jurisdiction in respect to damage occurring in another Member State 
arising from the accessibility of a website in the territory of this other Member 
State, provided that: 
1) the website where the content placed online is accessible and interactive 
and 
2) the defendant actually knew or could reasonably have foreseen that 
their act would lead to intellectual property rights infringement. 
The court first seized has the priority for resolving the entire dispute for all 
of the damage caused according to the rules of the lis pendens.” 
Moreover, Pinckney raised an interesting question with regard to the possibility 
of suing co-defendants on the basis of the mere accessibility of their websites. 
However, the facts of the case did not demonstrate clear connection requirements. In 
my opinion, it would be reasonable to allow claimants to sue all co-defendants in the 
court of one Member State under Articles 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast. In this 
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regard, the Brussels I Recast should be supplemented by Article 8 (1) (1) by allowing 
to suing co-defendants in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet. 
At the same time, I do not think that this will be possible on the basis of the 
mere accessibility of a website because “it is not the most sensible criterion”.1380 In 
this regard I would rather support the UK government’s approach to suing co-
defendants whereby jurisdiction is conditional on a defendant’s knowledge: “when 
the defendant sold the products to the third party concerned in one Member State, it 
actually knew or could have reasonably foreseen that the sale would result directly in 
the alleged unlawful act committed by that third party in another Member State”.1381 
Thus, Article 8 (1) (1) of the Brussels I Recast may be based on the additional 
criterion of the defendant’s knowledge. 
Therefore, taking into account the decision of the ECJ in Pinckney and our 
argument on the additional condition of the defendant’s knowledge, Article 8 (1) (1) 
of the Brussels I Recast should be read as follows: 
“A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued in another 
Member State where he is one of a number of defendants in disputes concerned 
with infringement carried out through ubiquitous media such as the Internet in 
the court whose jurisdiction is based on Article 7 (2) (1) of the Brussels I Recast 
provided that: 
- the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and 
determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting 
from separate proceedings; and 
- the defendant actually knew or could reasonably have foreseen that the 
act committed by third party would result in intellectual property rights 
infringement in another Member State.” 
Indeed, where the rules of general jurisdiction under Articles 4 and 8 (1) of the 
Brussels I Recast are difficult to apply (due to the difficulties associated with privacy 
and data protection, as discussed in Chapter 2), Articles 7 (2) (1) and 8 (1) (1) of the 
Brussels I Recast should provide an alternative jurisdictional basis to sue co-
                                                 
1380 Martin, Husovec, “Case Comment. European Union: comment on Pinckney” (2014) IIC 45(3), 370-
374. 
1381 Case C-360/12 Coty Germany GmbH v First Note Perfumes NV [2014] not yet published, Opinion of 
AG Jääskinen, para 60. 
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defendants in cases of intellectual property rights infringements committed over the 
Internet. However, this issue should be further developed by the ECJ. Indeed, this 
work does not discuss this approach in detail because of the absence of regulation in 
this sphere: the current version of the Brussels I Recast does not provide the 
possibility to sue co-defendants at the place of the commission of the tort and the 
ECJ’s decision in Pinckney is the first case where such a question was live. 
On the basis of this analysis we can conclude that jurisdiction based on the 
accessibility of a website and on the place where the advertiser or website owner is 
established is appropriate in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over 
the Internet – appropriate from the view of foreseeability and the sound 
administration of justice. 
5.2.3 Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast 
 As our findings indicate, the application of exlusive jurisdiction in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet should be rejected on the 
basis of reasons specified below.1382 
In particular, by way of analogy with recent ECJ cases in Wintersteiger, 
Pinckney and Hejduk, where the ECJ rejected the jurisdiction based on the place 
where the act of infringement occurred, the targeting/directing activities approach and 
also the claimant’s centre of interest, as these jurisdictional rules are based on the 
substance of the dispute rather than on jurisdictional connection,1383 the same 
approach may be applicable with regard to Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast. 
Indeed, the rules of jurisdiction under Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast are based 
on the substance of the dispute as the simple fact of registering patents, trade marks, 
designs, or other similar rights is not in itself sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of 
the courts of that Member State and additional connection requirements are 
necessary. This finding is supported also by the Football Dataco case, which held 
that registration is not sufficient for jurisdiction to be established and that a further 
link is required between the tort and the forum.1384 Indeed, as noted in the Marinari 
                                                 
1382 Please see Chapter 4, paragraph ‘4.3 Conclusions and recommendations’  
1383 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117; 
Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 2013 -00000, Opinion of AG Jääskinen; Case 
C-441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015], not yet published. 
1384 Case C-173/11 Football Dataco Ltd and Others v Sportradar GmbH and Sportradar AG.[2012] ECR 
00000, paras 36, 47. 
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case, the Brussels I Recast did not intend to link the rules on territorial jurisdiction 
with national provisions concerning the conditions under which non-contractual 
liability is incurred.1385 In my opinion, at the stage of finding international jurisdiction 
the substantive elements of the dispute are irrelevant. This is also supported by the 
argument that the rules of jurisdiction and the rules of substantive law are two 
independent sets of rules.1386 
Moreover, the fact of rejecting the exclusive jurisdiction in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet is also dictated by the 
scheme of the Brussles I Recast. Indeed, as the recent ECJ cases Pinckney, Hejduk 
and Wintersteiger indicate, in the case of intellectual property rights infringement 
over the Internet, jurisdiction should generally be based on the defendant’s domicile 
and jurisdiction must always be available on this ground.1387 The same approach is 
also supported by Fawcett and Slováková, who noted that the defendant should be 
sued in the Member State of his domicile rather than at the place in which the deposit 
or registration of intellectual property rights has taken place or is deemed to have 
taken place.1388 
The rejection of the exclusive jurisdiction in the case of intellectual property 
rights infringement over the Internet is also dictated by the combined effects of the 
ECJ cases GAT v LuK and Roche v Primus, which have created legal barriers for the 
application of the general and special jurisdiction. Indeed, the ECJ in GAT v LuK 
made clear that the invalidity issue, raised in the infringement proceedings by way of 
an action or plea in objection, is a matter of exclusive jurisdiction laid down by 
Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast in favour of the courts of the contracting state 
in which the deposit or registration has taken place or is deemed to have taken place. 
In addition, the ECJ in Roche v Primus supports the splitting of the infringement and 
validity proceedings by reference to the situation where “the defendant disputes the 
                                                 
1385 Case C-364/93 Antonio Marinari v Lloyd’s Bank plc and Zubaidi Co.[1995] ECR I-2719. I-2739, para 
18. 
1386 Stefania Bariatti, Litigating Intellectual Property Rights Disputes Cross-border: EU Regulations, ALI 
Principles, CLIP Project (Wolters Kluwer 2010) 33.  
1387 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
para 4; Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 3; Case C-441/13 Pez 
Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published, para 4. 
1388 Fawcett (n 112) 348; Zuzana Slováková, ‘International Private Law Issues regarding Trademark 
Protection and the Internet within the EU’, Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology (2008) Vol. 
3, Issue 1, 77-78 
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validity of a patent in the context of an infringement action”.1389 This means that 
Articles 4 and 7 (2) of the Brussels I Recast are not applicable if the infringement 
claims are concerned with validity proceedings, irrespective of whether the issue is 
raised by way of an action or a defence. In such a situation the court with general and 
special jurisdiction shall declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction.1390 
In my opinion, the issue of the validity of registered intellectual property 
rights should be considered by a specialised court: patent or design or trademark 
courts with exclusive jurisdiction rather than national courts. Indeed, in the case of 
Community trademark or Community design infringement the specialised court is 
involved. Moreover, we should take into account the establishing of the Unified 
Patent Court1391.  In particular, Article 32 of the Agreement on the Unified Patent 
Court grants exclusive competence to the UPC in respect of, among others, actions 
for actual or threatened infringements; actions for declarations of non-infringement; 
actions for provisional and protective measures and injunctions; actions and 
counterclaims for revocation of patents and for declaration of invalidity of 
supplementary protection certificates; actions for damages or compensation derived 
from the provisional protection conferred by a published European patent application; 
and, actions relating to the use of the invention prior to the granting of the patent or to 
the right based on prior use of the invention.1392 Therefore, the issues of   
infringement and validity of Unitary Patents are the competence of one court:  the 
Unified Patent Court.  In addition to that, the Unified Patent Court is intended to have 
exclusive jurisdiction for traditional European patents, which will remain a permanent 
alternative to the Unitary Patent. The Agreement on the Unified Patent Court entered 
into force on the same date as the amendments to the Brussels I Regulation: January 
10, 2015.1393 A similar situation exists with regard to Community trademark and 
Community designs infringement where a specialised court has exclusive jurisdiction. 
Indeed,  according to Article 96 of Regulation 207/2009 on the Community 
                                                 
1389 Case 4/03 GAT v LuK [2007] ECR I-6509, para 46.  
1390 Brussels I Recast, Art. 27.  
1391 Council Regulation (EC) 542/2014   amending Council Regulation   1215/2012 as regards the 
rules to be applied with respect to the Unified Patent Court and the Benelux Court of Justice [2014] OJ L 163.  
1392 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court   [2013] OJ C 175/1. 
1393 Council Regulation (EC) 542/2014   amending Council Regulation   1215/2012 as regards the 
rules to be applied with respect to the Unified Patent Court and the Benelux Court of Justice [2014] OJ L 163, 
Article 2.    
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trademark,1394 the Community trademark courts have exclusive jurisdiction not only 
in respect of all infringement proceedings regarding Community trademarks but also 
with regard to the declaration of non-infringement  and counterclaims for revocation 
or for a declaration of invalidity of the Community trademark.  Article 107 of the 
Council Regulation 207/209 stipulates that the national court dealing with a legal 
claim referred to in Article 96 must treat this trademark as valid. This means that in 
the case of Community trademark infringement the Community trademark court  has 
exclusive jurisdiction with regard to actions of infringement and invalidity. Similar to 
the law of Community trademarks, the registration and revocation of Community 
design rights is affected by the Office for the Harmonisation in the Internal Market in 
Alicante, Spain. In particular, according to Article 81 of Council Regulation 6/2002 
on Community designs1395 for infringement procedures, counterclaims for the 
declaration of invalidity and claims for the declaration of invalidity of unregistered 
Community design rights, the Community design courts have exclusive jurisdiction.  
Therefore, by way of analogy with infringement of Community registered 
rights a similar practice may be implemented in the case of the infringement of 
registered intellectual property rights over the Internet.  In my opinion, the issue of 
validity of registered intellectual property rights when this issue arises during 
infringement proceedings with regard to intellectual property rights over the Internet 
should be considered by specialised courts:  patent or design or trademark courts.  
Indeed, as noted by Fawcett and Torremans this is a welcome innovation that will end 
uncertainty with regard to international jurisdiction.1396 
Therefore, the rejection of exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 24 (4) of 
the Brussels I Recast in the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the 
Internet is dictated by the following finding: 
1) the rules of jurisdiction are based on the substance of the dispute rather 
than on the issue of jurisdiction as required in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet;1397 
                                                 
 1394 Council Regulation (EC) 207/2009 on the Community trade mark [2009] OJ L 78/1. 
1395  Council Regulation (EC) 6/2002 on Community designs [2002] OJ LEC L 3. 
1396 James J. Fawcett, Paul Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law (2nd, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2011) 418.  
1397 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117; 
Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, Opinion of AG Jääskinen; Case C-
441/13 Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published 
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2) it contradicts the scheme of the Brussels I Recast and recent ECJ cases 
in Pinckney, Hejduk and Wintersteiger, where the jurisdiction should 
generally be based on the defendant’s domicile and jurisdiction must 
always be available on this ground;1398 
3) create legal barriers to the application of the general and special 
jurisdiction1399.; 
Moreover, transferring the exclusive jurisdiction from national courts to 
specialised courts is a more economically justified route for the infringement of 
registered intellectual property rights over the Internet when the issue of validity 
arises during infringement proceedings. In such a situation one specialised court 
should deal with such complex issues as the infringement and validity of intellectual 
property rights.  
5.3 Concluding remarks  
On the basis of the analysis provided we can conclude that the jurisdictional 
rules under the adapted version of the Brussels I Recast in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet are more predictable for all of the 
parties involved as these jurisdictional rules take into account the unique 
characteristic of intellectual property rights infringement on the Internet. In my 
opinion, the reform of the Brussels I Recast will offer businesses a good alternative 
by simplifying the existing system and supporting a cost effective route for 
intellectual property rights protection on the Internet. 
The results of this research will be important not only for the academic 
community but also for policy makers. Indeed, the thesis provides not only an 
academic discussion (for example, by clarifying the issue of the substance of the 
dispute and the issue of jurisdiction) but also practical recommendations for the 
reform of the jurisdictional rules under the Brussels I Recast in the case of intellectual 
property rights infringement over the Internet. Indeed, it is the first work to 
                                                 
1398 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschinenbau GmbH. [2012] WLR (D) 117, 
para 4; Case C-170/12 Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG [2013] ECR 00000, para 3; Case C-441/13 Pez 
Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH. [2015] not yet published, para 4. 
1399 GAT v. LuK [2006] IIC 850; Case C-539/03 Roche Nederland BV v Primus, Goldenberg [2006] ECR 
I-6535. 
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investigate  the issue of jurisdiction in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet taking into account all of the available literature in the 
subject area. The work provides a critical analysis of the ECJ cases and national case 
law developments in the following EU Member States: the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Sweden and France. This means that the recommendations provided 
address the problems of applying the existing jurisdictional rules under the Brussels I 
Recast not only on the EU level but also in its Member States. Such an approach is 
very useful for providing the best alternative for deciding jurisdictional problems in 
the case of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. In particular, 
the work recommends removing legal barriers for applying general jurisdiction under 
Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet.  In this regard recommendations for reforming the 
General Data Protection Regulation are provided. The recommendation to consolidate 
multi-defendant claims before the court in the place where one of the defendants is 
domiciled under Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I Recast is also provided. 
Moreover, a new version of a special jurisdiction under Article 7 (2) of the 
Brussels I Recast is provided (Article 7 (2) (1) of the Brussels I Recast), which is 
specific for cases of intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet. The 
work also recommends supplementing the Brussels I Recast with Article 8 (1) (1) by 
allowing for the suing of co-defendants in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet (under Article 7 (2) (1) of the Brussels I Recast). 
The work also clarifies the application of the rules of exclusive jurisdiction 
under Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast in the case of intellectual property rights 
infringement over the Internet. In particular, by rejecting the application of the rules 
of exclusive jurisdiction under Article 24 (4) of the Brussels I Recast in the case of 
intellectual property rights infringement over the Internet the work suggests 
transferring the exclusive jurisdiction from national courts to specialised courts as this 
is a more economically justified route for the infringement of registered intellectual 
property rights over the Internet when the issue of validity arises during the 
infringement proceedings. 
Therefore, due to the development of the Internet and the growing importance 
of intellectual property rights protection across the world, adapting the Brussels I 
Recast is a necessary step in order to satisfy the requirements of a new virtual world. 
In this regard, this work is a form of legal dialogue with the legal and scientific 
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communities, which will provide further ideas for researching an acceptable 
jurisdictional solution to intellectual property rights protection over the Internet. 
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